Logic (2016)
23. Relations of Reason in De Potentia, and Aristotle's Chapter on Quality
Class of 2017-02-02
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/023-relations-of-reason-in-de-potentia-and-aristotles-chapter/

[0:00] Okay, now we get the famous text here, which I got reproduced again in that thing I got. If you want to, but but let's look at this one. This is a magnificent text. If you're asking about that, Father.

[0:14] Secret realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem rem, right? To a thing, to a thing. So the relation of reason consists in the order of things understood, which dupiciter. Can happen, right? Okay. So the first distinction is a two or three. It's two here, right? Okay.

[0:38] This is a very subtle Thomas says here. You realize the power here of this text. In one way, according as this order is what discovered or introduced, you might say even, by the understanding, and attributed to that which is said relatively. And of this sort are the relations which are attributed by the understanding to things understood, right? In so far as they understood. Just as a relation of genus and what species.

[1:20] So when I understand a tabitha to be an animal, I'm not understanding tabitha as much as when I understand tabitha to be a cat, right? But the relation of animal to cat there is something that's in my what? Yeah. And it belongs to things understood, in so far as they understood, right? Okay. Now these relations reason finds by considering the order of what is in the understanding to things which are outside, right?

[1:54] I got something in my mind. It's called man, right? Okay. And I compare man to you guys. I say, oh yeah, man is said of each of you guys, right? See, so I'm considering order, right? But now if I consider man and animal, right? Then I've got the order of things understood to each other, right? Yeah. Because universals exist, things a universal only in the mind, right?

[2:24] So they're a genus or a species. I got all the way from you guys to the species man, right? That's something universal. And even more universal, the what animal, right? And then I compare this to and I see the order of them, right? And that's important, right? To see that. That's one kind of relation of reason, right? Okay.

[2:50] Now the other one is more subtle, right? The other way is according as these relations follow upon the what? Yeah. To it that we understand something in order to another. Although that order was not introduced by the mind, right? But more from a certain necessity, it follows the way of what understanding. Now this is the time when when when the relation is real and one towards the other, right?

[3:27] But not the reverse. But our mind can't really understand this to relate to that without turning around and relating it back to us, right?

[3:39] But now another very important consequence of this. Well, let's finish the sentence first. But follows from a certain necessity the way of understanding, right? In relations of this sort, the understanding does not attribute to that which is in the understanding, but to that which is in the what thing, right?

[4:06] And this happens according as some things, not having in themselves an order, are understood orderly, okay. Although the understanding does not understand them to have an order, because thus it would be what false, huh?

[4:33] That's why do you call it the first world war and the second world war, right? Some people say the second world war is a continuation of the first world war, a consequence of it, right? I gotta kind of you know understand them in order, in orderly way, right? Can't do my history without can't be my historian without doing that, right? Huh?

[5:02] It's a very subtle thing, right? Now he's getting closer to a what distinction of the what second kind, right? And what he says next, huh?

[5:23] In order that some things have an order, it is necessary first that both be a what being, right? And secondly that both be what, yeah? Because of the same thing to itself, there is no order, right? Like I was insisting that what if reason looks before and after, it's got to look for a distinction, right? There can't be a before and after without what a distinction between what is before and what is after, huh?

[5:56] Not so? Right? And I go back to my axiom of before and after that nothing is before or after itself. So there must be some distinction between what is before what's after. So if you don't see a distinction first, you can't see what order, yeah.

[6:22] Sometimes Thomas says distinction is the first thing involved in order or between presupposed order, as long, as he says, you know, okay. Now the third thing is no more hard to understand,

[6:38] and both able to be ordered to the other, right? Okay. Now he starts to talk about how one of these things is what missing, right? And one of these three. Sometimes the understanding takes some two things as being, of whom either one only or neither is a being, right? As when it takes two future things, right? Okay.

[7:15] So I'm going to plant these vegetables right before I plant those ones, right? You're planning your farm harvest. Yeah, but now that's two things in the future, right? One of which I'm saying is before the other, but it's that real relation don't even exist the day when I plant these these things and those things, right? You're planting your garden for the next dream, you haven't got the seeds yet.

[7:45] He had to explain this to the farmer, right? My father's company, you know, they they made farm wagons and other farm things and so on. Because their father wasn't that business even before he started his own company, right? But he was still when he was dating my mother, he he was kept sometimes that a farmer had a problem with the machine, right? My father go out to the farm and get the machine, so it was working properly, right?

[8:13] And he'd take my mother with him, right? And my mother would would sit and talk to the the farmer's wife. My father would go out in the field with the the farmer, right?

[8:27] So it's kind of a. No, just that's the old fashioned family planning. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But I hate to try to explain to a farmer this this this about this being only relation of reason, you know. The farmer probably caught me over the head or something, try to get me back to reality, as he would say. Come back after barn.

[8:57] So sometimes intellect takes two things as beings, and one of them, or even both of them, are not a being, right? So he takes two future things. In that case, neither one would would be right, or one thing present, which might be somewhat real, as you said, and another future, right? And it understands one, right, in order to the other, right, saying that the one is before the other, right?

[9:26] Huh? Whence these relations are reason only. As falling upon the way of what understanding, huh? No, I may should try to explain this to an historian. Maybe even open to this. I doubt it. though. The First World War really didn't come before the Second World War.

[9:55] Strange, though. But kind of forced to understand the thing that way, are we? But I wonder, you know, when our dog uses the first sense of before and after, the before and after in in motion, right? One part of motion doesn't exist with the other part, right? And yesterday and tomorrow don't exist. So how could, you know, this be more than a relation of what reason, right, huh?

[10:24] Between today and tomorrow, right? We'll do that tomorrow. Just like when there's some prophecies, they know some prophecies in scripture they refer to future things as past, like you're looking in the future of that future as something past. Funny, because there

[10:50] used to be a program on the radio in the old days, and I was young. You know, they'd be re-enacting some historical event, right? And the program was called "You Are There" or something, right? You know, even had Socrates' trial. You know, you're in Athens. You know, and the guy's on the radio. It's kind of fun to watch, you know. It's sort of just a joke, you know, but that's what eternity is like, right?

[11:12] You are there, right? You know, because the past, present, and future are all present to God in His eternal now, right? And so then, you are there. You will be there. You know. We're in eternity. We share in eternity.

[11:29] Okay. Okay. That doesn't have the first thing right that both exist right now. Okay. Sometimes it takes something one as two, and understands it with some order, right? Well, this is going against the reason of being distinct, right? That's when it says something is the what same as itself, right?

[12:02] And such a relation is a reason only, right? So I'm the same as myself. That's not a real relation, right? Me myself or not Yeah.

[12:16] Sometimes it takes two things as order order to each other, right? Between which there is not a middle order, right? But rather, one of them is essentially an order or a relation, as when it says the relation happens to its what subject, huh? When such a relation of relation to something other of reason is is of reason only, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[12:46] And this you know this comes up when they take up the fact that the relation what is creation in the creature, right? What's relation to God, right? Who's produced it, huh? Well, of course, one of the objections to saying that this is a real relation of the creature to God is, well, then you'd have to say that the that relation was created, and therefore there's relation for relation, and this will go on forever, right?

[13:12] Huh? Well, that's going against this third thing, right? Huh? If something's essentially relation is not related to you by something else, right? Okay. Like they're saying like like all the time, right?

[13:32] Okay. Okay. Now, notice, those are three different things, aren't they? Right? Okay. Now, sometimes it takes something with an order to another, insofar as it is the what limit of the order of the other to it, although it is not ordered to the other. And this is the example that Aristotle pointed out, as it is by taking the scibile right as the limit of the order of knowledge to it.

[14:07] The name scibile is is signifying relatively right, but the relation of reason what only. But if knowledge is towards the thing known, it is the thing known by the knowledge. You know, your mind automatically thinks of it in orderly way, right? You know, it's kind of interesting. You know, you know when Shakespeare says reason looks before and after, you think of what the fact that it's looking for before and after in things, right?

[14:38] Now, not realizing that sometimes it has to think of things as what before and after to think about them at all, right? Now, historian's got to do this, right? Now, and he's kind of what thinking orderly, but the order really isn't there.

[15:01] That's very subtle, though, right? This this this text is is kind of the nearest thing I know of a text that divides, you know. He had at first one way. He separates the the ones that logic considers those ones, right, from these ones that are what kind of necessity of the way of understanding, right? And and he subdivides these, right? Now, but one way he subdivides it is what those three things that they got to be what

[15:34] both existing, right? They've got to be what really distinct, right? And they've got to be what able to be ordered to each other, right, or to one of them, right? And then this odd case that Aristotle points out. Okay.

[15:53] Now there's a text here. I don't know this. I think this is the one I you know have this text again in it, but other ones. But there's a a place where Thomas talks about, and this one Aristotle points out this example, you know, of a relative secundum rationem right? And Avicenna pointing out this one, right? You know, you know, and so on, right? So I mean, there's kind of in the texts that Thomas is aware of, he's learned something from.

[16:22] More than one guy, right? Pointing out, not that Aristotle didn't maybe know them all, but I mean, you know, we have a text where he's saying that the relation of the knowable to to knowledge, right, is a relation of reason. The relation of knowledge to the knowable is real, right? But the relation of the knowable to the knowledge is of reason, right? Aristotle points it out, right?

[16:47] But Avicenna maybe takes another one, right, and shows another kind. But this is the most complete text I know, so you can realize some of the power of the Disputed Questions on power. Most powerful ones that I think I know. This looks like this is a different text, but I don't have a source for it. I'm gonna try to find this this uh this next paragraph. What was it?

[17:11] It doesn't correspond. I don't think. Of course, it's not from De Potentia. I don't think. Yeah. Let me see if you have. Okay, this this is an objection now. One of the objections and the reply to it, right? Number, what says three down there? Yeah, that that's just one of the objections, right? Yeah, yeah.

[17:39] I mean, some of these ones we got, you know, seventeen, eighteen objections, right? And and they they have a way of concentrating your mind, you know, willy-nilly, but kind of. I've got to take a break.

[17:56] Okay, or I'm gonna read that again tomorrow, you know. Or I'm going to read that again tomorrow, you know. Yeah, yeah. Okay. Now, moreover, this name Dominus, right,

[18:20] signifies a what relation, right? Since it is a relativum secundum esse, now you've got to be careful of that way of speaking, huh? Well, what that means. But God is the Dominus, not according to reason only. Okay.

[18:40] And I noticed that when I taught at Assumption, you know, I was gonna, you know, quote Christ, right? I'd always say, you know, no, it's our Lord says. I always called him Lord, right? Okay. Well, this is the word Dominus, right? Huh? One of my sons is the Dominican right? I call I call him the Lord's man. Okay.

[19:05] But God is the Lord, not according to reason only. Therefore, neither are these relations in God according to reason only, huh? See, does God have a real relation to us, right? Well, then this would be something added to God, right? Can something be added to God?

[19:31] To third, it should be said, just as someone is really the same as himself, right? You can say that, right? Even though it's not by a real relation that he's the same as himself, right? And not only according to reason, right? It's not just according to reason that I am the same as Dwayne Berquist. But it's that real relation that I have to myself.

[20:00] Well, no, I'm not two, right? You can't have two things, right? Takes two to play relation, now, okay? Although relation is be according to reason only, on account of this, that the cause of relation is real, namely the unity of the substance, Duane Berquist. Right, which the understanding understands, right, under a what relation, right?

[20:38] Thus, the power of coercing the subject to him, right, is in God really, right? Which the understanding understands in order to the subjects, right? Why? Because in account of the order, the subjects to what him? Okay. Just as we understand the order of what the knowable, right, to knowledge, which is not real, but because the real order of knowledge to what the knowable, right? In account of this, we say that he's the Lord really, although the relation is one of reason only, right?

[21:22] Okay. Now we say the same thing about the knowable, wouldn't we The knowable is really known by knowledge, but is it a real relation that it has? You know, it's not a real relation it has, but it's really known by by knowledge. You can see how people get very mixed up in that, huh? Very subtle, you know. Easy. See, you know, you talk about creation is creator.

[21:54] We say God is the creator, right? Is that a real relation that He has to the creature? No. So we say, but isn't He really the creator? You say, you know, yeah, but He's not what creator by real relation to the creature. That's very subtle, right? Huh? You can see it's a problem people have, right? Huh? So there's no no easy business here, right? Huh? No cure.

[22:22] Yeah, yeah, yeah, nobody. No, I had a professor who had a real problem with this because he thought that if God's not really related to us. Then you know, he's kind of cold and distant. Well, that's the kind of thing you know. It's very hard for him now that he thinks that God really has emotions and that He doesn't have emotions. I know. I know that. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[22:45] Well, God does have emotions in His humanity. It's true. Sometimes He does hide them. So I, I'm saying, you know. I always talk to students, you know, about marriage, and I'd say, now, what does the priest ask you? Do you have wonderful feeling about this woman? Well, presumably you do, because that what makes you married, doesn't it?

[23:09] And I said, no. He says, do you take so and so? He's asking you to what express your choice of this woman for your wife, right? Or vice versa. You know, I take you know, take you as my husband, huh? And it's that which really marries you, right? Huh? Okay.

[23:33] Now I say, if a man leaves his wife, is he being true to himself? You know, let me sketch an expression of what it means to be true to yourself, right? And,

[23:47] well, I'm being true to my emotions. Well, is emotion more you than your choice? So I said, now suppose you're a member of the jury, right? And a person in a fit of anger, you know, strikes somebody and kills them, right?

[24:07] Would you regard this as seriously as you would a man who's plotted a murder, or, you know, see, because it's more what, him, right? So a a planned murder, right, would seem to be what, choice? Yeah, yeah. I used to say, you know, that people are breaking up a little bit, and somebody says, I don't ever see you again, you know, and, but you can walk that back better than if you write them a note, you know, because that means you thought about it and you you really wanted to have nothing more to do with them, right?

[24:47] See, why it might be just a sudden emotion, you know, that you, you know, you know that people go through those things. So when are you being false to yourself, right?

[25:00] Or you're being more false to yourself than when you go against your choice, than when you go against your what, emotion or change, right? Because the choice is more you, right? Quite Chester and I said that the marvel that they could get married is that it honors a man according to his keeps his word.

[25:27] I say honors his word. You said you were going to do this. Yeah, yeah. That's why it wasn't allowed in most cases. You're not honoring a man for his word.

[25:39] Okay. So you can see that problem that you have there. Let's stick that in third there. But anyway, in the above text, Thomas would seem to distinguish about five kinds of relations of reason, right? That's nearest I know to a thing one. But he distinguishes them first into two, right? All relations of reason are either attributable to things only as they are in the understanding, right? That's the first one he spoke about, right?

[26:07] What they call second intentions logic, or to them as they're outside the reason. Some relations of reason, such as genus and species, are said of things,

[26:20] only so far as they're in reason, where they are universal. Relations of reason that are said of things in themselves are four kinds, whereby they depart in some way from what is required for relation. And the first way was when one or both of the things between whom there is relation does not exist outside the mind, as today as before tomorrow, right? Thomas's example, or if it's early, you have two future things.

[26:50] Two, when things are not distinct outside the soul, as Socrates is the same as what Socrates. That's very true. That Socrates is Socrates, right? Yeah. But is as being the same as Socrates? Is that really?

[27:09] And when one is not orderable to the other because it is itself a relation order, as relation to its what subject. And four, when the foundation of the relation is found

[27:25] is found only in one, which is really towards the other, right? But not vice versa, as the known to the knowledge or knower, right?

[27:38] Perhaps in the first three there is relation of reason in both relatives, but in the last only in one, right? That's the other distinction Thomas has of the three, right? Okay. There seems to be two most universal divisions or distinctions of relations that we find in Thomas.

[28:00] Every relation is either a real relation or a relation of reason. That's thing. And then there's other distinction. Every relative is either a relative secundum dici or relative secundum esse. But some people confuse relative secundum esse and this means the same thing as real relation. It doesn't, right? Mhm. But the the word the language could confuse you, right? But there's a lot of mistakes from language. Aristotle says the most common mistake is equivocation.

[28:28] There is a danger in understanding dici and esse in the second distinction and confusing them with the first two. One could crisscross the two divisions, but that's something we don't get into too much. Okay.

[28:47] Okay. That's all the stuff on relation. It's a relational chapter. Horrible thing to do. So. Oh, you don't have this. I don't have this. I got a quality here. Yes. These cases have quality. Okay. I'm going to stick this one there so we don't get confused. Okay, this chapter can be divided into three parts. That happens a lot. In the first part, Aristotle defines quality. I put that in what?

[29:40] Quotes there. I because strictly speaking, a definition is of a species, right? And a genus, highest genus, cannot be defined in the strict sense, maybe, but it's kind of a notification of what quality is.

[29:58] And he distinguished was its species, right? And there's going to be four species, huh? Okay. It's not as easy to distinguish these as it was the species of quantity, huh? And Aristotle sometimes calls these species genera Well, because something can be both a genus and a species, right? But maybe it's a little bit because it's not so what? Doesn't seem much unity there, right? Don't

[30:35] push that too far. Yeah, yeah. In the second, he considers the properties of quality, right? Some of them have. Anyway. But in the third, he returns to the connection of some qualities with towards something, right? Which we talked about before. The reason why he seems to get out of order, right? Which would be a serious thing for the philosopher.

[31:07] Okay. In the first part, Aristotle defines the Greek word for quality by its concrete correspondent, just as Latins could define qualities as that by which you are qualities, right? This is difficult to imitate in English. It's as if we use the word "howness" for quality, right? And define howness as that by which we're said to be how we are. Sounds a little strange in English, right? Okay.

[31:46] Then Aristotle distinguishes four species or forms of quality. Finally, returning to the original definition, he points out that how we are is said denominatively from the above what species, right? That was in the first. Antipredicaments was it? Some things are named equivocally. Some are named univocally. Some are named by denomination, right? Okay.

[32:18] It's a different from the two. You know? Okay. Because you're not keeping the same word, right? But I am denominated healthy from health, right? Or a geometer from geometry, or something, right? You don't keep the same word, right? But you do in the equivocal.

[32:43] Okay. Now, the first species or form of quality Aristotle is habit and what? Disposition, right? Huh? Now, sometimes Aristotle will distinguish and divide habit against disposition. Sometimes he'll say that habit is a disposition. No, can't get away and do that, can he? Sure. You can't. You can't do that. But you don't realize how often we do this, right? Huh? You know? So I used to say to the students, if the biologist says that that you're an animal, right?

[33:25] He's probably not insulting you, right? But if your girlfriend says you're an animal, she is, right? So sometimes we divide man against the what? Animals, and then man is not an animal, right? But sometimes we say that that an animal can be man or a beast, right? Huh? They're both animals, right? But beast sometimes keeps the name animal, its own name, and man is called a man and not an animal, right?

[34:01] Now, what's the reason for that? And that takes place in more than one way, right? But what's the reason for that? Something's added to it. You mean man gets a new name? Yeah. Why would man get a new animal, right? Huh? A new name? Well, because he has something very noteworthy, right? Okay. Now, there's a famous example of this in Aristotle there when he's talking about the virtues of reason, right?

[34:29] And he distinguishes the the virtues of looking reason, nous or natural understanding, as I call it, episteme, right? Huh? Reasoned out knowledge, and then wisdom, right? And then the virtues of practical reason, which are art and and foresight or prudence, right? Okay. So he distinguishes between episteme and what? Sophia.

[34:56] But then in the book, of the fourteen books of wisdom, there, he calls what? Wisdom. An episteme. Oh, he's obviously mixed up, right? Obviously, we shouldn't be messing with hell. Yeah, yeah, he does. No, he's not. I remember the political scientist at Assumption. I mean, at the College of Saint Thomas, you know, he said. Yeah, Thomas uses words in so many senses, you know. You don't know what he's saying.

[35:22] He's given up trying to, you know. This guy's fairly well known. Yeah, his own textbook, you know, you know, it was kind of a pretty good seller. But how can Aristotle divide Sophia against episteme, right, in the discussion of the virtues and the ethics, and then make the mistake of calling Sophia an episteme in the metaphysics?

[35:52] It is a reasoned-out knowledge, but because it's so excellent, it gets a new name. Yeah. Yeah. See, episteme is a reasoned-out knowledge of causes, but wisdom is about the very first cause, right? Huh? You know, the first cause is God. Really, in an excellent sense, right? Now, Sophia's lady Sophia, there, my godchild, I mean, my grandchild. What is wisdom? She says it's a knowledge of God, right?

[36:20] Huh? Okay. So that's impressive, right? Huh? He does it with contraries I learned this recently on one of the courses. Yeah, He divides contraries against habit So sometimes he says disposition can be easily lost, like what we in English call mood, right? You can change your mood in the course of a day, right? Or you know, they have these cocktails; they call attitude adjustment. And if he'll get through the meeting, I need a drink, you know.

[36:57] They change the actor. Then they're laughing, you know, and they're enjoying themselves, something like that. So mood is an easily lost disposition, right? Huh? See, but a habit is a what stable, firm disposition, right? Huh? But because it adds something noteworthy over just any kind of disposition, right? This firmness or stability, right? Might even define your character, right? We give it a new name. We call it a what habit, right?

[37:26] So you find Aristotle sometimes saying habit is a disposition, a firm one, and sometimes he divides habit against disposition as a you know, as a unstable, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[37:47] Habits are more stable and longer-lasting than dispositions. Huh? Reasoned-out knowledge and moral virtues are habits, but health and sickness are more what dispositions, huh? But a habit can also be called a disposition in the broad sense, for by habit we are disposed in some way, right? Thus, the word disposition could be used in general for this species or genus of quality, and then be kept in particular.

[38:19] That is easily movable. While the other species, adding something noteworthy, stability and long lastingness, gets the name of what habitus Now, the second species or genus of quality is natural ability or inability. Thomas puts the powers of the soul in this what species,

[38:45] and so I define reason there, following my teacher, there Shakespeare, as ability for large discourse, right? Looking before and after. Now, why do you think he gives habit or disposition before natural ability or inability? Isn't that more fundamental a natural ability? So I have this ability called reason before I have geometry, right, which is the imperfection of it. So what is he, you know, he's obviously mixed up there in the order, isn't he?

[39:16] Is it the natural order in the thing or the way we know it? Well, he had put. Discrete quantity, didn't he, before continuous quantity? And that's because discrete quantity is is more perfect measurement, right?

[39:38] You measure every number by one, real fixed, you know, thing. You measure every length by what? There's no smallest line to use, right? It's a perfect thing, right? But perhaps the reason is that by habit we are well or ill disposed towards our what nature. The nature is what's most fundamental of the thing, right? And by habit we are well or ill disposed towards that. It may be more known too in some way, right?

[40:26] Because sometimes when they talk about quantity and quality, they say quantity is the measure of substance, quality is the disposition of substance, right? As if that's kind of used to cover the whole thing, right? But especially used for the first species, right? I like this other one in terms of its connection with our what nature, right?

[40:58] I mean, a habit is either virtue or vice, right? It's either either well disposed towards your nature or. something Yeah, yeah. It just sticks in my mind

[41:10] when the mayor of Worcester called these guys last night morons. He was well disposed. He did. He said, "I'm walking back now." You know, because he said some number of himself. There's one guy in the thing wants him to, you know, are we a a you know what they call these cities that accept people? Oh, safe haven or whatever. Yeah, yeah. What is it? That's not the word.

[41:37] Sanctuary city, guess, yeah, whatever it is. Yeah. And and he wants to avoid the word, right? But he wants to be a sanctuary city. The mayor, you know, this one guy is probably just trying to push the thing, you know, and so they all down there, you know, demonstrating in favor of us being the accepting city, you know, and so on. Accepting city for what? What? Illegal.

[41:56] Illegal? Oh, illegal. Yeah, yeah. Trump Trump wants to get rid of any any threatening, you know, to cut off funds, federal funds, you know. Well, there are sanctuary cities. Yeah. Oh, Chicago is announced in the article. San Francisco. Maybe they're more. Yeah, there's 50 cities that call themselves sanctuary cities. The illegals are there. You can't deport them. That they have to cooperate with the federal feds to do that.

[42:19] And so now Trump is threatening to cut off federal aid to those cities. He's threatening to do it. I don't think he's done yet, but that's one way to put the chokehold on. Yeah. Yeah.

[42:32] No end to no end to this, you know. I mean, we think it's always people in office, you know, they can really really plow forward, you know. We can't do anything games all the time Okay. Now the second species or genus of quality is natural ability or inability, huh? And I should say Thomas puts the powers of the soul in the species, right, huh? So the ability to grow, right, the ability to feed yourself, huh?

[43:00] The ability to reproduce, the sense powers, you know, the ability to see or hear, and the ability to reason and so on, right? The ability to choose and so on, right? These are all in the second species of quality.

[43:20] Now the third species of gene or genus, huh? That should have been or our genus of quality is what Aristotle calls undergoing qualities and undergoings, huh? Now when I was first studying these things, I used to always call these the sense qualities, right, huh? So hard and soft and hot and cold and wet and dry, these things that easily change. And I'd blush and it was like a red, you know, undergoing qualities, right?

[43:48] Things of that sort might be useful to call them the sense qualities, but Aristotle calls them this. Now the undergoings, of course, are more transitory and that's something imperfect in the genus of quality. They are called undergoing qualities because the senses undergo them, right? Hence, some call these sensible qualities, but some are called undergoing because they're the result of those having them undergoing something. So I blush, undergoing shame.

[44:26] Okay. Thomas alludes to the distinction here of undergoing quality undergoings in this text. Nulla potentia passiva can go into act unless it be what completed by the form of what is active upon it, in which it comes to be an act, because nothing operates except according as an act. But the impressions of active things are able to be in the passive things in two ways. In one way, by way of a what action undergoing, when the passive power is in a kind of state of change.

[45:09] In other way, by way of what quality and form, when the what impression of the active is already now made kind of what connatural to the thing. huh? People have been on the sun too long, right, and they got their they permanently died by the sun.

[45:27] Just as the philosopher in the Predicamentes, right, distinguishes passion and passibilem qualitatem. Now the fourth species, the fourth species of quality is figure and what, form. Okay. I can imagine how much more difficult it is to talk about quality here than quantity, right? Because quantity is divided into what, two, right? Then you subdivide it into two or three, and all the way down to the ones. I got it divided into four.

[45:59] This is horrible. This is horrible. Think of four. Aristotle even says maybe there's some other one too. You know, we don't know about. That's the one I couldn't figure out. Yeah, but Thomas says you know nobody's ever going to find the other the other one. So, you know, remember my logic teacher there Father Delac, that he thought there might be another one, but he no, he can come up with them.

[46:21] You know, it's kind of amazing Aristotle can distinguish these four, right? Now. So when Aristotle has finished distinguishing these four species, he says there may be others, but these are the ones many spoken of, right?

[46:41] Now, can you divide these four into two or three? Somebody could. Well, sometimes I I notice that the first three ones, right, seem to be in some way a source of what you do in some way, huh? Okay. You do something because your habit or disposition, right? You do something because of your inborn abilities or inabilities, and even because of your what undergoing qualities, right? Now, but the fourth species is the one around quantity, right?

[47:24] The shape of something, right? Is that a source of someone doing something? No. And when Aristotle is investigating, you know, the the virtues, you know, he's saying, well, what is in the soul, right? Huh? That's a source of what you do, and then he distinguishes these first three, right? You know. So maybe you could distinguish the first three against the fourth, right? And the fact that Aristotle gives those first three together, right, and then the fourth one maybe is a sign he sees a little a little difference, huh?

[48:02] Um. So they point out that you have in geometry figure and form, but you don't have any motion. The, you know, even the sphere doesn't go rolling off, right, or something like that, or the circle go rolling off, you know. The sphere has a hard time bumping along, you know. But doesn't seem to be any more than quantity itself as a source of change, right? That's kind of interesting.

[48:32] Right, there's no change, right? The triangles melt. and still, apply. So now, in the third part of the first part, right? Aristotle states how one is is said denominatively from the what? above, huh?

[49:07] Now, in the second chief part of the chapter, Aristotle considers three properties of quality. The first two fitting only some species of quality, right? And the latter being a property in a stricter sense, huh?

[49:25] The first. First property is to have a contrary. Okay. But Aristotle exemplifies in the first and third species of what quality? This is significant because the second and fourth species do not seem to have what contraries, huh?

[49:46] But not every species under the first and the third have a contrary either. A connection between the first and third species is seen in the fifth book of Wisdom. The fifth book after the books of natural philosophy,

[50:08] where these two senses are joined. Simplicius, huh? Greek commentator says that contrariety is found in other genera as there's something of quality what in them, huh?

[50:30] Recall the question in Lectio 11 of the first book of natural hearing, whether there's contrariety in substance or not. Aristotle reasoning from both the affirmative and the negative. But on the side of the differences is found the contrariety, and difference is said, as Boethius says, in qualequid right? I translate how it is what it is. You know, it's an essential difference, huh? Or how it is what it is.

[50:59] Likewise in quantity, and is the relatives secundum dici that were contrary. That's qualities, right? Secundum dici Don't worry too much about that. The second property which is added to the first one is to be said more and less, huh? Again Aristotle exemplifies this in the first and third species. But the fourth species he says does not admit of more or less. One circle is not more or less a circle than another, right?

[51:33] If you are a circle, that's a very definite thing, right? So sometimes we say something is more circular than another, right? Wheels of my car more circular than the wheels of your car. They're flattening out there. But strictly speaking, they're not. What the flattened tire is not the circle at all, right? I think somebody told me there's a peanuts cartoon and maybe Charlie Brown or somebody drew a circle and he said, "Now suppose that's a perfect circle."

[52:01] But Lucy said, "Every circle is a perfect circle." Some truth, ah, yeah. The third property is more a strict property, right? By its quality, a thing is like or unlike another thing, right? By by its quantity, it's what equal or unequal, right?

[52:32] Now the third chief part of the chapter returns to the connection of quality with towards something, right? Some qualities are said to be towards another by their genus. Each science is knowledge of something, right? Nothing prevents these from being put into highest genera you know, the relation in one place and the quality in another. Although fundamentally in quality, the relation fallen upon them is in towards something.

[53:06] We can now try to penetrate more these points at the help of some texts from Thomas. Now this is a very interesting word. This word how, right? Quality is defined by how, right?

[53:26] How are you today? The word how seems to signify the limit or determination of a thing. This can be seen when the word is used in combination, as in quantity, being called what or how many, yeah. So that's a kind of a what, how much or how many. That's kind of the concrete way of speaking of quantity, right? And we talked about that before. How in Greek, I guess you have one word, right, that can cover both discrete and continuous quantity.

[54:15] Warren Murray tells me that you can do that in French too, but you can't do in English, right? But you can use a word like size, right? Seems to me that the word size signifies what a quantity, not a quality, right?

[54:35] And we can speak of the size of a room, which should be a continuous quantity. We could speak of the size of a crowd, right? Or the size of a family, but that's a what? That's probably got that on the cover there because he had nine kids, right?

[54:55] And that's discrete quantity, right? But that's not a what same figure part of speech as as how. I think it's kind of interesting how that that quality seems to be tied up with the word how. How are you today, right? But if you add how many or how much, you're asking about what quantity. I'm not sure I understand fully the word how, right?

[55:40] Um, but if you're having a dinner, you know, and say, um, who's coming to dinner? Many, many are coming to dinner. How many? Ah, going to have a wine and beer tasting at the parish there, huh? And they want people to sign up beforehand, right? Now, why?

[56:07] You know, to pay. Yeah, I mean, to buy their ticket ahead of time, right? Um, so I know how many are coming, right? You gotta have enough. Yeah, you're going around with beer, around with wine, no.

[56:21] Um. So, what does it what does it say here, huh? How seems to signify the limit or determination of a thing, right? How much did you have to drink? How much did you have to drink, right? How much?

[56:45] How many cookies did you eat? You want you want it right up to the the limit, right? But it was, you know, I didn't know.

[56:59] Strange word, huh? If I say many friends are coming for dinner, or many students are coming to the party, and you have to prepare the food and drink for them, ask how many are coming. You want me to limit them to some what number, right?

[57:21] Of course, how many people came to the you know pro-life march right there? Nobody seems to know. Likewise, when the difference is defined, going back to Porphyry, right, as signifying how something is what it is, right? It is limiting the genus to one or some of its species, right? Okay.

[57:52] So I say, um, let's say let's say square. It's a what quadrilateral, right? Huh? Okay. Well, how is it a quadrilateral? Well, the four sides are all equal, and they all meet at right angles. Huh? That's how it is a quadrilateral, right? That's how it is what it is. It's quadrilateral says what it is in general, right? But this you wanted to determine exactly how it is what it is, huh?

[58:20] What's an isosceles triangle? huh Well, a triangle is a three-sided, you know, contained by three straight lines, huh? But in isosceles, you got two equal legs. The Greek word means isosceles, right? Okay, So when you stand like that. You're making a. Isosceles. Yeah, yeah. now. If you made the distance in the two feet there, you'd have equal to these. Then you'd have a what? You have an equilateral, yeah, yeah.

[58:49] But you know, kind of that kind of gets the idea that how is is kind of looking for some kind of determination, some kind of a limit, isn't it? What do you think?

[59:06] So I ask you, how are you today? I want some some definitely how you are. Yeah How is the patient? He's very. patient Yeah The connection between how and limit can also be seen by the correspondence of the four meanings of how in the fifth book of wisdom or first philosophy, and the four meanings of limit there. My goodness, That's really.

[59:58] Limit can also be connected with the species of quality through the senses of how. Well, you can write your doctoral thesis in philosophy on the word how. How's your dissertation going?

[1:00:15] And the reduction of the senses of how to two in the fifth book of the metaphysics also points to the distinction of the first and third, and perhaps second species of quality for the last. We'd have to go and check the Metaphysics there to realize what this is all about.

[1:00:36] By quality or howness, how something is is said, but this is how simpliciter, not how much or how many, as by quantity, huh? Or how towards another by relation, or how something is what it is in its species, making difference. Cajetan is commentary in the categories. you know it's. Dominican.

[1:01:02] Is he venerable or blessed or anything? There is a Saint Cajetan. I don't think this one is is canonized. He's the one they sent up to argue with with uh, Luther. Luther, yeah. Yeah, I, yeah, but um, 'cause what's his name? Marston has this thing on his blog. He says Saint Saint Cajetan pray for us. or something. Yeah, I don't. think it's a different Cajetan, no. I think there's a different.

[1:01:30] Yeah. I don't think, I don't think it's the same. one. I don't think this guy was ever canonized, but you know, in this in the Leonine edition, right, of the Summa Theologiae, they got his commentary, you know. Sometimes it's very helpful. Sylvester Ferrara,

[1:01:49] I think, has got the one in the Leonine edition of the Summa Contra Gentiles Okay Kind of like him better than Cajetan? anyway. Yeah yeah But anyways Vel et in idem redit it. returns the same. licet determinans potentiam substantiae secundum esse accidentale qualitas est quia tamen qualitatis ratio attenditur penes determinationem potentiae rei in solum genus consistendi ipsi determinati subjecti. My goodness. in distinguendo secundum quod diversi modi subjecti potentiam determinat.

[1:02:46] illi qualitatis sibi et rationem et nomen vindicavit. ita tamen ut dictum est omnia alia accidens ut determinat potentiam subjecti qualitatis rationem sapiat. Taste that right. And nomen quodammodo habent Et haec apparet ratio nominis qualitatis fuit causa, quod qualitas describitur per quale simpliciter Well I don't think it helped me too much, Cajetan Don't think it did that.

[1:03:23] Commentators are rightly puzzled by Aristotle's second statement in this chapter that quality is among those things said in many ways. In the fifth book of Wisdom Metaphysics, he distinguishes four senses.

[1:03:39] How can three species of quality be three meanings of how? The species of quality seem distinguished more like the senses of a word than by opposites in the division of a genus. This seems contrary to species which have one meaning in their genus. There seems more real diversity among the species or genera quality. Quality seems to be less one genus than quantity did, right?

[1:04:09] I'm getting very confused. Yeah. So maybe we have more than 10 categories. Well. 21st century discovery. In his commentary on the senses of quality in Wisdom, right, Thomas compares them with the species of quality in the categories. I notice the word the word substance, you know, is is sometimes said to have more than one meaning, right?

[1:04:41] The substance can mean, you know, what it is of anything. That has what it is, right? And then it can mean, you know, the first genus, right?

[1:04:54] So I can say what is an even number, right? I'm talking about the substance of it. That's different sense of the word, right? And you call substance the first genus, right? So the mere fact that a word could be equivocal, right, doesn't mean it couldn't be used univocally, right?

[1:05:19] But when you predicate quality of the four species, are you using the word univocally or not? Well, it's the size, right? Quantity? I mean, quality. Quality. Quality. When you predicate Yeah. yeah. the four species. Well, according to you, you're said to be how, right? Huh? Aren't you? But all of them. You said to be how in some way, aren't you? By all four of them, right? It's just kind of you know, it's not too distinct the notion of a highest genus here, right?

[1:05:53] Because you can't define a highest genus. strictly speaking. Thomas says, you know that when you define when you define quadrilateral, let's say, are you defining a genus or a species?

[1:06:09] Well, quadrilateral is both a genus and a species, right? It's a species of rectilineal plane figure, and a genus of square and oblong and rhombus and rhomboid and trapezium and so on. But Thomas says you're defining it as a species because you're defining it by its genus and what difference, right? Okay.

[1:06:34] And just like you would say that can a son generate? Not as son. Yeah. Now he might be both a father and a son, right? Huh?

[1:06:54] But I did I generate my children as a son or as a father? As a father. Yeah. I was generated as a son, right? Now so you have to even though I'm both a father and a son, right? So you can see that sometimes the son sometimes generates, right? You know, but not as son. As son, he is generated, right? So sometimes a genus is defined, but it's defined as what a species by its genus and what difference, right?

[1:07:27] What is a genus is a species, right? Well, you want to say that the genus is such as a species. Genus, but no, No, no, don't get into that kind of quagmire,

[1:07:51] Because a genus as such was a what species Then the highest genera would be species, right? if a species is such a genus, then the lowest species would be a genus, right? So you got to distinguish, right? huh?

[1:08:20] You made a stop now, huh? Get rid of this horrible, horrible stuff.