Logic (2016)
17. From Quantity to 'Towards Something': Categories, Chapter 7 on Relation
Class of 2017-01-12
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/017-from-quantity-to-towards-something-categories-chapter-7-on/

[0:00] Well, now we get back to the more common sense here. Back to the text itself, right? The division of chapter six on quantity, right? You got the quantites per se, right? And quantities per accidens, right?

[0:18] You have two divisions of quantity into its species, right? The distinction between discrete and continuous, and then that one whose parts are what have a position with respect to each other, and those that don't, right? And those two divisions are they identical or what?

[0:38] No, because what what is why aren't they identical? Yeah, because time the parts don't what have any position with respect to each other because they don't exist together, right? Yet time is a continuous quantity, right?

[1:02] So you have those two divisions, right? The first division, then, huh? And they're divided the first one, so definition of discrete quantity and species, and they were what number and speech, right? And the definition of continuous quantity and species, and there were how many there? Line, surface, body, right? Place and what? Time, remember five, right? Okay. Then species, the second division into those having or not having position.

[1:44] Then quantities perchidens, uh, like you know, the color that is on the surface, you know, blinding, right? And I'd help make a wagon there down my father's factory there, you know. We go out to the woodlot there, you know, and it's painted white, you know, and it's a bright July day. Yeah, yeah. You know, you have blinding, you know. Yeah, yeah. So there's too much white, right?

[2:13] But it's white, you know, a quantity Perxy dance, right? The surface is really, you know, the surface is all painted white, huh? Then we had the properties of quantity does not have a contrary. Is not said more or less. Let's see the connection between those two properties that it doesn't have when you get to qualities, right? Because in qualities you have contraries and you have more or less, right?

[2:39] So hot and cold are what contraries, but you can have more or less of them, right? I mean lukewarm and so on. But then the real strict property is equal or unequal, right?

[2:55] Oh my God, I'm not through the text yet. Oh my God, I thought we were through it. I got to that. I thought, at least it got back to the text there, you know, putting us around with the physics and all these things. This is not a book or a chapter of one of my books. This is a collection of text, right? You know the things. Well, earlier you said something about.

[3:19] We'll come back to that. Think about it later. Of course, I thought to myself, now why would you want to do that? Now, some interesting text here for Thomas here. The philosopher, right, which means Aristotle, in the *Predicamentes*, right—that's the *Categories*, Latin name for it—distinguishes the species of quantity according to diverse notions of what measure, right? So,

[3:51] how long is a surface? Just how long is a line, right? You might measure a line by what inches, right? Can you measure a surface by how many inches it is?

[4:09] Yeah, yeah. Can measure a surface though by square inches, right? It can be measured by something of its own kind. So an inch is a length. You use a length to measure a length. A square inch is a what? Surface. Yeah. And then, cube, right? Cube inches, yeah. Volume. Yeah.

[4:36] So I don't know. Do they measure a house properly? They say how much. Square feet. Yeah. The kind of a plan that you know is going to be more or less, you know. Yeah. pretty common Yeah When you buy, when you buy. concrete or you buy sand or you buy wood. you can buy it by volume.

[4:59] Now this is an interesting thing what he says here in this exposition of Boethius Dionysius, right? That the ratio, the definition, or the notion of both time and the number order follows, right? Because one species of number is naturally before what? Another. And time is also the number of motions, according to a before and after, right? So is that true about? It's interesting. He's putting time and number together, right?

[5:40] One is a discrete quantity, and one is a continuous quantity, but he's talking about they have order, right? And what did he give us an example of this order of being.

[5:53] post pregnance? What's the example he gave? Because he said my old teacher, Kasurik, said you can tell a man's. Was he give us an order there? Example there. One is before two, wasn't that the example?

[6:11] Opposed to my example, bricks in a brick wall, bricks in a brick house, right? Because one species of number is naturally before another. Naturally, right? Three is naturally before four, because three can be without four. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So my daughter and husband have been having these children, right? They had one child before. Two. And of course, sometimes you get twins, you know. Nanny twins. So two is before three, three before four, right?

[6:49] There's a natural order there, though, right? But it seems to be like the order of the what of being, right? You can have three kids without having four kids, but you can't have four kids without having what? Three. Yeah. Interesting, huh?

[7:08] And then time, right? Huh? Is a number too, right? Of the before and after, it's interesting, huh? Very subtle things. We made the same thing in earlier text, didn't we? The next text there, that all things partake of one, he proves through that about which it seems less. So, by number, right? Which is in some way opposed to one, right? Huh? Not everything is one, right? You know.

[7:41] Now, when you get into wisdom, right? Huh? When you get to the fourth book of wisdom, Aristotle finally decides what the subject of wisdom is. Not to the fourth book, right? And what is the subject of wisdom? Yeah, I wanted to ask you about that. Yeah, he says being in one though. He says. Oh. He says both being and one, right? Well, um,

[8:07] so if number is one kind of being, it's got to have some kind of what unity, right? If being in one go together, right? Okay. And therefore, Thomas says, you know, things resist their being what divided, right? Because if they lose their unity, they lose their what being, right? And and it's important, you know, in the military thing, divide and conquer, right? Yeah, when they divide the army, right, then the what?

[8:39] That they dissolve the army in a sense, right? Just gotta. They were running off. Freeboard escape, right? Divorce and so on kind of destroys the family, right? Huh.

[8:58] So people, he says, he says they they they fight disunity just like they you know defend their being, right? You know. So being and one go together, but number seems to be not one, all right.

[9:18] So Shakespeare has the poem there about reason being puzzled. You know, the love made the lovers one. How could two become one? Yeah. Does the Catholic Church exist?

[9:42] Yeah, it's got to be one to be right. And heresy kind of what divides the church, right? Huh? Kind of destructive for the church, isn't it? Got to be one, huh? Because division exists. Because plurality exists.

[10:03] Yeah. Yeah. Each each member of the plurality has got to be one though right now it's got to be some kind of being there.

[10:13] Being and nothing is that plurality. Yeah. I had a colleague during the philosophy department who always maintained you know France doesn't exist or or you know England doesn't exist because it's just it's multiple people right but there's no France there's no France.

[10:32] And always studied kind of a narrow view of of unity you know because I I would see a a a country doesn't have as much unity as the family right now and the family doesn't have as much unity as one man right now. Aristotle's criticizing you know the community of wives and so on and that sort of stuff in the Socrates Socrates presents in the dialogue of the Republic right you know that you're seeking you know more unity than the country should have right now okay but I'm not tired of my family and everybody obeys me so and no one can pursue their their own interests and so on you might say that I'm making the family more one than it is right it's just

[11:21] me you know which is large right. Yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah. That's kind of what Martin Luther did with Christianity it was him. Learning about it's a remarkable thing about it it's amazing he was in favor of death penalty for anybody. who doesn't read Just reading. Okay. So some of these texts there are there's also these ones here. Got a few more ones. This text at the bottom of this page 16 here right this is the one about the Trinity again right.

[12:04] Maybe just kind of saw that text before these days. Yeah. Yeah. My fault your fault. I just read it for a minute I don't really see it

[12:36] Repetition Okay. There's that same text there again I see on page 18 the three things. Uh-huh. That's enough to torture you with that I don't want to torture you anymore on these things right. I'm going to move on to the chapter towards something. Just begin What. Yeah.

[12:59] The other one I gave you. Okay. Now the first question you might raise here about the chapter seven, following chapter six, right? Aristotle seems to what change the order, right? Because when he enumerated the ten, he gave first what substance, right? Then how much, right? Or size, right? And then what how or quality, and then relation, right? And then when he ticks them up one by one, he does substance first, then quantity second, right?

[13:52] Which we just kind of concluded, and now you expect a chapter on quality, and here comes a chapter on towards something, and then the chapter on quality, right? Well, you got to read Aristotle carefully, you know. And why does he disturb, shall we say, the order that he had given before, right?

[14:21] So should be a reason. Yeah. And it's all because of Plato, right? Or someone defining towards something as whatever is said to be of another in one way or another, right? I'm the father of a son, or I'm the son of a father, I'm the teacher of my students, or I'm a student of my teachers, right?

[14:52] And then knowledge is always knowledge of something. Well, then knowledge must be what a in the category of toward something, Because it's it's of something, right? Other than itself.

[15:08] Is that what knowledge really is? Or is that a quality of the teacher that he has some knowledge? What is it? Now later on in medieval philosophy, they would call knowledge a relation secundum quid dici right? Which means that although it's said of something, right? Its whole nature is not that. Its whole nature is really what a quality, but it's a quality that has a certain relation to the known, following upon it, right?

[15:59] Why something like double or half, you know, is that something in itself? See. Well, how much is double or a half? It's entirely towards something else I'll have double for dinner tonight.

[16:21] Well, something incomplete, right? The poor wife says, "What do you mean by double, right You know, what, double what you had last night. My father gave me some box Some doubles in there.

[16:43] So the double they would call a what? Relative secundum esse right? But its whole nature is to be towards another, right? Okay. So Aristotle will proceed like he does often, right? According to what his people are already saying, you know, Plato and the great Plato had the school after which Academic World is named, right? He's quite a guy, then Plato, right? Academic World is named from Plato's school, right?

[17:13] I went to high school at St. Thomas Military Academy. Yeah. So I was being taught in Plato's school, right? So Plato is somebody, right now. And Thomas says, you know, the philosophi praecipui the chief philosophers, I guess you translate that as are Plato and Aristotle, right? And my teacher Albert the Great said the same thing, you know, the man that wants to be a master in philosophy needs to know Plato and Aristotle, right now.

[17:51] So Plato had this definition of, I guess, the Platonic school, anyway, right? And Aristotle, you know, proceeds as if this is okay until it runs into problems, right now. Okay.

[18:07] So you could say the the arm of my body is a what relation, right? And the heart of my body, right? And so on, and so I end up being a combination of what relations, and there's no substance left, right? This is serious, serious problem, right? So we have to, you know, part is always a part of a whole, right? So you gotta remake the definition, right?

[18:39] And he's going to say in terms of what something whose whole nature, whose whole being is to be towards another, right? That's what is in the category towards something, right?

[18:52] And then something which is fundamentally a quality, but has some relation falling upon it, should be treated of in what in the category. So he does have a reason for doing this, right? See, at first sight you should be, you know, scandalized and thinking over. This is out of the order, yeah.

[19:14] Makes sense. Okay. So he says the chapter on towards something is divided into three parts. The first part includes a definition of towards something, right? Then the properties of towards something are considered, right? It seems like you're doing what you did in the other chapters, right? Up to this point, the division of this chapter would seem to be like that of substance and of quantity. But then an objection is made to the first definition.

[19:49] A second definition proposed. And another right property is brought out, right? From the objection and second definition, we can see the distinction between what the Latins call relativa secundum, quid dici and the relativa secundum esse, right?

[20:14] We can also see the surprising order, right, of considering towards something before a quality, even though the latter isn't being or causality before towards what something, right?

[20:29] Okay. So why is one man a teacher, another man a student, right? Well, it's because of the character, the quality, the condition, you might say, of their mind, right, which is the quality, right now, that their mind has.

[20:48] So some relations, you know, come from quality and some from what quantity, right? And that's why quantity and quality are ordered before towards something, right? Some gradations like double and half and taller and shorter and so on follow upon quantity, don't they? And some like you know teacher and student or father and son, right, follow upon what qualities, right? So unless my father had the power of generating, right, father and mother, it wouldn't be this father and son, mother and son, right?

[21:30] Okay. So the imperfection of definition was so famous, you know, he begins from that, right? And they say, oh, there's something wrong here, something that needs to be corrected.

[21:54] So you don't disagree with Plato, and there's your reason for doing so, right? And a good reason. Not me, anyways. I wouldn't. Yeah. Yeah.

[22:07] The first definition of towards something is those things which, in what in what they are, are said of another or towards another in some way, right? There is a distinction between the first examples given by Aristotle and the second ones he gives. The first examples are purely towards something, such as greater or lesser, right? Or a more distinct one, such as double and half, right? But the second examples he gives are mainly of qualities, primarily which have some towards something following upon what they are, right?

[22:45] Aristotle then considers the properties of towards something thus defined. He first considers properties that belong to some of those that are said towards something, and then the stricter properties.

[23:00] The first property is to have a contrary. Now this fits those said towards another, which are qualities, in fact, right? Such as virtue and vice, but not those which are Purely towards something such as double or half. The second property is to admit of of more or less. That's "of" instead of "or." I guess this also fits those said toward another, which are qualities, huh? But only something of those purely said towards another.

[23:33] One thing may be more or less like another, but one thing is not more or less double than another. Aristotle then turns to stricter properties.

[23:48] The first is that what is said towards something will have something said reversibly towards it, right? If the master is said to be master of the slave, then reversibly the slave is the slave of the master.

[24:09] So if I'm the father of someone, he's the son of mine, right? No doubt. This does not seem to be true in some cases. If the correlative has not been stated correctly, it does not seem to be reversible. If the slave, for example, is said to be the slave of a man, the man is not said to be the man of the slave. But if one takes the correct correlative of master, then reversibly the master is the master of the slave, and the slave is the slave of the master.

[24:41] That's what I was saying about the the marriage. Huh? Used to say, "I now pronounce you man and wife." But is man the correlative of of wife? It's kind of putting away from their place, but... in Greek and Latin, is?

[24:59] I mean, you see the man of a wife. Yeah. So the correlative of wife is husband, right? And then you see that they're said convertibly, right? Actually, actually, yeah, I don't know. Do they have a word? I think they do, but I can't remember it right now. Because booksaurus, wife. But sometimes they just say, or in Greek they just say woman. Yeah. In man and woman, are they said correlatively?

[25:30] You know, am I the man of a woman? Well, maybe I'm my mother, but then read the son of my mother, you know. That's a good question. But I'm like, where's the government? Woman seems to come from man. That's why, at least in English translations, that's why she's called because she's from man. Yeah. Now as a joke, it says that woman comes from woe, w-o-e, woe to man.

[26:02] A man's woe. Yeah. But I looked it up in the in the etymological dictionary. Guess it means you know that she has a a veil. You know. Yeah. And so, in that case, you know the the word man becomes what equivocal, because in one sense of man, a woman is a man, right? She's not a dog or a cat. She's a man. And then, why does man, the male man, keep the name man, and the woman get a new name, right?

[26:36] Well, the one has the veil, the other one doesn't. Just like you know, in in Latin or Greek, the word name, you know, was used for noun and verb, but then the word for noun is the same as name, right? And the verb got the new name because it adds something, right? It signifies with time, and the noun signifies without time, right? And so it keeps the name name, you know.

[27:02] But in English, we have a different word for name and noun. But in Latin, it's nomen and verbum, right? So nomen can be common to nomen and verbum, and then can be opposed to verbum.

[27:14] That's the way woman, you know, man can be said of man and woman, and then can be opposed to woman, right? But the woman adds something special, you know. So a woman likes that explanation better.

[27:29] See, the other way I explain it is that man means in general an animal has reason, right? While man only has reason fully, so he keeps the name man, and the woman gets a new name. You want to know how a woman thinks? You marry one. Well, that could be in trouble.

[27:51] Yeah, so I've been there with the moon. It's something that man doesn't have. Oh yeah, yeah. That sounds definitely nice. I was like, the way that pleases the women is that well, man was made from dust of the earth, but woman was made from a man. Yeah.

[28:11] Which is more noble, man? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So. Okay. So this is the stricter property, right? And the second stricter property is that the relatives are together by nature, right?

[28:33] But here Aristotle says that this is true of the purely relatives, such as double and half, but is not true of relatives that are qualities, such as knowledge and sense. What knowledge and sense are of can be before them and without them, right?

[28:53] So the moon can be before or some other planet to sail before we have knowledge of it. At this point, Aristotle raises an objection or difficulty, which leads him to reject or modify the first definition of towards something, right? Each part of a substance can be said to be of another. For example, the hand of a man, or the head of a man, right? If the first definition of towards something is correct, then substance would be a collection of relations, huh?

[29:29] Hence, there is need to look again at the definition of towards something to avoid this absurd consequence of it. Aristotle then modifies the original definition to that whose whole being or nature is to be towards something, right, and not just to be just said to be of another.

[29:52] He then gives another property of towards something, which is that if one of the correlatives is known, so is the other. They are known together, right? This is a part of another more universal truth that there is the same knowledge of what opposites, right?

[30:10] Aristotle ends the chapter on towards something by noting the difficulty of the what matter, huh? Now, having given an outline of the chapter, we can come back on a number of things, right?

[30:28] First, we should concentrate on the name of this genus, right? It is correctly translated towards something, or in Latin to what ad aliquid, right? That's what you have in Pros ti here in Latin it's ad aliquid the great song, in Latin for the pros t of the Greek, right? Rather than by the word what relation. Thomas Aquinas points out how the more abstract word is not said towards something, right?

[30:56] It's like a more substantial word, right? You know, something in itself, right? Now, this text of Metaphysics a little bit about that, right? He lays down three ways by which some things are said ad aliquid, not by themselves, but according to something else, right? The second mode is when some abstract things are said ad aliquid, because the concrete things having those abstract things are said to another, as equality, right, and likeness, right, are said to be ad aliquid, right?

[31:45] Why? Because simile and aequale are ad aliquid sunt. So, my cousin Donald says, Dwayne, that's just like your father. You couldn't say with likeness, could you?

[32:17] It's kind of abstract, right? Okay, so something important about the concrete word, right? Ad aliquid, right? Towards something, right? Yeah, yeah. But you see, these tables have equality. Can

[32:46] say that, right? But it's have equality, you know, like the word equal to each other. Seems to be different Yeah, kind of abstract. Yeah, yeah. Okay.

[33:09] So he says equality and similitudo secundum nomen. Are not said towards something, right? But nevertheless, you probably see the relatives, right? Now, you always make fun of this term. I hear even priests in the thing talking about relationships relationships. It's like an abstraction of an abstraction, right? Because relation is already more abstract than towards something, right? And relationship is is the essence of

[33:42] some other thing. Yeah, yeah. Having a relationship. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's like having lunch. And we say, "What's our relation, right? " You know, it's kind of abstract, right? What are you towards me? Or am I towards you, right? That means it gets down, you know.

[34:04] If you're nothing towards me, then we don't have any relation. That's interesting'cause that's that's the way our Lord speaks to his mother in the Gospel. What to me and to thee? That's the way it strictly speaking. That's the Greek. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. At the Cana feast What to me and to thee? What's this to me? Yeah. More to speak, I say there. More to speak of relation between two things is to speak as if there's one accident between them, right?

[34:40] Now, Thomas says in this text here, from the sentences, some say, as Avicenna, in his Metaphysics. What? Yeah. Oh. Okay. He says that the same in number is relation in both extremes, which cannot be, he says. Thomas says, right? Why? Because one accident cannot be in two subjects, right?

[35:14] And therefore, it should be said that in both of the extremes, right, there is one relation differing from another in some differing according to species, right? Just as in those things which are what named by diverse names as paternity and filiation, all right. So if I'm the father of you, you are my son or my daughter, right? But in some, you know, if I'm like you, you are like me, right?

[35:46] But in some things they do not differ in species, but in number, what only, just as when both there's one name as in similitude and equality, right? So if I'm equal to you, then you're equal to me, right? And then the relation which is in one as in a subject is in the other as in a term and a converso. Okay. So it's really two different things, right?

[36:27] Now the question also arises why towards something is considered before how or quality. And Aristotle distinguished the first four genera in the order of nature, but in the order of teaching.

[36:43] He places towards something before quality, okay. And then I have a brilliant comparison here, right? That Porphyry imitated that in the what? Premium, yeah, on the premium to the Isagoge, he says, "Oh, Chrysorius, to know what what genus is, what difference is, what species is, what property is, and what accident is is necessary not only to understand the categories, but also to divide, he says, and to define and to demonstrate, right?

[37:14] But then when he takes them up, he takes up what genus and then species, and then difference and then property and accident. So there's one difference in the order there, right? Now he enumerates them in the beginning; it's the difference, and that's the order of nature, right? See, now you can say you can see that in the definition of square, right? It's a equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, right?

[37:45] Well, can quadrilateral be without square? Yeah. But can square be without quadrilateral? No. So quadrilateral is before square in nature, right? Now how about equilateral? Can equilateral be without square? Yeah. So what they call the rhombus I guess, the squares, um, that's equilateral, but it's not a square. So equilateral can be without square, but there cannot be a what square without an equilateral. quadrilateral. And then the other difference is what?

[38:29] Right angle. Right angle and can right-angled be in quadrilateral without square? Oh, I mean, can right-angled rather be in be in in quadrilateral without square? Yeah. It's in the what they call the oblong, right? Incidentally, a lot of students will call it a rectangle, right? But that's because square is something special, right? So it gets a new name, and the other ones. But if you want to give it its own name, it's oblong, right?

[39:04] So a quadrilateral can be right-angled without being a square, but it can't be a square without being there. So difference as well as the genus, right? Are before right now, but quadrilateral is before the differences right. You can't have a quadrilateral without equilateral, But you can't have equilateral, without, you know. So, but anyway, but the order is changed for a different reason than Aristotle's right in the categories right, and that is that the what genus and species are kind of defined together right.

[39:40] So the genus is a name said with one meaning of many things, either in species, signifying what it is right, and a species is what is placed under a genus, and which the genus is said in answer to the question what it is right. So, they're defined by each other right. They're like almost like relatives right now, and so you compare them to father and son right in Aristotle.

[40:05] You know the word genus goes back to generation after all right, and father can have many sons right now. Can a son have many fathers?

[40:16] Not in the same sense exactly anyway right. So, so it's a different reason than the categories right, but you have the same thing right huh? That these two great men right huh? Porphyry is taking this from Aristotle's remarks about genus and difference and so on, but it's interesting both of them do the same thing right huh? Precision these guys wrote with you know, while we in democratic times you know it's all sloppy writers, sloppy writers, sloppy thinkers, you know, just just just just a mess you know.

[41:01] We're not we're not diligent students. I remember remember you know they have these big fights you know they have fights in the in colleges all the time right, and

[41:20] you know when the other faction was in power there at the College Saint Thomas right, they divide philosophy according to being and good and true and so on, so logic is about true and and ethics is about the good and metaphysics about being or something you know. But these are all transcendentals, right huh? And that means that they're what convertible right the transcendentals, right, And so they all belong to the same science.

[41:50] They talk about the transcendentals, right, And uh that's stopping thinking though you know sloppy thinking you know. I know nothing. Make fun of that. So Thomas in Thomas at the beginning of the day Trinity right, the special question of the Trinity he's getting up to the true and then you see these things are really what convertible right, and so. The mind knows the truth about the good, and the will wills the good.

[42:24] Yeah, wills us no truth. Okay. What's interesting mistake, Derek, having sent in there right now, but kind of you know what that right? So wait for it to be a relationship right now. That's something one, you know, you know, you'd be thinking of it as something one, right? Aren't you relationship? You know.

[42:57] And the easy expression I'm in a relationship. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Very bad ways of speaking. huh It reflects their thinking Hmm It reflects their thinking. Yeah, yeah. Because Rick would not

[43:17] be speaking those ways, not that I was inclined to do so anyway. Instead of saying, you know, what's our relationship? You know, what are you towards me? It's right, direct, isn't it? What are you towards me? That's interesting. that the word. The word "lover," right?

[43:49] What genus did you put the word "lover" in? Is it a kind of quality or a relation or towards something? Yeah, but is is it

[44:07] a relative secundum esse or relative secundum dici, right? Is it like Maybe only the second. it seems. Yeah, yeah, I mean, is it fundamentally a quality, right? Now, you know, he's a knower. It's like the one about knowing, yeah, yeah.

[44:32] He's a searcher. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, I mean, is love a fundamentally is that a quality of the heart or or a relation of the heart?

[44:52] Yeah, Well there follows a relation, upon it, right? So it's relative in some way, right? That's why Plato, for instance, was mixing them up a little bit, huh? But is it fundamentally a quality that has its relation following upon it, right?

[45:13] I say, what are you towards me? And you say, a lover, right? You know, which is relative in some way, right? You can say that. It's like saying,

[45:26] what am I towards numbers? Well, I'm gonna go back and read the seventh, eighth, ninth books again. Which are the books on numbers, right? Now, so what am I towards numbers? I'm a knower, right? Okay.

[45:46] I probably say, you know, I'm towards my children. more a lover of my children, right? than a knower of my children, right? Knower of my children too, but you probably say, you know, I'm more a lover of my wife, or a lover of my children, than a knower of them, right? Though I know them pretty well now. For their sake. Yeah, yeah, yeah. A psychologist could be a knower, right?

[46:06] but not be a lover of you. So at the bottom of this page, then you have Aristotle's reason for changing the order, right? Okay. So, but notice, these are different senses of order, aren't they? Right. See. So if I say to you, is Porphyry speaking orderly when he

[46:53] enumerates the subject of his book, right? And is he proceeding orderly when he takes these up, right? It's not the same order, you know. Well, in the proemium Porphyry's got a magnificent proemium right? I mean, you know, just shows the importance of knowing these five, you know. He says, "Oh, Chrysaorius, you know, who asked him, you know, I'm trying to understand the categories, and Aristotle uses these words, I don't know what they mean, very much.

[47:26] " And he says, "It's not only to understand the categories, but understand what division, right? Because one of the most important kinds of division is that of a genus into species, right? And to understand definition, because composed of genus and difference, and to understand demonstration, to demonstrate a property of a, what species through its genus and difference, right? And he says, oh, this is, oh my gosh, I want to know this, right?

[47:52] I mean, this is, you know. But in there, he says to know what genus is, what difference is, what species is, what property is, what accident is, right? But then he takes up that's the order of what of being, right? Okay. But then when he takes them up, he gives them in the order of what learning, yeah, yeah.

[48:15] Here he shows Aristotle's great respect for Plato, right? That he, you know, thinks well, we got to. This is the accepted definition of relation, maybe, you know, proceeds as if it's okay, you know. You know, Thomas points out that Aristotle often gives examples, you know, in in logic, you know, that are commonly accepted at the time, right? And before he takes up those things, you know, and maybe corrects them, you know, in other books, right?

[48:44] So you got to be careful, you know, huh? Because sometimes you have an objection, you know, taken from the categories, even, you know, and when he talks about opposites and so on. And Thomas says, "Well, maybe he's doing this according to, you know, the customary positions of Pythagoras or somebody, you know. " Okay. Now we get a nice text. We're just going to stop here now,

[49:14] okay? Start start with page three there with a nice text from my my master by this written word. Albert the Great, now the logic. When I first went to to Laval we had a the logic. course, they gave us was was the one with Porphyry, right? But now with Porphyry, you're using actually Albert the Great's paraphrases, you know. Paraphrase of it.

[49:42] Albert kind of, you know, paraphrases the man. He's comments a little different. Worked with Thomases, where Thomas was teaching, revised the text. But Albert the Great is quite helpful, you know. Great, great, uh, logician.

[49:58] There's some, there's some teachers by the written word, like Aristotle, Thomas, Albert, Boethius, and so on, Augustine. Some by the spoken word, right? So.