Logic (2016)
27. The Last Six Categories, God's Eternity, and a Review of the Ante- and Post-Predicaments
Class of 2017-02-16
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/027-the-last-six-categories-gods-eternity-and-a-review-of-the/

[0:00] Okay. Well, now we're going to be more brief here at the next six categories, huh? Because Aristotle was kind of brief with them, right? Huh? Okay.

[0:12] Now, you know, you'll find in editions, you know, I've got to take the Loeb edition, right? Huh? You know, that they kind of mistranslate, you know.

[0:55] How about that one. Sometimes they translate the categories of where and when by what place and time. Now, place and time were species of what continuous quantity, right? That's kind of a bad translation, isn't it? Aristotle in the *Antepredicamenta right? He'd spoken of things that are named equivocally, right? Things that are named univocally, right? And then he'd talked about things that are named denominatively, right? Well, it's in a way denominative speaking, right?

[1:48] That you talk about where and when, right? But it's not really place and time, right? But to be in place or to be what in time, yeah. So they should be really translated where and when, right? And your being place and time are kind of extrinsic measures, right? Half a cup of rice, you know, cup of water, you know, and you kind of measure it, but but the measuring cup is what outside, right?

[2:16] You go and get a bottle of wine, and they get us what seven fifty milliliters or something, or you can get a one and a half liter, right? Lasts a lot longer, but but or you get a you know, yeah, yeah, barrel of wine lasts even longer.

[2:42] But you're kind of being named from something what outside, right? Yourself, right? Okay. So for me to be a man is something intrinsic to me, isn't it? I'm not a dog or a cat, right? To the best of my knowledge.

[3:01] But for me to be what a geometer, it's because there's something in me, right? A little bit of knowledge, Euclid's elements, and so on. And or I'm a magician, right? So on. Or I'm what five feet? Eight. That's my eight, I guess.

[3:26] One of the guys that comes on Wednesday night is six feet four. I said, I said, Richard, I'll tell you, six feet four. I'll pick a fight with you. It'll be eighty-two. But but your size is something in you, isn't it? Size of your body, right? Okay. And even the relation is something in you towards what another, right? And has a foundation in you. If I'm taller than you or shorter than you, right, it's something in me by reason of my size, right, towards you, right, though.

[4:04] But these last six ones are by reason of something what? Outside and say, well, how can you do that, right? To be in this room, right? So I make a joke about, you know, you leave this room, you'll cease to be, right? Well, it's not going to be intrinsic ceasing to be, but you'll cease to be in this room, right? See,

[4:32] it's interesting, though. No, it's a little while ago where we're talking about where would you put grace and where would you put the theological virtues, right? Faith, hope, and charity, right?

[4:54] Where? I noticed that when you were talking about that, many times people refer to their interior disposition. Yeah. I'm not in a place where I can do that now. That's a very common expression. I'm not in a place where I'm comfortable with that. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, that's true. Yeah. So

[5:19] you're making problems with them. You translate these where and when by what place and time, right? Huh? It's a species of quantity, right? Huh? But here you're talking about kind of an exterior thing, right? So the inner surface of the wine bottle, right, is kind of the place, right, where the wine is contained, right, contained by the inner walls of the thing, huh? The milk carton, right?

[5:44] Plastic walls over there. Um. So in in the place itself, it's it's the quantity's in the thing, right? Huh? You see, but where and when? Okay.

[6:03] Now, what's the next species of of these last six? The next genus, I should say. After where and when. I guess that was last. huh? So it's close. What? Position. Position, yeah, yeah. And position is given after where and when, right? Huh. Okay. But position is referring to what here? Kind of disposition and time. Yeah, the speaker sometimes says the order of parts in place, right? Huh.

[6:42] Okay. Now, if you're just thinking of the order of the parts in the man himself, right? Huh. You see, that doesn't seem to be something outside of me, does it? See. Okay. But I just take the example you know of. If I jump out of the airplane, You see? You see? My body's in the same position as it is now, right? You might say these parts right now, straight up and down, huh?

[7:15] But am I standing? No, right? Okay. Or if I if I crouch, as we say, right now, you know, am I sitting? You know, see, to be sitting, I really got to really have a chair, right? I always make a joke of. They say, you know, somebody comes to your house, you know, they're talking, you say, no, sit down, you know. If he just crouches, I touch his side.

[7:41] He's crazy. You know, He doesn't. you know, He doesn't arrange his parts around what? Yeah, something outside of him, right? So I need a chair to sit down, right? The other crouching would be very uncomfortable, I would find, right? Very short sleep. Yeah. And

[8:02] so when I'm standing, my parts are arranged, you know, my feet. But God has something outside me to be standing, right now. So that's the reason why we're talking about it is what something being said to you for a reason something outside of you right?

[8:17] Um, now Aristotle, I mean not Aristotle, but well he knows that of course. Um, position. Why is there a separate category for position of parts, but not for the position of time?

[8:38] Time doesn't exist all at once. Yeah, yeah. Okay, if you're talking about that, that's in the position. But the order of time, right, is kind of in the definition. Of what? Time. So time is defined as the number of the before and after in motion.

[9:02] Midnight, one o'clock, two o'clock, three o'clock, four o'clock, right? You know, the before and after in the motion of the sun, or the apparent motion anyway, of the sun around the earth, right? Huh? When you number the before and after in that motion, then you're you got time, right? Aristotle raises the question there in the fourth book of Natural Hearing whether time is would be entirely without the numbering soul, right?

[9:29] Yeah. That's interesting, right? What he's saying there, right? Okay. But you already got in the idea of time, the order, right? Huh? In the definition of it, huh? Why to say that, but to say that I'm in this room, well, I could be standing, I could be sitting, I sort of be laying down, not laying down here, but

[9:56] you know, the Romans used to lay down when they ate their meals. I would think that would seem comfortable to me the way they eat my meal. I don't know what you guys.

[10:07] Well, I don't take the idea too much. Um. So, um, but to say I'm in this room doesn't bring that out, does it? Huh? Whether I'm standing or sitting or laying down, yeah.

[10:25] I'm laying on the floor or sitting in the chair or standing up. Yeah, yeah. The old professors used to, you know, the the kind of lean on the lectern, you know, and so they kind of go forward like that. Where are you from? We got to go over, you know.

[10:46] Yeah, it tends to do that, you know. I was kind of afraid to do it myself, you know, going forward, but they do that, you know. The students, what's going to happen? Yeah, yeah. Okay. So, um, position has something in common with time, which is the order, right? But it's an order in the parts and place, right? So. He's put third, right, among those. Then the fourth thing is something what?

[11:22] What's the fourth species or genus? Yeah. Okay. And this will become one of the main meanings of have to have, right, in the Posterior Analytics right.

[11:39] And have seems to be found in habitus and found here, right? Okay. Um. They kind of need to give a lecture on this category, right? Because it's man's category, right? Okay. And so you contrast man with the other animals, right? The other animals have their clothing is part of their their body, you know, their fur and so on, right? They shed some fur in the summer, you know, to be more comfortable and so on.

[12:09] But man's got to have what? Put on, yeah. And then man has all these what? You know, this is a big fairy. I have a tuxedo, right?

[12:26] And. Going to bathe you or something? Yeah, yeah, yeah. And you know, if the bride's getting married, you know, I mean, how much did she pay for that dress? You know.

[12:39] Did Daddy pay for the dress? That's a whole nother sentence Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And. But you know, I noticed. I mean, the difference we have to have different clothing for different. You know, the priest says mass; he's he's clothed differently, maybe when he is when he's. And and the military man obviously has to have different things, right? So on, and so we tell something about man that he needs these, right?

[13:11] Now, that he wouldn't, you know, wear the same clothing, right? We're doing some menial task, right, and for meeting the president or something, or meeting the the pope for somebody, right? Or getting married or whatever might be, right?

[13:28] Yeah. And when somebody dies, they usually put them in kind of a nice suit or a nice dress, wherever it is, right? You know, it seems appropriate, right? I know what you guys do here. Same old, same old. He would wear the same shirt, and I says, "Put on a different shirt."

[13:57] I mean. I think putting is you know, because then there's some regularity, you know. Huh. My brother Mark and I we did together as professors at Saint Mary's there, and we had an apartment, you know, and we'd have you know. Monday we had lamb chops and Tuesday was you know hamburger or something and Wednesday was you know but it's the same week after week. How can you stand that?

[14:23] No variety in your life. Variety is a spice of life. I think it's it's more a woman's thing than a man's one. You know.

[14:38] To describe, you know, my grandmother coming back from a social fair and she's describing everybody's dress. I don't even know what people dress what they what they're wearing. Probably, you know.

[14:50] But there's something very much. They kind of could give a whole lecture on this. You know, I mean, a whole talk on this. You know, because it tells something about the nature of man, right? And he's a so because that's the fourth among these six, right? And then he gives what? Yeah, yeah. Now I like to to translate that acting upon and undergoing, right? You can say acting upon and being acted upon too, but undergoing.

[15:23] Now maybe he he he puts the four before the acting upon and undergoing because the first four have a certain connection with quantity, don't they? You know, because where and when are connected with what place and time, which are species of continuous quantity, and position, of course, is the order in place. And even you know clothing, it's got to fit. You know the size. We've been always talking about what's your size.

[15:51] You know, I don't know what size. Anyway. Anyway. Yeah. You know. And so those four, those first four, are kind of right. Potential quantity, right? While acting upon and undergoing seems to have more some connection with what quality, right? Because the just take you know the third species for example, quality there, right? Huh. Or but take the second one, ability, right? That's tied up, right? Acting upon undergoing.

[16:26] So, but acting upon undergoing, something is being said upon a set of you for reason of something outside of you, right? See, so if I'm kicking you, I'm acting upon you, right? And you're being acting upon undergoing something, right? And so one is from me to you, and others in you from me. So you're being named something outside of you, right? So what's the difference between being hot and warming something?

[17:04] Well, hot is talking about the quality that's in you, right? And. That's in the third species of what quality, right? Okay. But if I'm heating you or heating something, right?

[17:21] That's got to bring in something outside of me, right? Huh? So, so the stove in itself is hot at least when it's on. But you got to bring something to the stove to heat it up, right? Huh? So you're acting upon something outside of you, right? So you got to bring in something outside of you to to understand what this is, right?

[17:57] If you speak of something becoming hot, huh? Is that the same thing as undergoing? It's more like the change itself or something Yeah, it's a change of quality, and it's going to be called alteration, I guess, is the name they use for it, right? And be one of the species of change they talk about in the postpredicaments, right? Um, but being warmed or being heated, that seems to be an undergoing, right?

[18:33] So what's the difference between you're just saying becoming hot? You're not talking really about something outside you that may be causing this, right? You're just talking about inwardly your body is is acquiring this quality, right? It's something incomplete in the genus of being hot, right, or warm, right? See, but if you're being warmed, there must be something outside you that is acting upon you, right? Okay. Aristotle was fairly brief with those last six categories, right?

[19:02] It's not as important as the first four, but they're still, you know, I'm always talking about where I've got to be. when, you know, so on, right? Huh? I'm going to wear today, you know. Oh, so do me. I'm going to say, like what? Yeah,

[19:30] you know where am I supposed to be? So when he was someplace, and he sent his wife a telegram, yeah, where am I supposed to be now?

[19:44] And she replied, "We know." I was thinking, I was reading in Thomas there, you know, he's talking about God's knowledge, right? And the question is, you know, things like is God's knowledge variable, right? Does He know something He didn't know before, or does God know future contingents? All these different questions, right? Well, the key thing, you know, in understanding how God knows future contingents is that God's knowledge is not in time.

[20:20] His knowledge is what measured by eternity. If we speak of it being measured, right? And eternity, as we learn from the way this is a definition, right? is totissimo perfecta possessio, et interminabilis. It's very hard for us to understand that, right? I was thinking about the similar problem people had with place, right?

[20:50] The Greeks before Aristotle said, "Whatever is must be somewhere. " If it isn't somewhere, it doesn't exist, right? So when the Russian astronauts went up in the sky, they're saying, "There's no God up here, " you know.

[21:04] It's kind of funny that they should try to get a little kind of blow for atheism, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Destroy all religious belief. But you know, you know, we use the expression, you know, when your soul leaves your body, right now. That's originally naming a change of place, right? So where does your soul go, right? Let's not talk about. What's really important to know, but

[21:35] will your soul be in some place when it leaves the body? See, we tend to imagine that right now because we can't imagine something, not being in place, right? And so if we can't transcend our imagination, you know, the soul isn't somewhere; it doesn't exist anymore, right? It's gone. I mean, it's gone in the sense of, you know, non-existent, right? And it's very hard for us to overcome that, right?

[22:07] And you have this problem when people come into, you know, the universe, right now. You know, where is the universe? Well, I mean, if it's in some bigger place than itself, then it's not universe yet, right now. And and so they think, you know, it's got to go on forever necessarily, right now. And Aristotle, of course, came to the conclusion that universe is in fact finite, right, and that there's nothing outside the universe, right.

[22:39] You know, that's very hard for us not to understand, right? And same thing regards to the soul, right now. Well, but I was thinking, you know, of the fact. You know, reading these articles again, Thomas, there, he's talking about God's knowledge being being in eternity and not, so that the past and the present and the future are all present to God, right? Okay. So what I did twenty years ago is present to God now in His knowledge.

[23:15] You know what I'll be. You know, I'm more used to around here, but you know what I'll be doing. You know, five years from now, you know, that's present to Him, right? That's very hard for us to understand, right? Because because just like we live in place, we live in time, right? And so we can't understand that very well. You know, it's very hard for us to transcend it, right?

[23:41] We speak in space terms because in terms of place, God's above time. Yeah. So he can see it all at once. That's kind of the imagery. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of curious Yeah. Well. I mean, you can't transcend your imagination, right? People have a hard time doing that, right now. And so even with these names, these words that are equivocal by reason, you kind of be led gradually from one meaning to another meaning, you know.

[24:08] But it's very hard for us to do that. Very hard to do that. I mean, the consideration of eternity of God is attached to what consideration of God?

[24:27] What? Unchanging. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now you see, that's we have to study, you know, motion and time in natural philosophy before you study the definition of eternity, right? Because it's attached to consideration of God's being unchanging, right? That He's He's eternal and not temporal, right? But the definition of eternity negates things that are in the what? Things that are in time. Things are measured by time, have a beginning and end in time, right?

[25:05] And even while they're around, they have you know before and after, right? But neither of these is found in what eternity, right? So he says totissimo, right? But simo, what I mean is one of the most precedents. But simo negates what before and after, right? And then perfect possession of vitae interminabilis, that doesn't have a beginning or an end. You see, so God's life doesn't have beginning and my life, my life here on this earth has a beginning, right?

[25:40] Back in 1935, my mother's womb, and I don't know when it's going to come to an end, but it's going to have an end, right? So I have a beginning and an end in my life, and so he struck you know, you know, I was at the the bicentennial of Mozart's birth and then the bicentennial of his death, right? You know, they had these you know concerts, you know, and so on, you know.

[26:02] My mother said, What do you want for your birthday?" I said, "The bicentennial concert." The the Minneapolis, or they call it the Minnesota Orchestra now, but they had two concert votes entirely to Mozart, and and one was instrumental music, and I remember them doing the his first symphony and his last symphony, right, in the same concert, right? What a thing! And then they did the Così fan tutte, one of his operas, right?

[26:30] You know, you know, concert version where they come and they sing and everything, and they don't do all the acting out, you know. But it just is good. I mean, the music is what you hear, you know, and so I was at you know bicentennial concerts because he lived only what he died. He wasn't quite 36 years; it was 36th year, but he hadn't finished his 36th birthday.

[26:51] Wait, wait, how much his accomplishment was, you know? And all the pieces, he wonderful pieces here. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, yeah. Twice his life already. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But Thomas didn't live that long either, you know. Yeah, that's what Aristotle says. The mind is best at the age of 49. I'm going down there, you know.

[27:18] I'm going up, and I get 49, and I'm going down. I was struck by, you know, how hard it is to us to trans, us comparing, you know, kind of transcending place, right? And most people think whatever it is must be somewhere, right?

[27:37] And you can't transcend time, we're so bound up in time, you know. It's too difficult for us. So, what time do we get another half hour? Right. Sure. Okay. So, do we have to belabor the last six categories anymore? Do you think or not? Okay. Okay. Now it's customary to divide the book called the categories into

[28:07] three parts, right? And the first part is called the what? Antepredicaments. Antepredicaments, yeah, and the height in there. And then the middle part is called the predicaments, right? And then the last part is called the postpredicaments, right? Okay. Now, what were the antepredicaments How many antepredicaments were there to begin with, first?

[28:47] Five, yeah. I remember he said it was his favorite one. He said. before Okay, five, and I think there's five postpredicaments too, right? Okay, the ten categories. Yeah. Oh yeah see See.

[29:03] So, what are the five anti-predicaments, huh? Just to call them for a minute. huh? Is this with universal? substance? Well, he he he had. He didn't begin there though. he said That's one of them, right? Huh? But didn't he begin with the things are named equivocally? They have a name in common, but the definition according to the name is not the same. And then things are named what?

[29:37] Equivocally. And then things are sometimes named denominatively. Now, the great commentator said, "Why does he? " That's a distinction of three, right? Huh? But why does he give that distinction, right? Huh? Well, he says what is said of all ten categories, like being or one, is said what? Equivocally of them, right? Within each category, what is above is said of what is below univocally, right? Huh? And then going from one category to another, you get what?

[30:08] You get denominatively, right? Huh? Okay. So I'm a man. I'm not a quality, right? huh? But you can denominate me from a quality. I'm a geometer. or I'm a logician. Or, you know, I guess I'm kind of healthy. Down twice down the ice the other day. Yeah,

[30:32] yeah, yeah. But anyway, um, I didn't break anything. but Aris says, you break something, you're gonna that's gonna finish you off. You're gonna be. Yeah. Um. Okay. So that's one thing they point out, and it kind of prepares the way, right? Huh?

[30:55] Because the ten categories are ten what? Genera, and genera are said what? Genus is said univocally, right? Okay. Porphyry could have made it more clear than in the Isagoge. I said, I said Monsignor shouldn't he have said that? He says, yeah, he could have done that, you know. Yeah, because the distinction there is of names being said univocally right? But okay, then what comes next in the antepredicaments?

[31:38] Okay, well, there's a division that they call ton legomenon said, right? And then a division ton onton right, of beings. That's what it's called Oh simple what they have simple and composite Well forms of speech. Yeah, it's not very well said though. Yeah.

[32:20] Okay, in the Greek, it says at the beginning of chapter two, there, ton legomenon, right, of things said, or those said, ton legomenon. Some are said according to symplokēn which is intertwining, you know? Okay. And some without, right? And there he seems to be distinguishing between the first and the second act of reason, right? Huh? Because the example he gives of of what symplokē is, man runs or man wins or something, right?

[32:56] Without symplokē, man runs. You know, it's just one of these things, right? Okay. So, how does that prepare the way for the categories, huh?

[33:11] Yeah, but but logomenon are they said with or without symplokē? Without, yeah, yeah. So you can't put man thinks or man man healthy man in the category, right? Because that's combining two different things, right? Okay, and you can't put a really a statement there, right? Man is healthy, Where does that belong? Category? There's things like man or health that are going to be placed in there, right?

[33:41] So that's important too, right? Okay. Then you have the one that stands out in our mind, of course, is tone. What? ton onton in the Greek, right? Okay, the distinction ton onton, and that's a distinction of what universal substance, particular individual accident. What else?

[34:09] And then substance, yeah, yeah, yeah. And it's interesting what Aristotle does there, right? Because he he wants to contrast them by their opposition, right? Huh. So universal substance is said of another, but does not exist in another. Individual accident exists in another, but it's not said of another. So what's affirmed in one is denied in the other, right? And they kind of stand out very clearly, right?

[34:37] Like a lot of times when I'm talking about composed whole and universal whole, right? I say composed whole is put together from its parts, but not set of them. Universal whole is just the reverse, set of its parts, but not put together from them, right? You know, so it's very clear what he does, right? Takes things like that, and then he goes to what? Universal accident, right?

[35:02] Which is both said of another and exists in another, and then he takes finally individual substance, which is neither said of another nor exists another, right? He does it very farthest, the way he does it, right? Dummies like me, when I try to say universal substance, particular substance, and universal accident, well, you can see that too. But Aristotle does something unique; he does right. And by putting universal substance and particular accident first, right, what is affirmed in one is denied in the other.

[35:36] You realize that said of another exists another are not synonymous, right? Which you might kind of think, you know, similar, just similar, right? But they're what quite different, right? Because one of these one is affirmed and the other is denied, and they're kind of reversed, so not the same thing, right? So he makes you very clear about these things, right? Well, this obviously now tells you to distinguish between substance and the other nine what genera, right?

[36:05] Because universal substance and particular substance will be in the order of substance, and then universal accident and particular accident will be in each of the nine genera of it, right? Okay. And what does he do next? What's the fourth one? You know, he distinguishes the 10 memories.

[36:29] Well, didn't he do something before that? As far as the, uh, that which is predicable of the predicate is predicable of the subject. Yeah, This is re this is really a rule about the order within each category, right? So if if substance is said of body or material substance, right, and body is said of animal, right, then substance will be said of animal, right. The higher one is always said of the one below it, right?

[37:04] Now, so you see that's something of the predicamental order, right? Now, okay. Um. And that the differences will be not the same in every genus, right? Huh? Because they're dividing. Okay. And then the fifth one is to what enumerate the what? Ten things said without intertwining, right? Either substance or quantity. Then he he just exemplifies them, right? Okay. Okay. Then in the predicaments, the middle part, right?

[37:37] He takes them up one by one. These ten genera, but mainly the first four, right? That surprising disorder there. huh That's a curved law. Yeah, yeah. Now,

[37:55] what are the post postpredicaments, right? Well, I think people say more than one thing, but they seem to be, for the most part, you know, things that are equivocal by reason. Right, huh? But they're found maybe in more than one what category, right? So the first thing you'd be talking about would be what opposites, right? You're talking about before and after, right? Well, these are found in what?

[38:27] If I was going to divide substance, I'd probably divide it into material and immaterial. I'm dividing by opposites, right? You divide quantity into what discrete and continuous. That's by opposites, right? Okay, quality is no more difficult, right? But you you divide by opposites very often. And then there's a certain order, right? Because the genus is before the species, the species is genus is something below it, and so on.

[38:56] You get the order, right? So the first things you talk about are what opposites and about what order, yeah, yeah, yeah. And then some things are together in division, right? So when I divide quantity into discrete and continuous, they are on the same level, right? And I divide, you know, so

[39:24] line and and place and time are on the same line with discrete quantity, right? But discrete and continuous on the same line. They're hama together, right? Together, right? Okay. And then you could say there's maybe line, length, width, and so on. You know that these are in the same line, right? Okay. And same way, you know, if you divide what

[39:58] substance into what do you call it? Material and immaterial substance, right? And then same material substance we'll call body, right? Huh? Oh, body can use equivocally of course with the genus, of, quantity, but then bodies are divided maybe into what plant and animal, right? I mean living and non-living. Yeah, and they'd be on the same. They'd be hama living and non-living, and then living into animal and plant, which would be on the same division, right?

[40:31] And then start to subdivide those, right? Okay, so so you have those three things, right? But you say substance comes before body, body before living body, living body before animal, animal before man. We're way down there in the order, right? We're in the mental order, right? But all those things are said of me, right? If I'm a man, I'm an animal. If I'm an animal, I'm what living body.

[40:58] From living body, my body. from the body, my material substance. my substance, right? all these things are said of me, right? Way down, all these things.

[41:09] Okay. So that's just one thing you see, though, right? Okay. In those first three, right? Okay. But at the same time, you might say, you know, when you go into another science, right? You might, like Thomas does, you know, recall what? Um. Oh yeah, there was a category called what quality, right? And I bet that's where these virtues and vices belong, right? Now. Then you go back and recall the four genera, right?

[41:42] But eventually you're going to be going beyond the text of the categories, right? Because you'll be distinguishing the virtues of the moral virtues from the what? Yeah, from the virtues of reason, right? And then you know just you know infused virtues maybe later on, right? From from these, right, and so on. And.

[42:05] So those first three post-predicaments, right? Not only go back and illuminate what's gone before in the categories, right? But it's kind of a starting point for what you're going further subdividing these things by opposites, right? And putting them in order. Okay. Um. Okay.

[42:34] Now you can stand back even further and say, "This is of universal importance. These things too, right now. " Because both Plato and Aristotle say that there's the same knowledge of what. Yeah. That's kind of interesting. And so the medical art is about health and sickness. And ethics is about virtue and vice. Not equally, but.

[43:07] And. Logic is about you know fallacious reasoning as well as demonstration and so on, right? And so. And opposites is the way we distinguish things, right? That's what the mind is always doing, distinguishing things, right? In order, of course, is tighter. The definition of reason, right now. Yeah. You know Shakespeare said that reason looks before and after. But now if you look before, before and after, you see there's a distinction you have to see before.

[43:52] Because nothing is before after itself, so there must be some distinction. So reason looks for distinctions as well as for what before and after. And it looks for distinctions before it looks for before and after, right? Okay. It's kind of universal importance for the mind, right? Kind of you know the richness of Aristotle's text there, right? But but that's at least three things, right? You can say those first three things, right?

[44:21] There are things that are found in more than one category, right? But then we're going on sub dividing these categories, right? And if I am going to be talking, if I am studying the soul, there I am going to distinguish the second species of quality, right? Aristotle divides them into five groups of abilities, huh? This involves opposites and so on. Okay.

[45:00] So to understand the categories better, right? To to go forward, you know, sub dividing, right? In particular, right? And but then for the universal aspect of reason,

[45:21] a lot of times the commentators just say, you know, well, you know, these these have many meanings and they're found in one category. That's something to do with it, you know, but not the whole. I don't think of it, huh? Okay.

[45:42] So I go to this text on before and after for understanding Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? You know, so it's kind of universal use of reason, looking before and after.

[45:59] Now, what's the fifth post post-predicament? Excuse me, the fourth one. The fourth one. Well, this is the one of what the last two are a little different, right? There are motion and what having, right? Huh? He distinguishes motion because they are found in more than one what genus, right? But not at all, right? So generation and corruption are found in substance, growth, right? And shrinking. Am I shrinking now?

[46:35] Is found in quantity, right? Huh? But something imperfect or incomplete, right? Okay. Growing to be some height, right? It's not the same as having that height, right? Okay. Why having seems to be something more perfect, right? You know. Okay. So if you are growing to be six feet tall, you know, I was looking at the one one kid there in the grade school, there He's kind of towering above the other ones, you know, and something, you know, and but if he's going to be a basketball player, right, he has to grow to be six feet tall at least, I guess.

[47:10] And but something imperfect, right? Huh? See, Bony has six feet, or what, six feet four. right? He's doing, You know, I say to him, "Well, you should be

[47:21] playing basketball rather than coming to my house." Yeah, yeah, yeah. Um, but the word "have" there, you know, also is seems to be found in one category, right? Because use the word "have it is equivalent to having, right? And then "have" in the case of what of that category, right? Yeah, right. Okay. But when you start to take up the senses that Aristotle gives of "have," there, you know, I mean, he'll talk about when he said to have a quality, right?

[48:00] When he said to have a size, right? You go on, you know, distinguishing these things. The last sense he talks about is to have a wife right So this is an alien sense on this

[48:19] Some people are free of that Yeah. So, th the, the most common thing they say about the post pregnants are, we're talking about things that can't be placed in one, just one category, right? They're found in more than one, right? Okay. So, if you say to me, you know, Berquist, I heard you say ad nauseum that you know things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs, you know.

[48:44] So, motion is what my life is. Yeah, where does that belong in this division, right? Huh? You know, that's a pretty important thing, motion, right? And in mobile, they were talking before, and and natural philosophy proceeds per modum motus, right, By way of motion. Thomas says, "Where does motion belong in this thing? " I mean, you claim to, You know, to have tonuntan, you know, covers everything in some way.

[49:12] And I say, well, motion is found in some categories and other ones, right? And it's found in substance, it's found in quantity, and it's found in quality, and it's found in where.

[49:36] So, maybe there has to be a kind of a consideration of things and not let them escape, right? But I don't think it's the only reason, you know. but the post, pregments are there, right? What do you do with the categories now. See, well, I'm going to go forward from the first species of quality when I get to ethics, right? I'm going to go forward from the second species of what, of quality when I study the powers of the soul, right?

[50:03] When I go to my friend Euclid of Alexandria, right? And I say, well, those first six books are dealing with continuous quantity, geometry, right? But the seventh and the eighth and the ninth book are what? Yeah, they're dealing with number. Wow, it's very illuminating, right? Huh? See, so I'm going to go forward from from these, huh?

[50:28] And and but if I go to natural philosophy, we'll be talking about what in book five, the distinction of the kinds of what motion, right? He has a qualitative, you might say, division of motion, and then a quantitative division, right? You know,

[50:50] because they're continuous, right, and they're divisible forever, right? Oh my goodness! How can you get out? Walk out of the room, you know. Half the way to the door before you go to the door. They'll. Never get there. Yeah, paradoxes, as you know, right? Exactly. Yeah.

[51:15] It's amazing how many senses the word has, has right. But just in terms of the categories, you can say that things have a name, and a genus has species. In another sense of have, the species has a genus and what and differences,

[51:41] and then substance has accidents, right? All kinds of sense. Got to tie those those things up, doesn't he? You know, can't let them escape, right? Boethius, you know, great great mind.

[52:03] The definition of eternity, just one of the things. I mean, all kinds of things. Thomas is always quoting him, right? Thing is singular when sensed, universal understood. All kinds of quotes that appear again and again in Thomas, right? From Boethius, huh? Definition of eternity. Quoting him in the thing in the providence, now I'm reading this Oh my goodness, great guy Boethius, huh? Yeah, he greatly admired the categories, so.

[52:32] Commentary on it. Very good. So next time we'll maybe start to take up the post predicaments, right, huh? And the first one is opposites, right, huh?

[52:47] And I told you about the guy who was writing the doctoral thesis in Karl Marx's philosophy. Tell you about that. Well, it was at the LaValle there. You could go to the library, and there would be bound copies. Probably bound copies of my thesis there in the LaValle library there. And if you're interested in a particular topic, you maybe go read a thesis on this topic, right, huh?

[53:18] And if you want to see the you know the itty bitty stuff about the doctor thesis, don't. This also is nonsense. But this guy was writing about the Marxist philosophy. Well, the official name of Marxist philosophy in Marx himself is dialectical materialism, right? Materialism says that matter is what the beginning of reality, but dialectic is how things develop from matter, and it's probably the clash of opposites, dialectic.

[53:48] It's borrowed from logic, because you can argue on both sides of a question right now. Like in the disputed question, you know, we have ten objections on one side and some on the other side, right? And

[54:02] so on. Well, but nowhere does Marx really distinguish the kinds of opposites, right? But that's fundamental to his his whole philosophy, right? You know, and they'll speak of contradiction, you know, and be talking about contrariety, you know, the the rich and the poor or something, you know. Well, they're not contradictories. I mean, the different there's four different senses. I never see a modern philosopher, you know, even something that's crucial for their thinking, right?

[54:29] That's that's the name, right? I mean, they apply it to when they get to human society. They take what's most material, which is the economic mode of production, right? And then the the opposites that are involved in the economic mode of production, you know, so it gives rise to the you know capitalism and its contradictions give rise eventually to communism and so on, right? But they never distinguish the senses of what opposites, and of course Hegel comes before Kant, and Hegel was dealing with the opposites, right?

[54:59] And accepting contradictions, you know. But but you know they don't distinguish these words; they're equivocal by reason, and they they're all around the place, you know. Terrible, terrible confusion. I don't see the distinction Yeah,

[55:26] yeah. How common, how common this? Aristotle speaks of the you know fallacy of equivocation, mistake from mixing up the sense of the words as the most common source of. Was Trump's thing there? banning Muslims or not Or is it a Muslims or not? Or is it a ban on terrorists? Right now, you know.

[56:08] So, look at the opposites next time, okay? See, I'm gone.