Logic (2016)
20. Relation, Part 1: Relatives Secundum Esse and Secundum Dici, the Trinity, and Beings of Reason
Class of 2017-01-26
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/020-relation-part-1-relatives-secundum-esse-and-secundum-dici/

[0:00] Continue in our words here. Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the, Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment. Move us, God, to know and love you. Help us, God, to know and love you.

[0:17] Guiding angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or the luminaries, and arouse us to be more correct. and to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Help us to understand all truth. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Okay, we were on page what five, I guess. Okay, a couple of texts here

[0:49] where Thomas is explaining a little the distinction. Distinction of relatives: secundum esse and secundum dici, right? Okay. Now there's another distinction between real and what? Relations of reason, right? Huh? And Thomas says, "Don't confuse these two, right? " Okay. But we've talked here about already, I think, the distinction of relative relativa secundum esse and secundum dici. But what is that distinction?

[1:30] Kind of, you know, Latin is such an abstract language. You know, my two, two of my great teachers at Laval there, whose native language was French, right? Father Yasmin Boulet and Monsignor Dionne. They both thought that English was better for poetry than French is, right? And they both thought that English was better for philosophy than French. You know. So Perkins said that, and said, "We didn't know French that well.

[2:01] " You know, these guys' native language is French, right? Huh? You know. And Monsignor used to compare, you know, English is to French, but Greek is to Latin. Latin is kind of more abstract than Greek. You know, Greek is better. But anyway, relative secundum esse and secundum dici, right? What's the difference? And what's what has it got to do with this

[2:28] chapter on relation? My understanding is that um the relative relative uh sort of essay where you have something that has a relation towards something else in reality, like father and son. And second of Luci is where you have something that is not a relationship, but it somehow implies a relationship. Yeah. Yeah. The relative secundum esse is one whose whole nature, right? Its being in the sense of nature, right?

[3:04] Like human being, right? Talk the nature of the thing. Something whose whole nature is to be towards something, right? It's nothing in itself. So

[3:15] I'm going to give you a double, right? Oh, yeah, yeah. In itself, it's nothing, is it? How much is a double? Yeah You know it? Could be something very, very small, right? You know, these things could easily divided, right? You know, I'm going to give you a double helping of pie, right? A double what? Maybe it's the half of a half of a half of a half of a half.

[3:49] Because you've got doubled all the way down, right? Corresponding to those things, huh? So that's what the the genus, the highest genus of towards something, right?

[4:04] Which is sometimes called relation, but towards something is more the real nature, right? It's nothing in itself, but only towards a what? Another, yeah. Double and half, right? Why a relation secundum dici is kind of what Plato was saying, right? Whatever is said to be of another, right now. But it's something that is said to be of another, but fundamentally it's something other than a relation, huh?

[4:36] But it has relation following upon it, right now. Now the example of knowledge is was kind of one that often is given, there, right now, because knowledge is knowledge of something, right? So it seems to be relative to something else, right? But is knowledge fundamentally a relation, nothing in itself?

[5:02] For some of us. Now it's able to teach because you have students. Well, you got to have students that's supposed to do some teaching, right? But it's fundamentally because you have students that you can teach, or is it fundamentally you can teach because you know something? It's really a quality, right now, but it has a student what relation to something that you know, right now? Okay.

[5:32] Now this is the reason why Aristotle apparently changes the order, right, of talking about these things, right? Because when he first enumerates the highest genera of being, right, that's what the categories are, right. The genera that are only genera, not species, right? When he first distinguishes them, he gives substance first, then quantity or how much, size, then quality, and then relation, right? Well, he takes them up in particular now, first substance, like he did, and then chapter six, he takes up quantity.

[6:19] I'd expect quality, and Aristotle obviously got mixed up there, and he gave relation, next, right? Yeah, yeah. And why did he do that? Well, because there was a very much accepted definition of relation, right? That had some truth to it, right? But it's mixing up, right? Something that is fundamentally a quality and has only a relative as a consequence of what it is, right? And so they're mixing up, to use a Latin term, the relative secundum dicie.

[6:56] With the, he was defining Plato in a sense, the relative secundum dici. Well, we want the genera of being, right? What kind of being is, you know, relation that's unique, right? Well, it's just towards another, right? nothing in itself, right? Okay.

[7:14] And that's important to know later on when you talk about whether the relation is real or not. That's another distinction Aristotle touches upon, but not not here in the categories, right? Okay. So that's why he he takes up relation before quality, right? He wants to clear that up. And in the chapter in quality, after he distinguishes, you know, makes known some way what quality is, and distinguishes four different kinds of qualities, right?

[7:41] And yet at the end of the chapter, he comes back to this thing, right? You know, about things that have kind of relative aspect, right?

[7:53] Now another example we use that is is power or ability, right? Because we sometimes define power ability as the source of what doing something, right? So it's the source or the beginning of something other than itself, right?

[8:11] So I have the ability to see, right? Is my ability to see my seeing? No, but it's a source of the activity of seeing, right? Okay.

[8:26] I have the ability to make French fries, right? Huh? But is that but is that ability making French fries? No, but it's a source, a beginning, right? Wasn't a beginning kind of a relative thing, right?

[8:47] But is power or ability basically something of another, or is it something in itself? Yeah, you wanna, yeah. It's like my muscles and my mind or something, right? And so, ability would be relative secundum dicii in that Latin lingo, right? Okay. But it'd be put fundamentally in quality, and it would be the second species of what quality, right?

[9:31] So, I think I mentioned before tonight how Thomas, you know, when he talks about God, he sometimes quotes what the great Boethius says, right? There are two of the ten categories that we find in God, or something like them, you know. And that, strictly speaking, God is not in a genus, right? And what two categories are they? Substance and relation, right? When you get into the Trinity, right?

[10:03] Father and Son, and so. And so, I mentioned I think last time, wasn't I? How when you get into the Father is generating the Son, right? God from God, Light from Light, True God from True God, begotten, not made. Um,

[10:33] but what was the Father able to generate the Son? Was it by his substance? Or was it by his fatherhood? Well, if you say it was by his fatherhood, right, they generate the Son, which makes some sense. The Father generates the Son, right?

[11:07] You get into certain problem, right? Huh? Because every agent makes something like itself, right? Huh? Just raises something like itself. And so, does the Father communicate his fatherhood or his fatherliness to the Son? Sounds kind of heretical to me. You have two fathers, yeah. So the guy's having two sons, right? Yeah, you'd have a problem. He was a father before he got the son. Yeah. Yeah. But now, if you say that, I mean, what does the Son have in common with the Father?

[11:42] He's God, right? So it must be by his divine nature they generated the what Son, huh? Now that could rise rise to a problem. So you might say, well, if the Father generated the Son by his divine nature, and the Son has that same divine nature, numerically the same, in fact, then can't he generate a Son too? No. Well, maybe it's not a complete statement of by what the Father generated the Son, but it's fundamentally by the divine nature, as it is in the what Father, as it's the same as the Father, right?

[12:26] And that's why the Son can't generate, right? So, but fundamentally, his ability to generate the Son is the divine nature and not his what fatherhood, right? It's by that, right? And of course, Thomas, who refers to Aristotle, does right. He puts power in quality, right? But not in what relation, right? It's fundamentally something absolute, right, rather than towards another, right? It's kind of very subtle, right now.

[13:01] But it's kind of amazing, you know. Kind of the study of God is kind of the last thing we know, really, huh? Especially in philosophy, it's the last thing we know, and maybe the last thing is really the Trinity, right? Because Thomas takes up the unity of God, right, his divine nature and his operations and so on, before it takes up the Trinity, right? And here you're going back to the categories, right?

[13:22] Which is kind of the beginning of logic, which is the beginning of philosophy, right? In the order of learning, right? And he realized the importance of the categories, right?

[13:35] In for that. Okay. So now what's this other distinction? Now, but it's touched upon here, but Aristotle doesn't go into it in this particular chapter, right? He just considers that distinction between what the Latins call relativa secundum dici and secundum esse, right?

[13:58] But some relativa are what secundum esse, right, huh? Which are not real. Say what was that, right? And some are relativa secundum dici which nevertheless imply real relations, as is clear about sense and sense, science and sense.

[14:24] So he says things are said to be relativa secundum esse when the names are placed upon them to signify the relations themselves, right? But relativa secundum dici, when the names are placed upon them to signifying qualities or something of this sort, principally or chiefly, right, huh? To which nevertheless there follow certain what relations, right, huh? Okay. It's a little different there in the case of the father generating the son, right?

[14:56] I'm talking about a relation that follows upon having the divine nature, right? But you are talking about it's chiefly by his divine nature that he generates another one who has a divine nature, right? But that divine nature, in so far as it's in the what father, right? Okay.

[15:19] So I was talking before class there a little bit about how Thomas says, you know, that the father is the same as the divine nature. There's no distinction between the father and the son, no real distinction. A distinction of reason, right? There's no real distinction. The same thing. And the father and the divine nature of the son, same thing. There's no real what distinction, not two different things.

[15:46] A distinction of reason, right? But there's no real distinction. And then between them and the Holy Spirit, right? Okay. He says the is the way of the divine nature being in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Spirit the same. Well, they have the same divine nature numerically, right? It's not just that you and I have the same, you know, in species, right? Human nature, but they had the same nature numerically, one, right?

[16:25] And they're all equally God. One is not more God than another. So, do they all have the divine nature in the same way then?

[16:39] What's those relations? They're going to make it a little bit different in the way they have it. So he says the Father has the divine nature, not from another. The Son has the divine nature from the Father. That's what we say in the Creed, don't we? God from God, Light from Light, True God from True God. Begotten, not made. yeah. It's not an effect, right?

[17:09] Was it as Basil scandalized when he spoke of the Father as being the the idea of the Son? Yeah, yeah, yeah. He didn't mean that, but it's you know Thomas is very clear to distinguish between what you can call the Father the beginning of the Son because the Son proceeds from him, right? God from God, Light from Light, but not really what cause because then they wouldn't have the same being, wouldn't have the same nature, and so that's kind of a you know he said Theodore of Stalham or there Basil, you know, it's kind of scary you foresee it though, you know, because you realize that Basil's really really great mind, right, really great mind.

[17:53] But then, how is the holy, how is God divine nature in the Holy Spirit differently than in the Father and the Son, right? Well, I think if you said that he's in the Holy Spirit from the Father too, period, I think you're going to get in trouble, right? Then there'd be no distinction between the what between the Son and the Holy Spirit. Two Son. Yeah.

[18:21] And therefore, you have to say that the divine nature is in the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, right? Proceeds from their mutual love, right?

[18:42] That's kind of interesting distinction, you know. odd little thing to see huh Little minds, what is the one? The Church Father says, and they stutter when they speak of the Trinity, right? It's? It's a beautiful, beautiful. You know, you said the word stutter, isn't it?

[19:04] Because it's it's the mind stuttering, right? I'm going to say the words. I suppose you get stuttered the words, you know, too. But but takes a long time to to state these things correctly, right?

[19:28] Now, what is this second distinction? No, which is not in the categories, so it's kind of a ad bonitatem doctrinae, right now. But because of the words, you might say, you know, real distinction, distinction of reason isn't real distinction the same as secundum esse. No, no, no. For a relation to be a real relation, it's got to have something besides the relation. And in the case of God, that other thing is the divine substance, which is the same as these relations.

[20:08] But in order for the relations that we creatures have, right? Huh? Then we have to have what? Something else that's the cause of this, right?

[20:21] Okay. So I'm a father because I generated a son, right? Or I'm a teacher because I taught a student or something, right? Huh? But I say, you know, this is the right side of the glass, and this is the left side of the glass. Why do I say that? Yeah, was really something in the glass. Does the glass really have a right side and a left side?

[21:02] I drink tea a lot, but the mug, the the handle is on the right side of the mug, right? You're all confused. huh? You're confused. see, That's that's not a real right or left, right? Huh? See, but I'm right-handed. There's a real basis for, you know, right to left to me, you know,

[21:29] huh? So some relations are only of what reason, huh? And Aristotle was the first man to point this out, huh? And he speaks of knowledge is really related to the known, but the known is not really what. it is. If I have a window peeker, I'm looking at my neighbor's house, you know. If they don't know I'm looking at them, right? I didn't think really see any real relation them to me.

[22:06] See the real relation of me to them, right? But you know, to me to the known, right? Huh? There's really the relation the other way. But our mind can't really think of one thing being towards the other without, you know, turn around, fair game, so on. But then you have a relation of reason, right?

[22:28] Um. What about that first sense of before and after, right? Which is time, right? Huh? Is today before tomorrow? Well, yeah, I'd say that, right? I'm pretty smart. I'd say today is after yesterday if my grandchildren asked me. It's before tomorrow, right? Huh? Is that a real relation? Yeah. Yesterday doesn't exist Yeah Tomorrow. Tomorrow doesn't exist either, right? So these are these are relations of reason? huh Yeah.

[23:06] It's shocking the reason you know looks before and after in the first sense of before and after is in time, right? Like it's you know what a weak little son of guy, right? Okay.

[23:23] So that's a very difficult thing to get in, right? But you could say though that is it before kind of is it something fundamentally, or is its whole nature, I want to use that, to be towards another, right?

[23:48] Is before a relation? secundum dici or secundum esse Yeah. without specifying in what sense of before? Yeah, any sense of before, yeah. Yeah I guess.

[24:04] Well, I would say this part of the table is before this part of the table. If you're moving one way. Yeah. Yeah. See, it might it doesn't seem something absolute itself, does it? Before I don't know.

[24:24] This is a very difficult thing, right? And it's not really necessary for the understanding of the categories because he he's just giving that one distinction, right? In other places he Aristotle touches upon this, and Thomas would touch upon this, right? So it's very important when you come to talk about what relation of father and son, right? Because the heretic, right, was it Sabellius, right? And he said, well, same same guy is called father and son.

[24:52] He's called father insofar as he created us or something, and he's called son insofar as he became a man or something. you know. But is it is it um you know genus species aren't they also relations or reason? Yeah, yeah. That's another kind of relation of reason, right? What's a different kind? Yeah, yeah. But. I mean, this whole this whole doctrine of relations of reason is it about logic?

[25:15] Does it have a lot to do? Yeah, yeah. Logic is about relations of reason, yeah. Yeah. And so it's interesting. We need those ones, you know. So we try to define something. If I'm going to define square, you know, say, well, let's get his genus first, right? You know, I was teaching Shakespeare's exhortation to use reason, right? I'd say to students, you know, that he's teaching us among other things what reason is, right?

[25:42] And you got to kind of see that you got to start with the genus of what something is, right? Which is that it's a what an ability, right? Okay. And you can figure out that you're going to define an ability in particular by what it's an ability for, right? And then you say, well, okay, well, he's saying it's ability for a large discourse, looking before and after, right?

[26:05] But you know, if you ask somebody what is a square, they probably would have a little, have to stop to think, you know. The first thing you want to see about a square maybe is that it's a plane figure or a rectilinear plane figure, or maybe you could start closer, a quadrilateral, right? And then you got to add these what differences, right?

[26:26] So I ask my students, what is an odd number? What's an even number? And I think most of them know that. What's a perfect number? You know. Well, it's a number to begin with. Yeah, yeah, and then you just got to find the difference, right? A number which is equal to everything that measures it. I mean, it even if I want to, you know, help them a little bit.

[26:51] Yeah, yeah, yeah. So four is measured by one and two, but not by what three. And one and two don't add up to four, right? But six is measured by one and by two and by three, but not by four or five. And lo and behold, one plus two plus three equals what? Six. Yeah. Then the second perfect number I always remember is twenty-eight, right? Where Thomas takes up the consideration of the perfection of God Can you define, generally speaking, what a relation of reason is?

[27:34] Well, I think it's it's probably equivocal by reason, right? Now, okay. So. So okay, so there's no genus that you can. Well, you can you can speak about relation in a sense, right? But the categories are concerned with the highest genera of what of being, right? Okay. Now, if you if you look at Aristotle in the book about being, which is the Metaphysics, right? Metaphysics. The subject of metaphysics is being in one, right?

[28:08] And so when he gets to the fifth book, he's already pointed out that being is is equivocal, right? The word being, right? And then he distinguishes being into being what per se and being per accidens right? Copelton, Tyson, Bibekovs, and he talks about accidental being in that sense, not as accidental as to pose a substance, but as opposed to per se. Something like a white logician, right?

[28:44] Or a Christian geometer. I'm not a Christian geometer, right now. Is that really something to be a Christian geometer? Or a Christian logician. Apparently Porphyry attacked the church, I guess, and the Christians, you know. So and so Augustine, you know, kind of speculates as to why he he had this pride, you know, you know. But I'm following Porphyry, you know. the Isagoge and Cajetan has got his commentary.

[29:13] on the Isagoge and Thomas is always referring to the Aesagoge, even in the, you know, very advanced places. So you have to be a Christian to be a logician, right? And you can be a Christian without being a logician, right? You can be a logician, not being a Christian. But is a Christian logician really some kind of a logician? He's a better logician. Not necessarily. I know a lot of.

[29:42] It's not unnecessary Aristotle is the father of logic, right? You know, there's no Christian that's the father of logic, right? Don't you think there's a Christian mathematics?

[29:57] as far as I know, as far as I know Euclid was not a Christian. You know, I count the church's money on Monday evening now, and there's somebody in the parish whose name is Euclid, right? I'm dying to meet this person to see if I've ever read Euclid, you know. And that's a boy downtown in my hometown. of St. Paul, there was a Euclid Hotel you know how how it's got that name, you know.

[30:20] But maybe he had some contact with Euclid, I don't know. So Aristotle makes that distinction, right? Huh? To be a Christian or to be, you know, a logician is is being per se, right? Huh? But I speak of a Christian logician because to be a Christian to be a logician happens to the same man, right? Huh? But they don't come together and make something right called Christian logic or something, right?

[30:54] Um. Okay, but then when he gets to being per se, right? Huh? He divides that into what two ways, according to the ten genera of being, and according to act and ability, right? Okay.

[31:16] And then he says, when you consider being according to distinction of the categories, it's chiefly about substance, right? And so in books seven and eight, he talks about substance, right? But he leads you into it from logic in book seven and from natural philosophy in book eight, right? And then book nine he talks about the division of being according to act and ability, but then he gives this other sense of being, right?

[31:44] Which is the being a reason, right? Okay. Which is kind of what in no man's land there between being per se and being prejudice, right? It's not accidental being, right? Because in that case there could be no what science, no episteme, about what logic, right? So it's got to be can't be accidental, right? But it's not as real, shall we say, or fundamental as the ten categories are.

[32:14] Why wouldn't it be in the category of quality? Because knowledge is in the category of quality. Well, an analogy is is in the category of quality, yeah. See, but but

[32:29] let me take a simple example of this, son. Um, a living man, right, is being in a fuller sense than sitting is being, right?

[32:49] So if I was going to be assassinated, I leave here tonight. You could say you will cease to be, Mr. Berquist, if you leave this room, right? Okay. Or you wouldn't say that. I bought my not being anymore when I left it, right? So that's being in much lesser sense, right?

[33:15] Accident doesn't have being by itself, right? It's that by which substance is in some way, right? Okay. Now we have substance and then accident, right? And then what comes even lower than accident?

[33:35] Well, that could be motion, right? See, so is growing as much being as the size you now have? Motion is kind of what? Imperfect being. Yeah, it's defined in the third book as the act of what is able to be in so far as it's able to be, right? Huh? Okay. So it's learning the same thing as knowing.

[34:12] It's growing the same thing. Growing to be five foot ten is the same thing as being five foot ten. Well, it has something of the size, but not, you know. My grandchildren are growing, right? But they haven't reached their full thing, right? Sometimes people say something's going to shoot up suddenly, you know. I went to the military academy there, and we used to march with the M ones, right?

[34:40] Huh? You get these little shims sometimes, and they give a carb guy, you know, to march with, you know, and maybe it wouldn't be until their sophomore years, like that, that they would start marching with a M one, right? Huh? And it's kind of funny the way people shoot up, you know, just between a couple, you know, yeah. And so growing is is is the third, right?

[35:03] Huh? Okay. But now can some people be said to be ignorant? To say it. Or someone can be blind, right? Somebody can be deaf, right? Huh? Well, what kind of being is that? So now now you're starting to get dumb. Be dead. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And

[35:36] here you seem to be saying that non-being is is a kind of being, right? Which shows how equivocal the word "being" is, right? So it's substance first, then accident, then motion. Motion come up in the post predicaments, right? And then we have non-being, right? Like being ignorant or being blind or being deaf or impotent or something, right? Huh? But it's a kind of non-being. These things, right?

[36:04] Now, if we get really into non-being, let's talk about nothing right now. And what would you say about nothing? Is nothing something? Or would you say that nothing is nothing? Yeah, my friend Boethius, right, the great mind Boethius, he said, nothing, no statement is more true than what something is said to be itself, right? A dog is a dog, a cat is a cat, a rose is a rose, right?

[36:35] So you can say nothing is nothing, right? Now, what kind of is is that? See, that's really a being of what reason, right now? Something in the mind. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So nothing is something in the mind only, right? So we can talk about nothing, right? And if you're a natural philosopher, you may have met these guys who said, you know, you can't get something out of nothing.

[37:04] Shakespeare teaches us this. King Lear, you know, he says to Cordelia, "Nothing will get you nothing, right? " She won't flatter him, you know, instead of she loves him, right? The two elder sisters you know. Wretches. Yeah, terrible people, really. Um.

[37:25] But nothing seems to be a being of reason, and you can make a true statement about it, right? That nothing is nothing, right now. Or I can even say that something is not nothing, right? You know. So it can be in a true statement, right? And here that kind of kind of shows maybe that nothing is is in some way a being of reason that's closer, right, to real being because it's kind of in this descending order, right?

[37:56] It's kind of the bottom thing. I always quote my teacher, Kasurik because his joke was that philosophy is the only subject where you can get paid for talking about nothing.

[38:08] That's true, right? Yes. And this comes back with what our friend Hegel there right now. Okay. And Hegel kind of gets things confused, but you know he he thinks of becoming as kind of a union of being and non-being, right now. Yes. So people do think about these things, right? You know. But

[38:41] so you might say that nothing is is is being only in the mind, right? And therefore, it's something like this, what genus and species, right? But

[38:56] there seems to be. Two kinds of what beings of reason, one which is a a relation, right? What a relation of of reason, right? And that means a relation that arises from knowing something. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Or there's a little more cases in that too, but but that's what you talk about genus and what species, right? Now, and so you know when we define genus, we sometimes say it's a name said with one meaning of many things, other and kinder species, signifying what it is.

[39:38] And what's a species? What's the name of a particular kind of thing placed under genus in which the genus is said in answer to the question, what is it? And so they kind of seem as being what relative to each other, right? And that's the reason we gave why Porphyry takes up species right after genus rather than difference, right? And what I guess why wouldn't That relation, right so genus is relative to species, species relative to genus, right?

[40:08] Why isn't that relation a real relation? Genus and species? Yeah. Well, I mean, aren't those really things in your mind? I mean, don't you have animals? You could you could say that they're relativa secundum dici right. They are. Yeah, but they're not real relations. Relations. Oh yeah, Yeah, it's not in things outside the mind. That's why they're not real. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's a relation of universal to the singular, right?

[40:41] Universal set of the singulars, but things are universal only when they're separated in the what mind, right? Okay. So it's the it's the active understanding that separates the universal. It's common to many things, right? So the distinction between logical relations and real relations has to do with what's in the mind, what's outside. Well, that's one of them. Yeah, see, but those ones might be based upon what some kind of of relation of reason, right?

[41:10] Why nothing is more of a negation, right? So it's a different kind. Okay. Some are based upon negations, yeah, and deafness or blindness, right? Um, that's not quite as much nothing as nothing is nothing, right? And the crown represents nothing. But when you when you get to the post predicament, we'll come back to this because you'll talk about the kinds of opposites, right? And

[41:44] you know, distinguish between contradictories and and lack, right? Okay. So we can say that this class doesn't see, right? But you wouldn't speak to this class as being what blind, right? Because blind is the non-being of the ability to see in something that is able to see by nature and should be able to to see by nature, right? And so it's being deprived. But in the case of this, it's a mere what negation, right?

[42:15] And and again, you know, every time I study the substance of God, right, Thomas divides his consideration of the substance of God in both the Sumas, right, which kind of key works into five, right? The order is a little different, but the five are right there, right? Now one of the five is that God is infinite, right? And that first thing Thomas will point out that this is not a what privation, you see, like a limitless line or something, an infinite line, but it's a what negation instead of God, right?

[42:54] Yeah. And so he's going back to the categories and distinction between having and lacking something, right? And then being and not being, right? Huh? And so, is the relation of genus to species in the category of relation? No, no, because the categories are the be, you know, ones of being in the sense of even outside the mind, right? Huh? You know, so.

[43:24] But how many different kinds of relations of reason are there? Well, there's a good. You've got to read the De Potentia, but one distinction there is between ones that are like what, nothing, and like, you know, if I say

[43:57] you're known to be because I know you. See, well, that's kind of a relative thing, right? Right, negation is a different kind of thing. But you know,

[44:18] Thomas and I guess Aristotle too, but they'll speak of you know as the the reason kind of makes nothing to be like a what something, right?

[44:35] I did nothing. What are you doing? What's new? Okay.