Logic (2016)
43. Definition as Demonstration, the Rule of Two or Three, God's Ordered Likeness in Creatures, and the Four Tools of the Dialectician
Class of 2017-04-06
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/043-definition-as-demonstration-the-rule-of-two-or-three-gods/

[0:00] But notice what I was doing there. I was reasoning from the end or purpose, right, which is the cause of the cause, right, and I reasoned from that to the what, the matter, right? So go back

[0:22] if I said to you, what is a knife? And I said, well, we'll define a knife first by its end or purpose. A. Knife is a tool for cutting, right? And I said, now you want to cut something, you don't want to be cut yourself, though, right? You want to be able to pick up this knife, right, and cut something with it. So you got to need a what?

[0:45] A blade that will cut something, right? But then to avoid what? Cutting yourself, cutting your hand off, cutting something, you need a what? Handle, right? So I could argue a knife is a tool for cutting, and because it is a tool for cutting, because that's its purpose, right? It must be put together from a blade and a handle, right? With the blade inserted in the handle, so right More explicit right. So we're arguing the same.

[1:16] we're arguing here, right? Okay. So this is called a demonstration, right? I'm giving you the cause, right? And that which it is a cause, and it can't be otherwise. It must be made out of what the genus of differences, Now, Aristotle says, hey, if someone asks me what is a what a definition, right? I could give a very complete definition, say it's a definition

[2:17] is speech signifying what a species is, right? Can use a more different one. By its what genus and differences, right? Okay. This is a more complete definition than this definition definition, right? It gives you both the purpose, the definition, and what it's made out of, right? Okay. I can do the same thing with a knife, right? A knife is a tool for cutting, composed of a what blade and handle, right?

[3:12] So a perfect definition, a most complete definition, right? Is almost the same thing as a demonstration, right? But differing in position, right? Because here speech signifying what a thing is is the middle term, right? The major term is speech composed of genus and difference, and the definition is the minor term, right? That's the position, right? But here it's what in the form of a what definition, right?

[3:42] So a complete and magnificent definition of definition, right? Is kind of a what same thing as what the demonstration is, right? But it's in a what different form, right? Kind of beautiful Aristotle does that, right? You know, he seems to unite the the two kinds of questions, right? But he sees that, right? That's because there's many what kinds of causes, right? You can define a thing by its inner purpose, or you can define it by its what.

[4:15] Now, right? If you ask me what's the definition, I could say what definition is speech signifying what a thing is, or its speech making known what a thing is, right? That's a definition. Correct, right? Or its speech, right, composed of the genus and differences of a species. That's another definition. Which definition is correct? Oh, yeah. And not like a grand definition which includes everything, right? You know, its speech signifying what a thing is, right?

[4:50] Or what a species is through its what genus and differences, right? Ah, now that's that's perfect, right? Like everything in the sense that you have in the what demonstration, right? But in the form of a definition, right? Well, here it's in the form of a what syllogism, right? No, when

[5:38] I'm in my my doubting mood, right, I wonder, you know, I'm misleading my students when I talk about the rule of two or three or both, right? And sometimes I say that you can't understand distinctions of more than three except through distinctions of two or three. What

[6:04] should I add for the most part? I go to these famous distinctions like what the early philosophers called, you know, the book of Porphyry, the Isagoge, the book of the five names, right? And the categories, the book of the ten names, right? Well, how do you understand the distinction of the five names in the the work of Porphyry, right, the Isagoge? What seems to me that genus and species and difference go together, right, as being what involving the nature of the thing itself, right?

[6:57] They're very tied together because the genus gives you the nature of the thing in general, right? The difference in particular, right? And the species combines both of them, right? And genus and species are talked about first of all, usually because they they correspond one to another, like father and son, right? You know. So, and we define the difference by saying it's what the species has in addition to the genus, right?

[7:26] That's what separates species under the same genus, right? That's notions of difference that we have, right? Species is speech signifying how it is what it is. I put those three together, right? And then property and accident is something outside the nature, right? So inside the nature, outside the nature, right? And the accident has no connection with the nature, right? Like a green triangle, right? That's accident in the sense of the accidentality, right?

[7:58] Or it has connection with the nature, right? And then it's what property, right? Makes sense. Now I understand it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. See? And how many distinctions were there? Inside and outside the nature, a distinction of two. And then you had a distinction of two again, property and accident, right? Falling upon nature, not falling upon it, an distinction of three: genus, species, and what difference, right? You got to have all three, right?

[8:29] The species is something more than genus, and that's the difference. See? So, how do you understand the distinction of five in in in four ways? By a distinction of what? One distinction of two, one distinction of three, and one distinction of two again. Three distinctions of two or three, right? Then I go to this guy Aristotle, and he's he's kind of you know probably just a soul good guy, and he he enumerates ten of these you know highest genera, right?

[9:04] And simplifies them. And says, I mean, that's your word is to is to elevate from Aristotle. Well, then I go to my teacher between Aristotle and me. Aristotle means what Thomas says he means. That's my that's my my slogan. And so I go to Thomas, and I find two places at least where Thomas explains the ten. And one is in the fifth book of Wisdom, where Aristotle says, "This is one of the parasite divisions of being into the ten highest according to the figures of predication.

[9:44] And then in the third book of the Natural Here, right, Physics, so called, Aristotle is talking about motion and how involves acting upon undergoing. Aristotle puts motion though not in some other category from acting upon undergoing. It comes away. That's not a category, anyways. Makes sense of what Aristotle is saying here. But in both places, what does he do? He divides the ten into what? Not into ten, but into what?

[10:14] Three, right? You could also divide into two. So there's an accident, right? And there's a substance. That's correct, right? Thomas divides into three, right? These are distinguished by the way that something can be said of individual substances, like myself. And something can be said of me by reason of what I am, and that's the category of what substance. Or by reason of something in addition to what I am, that is inside me, right?

[10:47] Or by reason of what? Something what? Outside me, right? Okay, that first one is not subdivided, right? Substance is one genus. But the second, right? I could make a distinction between the absolute and the what? towards another, right? And the absolute, which seems to be matter and form, right? Corresponding to matter and form, right? Or matter or quantity and quality, right? So you're dividing the middle into two, maybe into two, right?

[11:22] And then what about the last five, right? Well, man is kind of the what? First thing, right? It's a mix. Yeah. Which sometimes divide man's categories, we call it, which is habit or being clothed, because the other animals don't go around what putting on clothes or armor. or things of that sort. They come with their clothing, right? It's part of their body, right? Or the armadillo, right?

[11:51] They come with their armor, right? Even though they're, you know the turtle is a house on his back. And so you divide that against the other what?

[12:06] Five. There's six. Oh, there's six. I'm sorry. Yeah, yeah. So they're five, right? And then the five you can't understand distinction of five, but you have the one based upon what motion, you know, acting upon undergoing, right? And the ones based upon what quantity, right? Where, when, in position, right? And Thomas will have used it, place and time, and then subdivided place, you know, because you have this question of position of parts in place, right?

[12:38] So he's always dividing by what? Two or three, right? Now, when you come though, you know, when I'm in my doubting mood, right, I'm always wondering about, you know, what about these eight meanings of in, right? How do you understand distinction of eight, right? Well, if you think deeply about it, right, you could say that the first three meanings of in something that is actually in something is said to be in, right?

[13:13] So I'm actually in this room. Aren't you guys actually in this room too? You're actually here, aren't you? Okay. And then that's the first meaning of in, right? Second meaning of in is I got teeth in my mouth, right? They're actually teeth in my mouth. So, so the sense of actually the action. And then you have what the genus is in the what species. Well, that's actually in there too, right?

[13:42] So the first three meanings, that's just three, right? Something is actually in something, right? And then you get into the meanings when something is in something but in ability. And the first one he gives is species in the genus,

[13:59] the reverse, the genus in the species. Genus is actually in species, right? So when you define the species, you you break it down into genus and what differences, right? But is species actually in the genus? No Because an animal means something composed of cat, dog, horse elephant etc. And so to say a dog is an animal, would be to say something composed of cat, dog, horse, elephant, etc.

[14:25] etc. etc. You know? So it's there only in what? And then form is in matter, first in ability, right? So form is to matter a little bit like species is to what? Genus. Genus, yeah, yeah. Got a built-in act there. and then the whole is in the parts. Well, whole is like form, and what parts are like what? Matter. Matter is that from which something comes to be existing in it, right?

[14:59] So you got two senses of what something being something in the passive sense of ability, right? And then the next sense is what? The seventh sense, right? You have the seven, right? Three something is actually in something, right? And three senses where it's in passive ability, and then you have the sense in which I've got you in my power, or it's out of my hands, the opposite, right?

[15:29] And that's in the active ability, right? And then you know I left my heart in San Francisco. Where your treasure is, there your heart shall be, right? Well, there you do more active ability, right? Okay. So you could divide it, you know, into what?

[15:52] Three, three, and three. Yeah, actually in their in their ability, subdivided into active ability, and passive ability, right? And you're always dividing into two or three, right? Ah,

[16:05] San Francisco. Okay. Now, in some cases, now take these famous distinctions that Aristotle has. Aristotle distinguishes four senses of the word cause, right, to begin with, right? Matter, form, mover, and what? End, right? Distinction of four. Can you understand distinction of four?

[16:32] I can't. I could have had a good distinction of what? Two or three, right? So sometimes we divide causes into two, right? The inner causes, right? And the what? Outside causes, right? So matter and form are the inner causes, right? And the mover or maker and the end are the extrinsic causes, right? That makes sense. Oh, I can understand. So I'm using what three distinctions of two?

[17:09] Inside and outside, and then distinction of inside into two, distinction of outside into two. Oh I think I understand a little bit of that. right? Can you divide the four into three and one? too

[17:25] Couldn't do it on the basis of inside and outside, but how could you divide them into three and one? Yeah, one is ability in the passive sense, right? And the other three are based upon what actuality, right? And that's why God can be said to be a cause in the sense of end and mover or maker, but also in a way like form in the sense of exemplar, right?

[17:53] Not the intrinsic form of things, but the exterior one. He can be all three or two and a half, as I say sometimes, because they're all based upon what actuality, right? And he's the first act, the pure act

[18:12] So that that's that's pretty easy, right? Now, but usually we divide the causes into two, right? Inside and outside, right? Makes sense, right? So when I give an example, I say, "What does the word 'cat' depend upon for its existence, right? " Or coming into existence, right? What depends upon the letters C A and T, right? But then, since the word 'act' is the same letters, you're kind of forced by the truth itself to say it also depends upon the order of the three, right?

[18:51] So those are the two intrinsic causes of the word 'cat', right? But the word 'cat' itself on the board? No, this Berquist is a fanatic loves cats, right? My my my, uh, oldest daughter there, her oldest grandchild there, she's in college, there, right? and she has crimes going up. We went on some kind of a help help some nuns at the monastery, or convent, right? And the, and the guys were laying down on the floor or something, the girls were helping other things.

[19:26] But she got to talk a lot to you know to get to know them students pretty soon. And so she invited this one girl up to the house because they lived not far from the college, right? And uh, of course, she got, you know, she got 8 or nine brothers or sisters, right? But this little girl, this little girl who's fresh from college, she was petting all the cats that we have there, you know.

[19:50] So I said, "I said, Rosie, tell that's good, you know. " You always tell the story of my Aunt Margaret, you know, my my mother's sister. You know, she went out to the farm. She came back with a kitten. I guess

[20:07] her parents didn't like animals that much, you know. But how could they, you know, hold it? And then it's like my daughter got her cat from the music teacher, right? and mother cat would get kittens and what you can do with these kittens. you know, she talks to the little little pianist into getting these kittens. Um,

[20:29] yeah. Now uh, Aristotle distinguishes the sense of opposite into four two, right? But does he divide the four into two and two or one and three? One and three. Yeah. He kind of separates relation, right, from the three, right? Because relation doesn't mean eliminate its opposite, but demands its opposite be right. On the other three ones, you have your opposition, right? Or you're you're you're being living and you're not being alive.

[21:06] You know, you can't. They're not compatible, right? And you're being virtuous and you're being vicious. They're not compatible, right? And you're knowing and you're being ignorant, they're not you know. And so he divides them into two, right? And he subdivides one into two into three, right? So, oh yeah, gee, maybe you can, you know, even with the name of equivocal by reason, right? Now, when I look at the second postpredicament, which was four right?

[21:35] And I'm not even sure how you divide those four up, right? It's not, you know, Thomas very clearly explains the four opposites. He divides them into one and three, right? And so there's two divisions there, right? One into two, and one of the two into three, right? But maybe

[21:58] before can be, let me see if we figure it out, right? It's not as clear, right? Think about that more, right? So sometimes I say, you know, for the most part, you can't have a distinction of of more than three without dividing into two or three, right? There may be some exceptions, right? But still, it's a pretty good rule, right? And makes you very what thoughtful, you know, trying to understand these things, right?

[22:25] And as soon as you understand better, right, why there's four kinds of opposites, then why there's four senses of before, right? I have to do a lot more thinking about that, right? I'm thinking about it, but I'm not saying it's quite as clear to me, right?

[22:42] I'm still having a lot of thinking about the eight senses of before to see how they divided up. So Aristotle says something that a complete definition, right? In a sense,

[22:57] contains everything that a complete demonstration does, right? This example, right? But it's in a different what form, right? On top, then we got it in the form of a syllogism of the demonstration, right? And the bottom, we have all these things together in one grand what definition, right? I

[23:20] might be better to do the demonstration before giving a grand definition, right? Because then you see the connection between it in what speech signifying what the thing is and being speech composed of what.

[23:41] Sometimes at the house there, I think I need what Manhattan, right? Okay, I got to have what whiskey and the sweet vermouth, right? And cherries, right? So,

[24:03] in a way, what the thing is put together from, right? Is going to be for its what purpose, right? Aristotle says that the end is the cause of all the other what causes, right? Augustine says, "Because God is good, we are." But good is a notion of an end, right?

[24:29] I mean, in God, you have to be careful because, strictly speaking, there aren't really what cause and effect within God. And Thomas talks about this.

[24:51] But he says there's cause and effect in the mode of pretty clumsy. He says. Now, suppose you try to understand a bit of God.

[25:08] Does God love himself? Now you ask the question: Why does God love himself? Right. Well, the first reason why he loves himself is because he's good. In fact, he's goodness itself, as Thomas shows in his favorite book. Right.

[25:31] He's the good of every good, as Thomas shows there in his favorite book. Summum bonum, right? Now this is the first cause of good, isn't it?

[25:50] Yeah, the cause of love is good. Yeah. Okay. Now the second cause of love is knowledge, right? So God is not only good and goodness itself and the good of every good and the highest good, but he knows he is.

[26:07] Okay. So let's kind of see why God loves himself, right? But can God now produce himself in us? Produce himself in us? Yeah. I think so. I think so. He can produce himself in some way. Look, he makes men virtuous to be God. A

[26:36] God? No, it's not that simple. No, because I'd be from nothing, right? Couldn't say to be God from nothing, right? So, what God wants to do? What? Make us like him. Now, are creatures like God?

[27:02] You see, even the lowest of creatures like to say the stone, right? The stone is not as much like God as the trees out there are, because

[27:16] Saint Peter said in his Confession of Faith. Or the Christ, the Son of the Living God, right? He says God is alive, right? Okay, well the tree is in some way alive, and the stone is not, right? So the tree is more like God than the stone. But is the stone in some way like God?

[27:38] Exists, right? And metaphors which are based upon likeness of. You see, the Lord is my rock, right? Don't you see that? So in some way the rock is like God, right? But not as much as the tree, right? But the tree doesn't know anything. So is the dog and the cat more like, you know, this Abivo or this Davidson? Is he more like God than the tree out there?

[28:07] Yeah, 'cause he at least he he sees and hears and smells. He smells more than one sense. He doesn't understand the dog, right? And so man who understands, right, is more like God than the dog and the cat. But man has to what? He has intellectus, habemus rational, overshadowing. He has to have discourse, right? When Aristotle in the book on demonstration talks about the axioms, right? Well, he talks about we come to know that the whole is more than the part, and I'm what the whole and what part is.

[28:59] Well, we come to know what the whole and the part is by our experience of wholes and parts in the world here. So even to those little things we do know without discourse, like the whole is more than the part, we haven't had discourse before we get to that, right? Since we're really, you know, so the angel doesn't have to go through that discourse. So he's more like God than we are by nature, am I right?

[29:25] Okay. So God makes everything like Himself, but not what equally, right? And why is that? And the old professor of Christianity, there's a rough way of saying things. God hates equality, says.

[29:45] And when Thomas explains angels, he says no two angels are what? Yeah, all different, right? And one angel is always more or less perfect than another angel, right? But they're never equally what perfect, right? They're never equally what simple, right? Touching about

[30:07] the the hierarchy of the angels, right? From the lowest to the highest, right? They get more and more simple and more and more perfect, right? So why does God what?

[30:22] Make everything like himself, but not equally. Why? Why is he so undemocratic? There's no way that he could put it all into one. Okay. Okay. Also because of

[30:42] two ways in which creatures can be like God. One is to be good, and the other is to be a cause. Okay. Okay. So sometimes he's saying too, though, that would there be order in the things he made, right? Unless one was better than another, right? And Thomas speaks sometimes as if the order of creatures is part of the fact that one is better than another, right?

[31:10] And that's the fourth sense of order, isn't it? Fourth sense of better. Was what Fourth sense of before? Before, yeah, w w was better, right? Okay. And but also, if they're unequal, right, and one is better than other, then the better one can what move the, yeah. So there's been also an order there. So the higher angels illuminate the lower angels, all the way down to my guardian angel illuminating me, right?

[31:39] That's why we pray to the guardian angel before we begin our class here. And uh, so that um, uh, Thomas speaks of the wise will of God, right, in wisdom what orders all things? Yeah, yeah. So God makes all things like himself, but in an orderly way, right? Because he's producing it by his wisdom, right? Thomas is always quoting what Aristotle said, right? Sapientis est ordinare, right?

[32:10] Belong to the wise to order things. And like you were saying, right? If creatures were all equal, you wouldn't have the what the creatures being like God and being a cause of goodness in others, huh? The cause of illumination, right?

[32:30] Like I was saying, you know, Aristotle was too above me. I needed to understand this distinction of ten. I needed Thomas to break it down, you know, so that it, you know fit my weak mind, right? huh? I told you what my teacher Kasurik said, right? He's the wisest man at the College of Saint Thomas. He says, "compared to Aristotle. I've got the brain of an angleworm he says.

[32:54] " So he stuck in my mind. He said that, you know. But it's good though. You know, those guys who, you know, there was ten. You know, how can you say that?

[33:11] I- I- I need you know, you know, it's like when Thomas explains how, you know, an angel illuminates angel directly or immediately below him, right? And that one the one immediately below him, down the line, right? Chain of command, so to speak, like in the army, right? You know, and

[33:34] yeah, okay. So Claire, Claire. Let me see the obvious thing. So one friend of my brother Mark said, "You know, just kind of rough with that Monsignor because he would get so kind of you see? you know, he just so excited about his teaching. you know, huh? And your little text and he just, you know, illuminating it huh? Yeah.

[34:15] I remember solving one of my great difficulties, and something had bothered me for years, and I got to go check this out with Monsignor, and I ran down and I started an orderly way to consider this. I know where you are going to, I said, "Damn it, don't go there."

[34:36] But De Koninck wanted a logical analysis of something? in the text he was reading you know, Yeah. So, there's kind of an order you know, from Kasurik to De Koninck right to Dionne right? Because some of my questions Kasurik couldn't answer, He says well, when De Koninck comes down, ask De Koninck. De Koninck explained very patiently to me, you know. I could see his superiority to Kasurik, you know.

[35:01] Then I was writing my doctoral thesis. I told you one time I decided to go ask De Koninck if he thought about something, that was in my thesis. And he said, "why did you bother to ask me? " You know Kasurik is your advisor. So I want to know what you think. So he told me what he thought, you know, It was first impression, You know, he's kind of you know, like the angels there, you know, but not quite as orderly as the angels.

[35:25] But amazing. I mean, you know, Thomas. You know, when you read Thomas's commentaries on Aristotle, and really the the technical word is not commentary but exposition, right? The laying out of Aristotle's thing. You know, you wouldn't hardly understand Aristotle without Thomas there to proportion what Aristotle was saying. You know, so this, he's really uh, necessary, um, necessary for us, right? now.

[35:59] It's like the church fathers necessary to understand scripture you know, or something like that. proportional to us. Okay. Now, there's many other things you could say here about the postulates, but four questions is a nice thing to see, right? The definition of demonstration, propter quid but also the distinction between demonstration, propter quid and quia, right? But also the connection here between the two sets of questions.

[36:32] Let's turn now a little bit to to dialectic now. Aristotle speaks of the four tools of the dialectician. You heard about those? It kind of strikes me the use of the four term, the four tools of the logician organon because they refer, you know, to the collection of Aristotle's books, you know. Collection of books that come down to us in the father of logic as the what organon, right?

[37:18] So if you get the basic works of Aristotle, they'll put the logical works first, right? And they'll have the title there, the organon, right? Because logic is said to be the tool of philosophy, okay? But now in the book on the dialectical reasoning, the book of places, Aristotle speaks of four tools, right? So these are the tools within the what tool philosophy, right? A very toolish subject, right?

[37:49] Okay. Now I'm not too bright, but as I follow Aristotle in the order of the four tools, right? I see more and more, more impressed. You know, as I go further, because it's harder for me to see, but these work, right? Okay. Now, timer

[38:19] for something, right? Four thirty, right? Is it? Four tools of dialectic, four tools of dialectician. We can say that, right? Now, even a dummy like me is not too surprised by the first tool, right? The first tool of the dialectician is the selection

[39:09] of probable opinions, right? And under that, of course, is our two old friends, the distinction, and order of them. Okay. So you want to select the opinions of all or most men, right? Or all or most men, the most famous of them in a particular art of science, right? And speaking about the matter of that art or science, right? So you want to distinguish the probable opinions.

[40:07] Well, these are probable opinions that pertain to ethics. So these are probable opinions that pertain to the natural world, right, or something of that sort, right? But also you want to what put them in order, right, from the what general to the what particular, right? Okay.

[40:27] Because you might use the more general to reason to something much more particular, right, or to apply it to more particular, right? Okay. Now even a dummy like me, right? Huh? Kind of a dull, dull mind here, right? Huh? I can see that since dialectical reasoning is reasoning from probable opinions, this has to be the first tool, right? What else could be the first tool, right? You're going to reason dialectically, going to reason from probable opinions, as opposed to what you do in demonstration, right?

[40:58] And so the first thing you need is to be able to select, right? Probable opinions, right? And if you're going to be reasoning in ethics, you want ones relevant to ethics, right? If you're in natural philosophy, opinions that are relevant to that, right, and so on, right? And so uh, and you want to order them of course Okay, even in demonic you can kind of see that. Does it make sense to say that it's the first two?

[41:26] Now, what is the second tool, Right. Well, these probable opinions are ones you've heard, right? We've read, and they're expressed in words. Yeah, yeah. Maybe

[41:54] you need to be able to distinguish the senses of words, right? Okay. Kind of what what they mean, right? Or if they mean many things, right? I mean, here, you know, let's take a famous guy named Shakespeare, right? Shakespeare says that apparently in the exhortation use reason, the reason's ability for large discourse looking before and after, right? Okay. What do you mean by before and after, right?

[42:27] And so, if I can distinguish the senses, is before and after just one meaning? No. One meaning. Yeah. And does Shakespeare mean all those senses? No. Does reason look before and after in just one of those senses? Okay. And as the father of logic points out in the book, that this clarification is the most common mistake: is to distinguish the word, right? Maybe, maybe you know.

[43:07] Maybe I have to have what ability to distinguish the senses of words, right? Now, this is going to be the second two, obviously, right? The ones I've heard, you know, have been stated in but words. Okay. So we can say the second one is the distinction

[43:32] of the senses of a word. Aristotle, under this part here, he gives what we call places, right? Where you look to see if a word has more than one meaning, right? Okay. Let's take an example in class. There, the word "liberal," right? You're at a liberal arts college, right now. In the political world, there are liberals and conservatives, right?

[44:17] And then in the ethics, you find out there's a virtue called liberality, right? What's the word liberal mean? Same in these three? Well, what's the opposite of it? Of liberal, right? In the political world, the opposite of liberal is conservative, right? In fine art, in the arts, the opposite of liberal is what? Conservative. And in the case of the virtue in terms of money, called liberality, right?

[44:47] The opposite liberal is what? Stingy, stingy. Okay. So if the word has many opposites, this is one place to look, right? Look at the opposite. If it has different meanings, right? Then the word itself has many different meanings, right? Okay. Now, when they see who gives, you know, money, charity, charitable money, right? They find out that conservatives give more money charitably than liberals. Yeah. So it's a joke they call liberals or liberal other people's money.

[45:21] That's what you're saying. Yeah, yeah. Okay. And you find conservatives more interested in liberal education too, than liberals. Real, real liberal education, right? So

[45:35] this is important, right? Now that you don't mix up these senses of the word liberal, right? Okay. But notice, if it's a probable opinion that reason looks for order or looks before and after, right? And I can distinguish the senses of before and after, right? Then I can multiply the senses. The probable opinions, right?

[46:09] Reason looks before and after in time, right? Looks before and after in cause and effect and being, right? Looks before and after in what? Yeah, yeah. And all kinds of courses you know, deduction too, and what's going to be the principles of the science, right? Which was to come before, right? And we're always looking before and after in the sense of what is better, right? Okay. So you can multiply in a sense.

[46:34] In a sense, you're multiplying probable opinions, right? As you distinguish these senses, right? As well as avoid, you know, confusing, right? These things, right? Okay.

[46:47] I saw this. Reason. I saw this. It's a little more difficult for me. You know, a little more of a surprise here. I'm not surprised that this should be the first tool of dialectician, right? But you have to stop and think. Hey, those opinions are expressed in words, and words have many meanings, and people are obviously deceived by them. You know, you got to really have the second tool, right?

[47:07] What's very next to what the opinion is, right? Because the sense of opinion is what Einstein said, or what most men say, or what they say, or those what they say are words. What the hell these words mean, right? And so on, right? I can see this. I am second, don't you? Okay. No.

[47:30] Third and fourth. Now, see. I mean, what could they possibly be, right? What does Aristotle see that I don't see, right? I don't see it. I don't see it. Okay.

[47:52] But now something's kind of clearer, right? To me, when you distinguish words, You're close to distinguishing what? Things, right? Okay. So I say he's liberal with his money, and he's liberal in politics, right?

[48:15] I mean, he's talking about different things, right? So the third tool is going to be the ability to what? To find or to see differences, right?

[48:35] Not just difference, not just different meanings, right? But differences of what? Of things, right? Okay. Now, if you need the ability to find differences, what other ability do you need?

[49:11] Similarities. Similarities. Yeah. The same now and so opposites, right? Okay. Would make any sense here? This doctor knows a lot about health, and the other doctor knows a lot about sickness, but. I'm no doctor that knows both, right? That makes sense to you. Okay. So

[49:37] the ability to consider likeness, right? Okay. Now it's kind of interesting that Aristotle speaks here of the ability to find differences, and doesn't here say the ability to find likeness, but the ability to consider likeness. Now Aristotle says that there can be likeness, you know, which is very close. Like the cat and the dog are both four-footed animals and like that. See, it's the cat and the dog and the cat, right?

[50:21] And sometimes a little child will call a dog a cat or a race a race, but they don't quite see the differences yet. But then the likeness of what ratios, right, is a more what distant what likeness, okay? And they say that that most discoveries are made in science by seeing the likeness of what ratios, okay? And of course Aristotle's works are filled with likenesses of ratios,

[50:53] okay? Now, the first meaning of proportionally is found in mathematics, With medike right Now, um I say to my students in class, I'm very educated. I'd say 2 is to 3. As four is to If you can supply the fourth term, then you see the likeness, right? But they would say what? Yeah. They'd say, well, the distance between two and three and four and five is the same, right?

[51:36] But is four really to five as two is to three? See? That's what they think, right? But are they really? Is the likeness really? The distance is the same, right? That's not even a question of likeness, right? It's not the same distance, right?

[51:58] Are they really like this? They have to consider the likeness, right? And exactly what way they are like. I say now, you, need a little help, right? Imagine six to be made up of three twos, or excuse me, four made up of two twos, right? Okay. What would four be to like two is to three? It would be three twos, which would be six, right? Not five, right?

[52:32] Okay. So if you kind of imagine six as being three twos and four two twos, right? Then it's kind of easy to see that four is made to six like two is to three, right? Ah, now you see that, right? But you have to stop and consider it, right? Aristotle speaks of that. Consideration of whatness, right? And what may they like, right? Okay. Now get into Aristotle's most difficult thing, right?

[53:02] Aristotle says that the first matter, which is the matter underlying substantial change, right? The first matter is known by what? A proportion, right? So the first matter is to man and dog, or man and lion.

[53:23] But clay is to sphere and cube. Now you have to consider the likeness, right? In what way they are like? Because they're sphere and cube, two different what substances? Like man and lion are.

[53:48] And is the first matter underlying substantial change from the lion from man to lion? the lion eats the man or something? Is is is uh, that first matter natural substance?

[54:07] Like and the clay is, right? And are man and dog two accidents like sphere and cube are two different shapes. Why aren't they like this? Well, you haven't considered the likeness right? Huh right? Huh?

[54:30] In what way are they alike, what way they're not, right? See? And I'll go back to something more known and illustrate this point, right? Huh? You said four is to six as two is to three. Now, four is to six as even numbers to an even number, and therefore two is to three as even numbers to an even number.

[54:53] What's wrong? You have misunderstood, right? Four is to six like two is to three, not because they're both the what ratio of an even number to an even number, right?

[55:10] Or two is to three is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number. So four is to six is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number, right? That's not the way they're alike, right? You have not considered, right, the likeness, In what way they exactly are alike, right? In what way is two to three like four to 6? Not in any of those ways you just mentioned, right?

[55:47] Well, four is to six is a ratio of an even number to an even number. So two to three is the ratio of an even number to an even number. Okay, you have got to think,

[56:01] though, right? Well, to state it fairly and strictly here, four is the same parts of six that two is of what three. And again, going back to help your little imagination, people soon. If you imagine the four, in a sense, you think of as being two twos, right? And the six as being three twos, right? Then four is the same parts of six that two is of three, right?

[56:35] Okay, there's two twos in four and three twos in six, so it's the same parts. Oh, that's the way they're alike, right? Huh? Okay. So in what way is clay to sphere and cube like the first matter is to man and lion, right? Well, not in so far as man and lion are different substances, right?

[57:02] Sphere and cube are in the what species in the genus of quality, the shape or form, right? The species, right? That's not where they're alike, right? Clay is an actual substance. The the matter, the first matter underlines lion and what man is not an actual substance, right? Well, how are they alike, then? Well, the clay is able to be a sphere or a cube, but not both at the same time, right?

[57:37] And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other, but if it becomes the other, it ceases to be the former, right? Yeah. Well, the first matter is able to be a man or a lion, right? Right. there. And if the man eats the lion, right? it will be a lion and not a man, right? Okay. And when it's a man, it can't be a lion.

[57:59] When it's a lion, it can't be a man, right? And if it becomes the other, it will cease to be the former, right? That's in what way they are alike, right? Okay. You see that, right?

[58:12] But they're not alike in the sense of man and lion being two qualities like sphere and cube are, right? Okay. You can say now the first matter is to man and lion or dog and cat. Take some other substances, right? Like what man is to healthy and sick, right? The man is able to be healthy. He's able to be sick, but not both at the same time, right?

[58:42] And if he's one, he's not the other, right? And if he becomes the other, he ceases to be the former, right? Okay. The first matter can be a dog or a cat. It can't be both at the same time, right? And when it's a dog, it's not a cat. But if it becomes a cat, it ceases to be a dog, right? And so, so you got to stop and consider in what way they are what alike.

[59:14] Remember how we talked about the uh, uh, likeness there between what a definition is to the first act, like what statement is to the second act, right?

[59:29] Well, it's proportional, right? What we are like, right? If you want to understand what a thing is, you might need a definition, right? If you want to understand the true or the false, you need a what Statement, yeah? The statement is not a definition, right? Understanding what something is is not the same thing as understanding true and false.

[59:53] But just as the definition enables you to understand what the thing is, so the statement enables you to understand the true and the false. So that's very important, right? Aristotle is always what

[1:00:09] using proportion, right? He talks about virtue, right? now. I used to take some class. they said, "What's the virtue of a knife?" I said, Well, when they define virtue, they say a, virtue is a what? Stable disposition. Yeah, yeah. It's what makes its power good and what it does good, right now. Well, what is the virtue of a knife, then? Sharpness, yeah. What's the vice of the knife?

[1:00:42] Dullness. Yeah, yeah. He's a. Moron. Yeah, yeah. But you see, you notice the difference there, right now. But you see proportion there, right now.

[1:00:56] So you would want a knife without its virtue. Why would you want a man without his virtue Yeah. Just it's annoying to have a knife that's dull, right? Would cut.

[1:01:10] a robber, or a thief or whatever it is. Yeah.