Logic (2016)
25. Quality Said in Many Ways: Qualis and 'How', Why Habit Comes First (Prima Secundae), Modus, and the Four Senses of End
Class of 2017-02-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/025-quality-said-in-many-ways-qualis-and-how-why-habit-comes/

[0:00] Okay, now why does Aristotle say that that the word quality has many senses, right? How, right? Well, it's kind of a hard word to get hold of, but

[0:12] in Latin, you know, the concrete word Aristotle uses for this category would be what? Qualis, huh? Qualis Okay. Well, then we used to always puzzle you know when we're studying the Isagoge, right? In? In the Latin edition, and in Albert and so on. When you talk about difference, right? Well, difference is said in what? Genus is said in regard to quid, right? What it is, right? But what does difference signify?

[0:49] Well, qualis quid, right? That same word quality that you have for the category of quality, right? Well Aristotle will distinguish in the fifth book of wisdom that sense of qualis, right? kind of the essential quality, right? From the quality that is an accident and isn't to be the species making difference, right?

[1:13] But you can see I can puzzle people right now. You know. So the species making difference is not necessarily a quality, right, in the sense of the genus, right? But use that same word how, right?

[1:30] Now that you take simpler things in more of my capacity to understand here, you know, like you say, what is a square, right? Well, you could answer this by giving the genus of square. It's a quadrilateral. What's a quadrilateral? Give the genus of that. Rectilineal plane figure, right? Okay. But how is it a a rectilineal plane figure? Well, it's one that's got four four sides. Four. Triangle's only got three, huh?

[1:58] Pentagon's got five, I guess. Okay. Sometimes they call the triangle trilateral, right? But because of why they use the angles, right? Pentagon, you know, that sort of thing. Okay. That makes sense, right?

[2:18] But but how is it that the square is a quadrilateral? How is it quadrilateral? Well, the four sides are all the same length, yeah, and and they meet at what at right angles, right? That's how it is a quadrilateral, right?

[2:37] Yeah, but those are really the species making differences of square, right? What's a what's a difference, right? Well, my teacher Porphyry says a difference is what the species has in addition to the genus.

[2:57] It's what separates different species under the same genus, right? Oh yeah, okay, that makes sense. But the differences will be in the genus of which they are a what difference? huh Remember Aristotle's example there, you know that we might distinguish animals by two-footed and four-footed, but we wouldn't distinguish the sciences by some are two-footed and some are four-footed. So the the differences fit the genus, right? Huh?

[3:32] So gotta realize the differences could be found in what any genus, it seems to me, right? Huh? Well, you got species, right? If you have a genus, right? Genus is defined as a name said with one meaning, which Porphyry should have pointed out. But anyway, it's a name said with one meaning, right? Said of many things, right?

[3:54] Other in kind or species, right? Signifying what it is, right? Okay. So we always have you know species under a genus, right? And the difference is what the species has in addition to the genus. But as he taught in the Antepredicaments right? The the differences fit the what genus? Yeah.

[4:20] How is your anger four-sided or what side? How many sides is it? You wouldn't have seen. Yeah. It's always right. So. Chesterton plays on that with the French, he says they always go at right angles to what everybody else. If for no other reason than that it's right. Yeah. Okay.

[4:59] So is God confined in the genus of substance then? Well, sometimes in the argument that God is in the genus of substance, they say what substance means. per se ens, right? You know, a thing that exists but not in another, right? That's how to fit God, right? Huh? You know.

[5:23] What Thomas there in the Summa Contra Gentiles he says. What the substance, the genus substance means is a what? A thing to which it belongs to be not in another.

[5:42] What's he saying? A thing to which it belongs to be. That's something other than the thing, right? But it is, right? Thing to which it belongs to be not in another. But in God, right? His substance and his to be, his being, are the same, right? And this is why he can say, "My name is who I am, right? So God is not in the genus of substance, is he?

[6:10] But nevertheless, it's a likeness to it, right? So, what we learn about the category of substance, the category of relation, is useful in talking about God, right? Now, but you have to realize that these things are what equivocal by reason. Yeah,

[6:31] I quoted Charles De Koninck he said one day in class. You know, every respectable word in philosophy is equivocal by reason. Right. Okay. So in this text here from the Metaphysics, here he's talking about the what substantial difference, right?

[6:57] Okay, and that's where you find that word quality, right? In in Latin, you know. Okay, but you can use the word how, right? Talking about differences, right? How is a square a what quadrilateral, right?

[7:14] Well, how are those four sides, right? They're all equal, and what angles do they meet, right? Okay, that's getting to how, right? What about this? Similiter numeri dicuntur quales. Taking the Latin down there. huh.

[7:53] Did you ever encounter a a square number? Yeah. But a square there, the fourth species of quality, right? And then they're even our cube numbers, right?

[8:21] What's the first number that is both a square number and a cube number? Can a square number be a cube number? Is it uh

[8:42] Square and a cube. Oh wait, maybe you know thirty-six. Thirty-six is the square of six. Is it a cube number? I guess not. Three times three times three. Not

[9:10] really. You could, you guys. Sixty-four. Yeah. Yeah. It's eight times eight, and then four times four is sixteen, and four times sixteen is sixty-four. Right? So sixty-four. When I was a little boy, they used to have this program on TV, and 40 you get the 64 dollar question, you know. I don't know why they decided that, but there was some significance it seemed to me, you know, that there was supposed to be the number sixty-four.

[9:31] I don't know, but it's both a square number and a cube number, right? That seems to be more closer to the howness of of what, you know, of a difference, right? You know, species making difference then, then the quality, the category of quality, right?

[9:55] So this number is square, and this number, you know, but that there's some likeness there, but it's kind of interesting, huh? Yeah, I guess you know, I think in the Greek they they use a term, you know, they don't use a term. We have factors or something, you know. They they'll call these sides, right? You know, what are the sides of six? What two and three, right?

[10:23] Okay. Okay. It's more appropriate for the wise man to make that, point that distinction out, but you have to point out to people, you know, because they confuse sometimes, right? Huh?

[10:56] I would imagine the average man would would think that three when they said the three persons and three of the fingers is the same, right? One, two, three. I can count them on my fingers, right?

[11:13] Yeah. yeah. So don't believe in that too much, You got an excerpt from the same passage there on page 5. Yeah. Okay. Okay. Let's spend more time on that right now.

[12:00] Okay. Yeah. Okay. I'm often puzzled by the term, you know. In Latin, see when they talk about quantity and quality, they say "quantus" and "qualis," right? You know. But in English, we have to say almost what, how much and how many, right? To be concrete and quantity, we don't have one way of saying it, right? Now, my friend Warren Murray says that in French, you can use the same word, right?

[12:36] I said the only way I can think of using the same word is to use the word "size," right? You can speak of the size of the room, which is a continuous quantity. The size of the desk or the table, here, right? And you can speak of the size of a crowd, right? Size of a family, right?

[12:58] And that's a discrete quantity you're talking about there, right? I think it makes some sense, you know. Call that second highest genus size, right? But if want to use it, you know, in adverbial sense, you say how much or how many. It seems right. How many for, or for discrete, and how much for continuous, right? But you got the word "how" in there again, right? That's it.

[13:25] You know. You know. So I went to get my license renewed. You know, I got to fill out this thing. What's my height? Five foot ten, or is five five foot eight? We can say, you know, the doctor says, I don't know. We've done, we're not going to do five foot ten. So I got up there, you know, for the final thing. You know, you're under, you know, lying.

[14:00] You know, it's surgery. So the woman says, "You no longer five foot eight? Oh yes, I guess I am that. Yeah. Okay, she's always changing and just initialing the th.

[14:14] But anyway, let's say I'm five foot eight, right? Okay. Now, someone asked me, you know, "How are you today, Duane? Would I say five foot eight?

[14:28] Would you say that? I'd say, "How are you today? " Would you give me your height? But that's how tall you are, right? So if

[14:41] I just say "how," you know, period, right? Then you're going to give me what? I'm sick today, or I'm, you know, depressed. He's not my patient. Yeah, yeah.

[14:58] How are you today? I'm angry. Crazy. I guess, I guess CNN was saying we're not going to invite Kellyanne anymore, right? She she answers the questions so well, and everybody's impressed with her, you know. And and I was listening, you know, when I leave here, sometimes I turn the radio and Levy's on, you know, the former mayor, you know, so. Huh? He's talking about Kellyanne, you know.

[15:36] He says she's one of the most remarkable person I've ever seen, you know. People are impressed, you know. And Rosa and I would love to hear her talk too, you know. Who was Kellyanne? Kellyanne. She's she's the one who actually was was the she's given the title of the first woman to to to plan the campaign. Oh yeah, she was the campaign manager. Yeah, yeah. Kellyanne Conway.

[15:57] Yeah, first name is kind of funny. Kellyanne is like one name, you know. Kellyanne Conway, She's a Catholic too. Oh, is she? Oh, she's a pro life Catholic Yeah, yeah. I mean, she answers the questions so well, you know, and she handles it right, and people really really like her, you know, and so on. So the the CNN is saying we can't invite her anymore.

[16:16] Because you know, She can embarrass us. yeah, yeah, yeah. This this scoundrel on this. It's like the the Presocratics who wanted to kick the guy out because he made everybody look bad. What was it? In Ephesus, the Presocratics. Who was it? They didn't want somebody to be a part of their camp because he he stood out.

[16:45] I think he was he was so virtuous. He was a virtuous man. We said we don't want him in our camp. Oh, that was in the in the yeah the guy was in Athens, there, right? Yeah, or wherever he was. Yeah, he was always being praised for his virtue. We don't want we want everybody to be equal. Yeah. Then be elsewhere, you know. Yeah. really.

[17:04] Yeah. Heraclitus was talking about that now because this guy, noble guy, they wanted to kick him out because he's so superior to everybody. Yeah. So nothing new. Nothing new under the sun. Right.

[17:33] And most of Thomas is here on on page six now. If you look at the Latin here, I don't know what the English is here. Okay.

[17:55] The modus of did you see that in in the middle of that passage in the prima Secundae, right? Okay. The modus sive determinatio of a subject, according to esse accidentale. Can be taken either in order to the very nature of the subject—that's the thing I was mentioning about before, something like that—or according to an action or passion which follow the principles of nature, which are matter and form, or according to quantity.

[18:26] If we take in the mode or determination of the subject according to quantity, then it is the fourth species of what quality, right? And because quantity, according to its notion, is without motion, without the notion of good or what bad, right?

[18:48] And therefore, for the fourth species of quality, does not pertain that something be bene vel male, right? eh? Cito vel tarde transiens, eh? quickly or slowly what changing, right?

[19:04] Now the mode or determination of the subject according to action and passion is attended in the second and the third species of quality. Thomas giving another division here into three here.

[19:17] And therefore, in both is considered that something is. done. easily or done difficultly, that it's quickly what passing over or long lasting. There's not ever considering these things something pertaining to the notion of good or what bad, right? Because motion, passion do not have the notion of what end, huh? But good and bad are said with respect to the end. But the mode and determination, of the subject in order to the nature of the thing pertains to the first species of quality, right?

[19:55] This be part of the reason why it's first, right? Which is the habit and disposition. And the philosopher says in the seventh book of natural hearing, the so-called physics, speaking about the habits of the soul and body, that there are dispositions of the perfect to the best, right? That's pretty important.

[20:21] I say, however, perfect what is disposed according to its what nature, right? Thomas is talking about the dog, huh? It's not a vice for the dog to be ferocious, right? Get

[20:39] a little dog across the street from me, and they put him out on this in the front thing, and because the form and nature of the thing is the end, and that for the cause of which something comes to be, therefore the first species is considered good and what evil, right?

[21:08] And also easily and more difficultly to be what moved, right? According as some nature is the end of generation, motion. Hence, in the fifth book of the wisdom, the fifth book after the books of natural philosophy, it says here, the philosopher defines habit that is disposition according to which someone is disposed well or what badly, right? And the second book of the ethics, he says that habits are that according to which we are disposed towards the passions, bene or male, right?

[21:45] Okay. So it's very much tied up with the good and bad, right? For species, huh? When it is a mode suitable to the nature of the thing, then it has a notion of something good. Whenever it does not fit the nature, then it has a notion of something what bad, huh? And because nature is that which is first considered in a thing, and therefore habit is laid down as the first species of quality.

[22:16] I was going to say that before when you were talking about both sorts of nature. I was following that up mentally. The nature is first.

[22:24] When Thomas is arguing, you know, about the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit, right? Now, he says the Son proceeds from the Father per modum naturae, right? That's why he's called the Son. It's nature, right? Why the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love and, therefore, by way of the will. But he says the procession that is natural naturally comes before the procession of the will, right?

[22:56] So the procession of the, you know, there's an order there. The procession of the Son from the Father, and it comes before the procession of the Holy Spirit from them. It's kind of interesting what he says there. It kind of reminds me of this same year, right? Now, for a different reason, huh?

[23:14] Because nature is that which is first considered a thing. Therefore, the habit is laid down as the first species of what quality, right? Because its relation of being what well disposed towards your nature.

[23:38] Why does Thomas use modus to distinguish the species of quality? If modus means measure, and he's always quoting Augustine into that effect, and the species of quantity are distinguished by measure, why should Thomas use the word modus to lead into the distinction of species of quality, right? But it can also have the sense of boundary or what limit, huh?

[24:11] Perhaps we are to understand modus in this way when trying to understand the species of quality. In the above text, Thomas uses the word modus in the terminatio and determinatio as what synonyms.

[24:24] To be measurable, a quantity must also be limited. As Shakespeare says of Mother Earth, in timon of Athens, right? Common Mother, thou whose womb immeasurable, right? An infinite breast teems and feeds all.

[24:49] I was looking at the uh is this the uh fourth lateran council, the one that Thomas put in his life there. But they use the word immensus, right, for infinite, right? Immensus, right. But what does that mean? Immensus. Yeah, yeah. That's what they say here. Common Mother, thou whose womb immeasurable and infinite breast, the womb and the breast spoken of as being immeasurable and infinite. Oh, Shakespeare is a pretty smart guy, there, you know.

[25:22] One time I was having a discussion with Warren about who's greater, Homer or Shakespeare, right? And Warren was maintaining that Shakespeare was greater, right? And I was maintaining that it was presumptuous of him to judge between these two great ones. So you set him up,

[25:50] and then Warren said, "Well, I'm not saying that Shakespeare was naturally a better poet than Homer, right? But the church came between Homer and Shakespeare, right? So Shakespeare had an advantage, right? Huh? So wasn't 29 the the idea that Homer, that Shakespeare was a greater poet, right? But he had the advantage of these guys, right? Huh?

[26:23] So one of the plays there, the character says he's studying that part of philosophy that treats of happiness by virtue, especially to be achieved. That's about as concise a statement of what the Nicomachean is about, right? It's about happiness to be achieved, especially by by virtue. That's what's about. That's that's concise, right? But I mean Homer is for, right? But when Homer talks about reason, huh? He talks about in terms of what looking before and behind yourself.

[26:54] Is that as good as before and after? It's not quite as as movable the words, huh? As before and after are, right? But one of the great critics there, Shakespeare, you know, one of the editors calls Shakespeare's phrase, you know, looking before and after, almost Homeric phrase, right? The two great poets, you know, in harmony, you know, it's just.

[27:24] Joshua is reading Homer now in Greek, you know, and you know, at the university now, and kind of enthusiastic about it, right? I'm showing him my my copy of the the Mozart trio, you know, you know them. But he was talking, you know, when he came and played his his violin on my birthday there, you know. I mean, his his the viola, I mean, yeah, cello, cello, cello, yeah.

[27:53] And and he was saying he had to be a part of a quartet, you know, just these things. And I said, "Well, here you got a trio. All you need is guy to play the piano, a guy to play the violin, and then the cello, right? And so on. " And the guy was really impressive guy. He has a cello, a beer, and everything, you know. So I'm showing the pictures that they had in the thing of listening to those things.

[28:21] Okay. So notice the infinite or unlimited is immeasurable, right? Huh? Okay. That reminds me, as they say, of the Vatican Council. I mean, the the

[28:37] ladder, yeah, the fourth one thing it is. Whether whether you speak of Christ, I mean, of God as being immensus, right? Huh? That's kind of way of saying, you know, that's the the he's unlimited, right? He's infinite, right? Huh? It's a way of saying that. Okay, almost like synonym, offer, Fred. Huh? Shakespeare using immeasurable here and infinite almost the same, right? Huh? Kind of synonymous, right?

[29:03] To see that the womb is immeasurable and the breast is infinite is saying the same thing really about them, right? So. But now this here, from the winter's tale. With thoughts so qualified as your charities, shall best instruct you. Measure me.

[29:31] In one edition, the note gives "qualified," that is, "moderated," right? Get the word "mode" and "qualities," right? then. And in King John, this inundation of mistempered humor rests by you only to be qualified.

[29:52] Modus also has a sense of way, right? Now, both words can be nouns, according corresponding to the word "how." Right? The mode or way of doing something is how you do it.

[30:07] The mode or way of knowing is how you know. Right? Thomas uses it all the time, right? huh? Once, there was one guy get back to he his doctoral thesis on the word "mode."

[30:19] Must have got tired of thinking about mode. I would think before he got through with his doctoral thesis. But Thomas uses it all the time, right? Now, modus praedicandi right? You know all these kinds of use of it Yeah, When in Boethius there in the Great Trinitate where he talks about the mode of the different sciences, right, how they proceed, right, he uses the word "mode," right.

[30:44] We used to translate the modus procedendi as what the way of proceeding, right? Modus has got a little different etymology, right, than way, right? In Greek, you know, you have what the tropos, turn, right?

[31:14] And my friend Washington Irving there sometimes speaks of a man's turn of mind. That's always kind of funny, you know. You know, if you're on a committee there at the college, there, you know, you got professors from all these different disciplines, right? And they all got a different turn of mind, right? And so they don't approach the same question on the same way, right? Because one is pushing from his turn of mind, you know, and so on.

[31:45] I told you that the sociologist, you know, saying to me, you know, he's trying to get a crisis idea, you know. And he says, "If you're doing a word count, on, Thomas, for example, you know." I said, "What the hell are you doing a word count, Thomas? " I mean, I don't know if the sociologist does know word count or this or that or something, you know.

[32:05] But that's not that's not my way of proceeding, you know. I was talking one guy was pursuing a doctorate in philosophy, you know, and uh and uh kind of the thing they're doing now in graduate school, you know, is what's your hypothesis, you know, you know, how are you testing it, you know? But you can see it's a turn of mind, and they're influenced by by by science right now, you know.

[32:47] You have a hypothesis, and they're going to test it right now. Somebody said it about word counts recently. Somebody said, "Oh, well, they did word counts in Shakespeare, and they they could show that his use of this word is different, and therefore it's not the same guy."

[33:15] Yeah. Is it taming out here? Is it? We still good? Okay. What were you officially into? What fourth word or what? Yeah. Okay. Nice. I know. Just relax. Okay. Yeah. Yeah.

[33:31] Yeah. Now this text I was referring to in the Secunda Ethicorum right here, where I was investigating now the what the virtues, right? I was trying to investigate them, right? Tria sunt in anima, sollicitat passiones, which seems to be like the third species of quality, right? Potentiae, which is like the second species of quality, right? And habitus, right? Nihil autem est in anima, nothing. Three is the first number about which we say what?

[34:00] Yeah. Nihil autem est anima, which is a what? Yeah, source of doing something, right? Nisi aliquid horum trium. It's kind of one of those three. So that's why I say I kind of divide the first three against the fourth one, right? Because quantity is not really, or not quantity, but the figure around quantity, right? It's not really a source of what motion, right? Okay. All

[34:30] these these love things, Valentine cards, and they got a heart there, right? You know, but is that shape there is really responsible for the movements of your heart? It's the source of emotion, is it? Huh? I think it is, is it? So you can divide those three, you know. So this is my key, you know.

[34:57] The fourth species is not a principle of any operation, as is clear from there being no motion in geometry. Okay. Good and bad are used to get at the genus of virtue and vice.

[35:33] Now we go into some more things here. Categories. Quod dictum est, habitus secundum quod qualitas is said to be a disposition, right? According to which one is well or badly what disposed? One who is disposed, right? But this happens according to any quality, huh? For according to the what figure, it happens one is well or badly disposed, right? And similarly, according to hot and cold, right? And according to all things of this sort, and therefore habit is not a determined what species of quality, huh?

[36:34] Now I know sometimes too, you know, when Thomas is talking about the categories, he'll say he'll say quickly, you know, that quantity is the measure of substance or something of this sort, right? Size of substance and quality is a disposition of substance, right? Is it the whole genus, you know, could be described as you know? Now as you know, it's very hard to define a highest genus, right?

[37:11] Because it's not a species, right? And a genus is not really as such definable. It's only a what species that's definable? Because a genus is a definition is by genus and what differences? So how are you going to define or make known what the highest genus is, right? It's only being made known by its its species, right? I mean, how do you make it more distinct, right?

[37:45] So they'll say, you know, well we distinguish the species of quantity by the the measure that they have, right? What's number? It's a multitude measured by one. That's kind of the definition, right?

[38:13] Can you measure a line by one? How many ones make up a line? No, it's more by what? An inch or something, right? But some, you know, length, right? It's taken as appropriate, right? It's not as rigorous as, as, you know. And how do you measure one of Shakespeare's things, right?

[38:52] Yeah, yeah. I was talking to to to Joshua there about Homer, in his case. what Homer has is what hexameter, I guess, huh? His lines are hexameter, huh? Six feet, right? Well, I remember reading, you know, that that when they're trying to learn from the Greeks and the Romans, you know, the English poets, they try to imitate that by making their lines six six. Well, apparently the English. syllables are longer for some reason, and just seeing that it's too long, right?

[39:26] And so they hit upon the idea of five feet, right? So not only are Shakespeare's sonnets written in what iambic pentameter, right? But what they call blank verse. A lot of his plays, you know, blank verse, yeah, iambic pentameter, right? But some of that that fits the English, how fast the syllables move, right? So it's a mistake, you know, to imitate the Greeks, maybe six, you know, that that can be done sometimes in English, right?

[39:58] But you can't make the whole thing, you know, with these lines; it's too too long, you know. Just not going to work, you know. So

[40:09] I was talking about what the the linguists told me told me, you know, that the the Latin grammarians, you know, tried to imitate the Greek grammar, and the Greeks understood their language; they were smart enough to figure out their language. And so they're trying to apply to Latin the grammar of the Greek what language, and it doesn't quite fit, right? And I guess the the English grammarians tried to imitate the Latin grammar.

[40:39] So, but you have to admire the the Greeks know what they're doing, right? Now, you know. You know, in logic, you know, when you get to the logic of reasoning, you talk about induction and what syllogism, right? Well,

[40:59] the Latins had their own word for induction, right? But they didn't have their own word for syllogisms. Too too far beyond the Latins are too dumb, you know. So they just borrowed the Greek word and made a kind of Latin word out of it, syllogismos or something, you know.

[41:20] Kind of kind of realizing that we have, right? Of course, that's when they started these these protests, right, in college, right? Now, student sins got to go, you know, they're got to get to know their steps. But we really defended for these guys.

[42:00] To the first, therefore, it should be said. Let's look at the reply to the objection. Then let's look at the second objection. To the first, it should be said that disposition implies a certain what order. Order This has been said. Whence one is not said to be disposed by a quality except in order to is not said to be disposed by a quality except in order to to something.

[42:25] And if one adds bene vel male which pertains to the notion of habit, is it necessary that one attend in order to nature which is the end?

[42:36] Beautiful. Second objection here. Moreover, the philosopher in the predicamentis says that caliditatem hotness, I guess, frigiditatem which is the other which we've got today here, to be dispositions or habits as sickness and what health. But calor and frigus calidum and frigidum sunt inter se species qualitatis. Therefore, habit or disposition are not distinguished from the other species of quality. In fact, you have these objections coming in at all is kind of showing the priority of disposition, right?

[43:30] And they sometimes speak of quality as what the disposition of substance, right? You know, quantity is the size of substance or something, you know, the measure of substance, right?

[43:44] Whence, according to figure, I'm going to the second paragraph that replied the first objection. Whence, according to figure or according to heat or cold, right? One is not said to be disposed well or badly except according to order to the nature of the thing, right? According as it is suitable or not suitable, right? You heat a man up too much or cool him down too much, you kill him, right?

[44:18] Okay, there can be a certain temperature that is suitable to your nature, right? Whence also figures and what undergoing qualities, according as they are considered as suitable or not suitable to the nature of the thing, pertain to habit or disposition, right? For figure, in so far as it is suitable to the nature of the thing, and color pertain to what beauty. So beauty is not what for species of quality it's going to be put up with habit or disposition, right?

[44:58] Color hot and cold, according as they are suitable to the nature of the thing, pertain to what health. And in this way, hot and cold, right, are placed by the philosopher in the first species of quality. It's very subtle, right? Whence it is clear the solution to the second objection, Although it's solved some ways sometimes otherwise, as Simplicius says in his commentary in the predicaments. I can bring in Simplicius but I'm not going to be subject to Simplicius But his great commentary is still in the style.

[45:48] These are very difficult things, right? We need to exhaust the categories here. Can be said about them. We can compare here the four senses of limit or end with the four senses of quality and wisdom with the four species of quality in the categories. But first, we give Thomas exposition of Aristotle's text and wisdom on the word what limit.

[46:31] That's interesting. Aristotle in the fifth book there. What's the first word he takes up? Do you know? Hmm. Yeah, beginning. Yeah. So he begins with the word beginning. Yeah. But then later on he takes up the word what terminus or end, right? Okay.

[46:59] He lays down the ratio of termini or end, right? What's the name of that station there in Rome? There, what do they call it? Ratio termini. Yeah. In the road. Yeah. All roads lead to Rome. That's yeah.

[47:15] Okay. Which the term is said. Which the first is according as in any species of magnitude. Now that's continuous, what quantity, right? Okay. The end of the magnitude or the thing having magnitude is said to be the terminus, right? Just as the point is said to be the terminus of the line. Now I'd rather use the word end, right? The point is the end of the line, right?

[47:44] Okay. That's one sense of end, right? Okay. And the surface is the end of the body, right? And also of the what stone having quantity, right? Okay.

[48:03] So when I leave Shrewsbury, I come to the end of Shrewsbury. Yeah. Now another meaning of end would be destruction, right? But it's not that end of Shrewsbury. Shrewsbury end of Shrewsbury. You get

[48:22] so just me, I'd say. You know, happiness is the end of life. The end of life is death. Therefore, happiness is death. Most common mistake in thinking is mixing up the senses of words, right?

[48:40] The second mode is like the first, right? According as one limit of what motion or of action is said to be the end, right?

[48:51] This to which there is motion, and not that from which is motion, right? So I made a journey today, right? This is my end here.

[49:06] That was end of my motion. It's a little different, but similar to the end of magnitude, right? But it's end of my my motion.

[49:18] To be here was the Right? Is that end in the sense of purpose to be here? Not necessarily. Did I come up here to be here? I come up here to teach or something, right? That's more my purpose, right? Into

[49:40] motion, right? The man runs a mile and then stops. It's enough today. Exercise, right? It's the end of his motion, right? He's no longer what? His running has come to an end.

[50:02] By the politicians, that should be kind of playing the word, right? Okay. What's the third meaning here? Second word, okay. Now, sometimes he says both extremes of the motion is said to be the term largo modo, right? Okay. That from which and that to which, right? As we say that every motion is between two what terms? Now, the third mode in which term is said is cuius causa fit aliquid for the sake of which something comes to be.

[50:48] And this now is the last of intention as a term. One, the second mode was the last of the motion or operation, right? But see, now if if I run for for for a what mile and then I stop, right?

[51:07] Is my stopping there my purpose? I ran to the purpose of stopping. I probably ran for the sake of exercise or something, right, or the health of my body or something, right? So health was my, you know, my end or in the sense of purpose, right? Okay. But stopping was the end of my motion in the second sense, right? So it's a different sense there, right now.

[51:36] Okay. My death is the end of my in the second sense, right? My death, right? Can go on no longer This is the end. Yeah

[51:52] Henry the fifth the fifth is waiting for him to the fourth to die, right? It's a very, very fatherly scene, very, very great Shakespeare, right? Okay.

[52:05] So we got three meanings so far of end, right? Now, the end of the line, right? The end of the table, right? Is the end of the table right there? Okay. Okay. It's the end of me right here. I'm extending the iron map. Right here, that's the end of me. That's the first sense of end, right? Okay,

[52:27] and then the second sense of end is where I what I stop. And the third sense is that for the sake of which, right? Okay, and that's one of the four kinds of causes, right? That for the sake of which I now what's the fifth? The fourth sense,

[52:48] obviously, the fourth sense is according as the substance of thing, which is its essence and definition, is said to be what terminus, right? Okay, now notice the word definition, right?

[53:04] Yeah, yeah. And Aristotle, you know, even he's trying to first know what the thing is. He speaks of perigraphy, right? So it's it's a little bit like drawing a line around, right? So you're going back to first sense, right? But you're using a different sense now, right? You're kind of what you know, description, you know, drawing a line around something, right? Okay. So definition, and that's what Thomas says here.

[53:31] It's beautiful what he does here. For it is terminus cognitionis, right? For knowledge of a thing begins from some exterior signs, but which one arrives eventually at knowing the definition of the thing. When one has arrived there, right, one has perfect knowledge of the thing, right?

[53:55] Or it is said to be the end of the knowledge of definition because within it are contained those things which the thing is known. So once I add, you know, to quadrilateral, equilateral, and right-angled, I got the square, you know. I fenced it in, right? Okay. And that's why you know Plato compares it, you know, to hunting, you know, and forcing the animal, you know, narrow and then finally they get the animal, right?

[54:28] The way they catch the the lions there in India, you know, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, and the lion keeps on, you know, kind of running away from all the sound, and finally got it. Okay. So defining something is like hunting, right? Hunting. And Plato said, "Don't let it escape you, you know. The thing you're trying to define, you know, like you in a hunt, you don't want the animal to escape you, you know."

[54:59] Okay, so if one changes one difference or adds it or subtracts it, it was not the same what definition, right? Okay. Natures of things are like numbers, right? Okay.

[55:15] If it is the term of the knowledge, it's also the term of the thing, right? Because knowledge takes place through being likened to the thing, right? Okay. He concludes then the comparison of. Terminus to beginning, saying that then as many ways as a beginning is said, right? So many ways as end said, and even more, right? Because every beginning is in some way an end, right? But not every what end is a beginning, right?

[55:48] For that to which motion is is an end and in no way a beginning, right? But that from which there is a motion is can be called both a beginning and an end, right? So someday I take a line, I say, okay, I am going to start here. So this point here is the beginning of the line, and the point down here is the end of the line, right?

[56:08] Okay. But someday I say the two end points, right? Two ends of the line, right? I wouldn't say the two beginnings of the line, would I? Probably not. You know, you know. So in some way, end seems to be even radical, huh? Okay. So it's beautiful, right? Now the way Aristotle brings out these things, right? Four senses of end, right? That's a pretty fundamental word, right? It's a respectable word, right?

[56:42] It's equivocal by by reason, right? Now it's got those four basic senses, huh? It's really I really find that impressive, you know. You know, this I read this book called the Book of Revelation, I guess they call it, and I noticed the way God really kind of plays with me a little bit. Says I am the Alpha and the Omega, right? And then he says I am the first and the last.

[57:12] Then he says I am the beginning, the end, right? And you had to see the words that Aristotle has, huh? Because it's in Greek, arche and telos, right? Well, both beginning and end have got many meanings, right? So in one sentence, is God a what beginning, right? Is he beginning like the point is the beginning of the line?

[57:39] When Aristotle begins with beginning, he takes what the beginning that is in the thing of which it is a beginning, right? And then he comes to the sense of beginning that is like the what father or the the maker, right? Who's outside the thing, right? And what sense is God a beginning? Do you like the point or Aristotle uses that the second sense there there of the the foundation of the house is the beginning of the house and the the boaty as the what they call that thing again?

[58:14] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's like the first part of the thing, right? Okay. The Isagoge is the beginning of logic in the traditional tradition, going back to the Greeks, right? Okay, or the Categories, the beginning for Aristotle in his books.

[58:41] Is that what God is, the fundamental part of? He's not beginning in any of those. That's But then Aristotle comes to the beginning that is not in the thing which it is the beginning, right? And it's not. And then you get into more of the senses, which God is the beginning, like He's the Mover, right? But then, is there any the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end?

[59:11] What sense of these senses of God, the end? Are those four senses of end? What sense is the end? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So God is is a beginning, right?

[59:35] Is an efficient cause, right? The mover or the maker, right? huh? Beginning. that says God made heaven and earth. I guess didn't He do that? And then, but He's also what? The end of the whole, right?

[59:52] Kind of unusual that God is both, right? How can the beginning be the end? So they talk about the perfection of the circle, right, where the beginning is the end. But that's different senses in the sense that God is the beginning and the end, right? But you keep coming back, you know. So I always say to students, you know, is reality more like a straight line or like a circle?

[1:00:25] Well, if it's like a straight line, the beginning would not be the end. So the evolutionist thinks it kind of, you know, straight line, you know, you know,

[1:00:37] uncomplicated, complicated, right? But then the beginning and the end would be something different, right? But if God is the beginning of all things and the end of all things, and reality is like what? Circle, right?

[1:00:54] And that's true, right? Okay. Aristotle speaks of of a circle in the diagram there, right now, because the the candy or the you know walking in the bakery, you know, it moves your senses, right now. You know, then your senses move your hunger, your desire, and then that's what brings you back to the thing that that was in the bakery there. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of interesting.

[1:01:31] It's a circle, right? The importance of it, now. We better stop here now. Okay.