Logic (2016)
18. Predication and the Category of 'Towards Something': Cajetan, Aristotle's Two Definitions, and the Senses of Being
Class of 2017-01-19
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/018-predication-and-the-category-of-towards-something-cajetan/

[0:03] Let's see a little quote there from Cajetan. Now you know who Cajetan is, huh? Yeah, he's a famous Dominican, right? I mean, there's other Cajetans too, but this is the famous Dominican. If you get the Great Glories or the Leonine Edition of Thomas, right? They have what, with the Summa Theologiae right? They have, they have, yeah, they have Cajetan's kind of commentary on it, you know. Okay.

[0:30] But he has something on the Isagoge. He has something on the categories, right? Cajetan and other things. And Thomas didn't finish his commentary on the Peri Hermeneias so Cajetan finished it, right? Cajetan became, you know, he was sent by the Church to argue with Martin Luther, right? And I guess he became, I think he became the head of the Dominicans too, the Master General. And he's supposed to have said, I forget the exact thing, but you know, he said that the Dominican doesn't study.

[1:02] I forget how many hours a day it was—five hours, it was four or five hours. He's living in sin, you know, because Dominicans are supposed to be, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[1:21] Notice this thing though, from him in the beginning here, right? The praedicamenta, huh? That's the Latin word for about the categories, right? Okay. I forget in Albert the Great or or in

[1:37] Cajetan they'll speak of the Isagoge as de predicabilibus, right? And they speak of the categories as de praedicamentis, but they both come from the word predicare, right? Which means what?

[1:57] Yeah, it means it means originally though Latin set of, right? Okay. So when you define genus, you say it's it's a name, right? Said with one meaning of many things. You're talking about something said of what? Another, right? I think I mentioned how

[2:18] in in wisdom, Aristotle sometimes takes us by the hand and leads us in from natural philosophy, right? And sometimes he takes us by the hand and leads us into wisdom from logic, right? And Thomas points out they don't proceed the same way in logic and in what natural philosophy, right? But now with the brevity of wisdom of which Shakespeare speaks, right?

[2:51] Thomas describes the way of natural philosophy and the way of logic with one word. That natural philosophy proceeds by way of motion. So even nature is defined by motion, isn't it? You're defining motion, and you're talking about time, which is the measure of motion, and so on. And

[3:19] even the modern scientist is what, watching motion, right, to know things, right? Always shooting some of the elementary particles and seeing how fast the thing goes, or what goes breaks up. Places logic proceeds by way of what, predication. Just one word, right? Okay. So logic is always considering the way this is said of that, the way something is said of something other than itself, right? And so one of the fundamental distinctions in logic is distinction between a name said univocally of many things, right?

[4:04] And a name said what, equivocally, right? And then subdivide names said equivocally of many things into equivocal by chance and equivocal by what, reason, right? So that's these are distinctions that the logician makes, right? Or points out, right? Now, so man is said of us three, right? Univocally, right? we say you're a man because you're an animal that has reason, right? And you're a two footed animal that has reason too.

[4:40] I'm a two footed animal that has reason, right? Okay. But if we look at the the statue of somebody up there, right now, let's see, that's a man, right? That's equivocal, isn't it now? But maybe not by chance, right? Okay. And

[5:02] so you can, when I say I like you because you're like me, the word like there is what? Yeah, yeah. See, isn't it? Yeah, yeah.

[5:28] So this is what logic does, right? And so if you go to the predicables, right, these are ways that something can be said univocally of many things, right? Either it's univocally as regards its, what nature, right, or outside of its nature, and then you subdivide those, right? Okay.

[5:52] So the genus said of many things differing in species, signifying what it is, right? But the difference is said of many things differing in species, not as many as the genus, but said of more than one, like equilateral said of more than one quadrilateral. But signifies how it is what it is, right?

[6:15] And then the species is said, you know, a little differently, right? It signifies what it is, but it's not said of many differing in species, right? Okay. But

[6:31] actually, the word species can become kind of critical in some ways. Okay. Okay. So, and the categories are what the ten highest what? genus, right? Huh? And they're what?

[6:52] They're genera. They're said of many things, right? And said with more or less the same meaning, right? Yeah. So the logician is always talking about that, right? They say the word category comes from what? The law, court, right? So when when the Pharisees or someone are accusing our Lord of blasphemy or whatever, they're accusing him of. They had the word category in Greek, right? In the Gospel, which is written in Greek, right?

[7:20] And so, but notice, the idea of accusing you, right? Huh? And if I'm going to, you know, bring you to trial, I'm going to accuse you of something, right? You're a murderer, or you're a thief, or you're an embezzler, or something, right? And so,

[7:42] they borrowed that word, right? Or generalized it, right? And so I sometimes call the ten categories the ten set of all right? But the set of none right But the set of vast multitude of things, right? So the logician is talking about that, right? Now when you get to the syllogism, right? Huh? The syllogism is is based on the set of all and the set of none.

[8:09] You know, if A is said of all B, then A is said of whatever B is said of. If A is said of none of the Bs, he is denied of whatever B is said of. You know, so these are great principles: the set of all and the set of none. They call them, right? Dici de omni dici de nullo in Latin, huh? But it goes back to what?

[8:33] Idea of being said of, right? In some way, right? Okay. Ah, when I say, you know, every student passed, or some students passed. Sometimes I say it of all. Sometimes I say it of what? Some, right? Huh?

[9:00] I used to tell the students. They say, suppose I give an exam, right? The students say, are they passed or not, right? They Say, do we pass, Prof? And I say, some of you passed.

[9:18] Have I said that some of you have not passed? Have I? Yes, please. See, so I'm very careful there, right now. Because suppose I'm correcting the exams, right? I've corrected half of them, right? And everybody I've corrected so far has passed, right?

[9:39] Now can I say that you've all passed? No. All I can say truthfully is, some of you have passed, right? See. And even if they all passed, would it be false to say some of them have passed? It would be. See? See?

[10:06] Yeah, all would include some. Yeah, yeah. See, So you might say, "Well, if we all passed, why would Berquist say that some of you have passed, right? " What could be because he's only corrected some of the papers, so he doesn't know if everybody's passed, right? I can say some of you have passed, but I can't say that all of you have passed. I can't say some of you have not passed either, can I?

[10:30] See, but people might jump right now. That's what he's saying. Some of them have passed. If he didn't mean that some of them have not, right?

[10:40] Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, you know, so so logicians going to talk about these things, right? Okay. And you know, if some men are are white, right? Can you conclude that all men are white from that?

[11:06] You know, it might be that the men I've seen were all white, huh? My mother tells me she came from a little small town in Minnesota, right, Watertown. I guess a little boy had never seen a black person, you know. And so they're walking down in the big town, right? And a little black boy comes by, and the little white boy from Watertown said, "Go home and wash your face."

[11:34] It's a very actually happened. My mother told me the story, right? But if you lived in darkest Africa, you might think that everybody is black. Black, yeah. But can you conclude from that, right, that some are not black, you know, or that all men are black, you know? You know, my old teacher, Kasurik, showed this picture one time, didn't I? You know, my old teacher, but he'd say, "Now, suppose someone went up to Mars, some other planet, right, huh?

[12:16] " And he came back and he said, "You know, there's pink snow on Mars. " Just that's impossible. I'd be surprised, but I'd say that's that's impossible. I don't see why it's impossible for snow to be pink to you. There may be some reason, but I don't know the reason why it couldn't be pink, right? Um, but suppose he said, you know, the food's food situation on the Earth is is saved now.

[12:45] But up on on Mars, a half a stone is as big as a whole stone. What would you say about that? Half a stone is as big as a whole stone Yeah

[12:57] Yeah, you know, I say it's impossible, right? For half a stone to be as big as a whole stone. But that the snow was pink there on Mars, I'd be surprised. But you know, I wouldn't say you know. So

[13:15] if you lived in darkest Africa, you might think everybody is black, right? You might be surprised to find there's white people, or vice versa, right? This little boy has this color of skin, right? But

[13:32] you don't see maybe the reason why somebody can be, you know. I mean, you know, Jack. What's the name of that vegetable there with the jolly green man? You know, on the cover. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, you know, you know, maybe if I see anybody with green, you know, and this green-colored skin, I don't know. I don't think there is, but I don't see why it should be white and black and yellow and not green, do you?

[13:56] I mean, all these trees around here are green, and it seems to be a sign of life, you know, evergreen, huh? Okay. Okay, let's go to text two now from Cajetan, right, in the middle of page three here.

[14:16] Notice what he's saying in the Latin. If you can read Latin at all, post predicamentum quantitatis, right, huh? After the predicamentum or the category of quantity, statim right away. He treats of the genus. He uses the concrete one, nomenclature, but ad aliquid, right, huh? Towards something, right, huh? In Greek it's pros ti, so ad aliquid is a very good translation. We say it in English towards something,

[14:50] because it most of all follows upon what quantity, right? So double and half, taller, shorter, right? Okay, wider. Okay. And already in the predicament of quantity, the sermo, the speech, about ad aliquid was begun, right, huh? Because he talked about how you could have equal and unequal there. It's kind of like a property, right, and those are things, huh? Where about magno and parvo disputatum est, right, huh?

[15:31] And also in the predicament or the category, that's Latin word for, equality, about it there will be had speech. Although notice he says naturae ordine, although in the order of nature, right?

[15:48] Post qualitatem, both action and passion, sit right, huh? Okay. But this is why it puts relation after quality. No, it goes on here, huh? I think myself right here, huh? I'm quoting here from Cajetan. I think the chief reason is connected with the two definitions of this chapter, right, huh?

[16:17] Those are said to be towards something, which, as regards what they are, are said to be of another, or in some other way towards another. That's like the Platonic definition of it, right? The first definition, right? And then those are towards something whose being, meaning being in the sense of nature, right, is towards something in some way, right? Okay. Now sometimes I kind of exaggerate it a bit.

[16:44] I say that the category of towards something is about those things whose whole nature is to be what towards something, right? In themselves, they're nothing, right? See? Yeah, like double and half, right? How much is what? Yeah. I'm

[17:12] going to give you double, right? Sounds pretty good, right? But what am I doubling, right? Huh? Maybe something very small, right? Huh? So is double anything in itself? How much is double?

[17:36] Is double more than a half? Which is more, half of ten or double of two? Half of ten. Yeah, yeah. So you gotta be careful here, right? You know, because double and half don't tell you in itself what it is, do they? They only say what it is towards something else, right? So it's four, double or half.

[18:11] Yeah. But towards two, it's double, and towards eight, it's half, right? Yeah. But double and half seem to be in some way opposed, don't they, right? Yeah. When Aristotle takes up opposites, he'll begin with relatives, right? Towards something, right? Because though he talked about them, right? Although there has to be the least kind of opposition, huh? You know. When I get contraries like hot and cold, I can't really be hot and cold at the same time, right?

[18:46] But I can be double and half at the same time, right? So when you read the text of Aristotle, right, huh? Before he gives the second definition that we give here, right, he's talking about how even the parts of a substance would be said to be of something. The heart of my body, right? The liver of my body, right? Huh? The part of the whole, right? Well, then a substance would be just a bunch of what?

[19:23] Towards something, right? Make any sense? No. So the fact that something can be said to be of another is not enough to say that it's really a species fundamentally of what? Towards something. It could be fundamentally what? Something substantial, right? Like part of my body, right? Huh? Or it could be something that's fundamentally a quality, right? Like my knowledge of something, right? Huh? Or my power to do something, right?

[19:58] It's subtle thing, though, isn't it? Right, and so we'll put something in the category where it most of all belongs, right? Later on, Aristotle when he talks about quality, he will say that you can maybe say that the quality is in the genus of quality, but the relation that falls upon it can be put in any other category, right? You know, but it's not fundamentally towards something because it's said to be of something, right?

[20:30] It's got to be that its whole being or nature, right, is to be towards something, right? And that's what you can see about things like double most clearly, right? See, double is in itself. What is it?

[20:48] Yeah, I thought that to a student there one time a couple years ago, and and I was the valedictorian in my class, so what's you know, because we had a very small class, she said.

[21:10] She didn't want to make me think that I was, you know, that she was greater than she was, right? You know, I was kind of impressed that she was the valedictorian in the class, right? No, no, I wasn't homeschooling, but it was you know some little minor school, you know.

[21:26] Yeah, yeah, but see, I was valedictorian of my Harvard class or something, right? Or, or you know, Douglas MacArthur was the valedictorian, you know, of the West Point, you know, large class, right? And so, okay, that's that's impressive, right? You know, there's three or four guys at your place, and the valedictorian doesn't mean too much, right? You might not even be too bright, even if it's a you know, backward school and so.

[21:55] She says the first definition is said to be Platonic, right? Huh. But this definition is so broad as to include the parts of substance, right, and qualities that have relation following upon them, right? Okay.

[22:22] The nature of quality and the parts of substance is not primarily to be towards something, and the second definition limits this genus to that whose very being or nature is to be in some way what towards another, right?

[22:45] So, since this book is about names signifying what things are, we must take into account, right, the distinction between something whose whole nature is to be towards something. And something whose fundamental nature is not that, even though it may have some relation, what, following upon it, right? Okay. Now, how should "esse" be understood in the second definition? Towards something, right? Are you talking about "esse" in the sense of existence, or "esse" in the sense of what, nature?

[23:19] Yeah. See, so over it's a little bit like the problem you have in English, huh? What does the word "being" mean? Well, you could say one meaning of "being" would be what, existence, right?

[23:37] But if I say you're a human being, does "being" mean there? Your human existence? No. It's part of your nature, right? Being there, right? What kind of a being are you? A human being, right? I call Tabitha that cat there, you know, feline being.

[24:04] So a being can have the sense of what, the nature of a thing, and that's where Aristotle's using the word "being there," right, in the text here, the Greek. Now, I was mentioning before, you know, the when you came in,

[24:21] in the Loeb thing, you know, when he gets to that second definition, huh? Let's see what he says here. It's not fair, you know. The Loeb is notorious for being bad translation, right? The former definition applies to all relatives beyond any doubt. But the fact that a thing is explained by a reference to something outside it is not the same thing as to say that it is a necessity relative.

[24:59] That doesn't get the proper idea, right? See. But the Greek says, right? Hode proteros horismos, the former definition, right? Parakolouthei follows upon pasia all, right? Tois pros ti all the things that are pros ti, right? But it's not the same thing, right? And the pros ti to einai auta hoper esti what they are, right? Heteron legetai right? What they very are, I mean, their their very nature, right?

[25:38] To be of another. And he has the footnote here. There seems to be something wrong here with the text. But here Aristotle is giving the reason why he's correcting the definition of Plato, right? There's some truth to it, right? But you're talking about things that are not fundamentally towards something, right? But they are an aspect of being towards something as a result of what they are, right?

[26:06] Okay. Okay. So I turned 81. So I'm older than most men. Yeah, yeah. Was the same thing to be 81 years old and to be older than other men? But the kind of relation follows upon being 81, right? Older than most men, right? You know, my wife's saying, "Hey, these people are dying younger than you." We look at look at the, you know, the obituaries, you know, the daily newspaper, you know.

[26:59] I mean, most of them are younger than 80, you know, and might be. I don't know. So there's a difference, right, between something whose fundamental nature is something other than towards something, right? And something whose whole nature is to be towards something, isn't there?

[27:26] And you put, therefore, knowledge and power primarily in quality, right? And the relation to the father of the father, if you want to put it in relation, makes some sense, right? But simply speaking, you put in the category of towards something, something whose whole nature, whose whole being is to be towards something, right? It's nothing in itself, right?

[27:53] So when Thomas distinguishes between relation and quantity and quality, quantity and quality are what something absolute, right? And relation, is nothing absolute, right? There's nothing in itself, right? It's only towards another, right? Okay. What is what it is to be double? What is it? What is it to be taller, right?

[28:24] I remember when I was first getting into astronomy, right, into astronomy in sixth grade. There, and you read about Betelgeuse. There are some of these stars. They say the whole solar system could be fitted into this thing. I said, "Wow!" You're impressed at the size of these, you know, some of these big stars and so on, huh? After a while, you see, it's all kind of relative, right?

[28:54] So I could take, you know, a line that is what greater than this other line, you know, but as much as this star is greater than our solar system, right? You know, these things are divisible forever, right? Big deal, right? I can get the thing that is thousands or a million times, right? I can drag the line once, and it's something twice as big now, and then, you know, four times as big, and I can go on forever, right?

[29:21] Making greater, greater, greater. So I get a little more cynical about these things, It's something relative, right? We have some of the texts here where we explain the different senses of what being, you know, especially that you find in Aristotle huh. Book of Wisdom, metaphysics. Essay to ens dicitur” said in two ways, right? Huh? In one way, according as it signifies the truth of a what proposition, right?

[30:14] According as is the copula in there, right? And thus, as the commentator says there, Averroes being is a predicato per accidens. And this being is not in the thing, but in the mind which joins the subject with the predicate, as the philosopher says in the sixth book of metaphysics. Huh? Let me ask a question. Would you say that nothing is nothing? Hmm? You wouldn't say nothing is something, would you?

[30:48] No. It knows the reason where it is, right? You're saying nothing is. Right? That's an odd sense of being, isn't it? Right? But it's in the mind, right? Huh? It's true to say that nothing is nothing, right? Monsignor Kasurik said, you know, philosophy is the only place where you can get paid for talking about nothing. Let me

[31:19] start. You get somebody going there, you know, they get kind of confused about the thing you say. Does the word nothing mean something? It doesn't mean nothing. No, I think we use it. We use it.

[31:44] Well, in natural philosophy, there's a famous thing, you know, that you can't get something out of nothing, right? And you know what King Lear says to to Cordelia, right? Huh? You know, King Lear. Shame on you! Shame on you! It's funny that that Laval there, Chris, some of his references to his native language was French. Now they would be, you know, quoting Shakespeare, and all kind of embarrassing us Americans who know Shakespeare.

[32:21] He means his own native language, right? And he's the master of English, right? Huh? But you know, the King Lear is kind of senile, right? He wants to retire from his throne, right? Huh? And so he's got three daughters, and he asks them, you know, do you love me, right? And of course, you know, the first daughter, you know, she's how much love she has, and the second daughter, you know, as much, and Cordelia, she can't just throw her heart into her mouth like that and kind of flatter the king, right?

[32:50] Huh? And so she's loving him according to how she should love him, you know, but she's not, you know. And then was like, oh, you think I love that Daddy so much right? And he says, is that all you can say? You know, nothing will get you nothing. He says, you know. So, but this is the thing, now. Can you get something out of nothing, right? Okay.

[33:12] And because it's the problem that people raise when they ask about creation, right? Huh? You know, it's creation making something from nothing. Say, I must understand that, right?

[33:30] Huh? Does he make it from nothing? If speaking affirmatively, or is it really that to make things from nothing means to make it not from something, right? To not make it from some matter, right? Huh? Okay. So there's been a lot of problems of nothing, right? Huh? Okay. But yet, it's got to have some meaning to the word nothing, right? Huh? Say. Um.

[34:00] What's what's a square circle? That's something. Well, square circle is nothing, huh? That's what it is, right? Well, that's a very diminished sense of of what, right? A very diminished sense of of being, right? Huh?

[34:25] But when I say that nothing is nothing, I seem to be saying something that's true, don't I? So what kind of being is that, right? Aristotle talks about that, right? Being in the mind only, right? Huh? You know.

[34:48] He said nothing. Because the problem is what that means, right? Did you really say nothing? Is that what you said, Or you mean you s you didn't say anything? You know. You know. What do you mean when you say he said nothing, huh? They gave you nothing. They give you something. I gave you nothing. Didn't give you anything. But we but we kind of you know have problems there.

[35:21] But there's a kind of truth, though, right? It signifies the truth of proposition, right? Huh? And this being is not in the thing, but in the mind which joins the subject with the what predicate, right? Huh?

[35:37] In another way, that is said to be being, which pertains to the nature of the thing, right? Huh? According as it's divided according to the ten what genera, substance, quantity, and so on, huh?

[35:55] Sometimes it is taken for the essence, right, according to which the thing is, and so on. Guess who's next? Text of Thomas, huh? It seems that these relations are not the divine essence, right?

[36:32] For either the things that are said relatively in God are either relativa secundum esse or only secundum dici, right? Now that's from Thomas. Now here he's speaking in the way that the medievals did, right? The first definition, right, a relativa is a definition of relativa secundum dici They are said to be of another, even though they're not be fundamentally a what relation, right? And then the relativa secundum what esse, right, huh?

[37:09] But these relations in God are not what only secundum dici because then they would fall the heresy of Sabellius, huh? As Hilary points out in the note above, right?

[37:26] Therefore, these are relativa secundum esse, right? But in such relations, according to the philosopher in the predicaments, ad aliquid esse to be towards something is to have oneself towards what another, right, huh? Since therefore the divine essence is not ad aliquid se habere, but something absolute, right? It seems that is not the same thing with relation, which is secundum esse according to its nature ad aliquid huh?

[38:06] Okay. The first, therefore, should be said that those relations are not only according to dici ad aliquid but also secundum esse. But it should be known that esse is said in three ways. The reason why I'm giving you this text is, is you want to know Aristotle. Since it's used the word esse, right? In the in the in the this guy here is puzzled, right?

[38:33] But it should be known that esse is said in three ways, huh? In one way, esse is the what it is, the whatness or the nature of the thing, right? As when it is said that definition is speech signifying what it is to be, right? Okay, what it is to be a man? What is it to be a man? Well, it's to be a two-footed animal with reason, right?

[38:59] For the definition signifies the whatness of a thing, right? In another way, to be signifies the active essence. That's what we call existence, right? Just as vivere, which is the essay for what living things is the act of the soul, but not the second act, which is operation, but the first act. So you got to be before you what do something, right? Even Descartes saw that, right?

[39:30] I think, therefore I am. You can be without thinking, but you can't think without being, right? In the third way, being is signifies the truth of the composition that we talked about before in the last text, right? According as est is the copula joining the subject and the predicate, and according to this, it is in the understanding. Composing in an affirmative or dividing, right, as regards its completion, but founded on the essay of the thing, which is the act of essence.

[40:11] Just as an above, it has been said about truth. I see, therefore, that when it is said, ad aliquid sunt, whose being is to have itself to another. This is Aristotle's second definition, right? He's referring to that. That has us all puzzled, right? It's understood about the essay that is the what Quiddity of the thing, right? Which is signified by the definition, right? Okay. So if I asked you what is to be human being, I'm for what?

[40:48] A definition of human being, right? And so being there is referring to the nature of the thing, right? Okay. But another sense of being is is what existence, right? Huh?

[41:12] Cease to be. Because the very nature of relation to which it is constituted in such a genus is to be for it another, right? Huh? And it's not understood about the essay which is the act of essence, which would be the the what existence, right? Huh? Just getting

[41:57] a little difficult for our purposes right here. So others are ratio paternity and others are ratio quiddity. As every student of the seventh book of wisdom knows, Aristotle often contracts his phrase "what was to be" to "to be." Huh? Which I find kind of confusing, but anyway. Yeah.

[42:37] We can now examine the distinction between relations made in the two definitions. This is a chapter known relation there. There is a fundamental distinction of relations made in Latin or named in Latin between the relativa secundum dici, right, what is said to be of another, right, whether it's fundamentally relation or not, and relative secundum esse, whose very nature is to be towards something, right? You kind of see it with the idea of double, right?

[43:06] Double is nothing in itself, right? It's only something towards another, right? The same way for half, right? But knowledge, right, and power, right, ability are something in themselves, right? Even though you might have a relation following upon them, and so they in Latin are called relative secundum esse, right? But esse means their essence of nature, right? What they are, right?

[43:39] What is it to have some ability just to be towards another? No, it's more than that, right? It's fundamentally a quality, right?