Logic (2016)
24. Relations of Reason and the Four Species of Quality: Dividing by Two or Three, Virtue as the Road to Happiness, and Number in the Trinity
Class of 2017-02-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/024-relations-of-reason-and-the-four-species-of-quality-dividing/

[0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand what you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. I finished my current reading of the Questiones Disputatae de Potentia. you know, Powerful. In the in the the last question, you know, question and divided into articles, right?

[0:40] Last question, you know, I was getting into the processions in the Trinity, right? And but the last one was, would the Son be distinguished, distinct from the Holy Spirit if the Holy Spirit didn't proceed from Him, right? So I took beautiful text. It's about 24 objections, you know. But but Thomas says, you know, nine arguments to to prove that, right? You know, and they're divided into three groups of three, you know.

[1:08] It's it's magnificent And uh So I was thinking, you know, of how do those Orthodox how do? They, you know, hold on to their position, right? You know, they almost regard us as heretics, don't they, for the Pope adding that? And then so when I started looking at the other work of Thomas, there the Contra Errores Graecorum, right? But he's going through and giving quotes, you know, from the great, greatest of the Greek doctors, and they certainly do accept that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, right?

[1:36] It's in their own text, right? They said, you know, I think Thomas was going to that council when he, you know, and he died at that time. Yeah, but I mean, I mean, even from their own great doctors, right? Yeah, yeah. And I remember when we'd go to the Greek festival there in Worcester, you know, and and you can get a nice tour of the Greek church there, which I wasn't always gone, you know.

[2:02] But the guy was talking there a little bit about the. the Filioque What? About the Filioque? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So again I was going to engage in an argument here, but I said no, I just not time to do on Sunday there, you know. Yeah, I'll never anyway, you know. It's scandal, you know. But the Billy Oakway is that, you know. It's it's. Well, one of our bishops, he's deceased now, rest his soul, Bishop Duane.

[2:29] He said, the Orthodox, if if we agreed on everything else, they would object. They can't be united with us because the Pope doesn't have a beard.

[2:40] Yeah, it's funny. Funny. Well, should we believe the relations of reason, or should we go into the quality? How how is this? No, I. We have a. I sent you the text, right? Relation of reason. I sent you

[3:09] that. Yeah. Maybe we should continue with quality now, huh? And then if we want it sometime, you know, go back if somebody you know wants to really do it, you know. But uh yeah it's it's worth doing yeah, I was mentioning before some of you came in there that

[3:24] Thomas was distinguishing. Actually, I was looking at another text here in the in the De Veritate, right? We distinguish these same four relations, but in other texts he will say that two of the ways are found in the words of Aristotle, and the other two in the words of what Avicenna. So Aristotle doesn't have complete thing on the you know the different kinds of relations of reason, and Avicenna doesn't either, But Aristotle takes the example of Socrates is the same as Socrates, right?

[4:03] That's one example of relation of reason. And why is the relation of reason? Well, because there aren't two Socrates, right? To be related to each other, right? To have a real relation, you have to have two things that really what distinct, right? So it's only you know in our mind that there are two Socrates, right? One is a subject, one is a predicate, but they're not real, really.

[4:28] That's one kind of example that Aristotle touches upon the fact that this is a relation of reason, it's not a real relation. And the other one is the case where there's a real relation on the side of one term, but not the other, right? An example is that of what knowledge and the known, right? So though knowledge is said to be knowledge of the known, and the known is known by knowledge, right?

[4:53] The relation of the knowledge to the known is real, real dependence yes upon the known. But the known, right, doesn't share in the act of knowing and so on, right? And doesn't really have a what real relation back to the thing. And then Avicenna brings out these other two forms, right? One where

[5:17] we say say tomorrow today is before tomorrow, right? And well, then if one or both of the terms doesn't exist, you can't have a real relation, right, between being and non-being, huh? Okay, that's one relation of reason that the great Avicenna pointed out, right? And then the other one was where you can't have a relation of relation, right? So how is your fatherhood or your sonship, whatever it is, related to you?

[5:51] Well, relation is essentially right, already relation, right? If you had a relation of relation, then you have to have a relation of the relation of the relation, and on forever, right? You know, but it's kind of interesting, huh? That Thomas takes in these four that he distinguishes, right, in a number of texts. I just saw it in the De Veritate. I mean, the day, Veritate. Looking at that again, you know, today, and he has those same four he gives in the the De Potentia and so on.

[6:19] And he acknowledges in some places, you know, well, a couple of these are mentioned by Aristotle, and a couple of these are mentioned by Avicenna. So how is bringing these Greek minds together? How is how is genus the relation? Well, that was another category that was not said of the thing, right? It's not said of the things in themselves. It's said of things only in the mind, right?

[6:44] Yeah, but the relations of relation that you just yeah yeah he distinguishes those kind also from the relations of reason that are said of the thing, right? Things themselves. Okay. So he, Aristotle, makes that distinction. Well, not as explicitly as Thomas does. No, no, no, no. But I'm talking about this distinction of of relations that are said of things, right? Socrates really is Socrates, right? He really is the same as Socrates, you know.

[7:17] But it's not by real relation that he's the same as himself, right? Okay. We say it's known is is what is known, right? By knowledge, right? But it's not a real relation that has towards that. So genus is instead of things. Is that true? Well, the genus, genus is and species and so on are universals, right? And things are universal only in the mind, not in themselves, right?

[7:46] So the relation of genus to species or species to genus, which was kind of the reason why why Porphyry took those up together, right? Before difference, and so there's a relation of things understood, things understood, right? You know, relation belongs to things in the state of being known, right? Not in themselves, right? I'm going to be tempted to say it about the things in themselves.

[8:14] Yeah. So that's really you know difficult stuff there, you know. But I was mentioning before when I was looking at the the examples of Aristotle when he talks about towards something in our relation in the post particuments, right? We haven't got the text yet there, but

[8:40] he gives the example of double, right? First, in double and half, it's real relation both sides, right? Or taller and shorter, right? In terms of your quantity, my quantity, right? One of us is taller, the other shorter, and then. The second example he gives is that of knowledge is said to be knowledge of the known, and the known is said to be known by knowledge, right? I said, why does he give both of those two examples and in that order, right?

[9:10] Well, in the second example, you have a real relation on the one side, but not the other side, right? And so he kind of puts that second right, and like he's almost hinting at the idea that there can be a real relation here on one side, but not the other side, right? So his choice of examples is significant, right? I always quoted my teacher, Kasruti, an undergraduate, says you can tell a man's intelligence by the examples he chooses, right?

[9:39] You know, they always contrast when Aristotle takes some very plain, ordinary, you know, thing in life, you know, as an example, it's clear to everybody, right? And and the modern philosopher takes some kind of abstruse example It then appeals, you know, appeals to the imagination some way, you know, and it's not a clear way of exemplifying something, right? And and then my teacher De Koninck, you know, I remember one time, you know, the text in class there, and Thomas was giving some examples, and he stopped to explain the order in which Thomas was giving examples, right?

[10:12] And he made kind of an aside that it was modern Thomist he wouldn't bother, you know, for you to try to find any order among the examples, right? Just, you know, see, you realize how close to these things are, right? Well, there's an order among these two examples of Aristotle, I think, in that that he gives them, and it's striking, you know, striking.

[10:35] So we'll let that lay fallow for a while, you know, and pick it up again, right? When I finish the last page here, the Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate say, "No, I have to reread this again, but I'll let it, you know, lay lay for maybe a year or something, and I'll pick it up again, you know, go and read the de tunitate, I mean, something, you know, you know, De Veritate and so on."

[11:01] I was noticing in my in my setup of the the De Veritate, huh? The way I I divided it, you know, and you see it's kind of

[11:19] called the De Veritate because the first question is about De Veritate, but and then things are tied up with the mind, right? But then down about I know question twenty, it's about the good. All the rest are about the good. So if you want to give what the work is a little bit more fully, say it's questionis disputate de veritate et bonitate, right? And I had actually divided them in my text there, you know, the two groups of questions, you know.

[11:45] Yeah. See. So gotta be careful, right now. I thought it was interesting, is when he gets to faith, the act of to believe. Unlike his other treatments elsewhere, he always asks about like the virtues. He talks about the object, then he does the act, and then subject, then subject, blah blah blah. But this one, he starts off. He asked about the act, right? He talks about the object.

[12:12] Okay, that's right. Then I realized, well, all these questions about the object, about the truth, that's right. He's already talked about it. He's just gonna talk about the act.

[12:24] Now, what about the one of the four species of quality that Aristotle distinguishes? Have we seen that already? Now, um, were you bothered as a as a man who's been propagandized with the the rule of what two or three or both, right? Are

[12:48] you scandalized by Aristotle does in the category of quality is distinguished from the category of quantity, huh? The category of quantity, huh? All quantities divided into what, two or three?

[13:05] Yeah, yeah. And although it's not as clear in the case of the category of towards something, right, huh? Nevertheless, Aristotle will point out that some relations are based upon quantity, like double and half, and some are based upon what? Action. Acting upon and going, right? Like father and son, right, huh? Teacher and student, right, huh? Okay. Mover and moved, and so on, right? So you could say, okay, we could divide um, real relations in creatures, right, on that basis, right, huh?

[13:48] Okay. Um. Well, here we got four species of what? Quality, right? That's not two or three, right? So you laugh at Berquist for trying to bring in two or three, you know. Um. I always defend myself by saying, you know, that Plato always divided into two in the dialogues on division, right? Like in the Sophist, everything's being divided into two, and subdivided to get the animal you're looking for.

[14:29] And Aristotle criticizes this in the biological works and says sometimes it makes more sense to divide into three than two. And when he's arguing in the book on the universe that there's only three

[14:49] lines that can all be at right angles to each other, right? He makes a famous statement that three is what? Enough. Three is the first number about which we say all. Okay. And we use the number three in praising God. He says, "People get excited, oh, he knew about the Trinity." He didn't, but he saw the perfection of the number three, right, huh? What is the beginning, middle, and end?

[15:17] And so I said, now you put these two great minds together, right? Say you should always divide by two because you divide by opposites, right? But maybe it makes sense to divide into three and say that that's the first number about which we say all. So you don't have all unless you have three, I mean that's, quite often true. So I put the two masters, you know, both what's his name?

[15:41] Thomas says that Plato and Aristotle are the philosophi praecipui, the chief philosophers. And Albert the Great said to be a complete philosopher, you have to know Plato and Aristotle. So I said put them together, right? And hit on the rule of two or three. Or as they point out, sometimes you should use what Both. huh? So Aristotle, my favorite example is Aristotle. He takes a plot, right?

[16:12] He praises the great Homer for teaching all the other Greeks how to make a good plot. That the unity of a plot doesn't consist about being what happened to you or me or some other man, right? But it's about a course of action that has a beginning, a middle, and an end. What's the division into what three? But then another place in the book on the poetic art, he says the plot can be divided into two parts: the tying of the knots and the untying of the knots.

[16:41] Okay. So should you divide the plot into two or three parts, or both? Okay. Now sometimes I see Thomas and Aristotle divide names said of many things into a name said of many things univocally and equivocally, right? And that's a division into what two. Then sometimes they'll subdivide said equivocally by reason and by what by chance, right? So that's all by twos, right? But then sometimes I see Thomas saying, "Well, when a name is said of many things, sometimes they have entirely the same meaning in each case, sometimes entirely different, and sometimes what kind of in between, partly the same but partly different.

[17:37] And so you have what a division to three: equivocal, equivocal, or purely equivocal, what they call it. And then the analogous or the equivocal by what reason? Yeah. So should you divide into two or into three? What would you say? Yeah.

[17:55] Or both. You know. See? See? I wouldn't say that one is correct and one is incorrect in this case. I'd say sometimes you said of both, right? And one brings out something the other one doesn't bring out so much, right? Okay. Um.

[18:17] How should you divide the family, huh? To two or three. Parents and children. Parents and children. Yeah, it's a division to two. But sometimes I think it makes sense to divide into father and mother and what children. Yeah. Especially when I talk about the father being the head of the family, right? Here's my argument, you know, lex orandi, lex credendi, right? While saying that the litany of Saint Joseph and he's called the head of the Holy Family, right?

[18:48] I say if anybody had a distinguished wife and distinguished son, and the wife and the son, you might say they were superior to him in many ways, it was him, right? We get we're asked to pray in in this is this one of the six psalms singled out right is of special importance in the history of the church to pray to him as the head of the holy family right well the head ought to be distinguished from the other parts right so it makes sense to say father mother and what children yeah makes sense see but not that it's wrong or it doesn't make sense to divide the parents and children that that makes sense too yeah

[19:35] I always tell them I say you know that marriage is two in one flesh right huh and I say that the husband the wife are more two in one flesh in the child than they are in the marital act because the marital act is temporary and they separate huh but in the child huh the husband and the wife are joined in the one Flesh of the child, Forever forever, right?

[20:03] And that's really profound when you stop and think about it, right? You know, two in one flesh. So it's like a common good, right? The child, it should it should fortify the the marriage, right? You know, how can you separate from this person when you're joined in this inseparable way, right? It's result in your one activity, right? But in this child, right? Something of both, right?

[20:35] I often think, you know, that I think a bit like my father, and I have emotions like my mother. So I got some of my father's flesh and some of my mother's flesh, you know. But it's kind of funny the way you you you you know. They say you philosophize like a businessman. You tell me

[20:56] something like that. My mother, my mother had a had had a tremendous hatred of dirty jokes, as we call, right? You know, and I just can't laugh at a dirty joke. Now I mean, just just how repugnant it is. I mean, emotional reaction to the thing. You know, they don't they don't like these things, you know. So, I think that's kind of interesting, huh? You probably are influenced more by your your mother, right?

[21:24] Huh? Emotionally than your father, right? But your way of thinking is more influenced by your your father, right? So coming back to the category of quality, right? Huh? Here we got a division of what four, right? Huh?

[21:51] But could you divide it into two or into three? It makes some sense. Maybe just to give us a little bit of of just more understandable. If you divide it into two, you can divide four either into three and one, or two and two, right?

[22:17] Sometimes you can do both. So could you divide these four into three and one, and into two and two, but by different principles? Well, again, the order in which Aristotle gives the four is interesting, right? Because there's a way you could divide the first three against the what the fourth one. But he puts the first three together, doesn't he? Puts the fourth one last, right? Okay, he doesn't put the fourth one.

[22:56] I think is distinct from the first three, right? Second place or third place, right? Okay. Here's a way of dividing the first three against the what fourth one, right? Now there's a second way of dividing the first two against the last two. So it follows the order in which he what enumerates them, right?

[23:22] Now what is this? What is the way of dividing it into three and one? Let's take that as one way. What do the first three, in some way, have in common that separates them from the fourth one? The fourth one is a quality about quantity. Yeah, yeah.

[23:52] Now I I you know read Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, right? And when he's investigating, you know, what the virtues are, right, huh? He knows the virtues are responsible in some way or a source of what you do or don't do, right? Okay. So a courageous man and a coward aren't going to do the same thing, are they? A just man and an unjust man are not going to do exactly the same thing, right?

[24:19] When you count the church's funds there on Monday night, we we joke, you know, a ten dollar bill or a twenty dollar bill falls on the floor. What's that doing down there? Just a joke among us, you know.

[24:40] Aristotle saying that virtue seems to be, you know, a source of doing something or not doing something, right? A source of motion change, right? Okay. What is in the soul that is a source of motion or change? Well, it's habits, sort of things, you know. It's also the abilities that are inborn, right? The ability to do this or do that, right? Huh? That's a source, right? And then even these what undergoing qualities Aristotle calls them, right?

[25:11] Even things like emotions, right, are a source in some way of doing something, right? So then Aristotle says, what are the virtues? Are they habits, or are they natural abilities that we have, or are they what emotions, right? And he's going to eventually conclude that they must be what habits, right? Huh? I won't go into how he figures it out, but I mean, you know, but it's not my ability to feel anger that is a virtue, is it, right?

[25:46] It's by habituated, you know, to moderate my anger and so on, right? Martin Bosworth, listening him on the way up, you know, he's very angry with the so if I have to control my anger, he says, huh? You know, people say I should show my anger. People like to see me showing my anger about these things. But I think I may not speak as clearly as I would if I control my anger.

[26:09] Says. So. Yeah, yeah. And because you get angry, is that virtue or vice? Well, no. It depends upon how you're habituated to get angry, right? When you should, and as much as you should, and so on, right? Now, I always example stories used in class was if you're walking down the hall, somebody bumps into you. Should you get angry?

[26:35] You know. Well, if he just happened to hit you a little bit, you know, you shouldn't get angry at all, right? He goes down the hall like that, you know. Me get a little bit like that, you know. But now, somebody's using your kid for target practice. Should you get angry at them? Shouldn't guard? Yeah. Because prudence, you know, we'll look at the situation, right? Now. Remember this one guy I knew.

[26:58] I just the neighbor's kid came over, you know, and their back little porch there, and there was a potted plant, right? And he's looking at my friend, and he shoves the thing down and throws it off and smacks, you know, and he gives a whack, you know.

[27:14] But darn right, he's ripped on. I don't care. You know what I mean, Marvin? You know what I mean. Why are you beating my kid? You know the guy next door about it.

[27:25] I wasn't there to see it, but I mean, he told me about it. You know what I'm saying? Just a little whack in the seat there, but ain't

[27:32] that kind of nonsense? Yeah. But you were saying how the the fourth one is tied up with quantity, right? And quantity is not a source as such of what motion, right? Okay. So shape and so on, right? You know, it's not a source of motion and so on, right? So you could divide the first three against the fourth one, right? And so Aristotle's order of putting those three that have that in common first, and then the fourth one, right?

[28:03] That makes some sense, doesn't it? I can see the distinction there. Now, another way to divide them into two and two, right? Sometimes that third species, instead of calling it undergoing qualities, it's just kind of hard to explain, you know. When I was first studying the categories, he used to call them sensible qualities, right? Well, when you study the senses, Aristotle would distinguish between the private sensible and the what?

[28:41] Common sensible, right? And the private sensible is known by only one sense, like color is known only by the eye, right? Sound only by the ear, right? And the common sensibles are known by more than one sense, right? So I could know the shape of this glass here by looking at it, but also if I, you know, was blind, I could feel the. The shape, right? Huh.

[29:03] So the shape is a what? Common sensible, right? But the inborn abilities that we have, right? Are they sensible? I really kind of know that I have the ability to see through my seeing, right? It's not like I know the you know senses know the ability to see directly immediately, do they? Not sensible, except maybe a sensible per accidens right? Okay not a proper. I mean, a sensible as such, right?

[29:39] But? The last two are sensible as such, right? And the first two are not. Huh? I don't sense my justice or my you know my virtue of courage if I have it, you know. Okay, temperance, justice. Okay. So again, the first two kind of. Could be divided against the last two, right? Or the first e against the fourth, right? Now,

[30:08] which on my fanatic adherence to the rule of two or three, right? I can see it through some way of of making use of it, but it helps to help you a little bit.

[30:20] Now, one thing that puzzles me is why does he give the habit or disposition before the natural ability or inability, right? Isn't that more basic and more fundamental? And when people ask, you know, why why does he give quantity before quality, right? And forget about the the reason why he took up the towards something before quality, right? Now, because when he first enumerated the ten categories, he gave what substance, quantity, quality, relation, right?

[30:57] Okay. So why did he put quantity before what quality? Well, the usual reason given is that quantity, in some ways, is more basic than some of the qualities, at least, right? So quantity is more basic than shape, right? Huh? And seems more basic than the sensible qualities. So the color green here is spread over a what surface, right? You know, and so

[31:26] quantity seems to be more fundamental, right? Okay. And quantity is tied up very much with the distinction of individual substances of the same kind, huh?

[31:43] Just like you can have many tables here, which are more or less of the same kind here, right? It's because you have enough what wood, right? Huh? So quantity seems to be tied up with wood and the distinction of many individuals, right? You have many men here sitting around this table because there's enough flesh and blood and bone to go around for all of us, and that's wonderful, you know.

[32:05] Aristotle thought that the that the sun was made out of all material that could be a sun, right? And therefore couldn't have more than one sun. The moon is made out of all of it, yeah, yeah. So, but we can keep on, you know, getting more flesh and blood and bones, right? And keeping getting more human beings, right? Huh? And so on. So it's very much tied up with the fact that you can have many individual substances and material ones, right?

[32:38] You can't have that in in angels, right? Huh? But in material substances, you can, right? Huh? No. So so it's even more fundamental, right? Now, I would say, what about the first and the second species of quality? Isn't second species of quality more fundamental because that's the natural Inborn, right? Huh? Is a Greek English word for for natural inborn ability or inability, right? You know the the abilities, the parts of the soul which are the abilities of the soul, right?

[33:12] Huh? They'll put that in the second species of quality, right? That's more fundamental, isn't it? And closer to my substance than my virtues or vices.

[33:27] Maybe not manifest. But you know Thomas gives a a reason in in the prima pars, right? I notice you know Thomas is just like Aristotle, you know, and I was teaching on Wednesday night there the De Anima, right? Huh? And Aristotle was going to define the soul, right? Huh? And he says there's a genus called substance. He says he recalls there's a genus substance. And then he starts to divide substance into matter and form and the composite and so on.

[34:07] And then which of these is the soul, right? Huh? But he recalls going back to substance, right? Huh? Well, if you look at Thomas when he takes up the virtues there and vices in the prima pars prima secundae he recalls this there's a chapter on quality, right? Huh? And then he kind of you know goes back to that distinction of the four species and comes down to habit disposition, right?

[34:29] And see how all these two guys work, you know? Are you there's a genus called quality. And that's where that's where you know I think virtue and vice are going to belong, right? Huh? And so let's go back, you know, to to that categories and go forward, right? I think that's part of the reason for the post predicaments right? And prepare the way for you to what subdivide these things and go further down in each genus, right?

[35:01] You know. So if Berquist was teaching, you know, the elements of Euclid, like they do at TAC, right? I'd say well now in these first six books of the Euclid there is the elements. It's geometry, right? Huh? We learn about triangles and circles and all interesting things. But then in book seven, eight, and nine he's going to be talking about numbers. Well, I recall that there's a genus called what quantity, right?

[35:32] And it's divided into discrete and continuous. And number comes under discrete over here, and under continuous comes what lines or lines and surfaces and so. Oh yeah. Well, that's the difference between you know the first six books and the and seven, eight, and nine, right? Huh? And it significantly starts at seven, right? Huh? Right, symbol of wisdom.

[36:02] The seven wise men of Greece, right? Seven angels stand before God, right? Seven parts of philosophy, as you know. Okay. Seven plays that they they save of Sophocles and seven plays. That's a great thing, yeah. Seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, right? Seven sacraments Yeah. Seven imitations of the Holy Spirit Yeah. Seven everything Seven virtues Seven gifts. So I could imitate. I could imitate, huh? Aristotle in the second book of the De Anima.

[36:39] I remember substance is a genus, and Thomas in the Prima Secundae quality is a genus. That's the starting point, right? Quality is a genus." I recall, yeah, and then go back and recall the distinction between discrete and continuous. Oh, this is fun, right? Okay. But if I was teaching, you know, Shakespeare's what his sonnets,

[37:08] right? Huh? Might go back, right? Because that was the second species, right? Of discrete quantity. How many feet, right? Okay. Iambic pentameter, five feet. Which is iambic pentameter, right? Five feet. Five iams, two syllables with the accent on the second one. Five of those. Yeah, yeah. So I recall Aristotle in quantity, right? Okay. But I think part of the reason here for the post-predicaments to get your mind ready, you know, for dividing by opposites, right, and seeing the order, you know, each one going forward, huh?

[37:49] Like we do when we take up the virtues, huh? Okay. Now, Thomas, again, the prima secundae, from right, he says that the by the virtues and vices, we are well or ill disposed towards our nature. In some ways, they're closer to our nature, right, than the abilities, right, in terms of being what, not just having something because of our nature, but in being what, well or ill disposed towards our nature, right?

[38:35] But Shakespeare, in one of the comedies, right, the character studying that part of philosophy, he says that treats of happiness by virtue especially to be achieved.

[38:47] And Thomas Aquinas says that virtue is the road to happiness. And guess what the road to misery is? It's vice, right now. Okay. That's a cheap thing to learn, you know. If you learn anything from the daily newspaper, is that someone has ended up in some miserable state because of vice of some sort, right now. Maybe he robbed something, or he got angry and killed somebody, or you know,

[39:19] he was unfaithful, but he had some vice, right, that led to misery for him and maybe people around him too, you know. So maybe there's something extremely important about that first one, right? That's the quality by which you are well disposed to being a man. That's the what by which you're on the road to your end or purpose, which is happiness, or your what?

[39:48] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Misery, right? Okay. Now you could also see this in terms, maybe, uh, we're Roman Catholics, right? And our two greatest teachers are Augustine of Hippo, right, and Thomas Aquinas, right.

[40:10] And when the educated layman there asked Augustine to give kind of a you know compact summary, right, of Christian doctrine, right, Saint Augustine wrote the great Enchiridion, right, which means I guess in the hand manual, in the hand.

[40:34] Enchiridion about what? Yeah, he didn't say the Enchiridion of reason and will, did he? Which would be natural abilities, right? And faith is in what? Reason Reason. and hope and charity are in the will, right? You know, someone asked Augustine one time, you know, he says, "Are faith and reason really compatible?" And Augustine began by saying, "Well, you can't have faith unless you have reason."

[41:08] And but notice, huh? Augustine is dealing with what virtues, theological virtues, now, right? Which the philosophers didn't know, but he's dividing the whole of sacred doctrine, in a sense, right, for us beginners, in a sense, or for the layman, you might say, into what faith, hope, and charity, right? Huh? Which is not the way Thomas divided the what Summa, right?

[41:42] His Summa Contra Gentiles is really divided into what? Three. He considered God in Himself, and then God is the what? Maker, and then God is the end, right? Okay. And insofar as these can be known by natural reason in the Summa Contra Gentiles, and then in the fourth book, right, he does the same three things. Insofar as they can be known only by what? By faith, right?

[42:11] That's really profound stuff, you know, the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? It's not. It's not for beginners. I used to joke about the Summa Theologiae supposed to be for beginners, Thomas says, but but he's not a beginner in the sense of of what a grade school kid, right?

[42:29] Now Saint Thomas, towards the end of his life, he came back to what Naples, right? Now, beautiful place. You ever been there? To Naples? That's really beautiful there, wasn't it? You been there? I never been there. Was it your brother went there? I came close. I went down to the. Where's the studios? Pompeii. I've been down to Pompeii before. Just get me close.

[42:53] But they say to see Naples and die. That's what they say. Oh yeah. So beautiful. Your brother, I think, went down to Pompeii. And. He said, "I saw it, and I." Yeah, I understand it differently.

[43:05] They've been they've been that way once, but no. Okay, so Thomas gave is what catechical instructions, right? For the common man, you know, and so on, and for the people of what Naples, right? It's very well received, right? But how does he divide it? The same way that Augustine divides it, right? Well, why is that, right? It's kind of more known in sense, but it's it's proximate to our what our end, right?

[43:33] You know. So under faith, we teach what the creed, right? And we teach the kid maybe the Apostles' Creed first, and then we expand into the Nicene Creed and so on.

[43:49] At Assumption College, this guy was new in the theology department, and he comes. He was introduced to me as some social functioner, you know, new guy in theology. So my first question was, "Are you orthodox? " He said, "What do you mean? " I said, "Do you accept the Nicene Creed? " He said, "Yes. " Okay, good. It's kind of good.

[44:11] But then under the what hope, we teach the Our Father, right? And then under charity, the two commandments of love and the Ten Commandments, right? Maybe you know some reason, so and it's kind of place to begin, isn't right? Teach kids that first, right? You don't give them the Summa Contra Gentiles and on. Teach them

[44:36] what to believe, what to hope for, right? Pray for and what to love, right? Right. We begin. So you put that together, and then as a natural man here, a natural philosopher, philosopher, you'd say, "Hey, virtue is the way to happiness, right? Happiness is really activity in accordance with virtue, right? And in the highest of virtue, right, which eventually Aristotle would say is wisdom, right? And

[45:11] vice is tied up with unhappiness, right? So the end is what's most important. So maybe that's why he puts it first. I don't know. Thomas, I'd say, mentions something similar that that you're well disposed, right? Or badly disposed by your habits, right? Okay.

[45:33] So if you have the ability to feel hunger or thirst and so on, you are disposed towards your nature or badly disposed, right? Well, if you eat and drink too much, right, it's not too good for your nature. Okay, it's not good for your body nature, maybe not even for your soul, right? You know. So kind of priority, right? Why he puts it maybe first, right? Okay.

[46:04] But some of those first two qualities or species of quality are more greater, right, than the later ones, right? Understandably, undergoing qualities and the shape, right? Okay.

[46:24] So, okay. We're on page what three of this or what? Yeah, are these getting things a little bit more metaphysical, right? Than appropriate for our here, but anyway.

[47:15] Commentators are rightly puzzled by Aristotle's second statement in this chapter, that quality is among those things said in many ways, huh? In the fifth book of Wisdom, he distinguishes four senses. How can three species of quality be three meanings of how? The species of quality seem distinguished more like the senses of a word than by opposites, as in the division of a what genus, Genus, right? This seems contrary to species which have one meaning in their what genus, huh?

[47:53] I notice in the text that Aristotle sometimes calls these species of quality what genera, huh? Okay, you know, of course, that the same thing can be a species and a what genus, right, huh? So discrete quantity, for example, is both a species and a genus, right?

[48:16] But it seems to be more apt to call these qualities genera, right? Huh? Is if it's a more expansive, shall we say, right, or a more spread out, right? Doesn't seem to be as what narrow as as what quantity, right? Huh? So there's something about it, right? Huh? You know. And people sometimes wonder as to whether there could be another species that is not, you know, but they don't kind of wonder that thing about quantity, right?

[48:44] Now, Henri Dulac, Father Henri Dulac, who was my logic teacher, you know, he was open to the mind might be another species, be it, you know, and Aristotle even in the in the chapter doesn't he say that, right? Might be something, right? Okay.

[48:59] So this way of speaking, you know, different senses of the word, right, kind of implies that maybe. You know, to have as much unity, right, as quantity seems to have. You notice how tied up, you know, when Aristotle explains. I was talking to a student there. I was saying, "How many fingers?" Three. Okay. And I also have three children. And there are three persons in the Blessed Trinity, right?

[49:35] Now, does three mean the same thing when I say three fingers and three persons in the Blessed Trinity? And he said, "Yeah, it seems to mean the same thing, right? You got three of them, right?" One, two, three. Yeah, yeah, same thing, right? You can count, right? Yeah. Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. Yeah, You can count I can count the them on these finger these same three fingers, right? You know, what would you say?

[50:04] Is three is three? Is the three that we have that we say there are three persons in God, right? Is that three in the genus of quantity under what? Discrete quantity. You have an accident in God. God has an accident. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And when we study more deeply, huh, the number, right? It's in the species in the genus of quantity. We say that plurality, huh, that multitude, right, arises from the what?

[50:43] Division of the what? Continuous. And remember the old definition. Let's give a natural philosophy of the continuous, right? In in logic, the definition of continuous quantity is a quantity whose parts meet at a what? Common boundary. Common boundary, right? Huh? So the parts of the line meet at a point, and the parts of the semicircle, right, say, meet at a line, right? Huh? And parts of a body meet at a surface, huh?

[51:17] And discrete quantity is a quantity which whose parts do not meet at a common what? Boundary, right? But number that is a species there of quantity arises from the division of the continuous. And the other definition of continuous is that which is divisible what? Forever, right? Aristotle has a beautiful way of showing that continuous things like line, the motion down the line, right? The time it takes to go down the line, right?

[51:56] That they're all divisible forever, right? And sometimes he argues each one separately. Sometimes he really, you know, kills two birds with one stone, you know? Huh? He says, you know, some bodies move faster than other bodies, and some bodies move slower. You know that? Is that in your experience? Okay. So the faster guy goes the same distance in what? Less time. Now you're dividing the time, right?

[52:21] Yeah. In that lesser time, the slower guy goes less distance. In that lesser distance, the faster guy goes in even less time. And just by alternating those two, you can see that they can divide distance and time forever, right? So that's why numbers go on forever, right?

[52:46] Well, sometimes people have another kind of strange notion of number, huh? Because they make it a what? A merely mental multiplication, right? So is Socrates? Socrates? Yes or no? What would you say? Socrates is Socrates, right? In my mind now, Socrates is both the subject and the predicate of that, and I get two Socrates, right? Now, as a statement, Socrates is Socrates. The statement Socrates is Socrates.

[53:18] Yeah. Now I got four Socrates, right? You can always come back and say something is itself, right? So the statement Socrates is Socrates is Socrates is Socrates is a statement Socrates is Socrates. Yeah. So I can go on forever, right? But this is not really what my friend Euclid is teaching us in seventy nine, right? This Greek quantity arises from the division of the what? Continuous, right?

[53:48] Okay. Someone's completely kind. Okay. They they talk about you know how the mind can come back upon itself, right? I know what a triangle is, and I know that I know what a triangle is, and I know that I know that I know what a triangle is, and I know that I know that. You can go on forever, right? You know, it's kind of a kind of a empty one, right?

[54:14] Now, how do you get this three in the Trinity, right? Is that by division of the continuous? You know, quantity in God, right? Huh? You know, and he had parts, right? And wouldn't be altogether simple, right? And quantity, of course, is comes because you have matter, right? And God's not material, right? So when you speak of these three fingers you see here, right? And the three persons of God, the number three is not being used univocally.

[54:52] It. Doesn't have the same meaning, right? There's some likeness there, so they would say, you know, right? But likeness is the cause of deception, right? Huh? Can't see the distinction between these things, huh? That's why the imagination is cause of deception, huh? Because it delights in the likeness of things, huh? Doesn't see distinctions in these things, huh?

[55:29] You know, the great Boethius says, you know, there's two categories in God: substance and relation, right? Huh? You know, but strictly speaking, is God in either genus? Is he in this predicament? We are in, right? You know. I mentioned how how my teacher De Koninck you know, liked the English word predicament, right? It seems to be borrowed from the fact that the Greek, the Latin word for what category was.

[56:00] Predicament, huh? Predicamenta right? The predicamenta, and what's a predicament, right? Well, it's a situation that's hard to get out of. What you do, you know, you're gonna

[56:16] be in trouble, something. And this is something like the category, right? Because you can't get out of it, right? So a quantity, I mean, a, substance cannot be a what? Quality and a quality cannot be a substance, right? And the relation cannot be a quantity and quantity and a relation, so on. You're confined, right? Huh? But there seems to be a certain likeness in God, right? To substance, right?

[56:42] Because substance, you know, is what a thing is, right? And God has what it is, right? And when Thomas gets through, you know, the beginning of the the of the Summa Theologiae, and he shows that he argues that God exists, right? First, right? And then he takes up the fact that God is what simple and unchanging and infinite, right? Huh? And so on. Takes about five things of God, right?

[57:12] Okay. He's unchanging, right? He's simple. He's perfect. Therefore, good, so on. And he says he goes on now to talk about what the operations of God, right? Huh? He said, "Now, having considered the substance of God, right? What God is, right? Huh? He's completely simple, right?

[57:40] Universally perfect, huh? Unchanging, right? Infinite, and he's one. I was puzzling over the the set of alls, right? Huh? It's kind of interesting. One of the objections there, I guess, they have an appropriation of the set of alls to God and the Trinity. He says, yeah, that's kind of interesting. So, being one, true and good, right? Being is a divine substance, right? One, the Father, true or truth, the Son, and what?

[58:29] Good, good, the Holy Spirit, yeah. Say, say I never remember reading that before It's kind of interesting But anyway, Thomas does say, you know, having considered the substance of God, right? Now we're going to go into the operations of God, right? His understanding and his will, right? So there's kind of likeness to substance there. Okay. Then when you get into the Father and the Son, this this reminds me of of well, I have a Father and a Son, right?

[59:03] Huh? You know. I guess people, you know, who had a bad father, you know, it's hard for them to, you know, accept the name father, right? Huh? You know, or you see somebody like we're reading in one of her works there, Saint Thérèse of Lisieux you know, she's so, you know, how nice it is to call him Father God, you know. But she had a very good relation with her father, right?

[59:28] You know, I mean, he was, I guess, he's on the way to canonization, is he? The archangels already, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, I mean, she had a very good, you know. And most of them have a good relation with their father, but there are some people who have a horrible time with their father, you know. So I don't know why, but but but this was this likeness then between father and son.

[59:49] A time when when Saint John is going to introduce this thing, he says. uh you know, he said we're the children of God, right? We s we're called the children of God, and we are. We are. So there is some likeness there, right? You know.

[1:00:12] So we're calling Father, right? I guess Father sometimes can mean God, right? Sometimes, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's a question to say which is Father, being Father first, you know. But there is some similarity between the two, right? Similarity, huh?

[1:00:37] Yeah.