Logic (2016)
30. Kinds of Opposites and the Trinity: Heaven's Praise, Evil as Privation, and Why the Father Is Not Before the Son
Class of 2017-03-02
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/030-kinds-of-opposites-and-the-trinity-heavens-praise-evil-as/

[0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Tell you a little thing I was thinking about, huh? So, what will we do if we get to heaven, right?

[0:34] Huh? What will we be doing, you know? And I said, well, first we'll be seeing God as He is, right? Seeing Him face to face.

[0:48] Second, we'll be loving Him more than we even loved Him on earth, because knowledge is a cause of love, huh? And when you see God as He is, you see that he's not only good, but as good as itself, right? You can't, but but love Him, right, huh? Okay. That's two things we'll be doing, right? But there must be a third thing we're doing, because three is the first number about which we say what?

[1:17] Yeah. Right. So, what is the third thing we'll be doing? Praise Him. Yeah, yeah, praising Him, yeah. So I was running this this idea by by Warren, you know, on the phone there, Canada, and so I said, I I know the music of Mozart by hearing it, right? I know how good that music is, right? And therefore, I love that music very much, right? And therefore, I end up praising Mozart, and I love to quote Wagner, you know, saying Mozart is above all the masters and all the arts and all the ages.

[2:00] And I say, you know, with modesty, I say that's probably right, probably correct, you know. You know, he's that good, right? What's that, huh? And

[2:11] then I said, and I know the works of the plays of Shakespeare, right, huh? You know, by my imagination as well as by you know reading his words, right? I love his plays, then, right? And then I spontaneously praise him, right, huh? Okay. And you have it in the in the that great prayer there, the anima Christi, right, huh? So the last petition is in in hora mortis meae voca me that I might come to you and with your what saints praise you, right?

[2:47] Cum sanctis tuis, yeah, okay. But it seems to me that that just as love is not the same act as as as knowing, right? So praise is not exactly the same thing as knowing or what loving, right? Okay. But then I wondered if there wasn't a connection between these three and the three theological virtues, huh? Because when you believe God, right, huh? You are kind of rewarded for believing in God by what coming to see Him as He is, right?

[3:22] And Thomas sometimes compares it to the student too in human matters, right? Where if you believe the teacher, if you believe Thomas, and therefore read him very carefully, you'll come to eventually know these things, right? Or I believe, you know, that Euclid is going to demonstrate the Pythagorean theorem, right? And sure enough, you know, I come to be able to to demonstrate myself, huh? And know it now, right?

[3:45] So I'm rewarded for my what belief in the great Euclid, right? With knowledge now and not belief, right? Okay, I know the Pythagorean theorem, huh? And

[3:59] so seeing God as He is face to face is in a way reward of believing in this life, right? And the love that you have of God in heaven, right, is kind of a culmination of the love you already began in this life, right? I said, is there a connection between praise and the remaining theological virtue, which is what hope, huh? Well, you know, the great Augustine, the great Thomas, when they teach Christian doctrine according to those virtues, right?

[4:30] They teach the creed with faith, right? And they teach the two commandments of love with charity, but with the hope, they teach the Our Father, right? And sometimes the Hail Mary too, but basically prayer, right? Oh, and Thomas talks about the mode of of the Psalms, right? He's talking about the mode of different books of Scripture, right? They have different modes or ways of proceeding. Well, the way describes the mode of the Psalms is orativus and laudativus, prayerful and what?

[5:05] Praise. Yes, it's a connection between the two, right? And that maybe you know that's kind of you know shows a connection. I mean, that third thing, praise, right? It's got the third thing there to correspond to. It's kind of what Saint Augustine says, also right? He who sings prays twice. So singing is like singing praise. Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, they say that the main hours are Lauds and Vespers, right?

[5:31] The principal ones, right? Of course, Vespers is named for the time of day, right? But lauds is named from praise, right? From the Psalms. Yeah, yeah. So yeah, talk about what you're going to do in heaven, right? And seems to me there's got to be three things, huh? Now Aristotle's famous text there in the the on the universe, huh? That he's talking about the three dimensions, so on, right?

[5:59] And he says that the we use the number three in praising God, right? And so when they take up this question, you know, in the sum and other places, you know, can we know by natural reason that there are three persons in God? And Thomas will say no, you need faith to know this. But one of the objections is, quote, I think, Aristotle, right? And Thomas says, well, he says that we use the number three in praising God, not because he has an inkling that there are three persons in God, right?

[6:30] But because of the perfection of the number what three? Because three has a beginning and middle and end, and that signifies perfection, right? So you have to have that third thing, right? And so we have

[6:48] seeing God as He is, loving Him even more than you love Him in this life, and and praising Him, right? You can kind of see by his kind of on your dextra, right? Like I find it easy to praise, you know, Mozart, you know, or praise Shakespeare, something like that, right? Because I know and love their works, right? Makes sense.

[7:30] What's the quote again from Aristotle? Well, that we use the number three in praising God, right? And then he makes the point that the three is the first number about which we say all, right? And so how many straight lines can you make that they're all at right angles to each other? Well, on a flat plane, you could have two, right? But then you have another one perpendicular, and you can have only three, right?

[7:54] And that's how you determine the three dimensions. But you need three. Some people think that there's a connection there with the Trinity, right? Three is the number of first number which you say all. There's always the idea of perfection, right? But it comes up again and again.

[8:17] There are three parts of logic, right? Okay. Now you have your copies here of the things here. Okay. Now there's a text here from the fifth book of metaphysics, huh? It's in the post predicaments, the short texts. Okay. And that text was actually found in the post-predicaments readings, and in the four kinds of opposites short text readings, right? We've got to put the two together because something's left out in one that's not left out in the other, and vice versa.

[8:53] Okay. He's going to depend. on page two There's it's my fault There's one paragraph. One paragraph is missing. One paragraph is missing on the post-predicaments reference, and another paragraph is missing on the four opposites reference. So we had to put the two together. I will do my best to supply you with that later. Yeah. But now I'm talking about three, right? And we talked about the rule of two or three.

[9:23] Okay. Well, let's notice the first thing in the text here. Primo enim dicit, right? Quote De modis oppositorum Aristotle does huh Okay. In how many ways opposites are what? Said, right? Because in four what? Ways, huh? Okay.

[9:47] And these are contradictory, contraries, privation and habit, and ad aliquid, right? Now the order is kind of funny, but maybe he puts contradictory and. Contraries because they both have contra in them, right? Okay. But he's going to order those three first three in a what different way, right? Huh? Okay. Because contradictory and contraries would be the extremes, and privation would be in between, huh? Okay. But now does Thomas divide it into four right away?

[10:25] Huh? Well he gives four ones, but when he tries to unfold it, he what divides the four into what two? Right. Okay. Something is placed against, contraponitur, right? Placed against another or is opposed to it, either by reason of dependence, right? By which it depends upon the other, and thus they are what opposites that are relatives, huh? Or by reason of what removal, right? Huh? Because one of them removes the other.

[11:12] Okay. But some remove more than others, yeah. Which happens in three ways, huh? And the first way is the kind you find in contradiction, for one wholly removes, leaving nothing, right? And this is negation, right? Huh? And this is what the contradictory, right? So man and non-man, right? Or man and not a man, right? Huh? What does not a man leave of man? Nothing, right? Okay. Now the second one, which is not in that first text there, if you have the other texts, huh?

[11:54] From the same passage there, or it leaves the subject only, huh? Okay. And thus it is privation, right? Now privation is the non-being, not simply like contradiction is, but it's the non-being of something in a what subject, right? That is able to have something, right? And perhaps either the strict sense should have it, right? Huh? But doesn't have it, yeah. Okay. So an example of this would be the opposition of sight and blindness, right?

[12:32] Now blindness doesn't take away everything that pertains to sight because it leaves the subject, right? That is able to have sight and should have it, but doesn't have it, right? Okay. So when they compare contradiction with privation, or to use an English word, lack, huh? Um, and having. And they point out that one of two contradictories must be said of everything, right? So to take the same example of seeing, the contradictory of seeing is doesn't see, right?

[13:11] Everything sees or doesn't see. It's got to be one or the other, right? So you could say, you know, not only that some men don't see, but you could say that a square, a stone doesn't see, right? Or the tree doesn't see, right? Okay. And

[13:33] now would you say that the stone is blind, like a man who doesn't see is blind? Would you say that? No, because blind leaves a subject that is by nature able to have sight, and maybe should have sight, right, in the full sense, huh? Okay.

[13:53] So if I give my wife a beautiful diamond now, but the diamond doesn't see, is there something lacking in my gift? Only if your heart wasn't in it.

[14:10] Because the diamond is not able to have sight, right? And it's what? Therefore not, and it's not something it should have, right? Now the third kind of opposite here of the kind called removal is what?

[14:36] Contraries, right? Huh? And that leaves both the subject and the what? Genus, right? So black and white are both colors, right? And they sometimes say contraries are the species that are furthest apart within the same genus.

[14:58] So you have the same subject surface, which can be black or white, and you have things that are in the same genus, like color, right? So they're less opposed, right? Okay. So virtue and vice are opposed as what? Contraries. Yeah. Virtue and vice have a common genus, which is habit, right?

[15:28] So you have three kinds of opposites there, where one is removing the other. But then the relatives, one kind of what doesn't remove the other? Say, does my being taller take away someone else being shorter? No, it demands that there be someone who's shorter. I can't be taller unless somebody's shorter, right? Okay. I can't be a father without having a son or a daughter, right? Okay.

[15:58] So the father doesn't take away the son, and the son doesn't take away the father, right? Okay. But now the other three kinds of opposites, right? It's very clear in the case of contradiction that one of them is non-being, right? Man and not a man, non-man. But privation, lack, lack is a kind of non-being too. But non-being is something in a subject, right, that is able to have this and maybe should have it, right?

[16:33] And if you know the text of Aristotle there in the first book of Natural Hearing, so-called Physics, he talks about in contraries, one contrary seems to be lacking something, right, in comparison to the other, like black in comparison to white, black seems to be lacking in some color, right? Okay. Or health and sickness, right? Well, sickness seems to be lacking something that should have, right? So we've talked before about the importance of opposites for formal distinction, right?

[17:13] We we had a distinction last time, didn't we, between what formal distinction, material distinction? Okay. So if I cut a straight line in half, I got two lines now, right? But that's a material what distinction, right? It's from the division of the what continuous, huh? And that's how the science of numbers arises, right? Number arises from the division of the what continuous, material. But things that don't have matter, right, don't have quantity.

[17:55] There's what we call formal distinction, and that's by what opposites, right? Okay. We talked about how seeing a distinction comes before seeing it before and after, right? Okay. So in God, right? We believe that there is a real distinction of persons, huh?

[18:23] And it's going to be a formal or material distinction. Formal, yeah, because God doesn't have, is not a body, doesn't have quantity. But come back to four kinds of opposites, right? And which kind of opposite must it be? Yeah, because God is I am who am, right? So if one of them was a contradiction to the other, right? Not. Yeah, yeah. Okay, maybe some lack of being, right?

[18:56] So the only kind of formal distinction that can be in God is by reason of what relatives, right? And that's what the great Augustine saw, right? Great Boethius saw, right? And Thomas sees following them too, right? These great minds. See how important this is, right?

[19:20] I was reading Thomas there in the De Veritate, which is my current reading, you know, and he's talking about the image of God in man, right? And he says, do you have an image of God of the Trinity, rather, the image of the Trinity in man, insofar as he knows God, or insofar as he knows himself, or insofar as he knows material things? Well, not in his knowing material things at all, he says, right? Okay, but most of all in knowing what God Himself, right?

[20:07] If you remember God and then you understand Him and then you love Him, you have a certain what likeness to the Trinity, and that's the most because God is most like God, right? You're most like God and you know God, right? The knower and the known are in some way what one, okay?

[20:31] The old definition of knowing is receiving the form of another as other while retaining one your own, right? So you take on the form of another, right? Become in a sense this. He says in a secondary way you have an image of the Trinity when the soul knows itself and loves itself, right? Or you can say when reason knows what reason is, right? Think of what's his name, Shakespeare's definition of reason, right?

[21:00] Okay, well reason is like the Father, and then the definition that reason brings forth, right, is like the Word, and then when you see how wonderful the reason is, then there is love, right? That's an image of the Trinity. But it's because because knowing a better thing is always better knowledge. Thomas always goes back to the insists upon that. He goes back back to the to the proemium to the three books on the soul, right?

[21:33] Where Aristotle says all knowledge as such is good, but knowledge of a better thing is better. So knowledge of the soul is what better than knowledge of the body because the soul is a better thing than the body, and knowledge of an angel is even better than knowledge of the soul because the angel by nature is a better thing than the soul, and knowledge of God is even better than knowledge of an angel, right?

[22:06] And so when we study the soul, we do so not only to know the soul, but as a what way of knowing what an immaterial thing is like, and helps us to know what the angel, right? And knowing the angel is good, not only to know the angel, but it helps you to eventually know God, right? Okay. So sometimes I like to read the Summa backward, you know, read about the soul first, and then ascend to reading about the angels, and then finally to God, right?

[22:36] So I think about the soul to think about the angels, and I think about the angels to think about God, but that's where it stops.

[22:47] So interesting. So let's look at some other texts here about the opposites, huh? Let's take the first thing, the short text of the post predicaments on page three, right?

[23:13] Where are the opposites then No, still on the four. It's in the post predicaments. It may be elsewhere too, but the short text, page three, now.

[23:28] Yeah, scriptum super librum primum Sententiarum. No I'm sorry yes. Yeah, page three, right? He says affirmation and negation are said to be what? Maxime opponuntur, right? Why? Why? Quia in eis, because in them, there is not implied any what? Coming together, right? It's in the case of what?

[24:01] Lack and having, they come together and having the same subject, right? You can't be blind without being a thing that's able to have sight, right? And and should have sight in a certain sense, right?

[24:18] And what? Contraries, right, in the same subject, but also in the same genus. Oh, so they even have more in common Yes even yes, even less, yeah, opposed, right? Okay. And then relations are, you might say, least opposed, right? You know, in fact, not really opposed hardly at all, right? It's kind of amazing Aristotle as a kind of opposites and all this, right? And you see one of these texts here may say, you know, that if I am your father, I can't be your son.

[24:50] I can't be my son if I'm a father. Okay. So and of course he opposed that to the other three, right? Because it's not by removal, but by reason of positing it, right? So he says

[25:14] affirmation and negation then are said to be maxime opponuntur, right? Because in them there is not implied any what? Coming together. In things that are opposed privatively, lacking, there is implied a certain coming together as regards the subject, because they are apt to come to be about the same thing, right?

[25:38] In contraries and relatives, right? There's also as regards the what? Genus, right? Because they are in the same genus, right? Once in both kinds of opposition of the extremes, right? They're signified by way of being in a certain. Nature, right? This is talking about contraries, right? And relatives, huh? Okay. The species is something; it's not a lack or an unbeing, right? It's particular kind and the genus, huh?

[26:23] Nothing goes on to say here. That in which there is found something not mixed with its contrary, right, is maximum, huh? Most of all, right? And it's going to be first in that what genus, huh? And the cause of all the others, huh? It's an amazing thing, right? And therefore, the opposition of affirmation, negation, to which there is not what mixed up any coming together, is the first and the greatest opposition, right?

[26:56] And the cause of all opposition, and the cause of all distinction, right? See how Thomas is really profoundly describing these. And therefore, in any other opposition, there is included some affirmation, negation. The father is not his son, right? Virtue is not vice. Sight is not blindness, right? And obviously, being is not non-being. Something is not nothing, right? Just as the first is found in the posterior, right?

[27:34] Because more things are required for the other oppositions than for the opposition of contradiction, because they all have themselves by addition to it. Okay.

[27:50] Whence it is not necessary that if contrariety is not found except in things that are diverse, really, really different things, right? That affirmation, negation are found in things that are diverse, really.

[28:06] Okay. Now that's a very difficult thing I want to get into right now, right now. But the essentia known as generans, right? but the pot was generations. Therefore, they are not the same.

[28:25] Neither suffices a distinction of reason for affirmation, negation, since what any distinction includes affirmation, negation. And there is such a distinction of reason between the essence and the what person, right? Okay. So is there a real distinction between the father and and God? Is God one thing and the father something different, or is altogether the same thing, right? Yet there is a distinction of reason between father and what?

[29:00] Yeah. But things that are opposed relatively require a diversity or a distinction that is real, and such are the things that distinguish the divine persons.

[29:15] Sometimes there is a distinction of reason only, as when something is said to be the same as itself. Okay. Okay. And it's the same text. We got that same text there from the sentences, right? Okay. What is we saying can be said more than once.

[29:47] Okay. A little text here for about men being. here huh about evil there. And this next text here from the sentences, right? Mm hmm Same page three Page three there. Paul's fragments, right? Text. In bad things, in this way, said there is such an order that that which is per se malum is said first, right? And all others privation to it. And according to the grade it holds malum procedens, which is the subject of evil that is said to be bad from this privation which per se is evil in itself.

[30:47] And in the third grade, that which is said to be malum procedens has a cause inducing evil, right? Okay. For this does not have itself a necessity of privation, but it makes something having privation. Whence first is said absolutely evil, the second order to the first, and the third in order to the what? Yeah. Second. It should be said therefore that malum nominat what Non-being. Yeah.

[31:21] This way Aristotle, I mean Thomas would say, you know, there's no what evil itself, right? Yeah. Okay. But evil something what is not having something you should have when you should have it, right? Okay. Whence that which is per se evil does not place something, but it's said to be as a what? Privation. Privation. Huh? Okay. But the evil that is the subject privation is something what positive, right?

[31:52] Then. And not from this that it is evil, just as the eye is something, but not from this that it is what. Blind. Huh? Okay. Because blindness is not in it except as a negation of vision. But what is said to be evil as a cause of evil in itself considered is something, but in order to the effect, a reason of which it is said to be evil, it is said to be what?

[32:25] Said privatively. It is said to be bad from the fact that it induces what? Privation. Okay. Okay. You can go into that. That's a you know a big study, but when you study evil, you find out that it's a kind of what? Yeah. It's not simply non-being, but it's more the privation that sense of it, right? Okay.

[32:53] That is profound, huh? Very profound. We'll get into the study of evil today, huh? Yeah. Now, look in the bottom of page four here a little bit about evil. I'll talk tomorrow about evil. Then a nice objection here. I'm the nineteenth objection, right? Huh? He's really profound these things. Okay. This is the questionis disputatae de malo, right there. The most definitive work on evil that I know.

[33:42] It's the best about the worst. Yeah. Yeah. They call it a synthesis. Yeah. Synthesis. Moreover, this is the argument now. If goodness was not something, right, nothing would be good, right? Therefore, likewise, if malicia, evil, right, is not something, nothing is. Yeah. But it stands. many things are bad. Yeah, that many things are bad. Therefore, malizia is something. That makes sense, doesn't it? Now, to the nineteenth, Thomas says it should be said.

[34:25] And now he's going to the distinction that Aristotle makes of being, right? Okay. It ends is said in two ways. In one way, according as it signifies the nature of the ten what genera, which we've been studying here for some time, right? Huh? Substance, quantity, quality, etc. And in this sense, neither evil nor any privation, right, is a being, right? Nor is it something, right? Huh?

[35:02] In another way, according as it corresponds to the question whether it is, right? And thus evil is just as blindness is, right? Huh? But nevertheless, malum is not something, right? Because to be something not only signifies that it answers to the question whether it is, but also that it responds to the what? What. it is. To the question what it is, yeah.

[35:42] Now, this twentieth objection. But it should be said that evil is not a being of nature, or a moral thing, right? But it's a being of what? Reason. But against this is what the philosopher says in the sixth book of the metaphysics that good and evil are in things, but true and false are in the what understanding. In this, we're going on to the second act shortly, and all that's where you find truth and falsity in the second act.

[36:14] Therefore, if good and evil are in things, evil is not a being of reason only, but it's something in what natural things. To the twentieth, Thomas says that's the objection twenty. He's referring to that evil to it is in things, but as a what privation, not as something what real, but it's in reason as something understood,

[36:47] and therefore it can be said that evil is a being of reason and not of what being of things, yeah, because it is in the understanding, it is something right, but not over in the thing.

[37:05] And this, that it is to be understood according as is said to be a being of reason is good, for good is something to be understood.

[37:20] So the professor, I should talk to you about your ignorance. And that's good Then what is your ignorance? Yeah, what kind of an opposite is it? See, ignorance is opposed to knowledge. As in what kind of opposition is it?

[37:45] No. See, it's just simply the lack of knowledge, right? Okay. Yeah, yeah. And English word for privation is lack, right? Just the lack of knowledge, right? And so

[38:05] now, what would be the contrary of knowledge? What? Foolishness, or stupidity. Well, it would be a mistake or an error, right? I was going to bring in the comedy of errors of Shakespeare, you know, because you get you get the word you know error obviously in the title there, but you also have the English word for error, which is mistake, right?

[38:32] But interesting things in that play, but anyway, continue. I have to say to students now: suppose you're you're in a political campaign right now, you're trying to get people to vote for your candidate, right? So I find out that you you're thinking of voting for the opposite. Guy, right? And you gotta map your mind whether you should vote for my candidate or the other candidate, right? Better use of my time to try to convince him or to convince you.

[39:10] Yeah, yeah. He's going to resist my persuasive words, right? Because he's already, in a sense, what thinking he should vote, right? Which is a mistake. Thinking he should vote for the other guy, right?

[39:24] While you are just what undetermined, right? There's a lack of determination, right? There's nothing positive, you know. So, what's the difference between a mistake and and being ignorant, huh? See? Well, ignorance can mean just a lack of knowledge, right? Huh? See?

[39:52] I got a four-chambered heart, right? Say it again. I have a four-chambered heart. Oh yes. Congratulations. Yeah. Now, does a cat have a four-chambered heart? I think so. Or maybe. I don't know See? What? There's a privation of my knowledge. Yeah. You, you still know, right? See? But now, if you try to say whether it's a four-chambered heart or a three-chambered heart or a two-chambered heart, you might be mistaken, right?

[40:23] You know. So the difference between being mistaken, right? To be mistaken is just to have an opinion, right? To be mistaken is not to have an opinion, is to lack the, the, the, knowledge, right? Lack the true opinion. Like I say, if you ask me about tree surgery, I'd be stumped. Yeah. They give me a glass of dry red wine. Say, what kind of grape is this, right?

[40:52] But Mark would know. Or Brother Mark would know. yeah. That's what we learned in epistemology. The only thing worse than ignorance is error. Yeah. Yeah. Notice, huh? The man who knows has the true thinking, right? And the man who's mistaken has the false thinking, right? But the man who's merely ignorant just lacks, you know, just lacks it. So these things are important, right?

[41:33] Is ignorance something bad? But is it as bad as a mistake, right there? Okay. So. Okay. So. We've got a, a little more insight into the opposites, right? Huh? Okay. And Thomas does divide them into what? When he unfolds, right?

[42:18] Um. He divides them into two, right? And then he subdivides one into what? Three, yeah. So he follows the rule of two or three, right? Huh?

[42:38] Aristotle didn't do that, right? Huh? See. And when he enumerated the ten categories, Aristotle, there in the text we have, then when Thomas distinguishes the ten, he divides them into what? Three. And he keeps on dividing into two or three until he's got all ten, right? Huh? As if you can't understand it really without dividing usually into twos or threes, huh?

[43:05] So I've seen this over and over again in Thomas, you know. So by induction, if by no other reason, I come up the rule, you know, that certainly for the most part, you know, to understand, you have to divide into two or three. And if you divide into more than three, right,

[43:26] then you have to subdivide into twos and threes to get them, right? Okay. Okay. Let's look at a texture now in the senses of before, right? The short text senses of before. The short text. This is the second of the what post predicaments, right? Okay.

[43:58] Now, notice the title of this article here in the Thomas's Scriptum Super Liber Primus Sententiarum. The sentences were what worked with that in the Middle Ages. What was that position that worked? It was kind of the standard work, right, in theology, huh? You know, was replaced by Summa Theologiae eventually, but the sentences everybody would write a commentary on the sentences, right? So Thomas did, and I guess Albert the Great did, and I guess Bonaventure and so on.

[44:33] Okay. So he's asking the question here: whether the the Father is what? Yeah. Now, as you know, we know more what God is not than what He is, right?

[44:56] So if the Father is before the Son, we'd have to ask and put sense of before as the Father before the Son, right? But if we're going to have an example here of knowing more what God is not, or what is not in the Trinity,

[45:16] we'd have to go through all the senses of before, right? Now, okay. Okay. To the first, then one proceeds thus. It seems that the Father is before the Son. Okay.

[45:40] For just as corruption has itself to what? I suppose non-being, right? So generation is to what? Beginning, right? Okay. So all ceases to be when I corrupt, right? Okay. When I was generated, I began to be, right? Okay. But everything that is corrupted ceases to be, right?

[46:09] Therefore, everything that is generated begins to be by generation. Therefore, the son began to be, and therefore he's, yeah, in the first sense of before, right? Yeah. It sounds like I am convincing a dummy like me, you know.

[46:31] Moreover, nothing receives something right, Except something right, Except what it doesn't have. But everything that is generated receives being from the one what, generating it, right?

[46:49] Therefore, everything that is generated before the generation does not have being. And that's the same thing as we said before, right? It's obviously the father is before the the son, right? Convinces me.

[47:06] Moreover, a beginning is naturally before that of which it is a beginning. Well, I'll go along with that; it doesn't make sense to me. But the father is the beginning of the son.

[47:19] Therefore, even if not in time, at least by nature he is before him. That sounds damn good. I'm convinced, right? You hear the story about Voltaire? Hasn't gone through, you know, to get these objections that Thomas has against his own thinking, and and then he, you know, pulls off on these, you know, Christians and so expecting the clergy. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[47:46] having dinner, you know, and and having a good time, you know, and all of a sudden I hit you with this objection. Oh my God, you know, you know, I I just see I'm way out of it, and it's gonna be be I'll be not capable of defending the faith, right? It's terrible.

[48:06] Moreover, to give being is some what dignity on some something very worthwhile. But the father gives being his own being to the son. Therefore, the father, at least what, in dignity, right, is before the son, right? That's kinda like the The fourth sentence. huh?

[48:33] Well. My brother Mark and I used to joke about being some of these dumb professors, you know, locking in a room, you know, and just dropping in the objections and see what they can do with them, you know.

[48:48] No kidding, the solution, by the way, you know. I mean, ideally, you know, if we had all the time in the world, you know, the idea would be to give the students on one day the objections and keep them away from the text, you know, or and and let them, you know, stew a little bit, you know, and. And to be much more thankful, you know, for what Thomas does later on, huh?

[49:18] However, but against this, contra this, on the other side, right, everything in which what there was something before is not simpliciter first. If therefore the Father was before the Son, the fun the Son would not be simply first, huh? But all say that God is the first beginning, as even the philosopher says, right? I don't pagan there, Aristotle, right? Therefore, the Son would not be God, which the Arians concede, right?

[49:55] Oh my gosh, I'm now stuck with the Arians, right? So, on what does Jerome say? There you know, the church woke up and found itself grown. He says to find itself Arian because bishops, you know, were a lot of them were Arians and emperors were Arians and so on. Oh my God! And I'm I'm in that class of those Arians. Oh my God!

[50:22] Now, notice the way Thomas begins his response, right? He's the master, right? They tell they tell the story, you know, of Thomas coming in, you know, in this kind of a brusque manner, you know, posing objections, you know, and so on. Everybody's kind of scandalized that he's challenging the great master Thomas. Thomas, no, no, Thomas, very, you know, very gentle with the students, you know, and answers his objections, right?

[50:48] Huh? I told you I had the student when I was first teaching in California at St. Mary's College. There he'd come in every day, just about. He'd have an objection, you know. Huh? Naturally, I heard all these objections, you know. And I'd answer the objection, you know. One time we're having a conversation after the after the course was over, you know. And he said, "I always thought I was going to have this day, you know."

[51:09] I answer. It should be said that the Father in no way is before the Son, right? Huh? So we're going to know something negative about God, right? Huh? That the Father is in no way before the Son, and likewise the Father and the Son are in no way before the Holy Spirit. But notice he goes on to say, "Neque duratio," and that's the first sense, huh? "Neque natura," second sense, "Neque intellectu," "Neque dignitate."

[51:53] Yeah. But you see how Thomas is following the four senses in exactly the same what order, right? It's interesting how that something like the second post-predicament in this case before, right? Is now being used in the highest and at the other end, you might say the now, right? Because logic is just the what introduction to philosophy, right? I mentioned before how how they they came to see the Isagoge.

[52:25] You know, is the introduction because logic is the introduction to all philosophy, and the Isagoge is the introduction to the first book of logic, right? You know. Well, look at this. He's using, you know, in order to show adequately that God, the Father, is not before the Son, he has to show in those four chief senses anyway, right? That the Father is not before the Son. So where would Thomas be without Aristotle.

[53:02] Remember, when Cindy was talking about uh the Vilpar arts, right? And you know, he was a Manichaean for a while, right? And the the great uh Manichaean there, what is the name? of him? Faust. Faust came there. He's talking about things there, you know, above Augustine's understanding at that time, you know. But uh he didn't begin to see that he didn't, you know, know the liberal arts, faust.

[53:28] and uh so he didn't get suspicious of the man, right? Huh? How can he know these things are very difficult to know? He doesn't know the fundamental things, right? You know. So Deon said, "Why would Augustine be without the liberal arts, right? " well, i say, "where would thomas be you know in a question like this without knowing the categories, right? And knowing, in particular, the second what post-predicament, right?

[53:54] Where would he be in talking about the distinction of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit without the first uh post-predicament, which is the opposites, right? Because there has to be. This is what Thomas takes this as being a complete way of talking about formal distinction, right? And you can't have material distinction; it eliminates that possibility, right? So it's got to be a formal distinction, and then he's got to understand all the kinds of opposites in order to see which kind is that distinguishes the Father and the Son, right?

[54:27] And now he's using the second one, right? Okay. So that's a good, good beginning there, right? Huh? Yeah. In the in the Father and the Son, we are not able except two things to consider. Did you know that? Either that which is absolute, right? And that's the what divine nature, right? And this is common to what both, right?

[55:10] Whence from this one does not have any priority to the other, right? Since the divine essence is not divisible, as has been shown above in this distinction question, one article, right? Yeah, yeah. Now, if it's not absolute, it's going to be in quantum ad aliquid huh? Towards something, right? I don't know how Thomas uses the ad aliquid there, right? Okay.

[55:41] Now, of relatives, there is the what? now, simul is which it's the third. he said he's got to know that too, right? Okay. So our relatives, they are simul by nature, according to the philosopher himself, right? And also by time, because placing they place each other, right? That's the kind of opposition it is, right?

[56:17] Can I be taller than you for an hour, and then not till another hour has passed that you become shorter than me? Can I even be a father without having a son? Paul Berkus is my first son, right? Say I fathered before he was my son. Simul right? It's the third. It's the third post-predicament right? You think Aristotle was was thinking about the Trinity? You must have been thinking about the Trinity.

[56:53] This is so useful. for the Trinity the Trinity, isn't it? The first three, what? Post-predicaments, right? They're very useful with thinking about the Trinity, aren't they? The first one tells you how the Trinity are distinguished, right? And the second and the third about what? That they're simul and not one before the other, right? Okay.

[57:18] So when Shakespeare says, you know, reason looks before and after, it does look before and after, but it's going to have negative knowledge here, right? That there is no before and after in the Trinity. It's an amazing thing, right?

[57:35] And they're also what? In understanding, right? Since one is defined through the other, right? Okay. So I know what it is to be taller. I know what it is to be shorter.

[57:55] I know it is to be double. I have the slightest idea what it is to be half. Can I really know what double is without knowing what half is? Okay. How about I know? I mean, I can know what half is, though without knowing what double is, right?

[58:19] Which which do you define first, dub or half? See? Do you know one, and after while you come to know the other? Hmm. You have to know them what? Hama! Simo together, right? These are three languages. Hama, Simo, together, right?

[58:52] Although in men, huh? The one who is a father, right, is before the one who is a son, right? I was before my son, okay. As Socrates was before Plato, right? Huh. Nevertheless, these two relatives, insofar as they're relatives, father and son, are simul, right? In all the foresaid ways, they're simul in time, right? Huh? They're similar in what? By nature, right? They're similar in knowledge, right?

[59:29] Huh? They're similar in dignity too, yeah. Once it is clear that the father in no way is what before the son, huh? Neither according to that which is absolute, right? Nor according to that which is towards something, right? Okay.

[59:56] Now let's go to the first objection, right? Nothing accepts something except what it does not have, right? Now, everything generated accepts being from the one. Excuse me, the second one, corruption. Yeah, okay.

[1:00:14] As corruption has itself to ceasing to be, so generation to beginning to be, right? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the generation which is opposed to corruption is a what change? And to such a generation, there is always what joined a beginning, right? Huh? But generation, in so far as it's found in divine things, is not a what change? There's no change in God, huh?

[1:00:46] But it's the operation of the divine nature, in so far as it's in the Father, and because a natural operation always what, which it is, since the divine nature is eternal, so the generation will be what eternal, right? Huh? You'd say he's always generated from the the son is always generated from the Father, right? Doesn't begin to be generated.

[1:01:18] Strictly speaking, what is a change? Right? What does it mean to say that something has changed? Now, if I come in here next class and what way has changed? Professor Burquist has changed. Yeah, I'm not the same this week as I was last week, right? So you got to have something that is what composed, right? Huh? Yeah. So there has to be something that was there last week and this week to say that I've changed, right?

[1:01:53] So is there something? Is the son composed or something that changes? No, no. He's altogether simple, right? Huh? The generation. Now the second objection there about the one who what receives something, right? Doesn't he not have it before he receives it, right? But if he always receives it, he always has it, yeah. Okay.

[1:02:31] To the second, should be said that the one who receives something, huh, does not have that from himself, right? Huh. But nevertheless, it does not follow, right, that he does not have it simply, because it is possible that what that never began, right? It's always he always received it from the Father, right? Okay.

[1:03:03] The Father is giving the Son the divine nature is in what not measured by time right huh okay but it's measured by by eternity right so the Father always gave the Son the divine nature so the Son always had the divine nature

[1:03:28] now to the third it should be said huh that that's one from the argument from the beginning right the Father and Thomas does say huh the Father is the beginning of the Son right because the beginning in the general sense is that from which something goes forward right from which something proceeds in some way right huh well the Son goes forward from the Father right huh so he's the beginning right God from God light from light true God from true God right to the third it should be said that a beginning can be considered in two ways either that which is a beginning and this is naturally before that which it is a beginning right huh or according to the relation of the beginning itself

[1:04:21] and thus it is together simul naturally with the begun now if there was something from the same thing having that it is something and that it is adequate altogether it would be what simul with that which it is said and because in divine things the Father from the same has that he be someone right and that he be the Father right then simul by nature with the Son not only insofar as he's the Father but simply he must be huh no distinction between the Father and what he is right

[1:05:11] to the fourth it should be said that the property by which the Father gives being is his what dignity but because dignity is of the absolute things therefore there's the same dignity in the Father and the Son and the same dignity which in the Father is fatherhood in the Son is sonship just as the fatherhood in the Father is the divine essence or the divine goodness and the same essence and number or goodness is the sonship in the Son

[1:05:45] okay now that's a very profound you know treatment but Thomas takes it up but the thing I emphasize is the fact that his opening sentence right huh you see. on Dale. I answer that: The Father is in no way before the Son, either in duration, nor by nature, nor by understanding, nor in dignity. Right? Huh? So, in a sense, he's taking that distinction of the four chief senses of before as being what complete, right?

[1:06:24] Otherwise, his defense would not be what. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's interesting. He investigates the distinction of the of the Trinity. He takes the distinction of the four opposites as complete for what the basis of formal distinction, right? So, it's got to be one of these four, right? Okay. So there, he's trying to find which one of the four it is. Because a real there is a real distinction.

[1:06:58] We believe there's a real distinction, right? Huh? But we think the Father and the Son are altogether equal, right? Now, and one is not before the other in any way, right? They're equal in duration, equal in nature, nature, knowledge, understanding, and goodness. Yeah, yeah.

[1:07:18] You gotta, gotta, you gotta, you know, the kind of said Aristotle or somebody. You know, your biases, huh? And it's kind of amazing, huh? The Aristotle is called the father of logic, right? And the first book that has come down to us from Aristotle, right, is the book called the Categories, right? Huh? Not that there weren't other things to be said, maybe you know, but this is kind of the most essential book.

[1:07:44] Aristotle's put this first, right? And the first book that's come down to us from the father of logic, huh? The Categories, and now it's being used at the other end of our knowledge, right? You're talking about the what Trinity, the distinction of the persons and their order. Of course, the third one is involved too, right? simul right? Because you're showing that there are simul in all of these what four senses that are opposed to the four senses of what before, right?

[1:08:25] You can say that the Son is from the Father, though. And for the Father is his beginning, right? But you can't say he's before. Okay. Again, this texture and relation, but I won't go back to that

[1:08:46] right now.