Logic (2016)
26. Quality in Theology: Powers, Grace, Sacramental Character and Words Taken from the Continuous
Class of 2017-02-16
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/026-quality-in-theology-powers-grace-sacramental-character-and/

[0:00] So you obviously need some help in the name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment. Move us, God, to know and love you. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, ordain and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand all that you have written, Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

[0:32] amen. I think we'll pass over this little passage here in ten and eleven there, where he's talking about the senses of how, because we'll have that text here, and we'll have to refresh our minds on it. But look at the bottom of page eleven there, right?

[0:49] We mentioned before about the reason why Aristotle had observed, had altered the consideration of them, the order, right? And he takes up the genera in particular. He takes up what substance first, then quantity, then what quality. He says, right, he first enumerates them, and then relation, then the other six. But here he takes up substance first, then quantity, and then takes relation third. Well, it's because of the fact that what there was this big accepted definition of relation in Plato, and where everything that's said to be of something else, right, seems to be relative, right?

[1:32] And Aristotle said, no, there are some things which are really not basically relations, but they have a relation following upon them, right? And of course the famous example where Aristotle pointed this out was knowledge, right? At the bottom here of page eleven, Aristotle or Thomas rather, makes the same point about what Potentia, right, power, right, now. Okay. Notice Thomas says here, although the ratio of principii the notion of a beginning, right, belongs to potency, right, huh?

[2:14] And that ratio of beginning is in the genus of what relation. Nevertheless, that which is this beginning of action, passion, is not a relation, huh? But some forma absoluta, as opposed to the relative, towards another, right? And that is the essence of potency, right? And hence it is that the philosopher places power not in the genus of what relation, but of quality, right? Because it's fundamentally a quality, but it has relation following upon it.

[2:52] Just as science, which is the example where Aristotle happens to point out that this sort of thing, that knowledge is what. Basically a quality, but it has relation to the known following upon it. Although to both some relation happens, right? So it gives you the more richer, two examples, right, of things that are basically qualities, power and knowledge, but they both have following upon them relation to something else, right?

[3:22] So you place them fundamentally in quality. If you want to say the relation, belongs to relation, okay, but power or knowledge are fundamentally qualities, right? Okay.

[3:49] Now I point out that the Aristotle calls that second species of quality what natural ability or inability, right? And it's good to have in mind the word natural because the first species of quality, which are habits dispositions, these are acquired abilities, right? Okay.

[4:14] Now Thomas clearly places the powers of the soul in the second species of quality. So when he talks about the virtues in the ethics, right, or in the prima Secundae, right? He goes to the genus of quality and then goes to the first what species, right? Huh? But in the what study of the soul, he goes to talk about the powers of the soul. And Aristotle was talking about them last night.

[4:40] They're the five genera of powers, right? They're found in souls, right? And but he goes to the what category of quality, but to the what second species, huh?

[4:56] Now just a few texts there on the page twelve there, the first one is from the Summa Theologiae, where he's taking up the soul, right, and its powers. Since the power of the soul is not its essence, Thomas will often have articles on that, just like he'll argue in the angel his powers are not his what? I mean his his powers are not his essence, his nature, right?

[5:21] It is necessary that it be an accident, and it is in the second species of quality, right? Right. Okay. But it's not an accident in the sense of porphyry, right? The Isagoge, right? But an accident is defined in the Antipredicaments, right? Exists in another.

[5:44] Take another one from the the De Spiritualibus Creaturis. I guess that's one of your disputed questions, right? It's still a delicious reading. You grind these things, consume them again. It's delicious. Yeah, nothing like that in the modern philosophers. Nothing like that at all. Thomas has twenty four objections against the truth, you know, and what he's going to maintain in the body of the article, you know. And sometimes he has arguments on both sides, you know.

[6:14] That's marvelous, huh? Concentrate your mind upon these things. If the powers of the soul are not its the very essence of the soul, and it's manifest that they're not other substances, right? It follows that they are accidents in one of the what nine genera that are genera of accidents, right? But they are in the second species of quality, which is called potentia, et impotentia naturalis, huh? Natural power.

[6:45] Okay. So, if you by by upbringing, you know, are able to to acquire a certain habit, you get a certain ability, right? But it's not really what. Hm? Not natural. Yeah. Yeah, it's an acquired ability, right? You see, so distinguish the two things, right? Okay. What do you do when your little boy comes home from the store with something that was not paid for?

[7:27] Yeah, we make him go back and and and yeah, yeah, yeah. And so after a while, you get so you could, you know you know avoid these things, huh? What what do you say about Mozart who played the violin the first time? Oh yeah, that's that guy. that guy was. That natural ability. It's something, yeah.

[7:54] Many times I said I wish that that uh Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas had known Mozart's music right They would have been I think very much impressed with it right And if they had known Shakespeare they would have been very impressed with his plays right But at least my my great teachers like Monsignor Dionne and and and De Koninck and so on were very much taken up with these things right And I remember remember I guess De Koninck was out at uh St Mary's College That's where I first taught you know before I had my doctorate And uh the uh De Koninck had been out there one time I guess in the summer and of course he'd spoken so so you know well of Shakespeare right

[8:32] now You know one of the uh the uh uh clerics out there was telling me about it so he thought almost embarrassed you know that I would be be sh you know uh shocked or or something you know by that respect that he had for Shakespeare right you know it was kind of kind of striking Of course. I fully agreed with it, you know, but I would say, you know, you know, Aristotle, you know, the in the eighth book of the Politics, there he talks about music and how some music is suitable for kids, and I'm sure you'd see that rock and roll is not suitable for kids.

[9:09] And so, my favorite example was when my cousin Donald went into the Navy, right? He was down in the Navy place there on the East Coast, huh? And they were playing some of that wild stuff, you know. People were taking these fold-up metal chairs and going, those things flying through the room like, you know, you know, it just went crazy with this music, you know.

[9:41] Now, next text is a little one on what alteration, right? Huh? And this is in regard, right? Aristotle says, omnis alteratio fit secundum qualitatem sensibilem right? There he uses the word sensible, right? Huh? Which is the third Species of quality. According to these things, bodies are altered, huh? By which first bodies differ from each other, right? Because they distinguish earth, air, fire, and water by hot and cold, and wet and dry.

[10:16] Which are sensible qualities, as gravitas and levitas, dulcedo and mollities, which are perceived by touch, right? Okay. And these are certain passions under the what genus of quality contained, and they're called passiones because they, what engender a passion in the senses, or because from some passions they are caused, as Aristotle says in the predicaments, huh? Okay. So my face may turn red in embarrassment as I'm shown to be the scoundrel that I am, right?

[10:50] Okay. So yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, in the fifth book of Physics, there at the bottom of page twelve, to this genus he alludes this common name which is alteration. For alterum, as a custom to be said, what differs secundum what? Qualitatem, right, huh? We speak now about quality not according as quality is found in the genus of substance, according as a what substantial difference is said to be predicated in secundum quod quale, right, huh?

[11:34] So when they define, you know, even difference, they'd say it signifies how something is what it is, right? Quale quid, right? Okay. And de quali passivo, which is contained in the third species of of quality, huh? But you can call those sensible qualities too, like Thomas seems to do here. Okay.

[11:58] But quale dicitur aliquid pati aut non pati, what? Hot and cold, white and black, and so on, right? Okay. So they're like per se sensibles, but private sensibles, right? And the fourth species is of course that.

[12:24] The philosopher in the seventh book of the Physics, at the top of page thirteen, he proves that in the first and fourth species of quality there is not the motion of alteration, but only in the third, which is called the undergoing or undergoing quality. In account of this, he significantly says that alteration is a transmutation in the passions, right? Okay. That's kind of interesting, you know. In the first species of quality, though, there seems to be something alteration, right?

[12:54] Can a man go from being vicious to to virtuous, or vice versa? You know. But how do you go? How do you acquire these moral virtues, huh? Well, Aristotle says it's by doing courageous things that we become courageous. And then people say, well, how can you say that it's by doing courageous things that you become courageous? Because if you are doing courageous things, you are courageous. Well, you don't do it with the what?

[13:28] Perseverance. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So you kind of force yourself and do kind of violence to yourself, right? I remember this this guy in college. There, he wanted to, you know, be active in some organizations, but he had a fear of talking in public, right? So he signed up for this course for a professor, you know, speech course, right? And for, you know you are forced to get up and talk in front of the class, and professor, you know, you know, will tell you what's wrong with the way you are addressing the class and so on.

[14:02] So, but he's what doing kind of violence to himself, right? Huh? But he's starting to build up this thing, right? So eventually he can he can speak without what fear, right? I was there at the lead through the mass there, you know, in the local parish. And well, today they have the you know once a while they have all the kids come in from the grade school St.

[14:25] Mary's grade school there you know and and Christ they get them up you know at the time and they have to say the prayer of the faithful and so on each little kid gets it has a little petition right and they climb up there and so on none of them seem to be afraid you know see at that age I would be afraid to get up in front of the church you know and all these people out there you know but they all they seem to be you know but it's probably good for them though you know to get up there and speak in front of a crowd like that and not panic you know huh yeah man I did in high school he took

[14:58] a speech class for public speaking with this big big room empty yeah you are in the front and you are talking professors in the back and he had a big metal bucket and a handful of nails and every time he would stutter or say something he'd drop a nail in the bucket bang and you know you stutter again you said you know again or something like that that's a way we gotta

[15:27] do that for a preaching class you know like like like okay now in the appendix here going to some things in theology right now okay

[15:53] what about grace what is grace huh is there a place for for grace in the category of what quality huh see Moreover, grace is a certain what quality, huh? But it is manifested as not in the fourth species of quality, which is a form and a figure right around something, because grace doesn't pertain to the what body, right? Nor is it in the third species because it's not a passio, an undergoing, right, or undergoing quality, huh?

[16:36] Which is in the sensitive part of the soul, right? This is proven in the seventh book of the physics, huh? For grace is chiefly in the mente, in the immaterial part, yeah. Mente doesn't mean just you know mind as opposed to will or something, but in the thing. Nor again is it in the second species, which is potency of impotentia naturalis. I was emphasizing the word naturalis, right?

[17:04] Because grace is super natura, huh? above it, huh? And does not have itself to good and bad as a natural power can be, huh? Therefore, it remains that it is in the first species, which is habitus, habit or disposition, huh?

[17:26] For the habits of the mind are what virtues, huh? Because even knowledge itself, scientia, is in some way a what virtue, huh? Virtue is what makes its have or good and is what doing doing good, right? Said and said above. Therefore, grace is the same thing as virtue, it seems, right? You're kind of taking those four species that Aristotle gives, right? As if they are what exhausting all the species.

[17:57] Aristotle himself says they made the other ones, right? I tell you, the Father Henri Dulac there was my logic teacher in college. There, huh? You thought that there might be some other species, that didn't bring anyone out. okay. Notice what Thomas says in his reply to this objection argument, to the third it should be said, top of page 14 here. To the third it should be said that grace is reduced.

[18:26] That's that that's simply there, right? But led back there to the first species of what quality, huh? But it is not over the same thing as virtue, but a certain what habitudo, huh? Way of having yourself, which presupposed, which is presupposed, huh? More fundamental in that sense to the infused virtues, right? As if it's the beginning and the root, huh? I like those words, the chief human radix huh?

[18:57] Root, huh? And in another text, where Thomas does the same, he notes that grace is a quality not known by the what philosophers. So grace is reduced to the genus of quality, but that reduction to it doesn't mean it's put there simply, right? And to the first species of quality, right?

[19:22] But does not properly have the name, the nature of a what habit, because it's not immediately ordered to what act in the way that you could say that faith and hope and charity are, right? Faith is what immediately, huh? Not to anything else. immediately ordered to what believing, right? And hope to hoping, right? And charity to what loving your God and your neighbor. But it's a certain way of having yourself, right?

[19:54] Just as health has itself to the what body, and therefore. Chrysostom says that grace is the sanitas mentis, the health of the mind, right? As opposed to gender ideology Yeah. Whence it is not numbered neither among the sciences nor among the virtues, right? Okay.

[20:22] Nor among the other qualities which the philosophers number. of whom it did not belong to what? to eat except natural habits and acquiring ones, right? Okay. Now this next one it goes further along.

[20:41] In a third text, where Thomas also notes the difference of this quality, which is grace, from those known by the philosophers, and this is maybe more clear now, grace is in the first species of quality, right? Although it's not properly said to be what cannot properly be said to be a habit. I think it's the same reason he gave the other argument, because it is not immediately ordered to what act, but to a quoddam esse spirituale, right?

[21:16] See, a kind of spiritual what being, right? Huh? Which therefore is in the soul, right? Which it makes in the soul rather than in the what powers of the soul, right? See, so grace is like a habitudo, as he calls it, in the soul itself, right? Giving it a kind of spiritual existence, right? Kind of spiritual being, right? Huh? And it's as a disposition, which with respect, which is with respect to glory, which is they call this gratia consummata in gloria You've heard that before, I'm sure.

[21:54] Okay. But nothing like grace in the accidents of the soul, which the philosophers known, can be found, right? Huh? Because the philosophers did not know except those what accidents of the soul, which are ordered to the acts that are proportioned to human what nature, right? Okay. So yes, it was what he says there, right? Huh? Quoddam esse spirituale right? I sometimes tied up with you know doesn't Saint Peter talk about partaking of the divine nature, right?

[22:37] Huh? And you're partaking the divine nature, you see, in in your very soul, right? Huh? And therefore it's kind of a spiritual being, right? Huh? And therefore this is a beginning and a what root, as he says, right? Of faith, hope, and charity, which are not in the soul but in the powers of soul, huh? Faith being in reason, and hope and charity being in the will.

[23:05] And now, if you go back to to nature, and just talk with nature, you say, what is the connection between the nature of the soul and these abilities of the soul? See, like like reason, for example, and and will and so on, right? Well, they're like what properties, in the sense of the predicables, right? They're they're something what accidental, right? But they follow upon the what nature, right?

[23:35] So you might say that from the nature of the soul, there proceeds these what abilities of understanding and will, right? Huh? And therefore, from the elevation of the what soul to a kind of spiritual being or a kind of partaking of the divine nature, there proceeds from the soul, right, as a beginning and a root of what faith, hope, and what charity, right, which are in the

[24:06] powers of the soul rather than the soul itself, right? It's kind of interesting, I mean, to see that connection between grace and distinction, nevertheless, in grace and the theological virtues, right? We talk about those things, huh? They speak of sanctifying grace, right? Now, but it's giving the soul kind of a a more elevated existence than it has by nature, right? That's kind of interesting.

[24:38] But it's a little bit like you know, you know, if you had to lead it back to one of the four species, you'd need it back to the first one. It's kind of a what disposition of the soul, right? So that it has a kind of spiritual being. It's interesting he makes use of the terms habitus and habitudo. Yeah, yeah, Kind of interesting. Yeah, Different sense of the words.

[25:02] But even habitudo and habitus have certain affinity, right? huh? In their thing. This next text is very long and it doesn't exist in English, so I apologize. Okay. This is talking about character, right? A character in some sacraments is what pressed upon us, right? Huh? No, and all the moderni, not modern, moderns, no, confess, right? None of them confess it now.

[25:42] Yeah, yeah. But in the way of placing it in the soul, they partly differ and partly come together, right? Huh? They come together, and that they say that through character is implied a threefold relation, right? Huh? For it's a character is a sign that is what distinguishing and configurative, but they differ in this that some lay these relations not to be what. There's not underneath underneath them some absolute accident, right?

[26:14] See, as opposed to what relation, right? Okay. Don't be too absolute about the word. Absolute is we use it nowadays. You know, it's absolutely true. You know, so the thing, say, you know, but

[26:28] absolute there is opposed to towards another, right? Okay. So he's saying these characters maybe are not just relations, just like we saw this point about, you know, power and and knowledge that they're not fundamentally a relation, right? But there a quality that has relation falling upon it, right? Okay.

[26:58] But this cannot be, because the sign, right, through the form which it impresses upon the senses or the understanding, makes something come into our knowledge. Likewise, nothing is distinguished from another except through some form. For likeness is relation founded upon unity of what quality? Huh? As is said in the fifth book of the metaphysics.

[27:30] That's why they state that those relations of likeness and equality and so on are based upon unity, which is the beginning of number, right? So that's why they kind of see their qual their relations are based upon what quantity, right? But it's not this kind of extension of the thing, right?

[27:49] Once it is clear that of those relations which character implies, there's required some what form lying neath, stretched out underneath it, and since it's not a substantial form, right? Because a substantial form is not given the sacraments, right?

[28:12] It remains that the form undergoing this is a certain quality whose what unity of of meaning, right, makes for what likeness. Okay, that's what difficult. And there

[28:34] some people say therefore that it's not in one of the four species of quality which Aristotle distinguished, right? And nevertheless, it's in the genus of quality, resting upon the word of the philosopher himself in the predicaments right? Where Aristotle, said and I'm quoting Aristotle now in Latin, here fortasse right, perhaps there will appear other modes of quality than these four that he's. Good guess.

[29:02] But notice Thomas is kind of tough tough about this. Notice he goes on to say, But this is a fuga, flight. Okay. Because although there are other modes of quality, nevertheless all in some way are led back to these what species, which he says is clear from this that no other species is able to be found. Right? I didn't have this text to quote it to Father DeLac, you know.

[29:29] I'm a little suspicious of Father DeLac, though. he went in and helped started raising money for the college, you know. Yeah. I don't know if that's a good sign of a philosopher. He knows how to raise money for a college. He's quite sophisticated in some ways. Took the D right out of fundraising Yeah.

[30:10] And therefore they say that it is the fourth species of quality, right? Because this configuratio, which character expresses by its name, implies the unity of the figure, which is in the fourth what species of quality. And some say this figure is the cross of Christ. Sed hoc non potest stare. This can't stand up. That's a beautiful thing Thomas says. You know, said hoc non potest. Okay.

[30:42] Almost like what Saint Dion would say. So, hoc non potest stare. Because either figure is taken what properly, right? Or metaphorically, right? If it's taken properly, thus it implies the termination of quantity, dimensive quantity, which means continuous quantity, right? Dimensional quantity, you might say. Which it is clear is not in the what soul, right?

[31:14] If, however, is said metaphorically, right? Then it is necessary, right, that the metaphor be led back to something what proper, not figurative speaking, right? Because the thing is not placed in a genus through that which is said of it metaphorically, right? Okay.

[31:41] This is not said that the what are in the genus of quality, because it was said in Matthew five fourteen, you are the light of the world, right?

[31:59] Nor can it something in the fourth species be found that is in the soul secundum proprietatem, right? Only metaphorically. Whence the character about which we speak cannot be founded upon quality of the fourth what species, huh? And therefore some say that is in the third species of quality. This doesn't seem much improvement. In that what?

[32:28] Yeah, a certain sweetening, I guess, huh? Passion, huh? Insofar as it what ornates, huh? It like this and decorates the soul, right, huh? Okay. But this again cannot stand, huh? Because as the philosopher proves in the seventh book of the physics, the third species of quality is not except in the sensible part of the soul, right?

[33:01] But character, by no one, is placed in this part of the soul, but in the understanding part of the soul, right? Okay. Just like we say, you know, we speak of the will as being in the understanding part of the soul, right? Okay. Even though it's different power than that. And moreover, these qualities are the the third species of quality, always have an order to some bodily change, right?

[33:29] Huh. Which they either produce, right, or by which they are what caused, huh? And therefore others say that it's in the first species of quality, and it's kind of a middle between disposition and what habit, right? Huh. Insofar as it's with difficulty change movable, it comes together habit. Insofar, however, it is not the ultimate perfection, but it disposes for grace. Huh. It comes together with disposition, right?

[34:02] Huh. But this cannot stand, because according to the philosopher in the second book of the ethics, a habit is that by which we have ourselves to passions well or badly, right? Huh. And universally, into one university considering, there appears this difference between habit and power, because a power is that by which we are able to do something without qualification, right? Huh. Habit, however, by which we are able to do that well or what badly, right?

[34:36] Huh. Just as the understanding by which we consider, but by science by which we consider what well, right? Huh. Concupiscence is that by which we have concupiscences, but temperance by which we do so well, right? Huh. Intemperance by which we do so badly, huh? And likewise is about disposition, because disposition is nothing other than a certain incomplete habit. Huh. It's not stabilized yet. Huh. Since therefore character is ordered to something simpliciter, not to that thing well or badly, because the priest can what?

[35:17] Confect. Yeah, it means consecrate, right? I mean. Or it could be any of the sacraments. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. bene vel male, right? Huh. Okay.

[35:29] It cannot be that the quality upon which is founded the relation of the character be a habit, but more a what? Yeah. So, I guess what is it? Is it what the sacraments? The the baptism you get a character, don't you? And then confirmation, holy orders. Yeah, I don't think you get for matrimony. I don't think. And you don't get the Eucharist because you you over and over again, and and confession, you know.

[35:56] Yeah. Yeah. So. The priest, by his consecration, has a power right now, but that power doesn't show he's going to use it well or badly. Right, he might use it to make money or something, right? Or to reward his his nephews or something. Okay.

[36:20] Whence remains that is not in the first species of quality, but is more reduced to the second, as some others say. Right now, and this in this way becomes clear, just as of anything existing in some nature, there are some operations that are proper to it. Huh? So also to those regenerated into spiritual life, as Dionysius says, huh? Operations. Wherever there are operations that are proper to something, private to it, you might say, is necessary that there be what proper beginnings of those operations.

[36:58] Whence, just as in other things, there are natural powers or abilities for their proper operations or private operations. So to those reborn to the spiritual life, they have certain powers according to which they are able to what do certain things. Right

[37:22] now, nothing says here. To the second, it should be said that it's reduced to the second species of quality and is a different mode or way from the one which the philosopher there lays down, because that's what natural ability or inability, right? Because the philosopher did not know except the natural operations, and not except the what natural powers, right? So Thomas the Inviscid here says it's a natural ability or inability.

[37:50] But it stands that for among us, it's necessary to lay down that there are what spiritual powers as the power of consecrating, I guess, conficiendi, and then sin absolving and huiusmodi, and that these are reduced to the second species of quality. Right, but you got to be careful. The way we we do counter, right? Huh? No, not being reduced to them as natural powers, right? You know, but

[38:23] just as the infused habits are in the same species of quality with the natural habits or acquired ones. Okay. So we kind of saw this before. I think the division of the chapter quality here on the last page and divided into three. Right now. I think I mentioned in the last time about one thing that I picked up at least in Thomas. From the,

[39:06] I guess the first question of the disputed questions on potency, he gets a little more precise than he is say, in the. I remember him at least in the fifth book of wisdom. When Aristotle, when Thomas is explaining these words equivocal by reason that Aristotle is distinguishing the senses and wording them in the fifth book of wisdom. Thomas, you know, makes the famous statement that we name things as we know them.

[39:35] And then he alludes to the fact that our knowledge starts with our senses and goes forward from there. Right now. Now, when he's talking about something very high in theology, the procession of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, but even before he gets into the details of those. processions, he asks, "Is there procession in God? Is there a going forward in God, right?

[40:10] " And so he's got to stop and talk about whether a text, you know, in Scripture, right, speaking of the Son proceeding from the Father or the Holy Spirit proceeding. And then Thomas makes a interesting point, huh? And he says that he speaks as if our equivocal names equivocal by reason, as if they start from the continuous, right? And what is the continuous? I think I mentioned that last time, didn't I?

[40:43] Did I? Yeah, I know. You know, you don't take. You say, okay, the natural road is from the senses into reason, right? But do we really use the names of private sensibles like red and green and so on? Make them words equivocal by reason?

[41:09] Don't seem to me they're too. Yeah, and they're too immersed in the sensible, right? Okay. And but we do take names from the continuous or what is in the continuous, huh? And Thomas emphasized that, huh? Okay.

[41:31] Well, De Koninck was always fond of the the word equivocal word in or to be in, right? Because he was teaching physics, you know, since the nineteen thirties. And and I told you, you know, he was having his course on place, right? He had a whole semester on place. And everyone coming down for the class, and I was standing in the hall there. He came up to me, looked up at me.

[42:03] He's kind of a short man, Newton. He says, "Isn't this wonderful? " He was just he was just filled with wonder, you know, more than even the whole class, right? He's been teaching the same thing since the nineteen thirties, right? You know, and you know, he really would get you interested in the text, you know. And but what is that taken from? It's taken the first sense of in is to be in this room, right?

[42:29] To be in some place, right? And place, if you recall, in the chapter on quantity, it's a species of what? Quantity of continuous quantity, right? So here is eight senses, right? You know, to be in place, to be a part in a whole, right? Huh? Genus and species, species in the genus, and so on. Form and matter, right? Huh? For all its parts, I got you in my power, and I left my heart in San Francisco.

[43:08] You eight meanings of of to be in, but they all start from what? The continuous and from place in particular, right? Okay. And it's it's got marvelous, right? Okay, we had looked at the word what before, right? Now we'll meet again here in in the text I give from before the fundamental one is not from the fifth book of metaphysics. I think should be on one of the categories, right?

[43:36] And therefore, Aristotle distinguishes the four central senses, the chief senses of the word before, right? But the first meaning is what? Time. Yeah, and time is given as a species of what? Continuous quantity there in the chapter one. That's interesting, right? Okay.

[43:59] And so Thomas talks about how, processio comes from going forward, right? Which first names a what change of place? But when I go forward to your place of my house, that's a continuous what motion, right? Unless I stopped and get hamburgers.

[44:25] But so you first name it from continuous thing, right? So you can see this in in other words too. I was thinking, you know, about what is the first meaning of form, right? huh? Shape. Yeah, yeah, and that's something in the continuous, right? Huh.

[44:49] And then from there you go to you know other forms and eventually to substantial form and so on, right? But you start from the continuous, right? That's a really marvelous insight that Thomas had into those things, right? Huh. So it makes a little more precise, you know. You start from the senses, right? But exactly, what do you start to get these words? Huh. So I was thinking about that.

[45:13] Now, as you know, there are two definitions of the continuous, huh? And the one given in logic is is that the quantity whose parts, right, meet at a common boundary, right?

[45:30] But there is another definition of continuous given in natural philosophy, which is that the continuous is that which is divisible forever, right? Now, when you go to natural philosophy, Aristotle will talk about how magnitude, length, and so on is divisible forever, right? And then motion, which is proper to natural philosophy. The motion down the line, right, or down the road, is continuous, right, and the time it takes you to move down the road is continuous, right.

[46:10] So these three kind of what go together, right? Place, you know, and motion and time, right. That's why when Aristotle distinguishes the eight senses of in there and the first sense is to be in place, right. Thomas says, well, didn't he leave out the sense of to be in time? You know, he says, well, that's laid alongside the first one because place and time are extrinsic measures, and so on, right?

[46:39] Okay, but again, alluding, you know, to what you find out when you talk about in the Natural Philosophy in the sixth book, you know, which shows that magnitude and motion and over the magnitude and the time it takes are all divisible, what forever, right? Now, you know, big arguments, right? But I'm always struck by the fact that he he he kills two birds with one stone, right?

[47:03] But the fact that one guy moves faster than somebody else, right? But the faster guy, you know, covers the same distance in less time. Now the time is being divided, and a lesser time, the what the the slower guy would would go less distance, so that's divisible, right? And then at lesser distance, he would done a lesser time even yet the faster, you know, it's a marvelous way he shows it, huh?

[47:29] So I was thinking about this, right? And then I got thinking about Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? Reason is the ability for large discourse looking before and after, right? I see. Gee whiz, where does the word large come from? Yeah, yeah. And sometimes when I'm explaining what the word large means, there has more than one meaning, I think. But the first thing I like to bring out is that it's a discourse about the universal.

[48:10] The universal covers, might say, a large area because it's said of what many, right? So when I say no odd numbers even, I'm covering how many odd numbers. Wow.

[48:30] I say this to you, you know. You know what something is? It's not. It's the opposite of nothing, right? Yeah. Okay. And everything is something, right? So you know everything in some way, don't you? Oh boy, I wouldn't tell my father that. But in some way, you know, something that is said of everything, right?

[48:50] Everything is something, isn't it? Even nothing is something in the mind. Okay. So large is taken from the first. Example, right? First kind of continuous, the what? Magnitude, right? eh? Continuous quantity. Okay. Then discourse is taken from what? Running, yeah. Motion. Yeah, that's continuous too, right? See, and finally get that to the discourse of reason, right? I see where you're going. Yeah, yeah. And last night there, Aristotle, you know, in the text there, his distinction of powers and soul, right?

[49:34] Huh? When it comes to to reason, right? Huh? With the understanding, he has two words there at one point. There, nous, right? Huh? Which never is, you know, kind of obscure word in some ways. Nous. The other word he has is dianoetikon right? So I think kind of touches upon the idea of discourse, huh? And they they they compare it in the dictionary to Latin cogitare, you know, and so on, just kind of a sense of Discourse rather than of understanding, right?

[50:02] Huh? And interesting Aristotle does that, right? And then the definition continues with looking before and after, and before starts with time, right? So you have magnitude, motion over the magnitude, and then the time it takes to go down the magnitude, right? And large is taken from one, from the other. My goodness, Shakespeare. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, how illuminating, you know, if you bring you know Thomas and and Shakespeare together, you know, I can see Thomas, you know, expounding that.

[50:42] Well, Shakespeare. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, how beautiful that is, though, huh? How beautiful that is, huh? To see that, huh? Struck with that, huh? Now you see when I when I go to talk about act and ability, right?

[51:02] And this is kind of the key, I think, to be knowing God and especially the substance of God, huh? Both the existence of God, right, and so on. And when Aristotle gets through distinguishing act and ability, right, then he considers in the third and last part of Book Nine, he considers the what? The order of act and ability, right? And he points out, you know, how act is before ability in many ways, right?

[51:36] But part of that is he says that although in the thing that goes from ability to act, it's an ability before it's an act. It goes from ability to act by reason of something already in act, right? So if I put the water on to make tea in the morning,

[51:56] the water is able to be hot before it is hot, but it goes from being cold to being hot by the heat that we have in the stove, yeah. And so, simply speaking, act is before ability, and this is going to point to the way that the first being, right, is going to be an act or be really pure act, right? God is the first act; he's called sometimes by Thomas, right?

[52:24] But the first act is going to be pure act, right? Huh? Say, okay. So this is, you know, when I was, you know, I'm a lazy son of a gun, so when I was learning, you know, how can you prove that God is simple? You know, how can you prove that God is unchanging, right? How can you prove that God is perfect? You know, well, all of this and the fact that he's pure act, right?

[52:46] I said, I like that. I'm killing. I had to kill many birds with one stone, right? And you can see Thomas as he develops it in the Summa Contra Gentiles so I find my favorite book there. That's how he develops it more fully than he does in the Summa Theologiae. But

[53:04] but Aristotle in the ninth book, ability and act and ability, the ninth book of wisdom, he points out that the first meaning of act is motion. Okay.

[53:18] James, there he goes, there he goes, continually again, right? He's really stuck on that. Did I tell you that when I was in Quebec? There, you know, sometimes he'd go see one of these French movies. The movies are French, right? And as the joke was, you know, that if you go to a French comedy, you can't follow it because it goes too fast in the comedy. But if it gets sad, you know, a love story or something like that, the words you can follow it, you know, try to work on your French a little bit, you know.

[53:49] But anyway, in those days, you still had the news reel, right? You see, and we in the states here would call what the news reel or something like that, right? And maybe just before your time. But but anyway, in Quebec, when the news reel came on, right, he would say, les actualités.

[54:12] What's actual, you know? But the news is what's going on, right? What's going on, right? You know. He would say to me, "What's new, Berquist? I don't know it seemed pretty old, but I was thinking. I don't know anything new.

[54:35] But Aristotle starts to distinguish act in general, right? Kind of beautiful. The ninth book of wisdom is, you might expect, it's got three parts, right? In the first part, he talks about what he distinguishes ability for motion. That's all he does in the first part. Different kinds of ability for motion, right? The active ability, the passive ability, right? The rational ability, the natural ability, right? You know.

[55:05] And and then in the second part, he's going to what distinguish other senses of act than motion, right? And one distinction that's very important is distinction between motion and form.

[55:25] Motion, continuous. Form is in the continuous, right? The first meaning of form, right? So, James Thomas, you really you really hit the nail on the head there, and the the thing, huh? And so you're struck by that, huh? You know, that's so important to understand act and ability, huh?

[55:50] But you have to realize that these words come from what? They seem to come mainly from the continuous, right? Aristotle begins the fifth book of wisdom. The first word he takes up is beginning. But what's the first meaning of beginning, right? See, beginning of the, you know, yeah. I was telling my students last night, you know that that curb is the beginning of my property, you know.

[56:18] And but that's the first meaning, right? The point is the beginning, of, the line, right? The line is beginning of the surface, you know, and the surface is the beginning of the body, right? Huh? That's the first meaning of beginning, right? Huh?

[56:33] And later on, Aristotle takes up the word end. What's the first end? Well, there is the end of the table over there. If it begins here and it ends over there, right? Doesn't go all the way down to you guys down there, right? This table. And so, beginning and end, they both begin with something what in the continuous, right? Okay. Now, of course, if you take a point, a point is not continuous, but it's something in the continuous, right?

[57:04] Okay. And then, I was reading this book one time. It's called the Apocalypse, right? God is kind of, you know, I am the Alpha and Omega. I think he just says it by itself first. And later on, a little bit, he says, "I am the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last." And finally, says, "I am the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last." The beginning, the end, right?

[57:28] In the same words that Aristotle uses, right? Arche and telos, huh? In that text. right. So that's pretty important, right? As you know, Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles, the first book is about God in Himself, right? And the second book is about God as the beginning, and the third book is about God as the end, right? Okay. So yeah, it's pretty good, pretty important to know what beginning and end mean, right?

[57:58] You know, and he's arche and telos right, right? The beginning and the end. You know, and you say, well, those words are equivocal. In the first meaning of beginning and end, is what

[58:20] in the continuous, right? Huh? Okay. And Aristotle moves it, you know, you know the second sense of beginning there is like like the fundamental part of the thing, right? The foundation of the house is the beginning of the house, right? Huh? See, and then eventually he gets to a beginning that is not a part of or a limit of the thing which is the beginning, right? And then you say, well, the father is the beginning of the the son, right?

[58:50] Huh? Or the carpenter is the beginning of the table, right? In some sense, right? And you're getting closer to the sense in which God is saying what beginning, right? Huh?

[59:03] He's not a beginning. He's the edge of things. He's not a beginning. That he's the fundamental part of things, right? He's a he's the foundation of the house of the world. You might say metaphorically is, but strictly speaking, he's not the foundation. You know, the foundation of the house, right? And

[59:24] but he's a beginning, like the you know father is or the carpenter is, right? And the same way with with with end, right now. I mean, the first sense of end would be the end of the magnitude, right? And then the second meaning would be the what the end of my what motion, right? So I take a nice walk and then I stop. That's the end of my motion?

[59:55] And the third meaning of end is my what intention, my purpose, huh? And then the fourth sense of end is definition. Be kind of strange fourth sense, right? But Thomas says, you know, that we know a thing outwardly first, right? Then we gradually move inward, right? That's again to our discourse, right? To know what we know what thing is, right? And we didn't know.

[1:00:31] So what what a beautiful beginning! Their Thomas has given us there in the. He may point out elsewhere, but I just happen to remember this. You know, this thing of the De Potentia, which is so powerful, right? You know, just just in one, you know, one article, one question, right in there, right? You get such a powerful what beginning, right? Huh? You know, the importance of understanding the continuous and what is in the continuous, right?

[1:00:59] And seeing how it lies at the basis of before and in and beginning and end and all kinds of words. You know, that's really impressive, huh?

[1:01:14] But Shakespeare's definition is magnificent because it has, you know, three different senses there, right? Huh? Is this small talk? This large talk we're having. See, that's another sense of large and small, right? Huh? You see,

[1:01:42] bigger and better—the American way of life. Yeah.