Logic (2016)
45. Distinctions and Likeness Among the Tools; Why Aristotle's Metaphysics Book III Begins with Doubting Well
Class of 2017-04-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/045-distinctions-and-likeness-among-the-tools-why-aristotles/

[0:00] Okay, So I got into that discourse there. I was talking about why does this come right after this, right? Well, partly because they say what does somebody mean, right? Because you know I know it's Thomas too in the in the De Veritate we had disputed questions. So he's always quoting Augustine or Damascene or something like that, and sometimes you might not understand what they're saying. So if you argue from that as a probable opinion, you might want to, you know, know exactly what they mean, right?

[0:28] And that requires this thing here, right? At the same time, you say, you know, if I say it's a probable thing that reason looks before and after, right? Then I can say that it's before and after in each of these what different senses, right? So if it's probable, the reason looks before and after, and before and after has four or five senses, right? Then the reason looks before and after in each of these senses might be also what probable, right?

[1:00] And you can indicate that, right? So I can multiply my what probable what statements, right? Or we find out that act is before ability in what many ways, right? It's before in causality and being, right? And act is before ability in what knowledge, right? Because ability is known by the act that it's ability for, right? So the ability to see is distinguished from the ability to hear by the acts for which each is an ability, right?

[1:40] Seeing or hearing, right? So act is is before ability in what being and in causality and in what knowledge, right? And in goodness, right?

[2:10] Maybe not in in time, but perhaps in duration, you might say, Okay, before Abraham was. So you kind of see the reason why this would come next to this, right? Now, which is more like the second, the third, or the fourth tool?

[2:33] I think the fourth is more like the second. Well, here though you're distinguishing things, right? Oh, I'm sorry, yeah. And here you're distinguishing things too, but the difference is in things, right? I'm sorry, yeah. I'm thinking the word considered.

[2:53] And so you might even, you know, see a distinction in words, but you don't see a distinction of things, too, right? It's something similar, right? And this one here, then, is left in fourth place, right? This is very important for what discovering things, right? And when I taught the philosophy of science, and I read some of the scientists, you know, who not only are, you know, men eminent in their scientific field, but they also some of them are historians of science, too, right?

[3:29] And they see the importance, right, of being able to see a likeness of what ratios, right? I'm thinking of Einstein, there where he's talking about

[3:43] we're three-dimensional creatures, you know, coming to realize we're living in a fourth-dimensional world, right? Huh? He compares that to a two-dimensional creature discovering that there is what a third, third dimension in his universe, right? Huh? Kind of ingenious, you know. Huh? Those kind of issues of likeness there, right? Huh? You know, and it's easier to talk about what would be for a two-dimensional creature to discover that, you know, even though I don't seem to be a part of my experience, you know, that the facts are obviously I live in a three-dimensional world.

[4:20] And something has led us to say that we're living in a fourth-dimensional world, right? I heard, I read these scientists saying, you know, that this has been probably the most fertile thing for discovering science, right? To see what likeness of ratios, huh? You think just of you know going from the water wave to the what sound wave to going to light waves, right? This what proportion there between the three, right?

[4:55] And so your understanding of water wave, in some sense is, preparing you for understanding the sound wave, right? Sound wave for understanding the. They talk about

[5:11] gravity waves as well. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's very, you know, the idea of likeness there. Aristotle very often argues from what ratios, likeness of ratios, huh? To seeing something. As they compare what genus is to difference, like matter is to what form, yeah.

[5:48] An animal is able to be a dog or cat or a horse or something, right? And wood is able to be a chair or a desk or a table or something, right? Or crucifix or something, right? And this seems to be somewhat like this there, right?

[6:10] Remember the order of the senses of in. The first sense of in is we're in this room, right? Second sense of in is my tooth is in my mouth, right? Third sense of in is my what? The genus is in the species, right?

[6:33] Now those are all senses of in where what is in something is actually there, right? We're actually in this room, aren't we, you and I? My teeth are actually in my mouth, and the genus is actually in the Understanding of the what species, right? But then you get to the fourth sense, which is what? Species in the genus? Yeah, this is something where the species is not actually in the genus, is it?

[7:05] But it's potentially, right? And then what comes next? Form in what? Matter. Yeah. So species is to genus a bit like what? Form is to matter, right? You don't want to overextend the likeness there, right? But there's some likeness there.

[7:29] You have to see in what way they are like, right? Because the genus can be said of the species, right? Can matter be said of the form

[7:47] Can we say it of the form? Yeah, the wood table. Is the shape of the table a kind of wood? No, not really said of it, is it?

[8:05] The shape of the table is wood. The shape of the chair is is wood. But the species is what some way has the genus said of it, right? A dog is a animal, right? Cat is an animal, right? Okay.

[8:29] But there's a likeness. You got to consider what the likeness is, though, right? So the genus, an animal, in some sense we could say is able to be a dog or a cat, but you have to add this what difference to make it be one or the other, right?

[8:53] Or a triangle is able to be scalene or isosceles or equilateral, right? Okay, but you have to add this actuality to it, right? Okay. All triangles is contained by three sides. It doesn't say whether they're all equal or two of them are equal or none of them are equal, right? Could be any one of those, right? Okay. Well, wood is able to be what? A table or a chair or a desk or crucifix or something, right?

[9:23] There's a likeness there, isn't it? See. But you don't want to extend the likeness more than you should, right? See. And the distinction of genus and species is that a real distinction or a distinction of reason? Is my

[9:49] being a man my being an animal really two different things? Could be both. Yeah, but you know, man is an animal, right? By form and matter, we're not the same thing, are they?

[10:10] And so there's a likeness there, right? But you have to, you know, the famous thing here, Aristotle's choice of the word there, huh? Consideration, right? Um,

[10:26] you have to consider in what way the genus is to the species like matter is to to form, right? Or maybe even that the genus is to the difference, maybe, right? Like what? Matter is to form. Yeah, Yeah.

[10:48] So you have to add something, right, to wood to make it a chair or a table or crucifix, right? A certain form, right? And you have to add some difference to get a what? Quadrilateral to get square to get oblong or to get rhombus or rhomboid and trapezium.

[11:18] Euclid has that distinction of five kinds of what quadrilateral, right? But four of them are really what parallelograms, right? And then the trapezium is just to kind of cover all the oddballs, yeah, yeah, yeah. Don't bother much with trapeziums, but

[11:37] okay. I think it's kind of beautiful to see that, right? But likewise, when you say, you know, that there's a a tooth is in my mouth, right?

[11:50] And what the genus is in the what species, right? Is that there's a difference there? There's two ways, right? You wouldn't say in my mouth is a tool, as a tooth or a tooth is a mouth, right? But you might say the genus of the what? Yeah, you might say a dog is an animal, right? So there's there's a difference

[12:17] there, you know. So I can I can I can use the third and fourth to both, right? Have to find the difference between genus and species and

[12:30] whole and part, right? And it's kind of unusual too, you know, that genus and species in one way is like form and matter, another way it's like part and whole, right? You see? So it's kind of you know there's a lot to be considered there in terms of what way those things are what alike right and then you say well is form in matter like whole and parts or is it like species and genus or is it like both of them?

[13:33] Maybe if you consider the matter in relation to the form, it's kind of like part and whole. Yeah, but you know we take the first three senses of to be in right.

[13:54] Something is said to be more actually in that which it is right. You take the next three senses right. Something is in something in what ability right? What kinds of passive ability and then in the was it the seventh sense right? I got you in my power right. That's the active ability right. I can move you. You better obey me when I give you your command right.

[14:24] You know. They show you all these these films from North Korea. You know you see them and of course they're showing up the whatever his name is it the leader there up at the thing there and they're you know marching like you know the Nazis in the Nazis know the legs like that. But then these other things going by with the you know tanks are going by with the with the you know the rockets and so on right.

[14:52] And you know the military guys like just you know you know just standing up and then thing goes by the stand there like that you know you know to the to the to fearless leader. Yeah yeah yeah yeah. So you better obey me. You you don't you might be in trouble if you didn't you didn't kick your legs up and you march by by them.

[15:19] Yeah, that must be exhausting, you know, to march that way for very long. And I know how much the Nazis did like that, you know.

[15:32] So the first three senses of in right there's a likeness, isn't there? Now which is more like like genus in species? My tooth in my mouth, or you? Me in this room, which is more like it.

[16:02] Probably like the genus and the species. Yeah, because it's more like a part, right now. You know, the genus is in the definition of the species, right now, like a part in a whole, right

[16:18] now. Am I in this room as a part in the whole? You might might say that this woodwork here is is in this room as a real part of the room, but am I really part of this? That was when you had your feet on the floor. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. You see, part of the cross, you know, part of the cross. Um, so I mean, you could say maybe one is more. like the other than the other, right?

[16:54] But there's a likeness there, right? But you have to stop and be to consider that, right? And how did Aristotle ever, or Thomas actually in this case, right? Thomas ordered the eight senses. that Aristotle had given them there in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, right? Book of the Physics. He had ordered them by their what, likeness, right? Aristotle had given them the starting point there, saying that the first sense is really to be in this room, right?

[17:27] It's easiest one for us to understand, kind of, huh? And what does Aristotle take up in Book Four of Natural Hearing? It's place and time, right? Talk about empty too, but I mean, everybody's always talking about empty, but place and time, right? But in the senses of before, the first sense is tied up with what? Time, right? The first sense of in is tied up with place.

[18:03] Notice how, how, how, if you take the word where, right? Isn't where, first of all, suggesting place? I woke up in the hospital. Where am I, right? You know, if you get lost, where am I? You know.

[18:29] But now, you know, we're asking the question: Where would you put grace, right? What category would you put grace? Remember that? I was just reading the De Veritate, and Thomas, you know, speaks of grace as being in the what quality in quality, right? In the first species of quality, but it's not probably speaking of habit, it's different from the from the habits, but it's in that species.

[18:56] Nevertheless, but notice I used the word where, right? Well, I mean what use the word where where for? It's not to just. That's where it belongs, right?

[19:10] You grow up, your mother's you put things where they belong, right? We had these kind of weights in there for holding the book. Suddenly we have a book to stay at the table or something like that, and both of them had disappeared. We couldn't find them. I. And then I did a little search the other day there, and I found both of them, right? You know, so so.

[19:33] I said, where were they? You know. And then we have two nice letter openers, you know, and always the mail. You know, you got to look to see if there's anything important in there. You know, and open up the things. We couldn't find either one of them. You know, I don't know where they are. Where are they? You know. Well, then you put it where you're supposed to put it, you know.

[19:59] Okay, that's kind of the first sense, huh? But the fact we use the word "where," Aristotle is talking about, body talking about body, right? Body is into what? Generals, you know.

[20:22] So, substance and and quantity. So, if you're talking about just the dimensions, right? Then the three-dimensional is is the body, right? But then, body is also the name of a what? Yeah, that's one of the places there in in the second one, right? You know, see what genus it belongs to, right? Well, if body is both in the genus of substance and in the genus of

[20:47] of quantity, right? Then the word body must be what? Yeah, must be a different different sense, right? And most people can't make that distinction, right? Now, Descartes got my beating, boy. because I wrote my doctoral thesis comparing Descartes and Aristotle on the three roads, right? Three ways of going forward. But

[21:16] Descartes seems to make the substance of material things, right? The length and width and depth, right? So I asked a joke, and I said, Descartes never grew up.

[21:31] Because if your substance was your was your size, right? Huh? Your dimensions, then when you grew taller, you would not be the same person, right? Huh? You know. So my size is something what? Accidental, right? Although it's closest, you might say, to my material substance, right? Huh? But body, right? Huh?

[22:00] So if something is is a different genre, right? It can't be the same meaning, right? And you know, I told you how De Koninck used to like the word predicament, you know, and the word predicament, right? Because a predicament is a situation you're in that's you don't see any way out of it, right? And this is true about a predicament category, right? It's the Latin word for category there.

[22:24] That you you know, if you're in one predicament, you're you're in there forever. You can't go and wander into another predicament, right? You're stuck in this predicament now. It isn't

[22:49] interesting how we're taking this example, you know, of the likeness of the senses of a word, right? And how we have to stop and consider in what way, you know, genuses to what species, right?

[23:14] Are genus and species like whole and part? Do you see a likeness between them? I think so. Or are genus and species like matter and form? Well, you got

[23:34] to be more precise, though, right now. You see, you can say that the genus is to the species like what part is to whole, right now. But the species is to the genus as what form is to matter. Yeah, yeah. So very, very subtle, right now. But notice we're talking about different senses, right? The eight senses of in. And what? Yeah, yeah. The way these tools are what connected, huh?

[24:07] Like each other, huh? Very much like each other, huh? So although we put the third tool as Aristotle does, the third, right, is being closer to the second, right? There's a connection between the second tool and the what? Fourth tool, right now.

[24:41] Because Thomas seems to be ordering those senses of in by the likeness of them, right? Now I know myself, and I think I'm kind of a fanatic there to defend Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? And so I go to the first, second, second post predicament to go to the senses of before, right now. Well,

[25:11] I'm kind of struck by the likeness between the second and the third sense, huh? And you say, well, I can present this way. I say,

[25:22] as something can be without something else, but not vice versa, right? So likewise, something can be known without something else, but not the reverse, right? So it's a real likeness, isn't it? Do you see that?

[25:41] Say. Marble can be without the Pietas there, Michelangelo there in the Vatican, right? But the Pietas cannot be without what? Marble. Yeah. Okay. I can know what a what a number is without knowing what a perfect number is. I found for many years in teaching students know what a number is to some extent, but they don't know what a perfect number is, right? But can you know what a perfect number is without knowing what a number is?

[26:16] I see. I like this, don't you? I see. I see. Just as the letters C A and T can be without the word cat, can they be without the word cat?

[26:32] The letters C A and T can they be without the word cat? Yeah, like in the word act, right? Or they say Joshua T A C, right? They don't refer to their alma mater as TAC right? Um It's like WPI, over here you know. Worcester Polytechnic Institute.

[26:58] So, WPI can be without WIMP, right? And WIMP can be without. Can't be without WIP, right? Okay. Okay. I see something like that, and that I can know

[27:26] what a number is without knowing what a perfect number is. But I can't know what a perfect number is without knowing what a number is. I can know what a quadrilateral is, right? Without knowing what a trapezium is. I certainly can't know what a trapezium is without knowing what a quadrilateral is.

[27:48] I was trying to remember rhombus and rhomboid, you know. So my mnemonic device, where was, I mean, my memory device was rhombus ends with S, right? So it's a square that's been jerked, right? Then rhomboid is the oblong jerked, right? Yeah, you know. So, so I can know what a quadrilateral is without knowing what a rhombus is, not vice versa, right? Or I can know what a quadrilateral is without knowing what a

[28:22] parallelogram is, right? It's a big, big word, right? But I can't know what a parallelogram is without knowing what a quadrilateral is. A parallelogram is a quadrilateral whose opposite sides and angles are what equal, something like the definition of a parallelogram. is a marvelous thing, right? Parallelograms.

[28:56] Compose. it- it- it's- it's- it's, uh, limits are what lines never meet. But they have to meet to form a figure, right? But it's not the parallel lines, that... No. Unless you're Muslim. Yeah. Yeah. Then they can meet. Yeah. So you see, all those those four tools are very closely related, aren't they? I remember Einstein talking about you know Louis de Broglie's discovery of the wave mechanics and so on, you know, and how he says you can find this as a proportion, you know, that doesn't mean anything, you know, just plaything, but then to see a real important proportion, he says, you know, it's just major scientific, you know, he really, really insists that, you know, and you can see that Louis de Broglie, you

[29:48] know, was carrying out his seeing this proportion, right? Until he had a theory that they called the French comedy. He says, "No, no, let's let's test this, you know." And turned out to be, so yeah, it's a marvelous thing, you know, to read about, you know.

[30:04] Warren had lunch with him, you know, with Louis de Broglie in Paris. There, you know, I actually think about about what's his name, the Russian physicist there. Can't remember his name.

[30:17] But he went to see Louis de Broglie in Paris, and Louis de Broglie, you know, Gamow Gamow he didn't didn't speak French yet. Really, he spoke English very well, you know. And he wanted to speak to Louis de Broglie in English, Louis de Broglie in Paris. You know, he insisted on speaking in French. And then Gamow went over to England, right? Where he was at home, he knew English very well."

[30:42] Louis de Broglie came over to give a talk in England, and he gave it in perfect English. But he wouldn't talk. He wouldn't talk to Gamow in English, right? In Paris, right? He talked. Contaminate the air. Yeah, yeah,

[31:00] yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. No way, way. So insisted upon that. French Canadian, barely speak English, native tongue is French. Yeah. But the Parisians treated him terribly. They all thought he was American who did not speak French. Yeah, yeah.

[31:20] Well, my friend Rodney Milkley, he spent his junior year abroad there, you know, in France, right? And so he got kind of bugged, you know, to travel and so on. And he come home and he worked for a while, you know, and then he go to another country, you know. So he went to Spain, right? And the Spaniards are much more friendly than the French, and much more helpful, you know, helping you to speak their language.

[31:43] And but he tells me of coming back from Spain, going through France, to the United States, and he got into France again, coming back after being in Spain for six months, whatever it was. And he went into a bar, you know, drinking. The guy said, "He's serving the drink, service, which means tip, you know." Hey, hey, guys! The man, he demanded a tip,

[32:07] and he said, "You know, service modim." I remember he walked right out. So Rodney's neighbor, neighbor, friendly with, you know, was a a guy who liked good music, you know. He had a whole collection of Haydn, you know, almost all Haydn's things, you know. Never seen anybody with a collection that big of Haydn? And he went to he went to Minnesota and got a degree in botany.

[32:40] You know, he died young, you know, but he left money in his what will to Rodney, you know, and that is quite a good sum of money, you know. That's just the time when Rodney ran into the girl that he he married here in England, and his mother was debating. should I tell him about this inheritance or not?

[33:05] Let him struggle, but you know, wondering how he'll support his wife. You know. Okay, now. I'm going to go to the third book of wisdom, okay?

[33:19] Now, reason we're going there is the third book of wisdom is entirely dialectical, okay? And I'm not going to be going through the third book of wisdom, but in the first Alexio, you might say, of book three, right? Aristotle gives four reasons why he's going to proceed dialectically in this third book, right? Okay.

[33:50] And you know Thomas talks about how these four reasons are reasons not only why he he has this book of dialectic here in the

[34:06] 14 books of wisdom, right? But also why he has dialectic in the book of the physics, right? In the eight books of natural hearing and the ethics and so on, right? But he said what's unique about the third book here is that the whole book is dialectical, and that's not really the point I want to break here so much, but it's because of the affinity between dialectic and what wisdom, which Averroes had talked about too, right?

[34:35] In Aristotle, he compares the wisdom to both dialectic and what Sophistic sophistic, and the likeness consists in their universality. See, see, the sophist is a man who what wants to appear wise, right? And though he's not really wise, huh? And he'd rather appear wise than be wise. See, why the true philosopher is a what lover of wisdom, right? He'd rather be wise than appear wise, right? Huh?

[35:16] Okay. But because the wise, the sophist is trying to be what wise, he's kind of know it all, right? Huh? Tries to get the appearance that he knows it all. He's got in some way be what complete universal, right? And so when you study the the fallacies, right? Huh? Like the fallacy of what of equivocation, take the most common mistake, huh? He can use that any any part of philosophy, right?

[35:46] You know, I can I can argue equivocally, right? In natural philosophy, and I can do so in ethics, and I can you know into the orphan place, right? So I'm I'm kind of a man of universal what? Sophistication. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And dialectic, you know, you can use these four tools anywhere, right? Right? You know, so there's something universal. Of course, one of the attributes of the wise man is that he knows all things in some way, right?

[36:12] That's one of the first in the proemium the premium, you know. So there's a real reason why a whole book is devoted to dialectic because of the likeness, in particular, between dialectic and wisdom in terms of their what universality. Okay, it's kind of an amazing thing to see this, right? And the fifth book of wisdom, you know, is all about what distinguishing the senses of the words used in wisdom, and used what in the axioms, and used to some extent in in all our knowledge, right?

[36:43] Because they're so universal, right? The whole book is it, right? Now, you know, we've talked about the fourth book of physics where he distinguishes eight senses of in, right? He doesn't have a whole book devoted to distinguishing the senses, but the fifth book is all about what distinguishing the senses of words, right? It's kind of a strange thing, right? Huh? But shows the affinity between this and what dialectic, right?

[37:08] Huh? Okay. So he says anankē, right? That means necessary. Okay. proteron epizetoumen episteme. It's necessary for the what the one we are now proposing to proceed, right? Episteme is a word for science, huh? To first for us to go through, right? Huh? About those things about which one ought first to what to doubt. Okay. Find what's really doubtful, because you're trying to find what you don't know, and

[37:54] when something is doubtful, it's a sign that you don't know something, right? Huh? Okay. Now these are whatever things others have spoken what differently about, right? So if the famous thinkers before him, right, have said different things, right? Huh? And each of them had some kind of reason for what he thought, right? Well,

[38:23] should consider what they had to say, right? Huh? Okay. Okay. But now he starts to give the first reason, right? It's really marvelous what he says here.

[38:39] It is before necessary, huh? Pro ergo, right? For those wishing to what to discover. Okay. To diaporesai kalos, huh? To doubt well. Okay. I've always struck by that because when I read the modern philosophers, they're all filled with doubts, obviously, right? Huh? But they don't doubt well, right? Huh? Now if you pick up, I tell you, I'm re-reading the what disputed questions. On truth and goodness, right?

[39:20] The question is De Veritate, right? Okay, twenty-nine questions, right? And each question's got many articles, right? Sometimes at least ten articles. But you have what disputatio, right? Huh? You have arguments. Sometimes fifteen arguments on this side, and sometimes ten arguments on this side, right? Okay, they all begin that way, right? Huh? The Summa Theologiae has got an abbreviation of that, right? So you maybe have just just three or four things.

[39:47] But the real thing is the question on disputati, right? You got you know as many as fifteen, twenty, sometimes you know, But you're attacking from every angle, you might say, right? Huh? But you're proceeding quite dialectically, right? Huh? So he says it's what necessary, right? Huh? It it says for those wishing to what discover, right? euporesai, pro ergo, it's necessary before, you might say, right? To doubt well, okay?

[40:22] Say, well, how do you how doubt well? By giving the arguments on what both sides and so on, right? Then you doubt well, right? Okay. The moderns doubt without, yeah, yeah.

[40:38] And then it goes on in this same first argument here. For the later eusteron, right? It's afterwards. Euporia, the discovery afterwards is a lucis an untying, right? See, of the things before doubted, right? Okay.

[41:01] And one is not able to untie who doesn't know the knot. Okay. If you don't know it's a knot. you won't untie it. Yeah. But the doubt of the mind shows this about the thing, right? Huh? In so far as it doubts, it is in a condition like the one who undergoes his chains or something, right? Huh? So I can't walk forward if you got me my feet tied together, right?

[41:32] And if you have arguments on both sides and they both seem good, you know, and I say, you know, to this dummy that looks pretty good argument, and then I go into the other side that looks pretty good too, you know, you know, and my brother Mark and I were going to, you know, get these stupid professors straightened out, you know, by locking them up in a room, you know, and you drop in the objections, you know, on one side and the objections the other side and make them stew in the objections on both sides, and before you you give them the what the body of the article, right?

[42:05] Which would be untying it, right? And then the reply to the objections, right? Which is sometimes reply to the objections on one side if the truth is all on the other side completely, and sometimes to both sets of objections if there is defects in both arguments, huh?

[42:27] Okay, so insofar as it doubts, it's like one what tied together, right? Huh? One's legs, right? Huh? Okay. I know how we use that expression, you know, in sports sometimes, you know, when somebody it's a thing that ties up the game, right? They use expression, don't we? Tied up. This game is all tied up. You'll see that when the guy is announcing. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And then somebody gets up in you know the last half of the ninth, and it's a home run, and the game's untied, right?

[42:59] See? Okay. So he's saying that the man who's heard you know reasonable arguments, maybe not necessarily true, you know, arguments, but Arguments that seem to make some sense, right? Huh? On both sides, his mind is really tied up, right? Huh? But the untying of this knot, right, is the discovery of something, right? Okay. And that's the way discoveries are made, right? Huh? So something seems to what contradict something else, and so you realize there's something I don't see here, right?

[43:39] Huh? And the subsequent discovery will be an untying of that what knot, huh? Yeah. Okay. Bohr there, then tied the knot about the atom, right? Huh? Okay. Applying the quantum to the atom. Okay.

[44:03] So insofar as he doubts, in some way he is like the one, you know, tied up with the with the chains. I won't say fettered. For both is impossible to go forward, right? Huh? Okay.

[44:23] Okay. That's the first reason he gives, right? Huh? You have to proceed dialectically first, because dialectic reasons from what probable arguments to opposite what? Yeah. So in every one of these disputed questions, right? Huh? Questions disputati, right? Huh? Heraclitus said dispute, right? That's he said that right he said that, right? Um, you have arguments on what opposite sides, right? Huh? It's possible to have probable arguments on both sides, right?

[44:55] Huh? And therefore your mind is tied in a knot, right? But that's not bad, right? Huh? But the subsequent discovery of something you didn't know before will be the untying of that knot, right? Huh? Okay. That's the first reason he gives, right? Just a reason for dialectic, not just in this book, but in other places, huh?

[45:23] Okay. Now he goes on, on account of which, right? One must have considered the difficulties, right? All of them before, right? Huh? For the sake of this, right? Huh? Okay.

[45:42] And now he starts to give the second reason, right? The second, the third reason, you'll see that they're kind of what tied together, right? Huh?

[45:53] And he says, an account of also the fact that those seeking without doubting first, right, are like those who don't know where they're going.

[46:08] Well, where are you going? You're going in the direction of untying this knot. If you haven't seen the knot, you don't know where you're going. See, that's kind of a marvelous thing, right now.

[46:23] Now, sometimes when I begin an article, Thomas, you know, if I'm not familiar with it, I haven't looked at it for a long time. I say, what the hell is he? Is he raising a question about this? I haven't seen it. Difficult. I don't know this. So, and then he ties me in a knot, right? With the arguments on both sides, right? And now I realize that there's something hidden here that I don't see, right?

[46:45] My mind wouldn't be thinking it is so and it is not so at the same time. More or less, huh? As I hear one arm to the other side, right? And maybe ten reasons think it is so, and ten arms to think it is not so, right? If it wasn't something hidden from me, right? Whatever is hidden from me is what. So you got your feet tied Yeah, and I can't go forward until I untie that knot, right?

[47:11] But that will be the the untieing of that knot will be the discovery, right, of what was hidden from me, right? And what I thought I might have known, I don't didn't really know, right? I was going to untie this. Oh my God. Okay. But then he argues. He said, "He's like a man that doesn't know where he's going, because you're going in the direction of untying that knot.

[47:35] How can you go in the direction of untying that knot? You haven't seen the knot already, right? So you don't know where you're going. That's the way the moderns are, right? See. Right, like the expression he used earlier there. You know, he's talking about the reasons now for doubting well, right? What does that mean to doubt well? It means to. Yeah, yeah, yeah. To think. Yeah, yeah.

[48:03] Yeah. Okay. And then the third argument, which is the other side of the coin, right? And in addition to these things, if they what? They won't know when they found the thing or not, right? Okay. How do you know you've arrived? You didn't know where you were going. How do you know you're there? Yeah, yeah, yeah. See, if you haven't seen the the knot, right, huh? Um, you don't know where to go, which is the direction of untying the knot.

[48:37] But you don't know when you've arrived until the knot is untied. Once the knot is untied, ah, then you know you've what? Found it, right? Okay. Yeah. So the modern philosophers don't know where the knot is, right? And so they don't untie the knot and make the discovery, right? And then if they, but if you do do it, right? Then you also know where you're going, right?

[49:08] And you know when you have what arrived, you know. You know it's beautiful to read read Heisenberg's book there, and he's talking about the his conversations with Niels Bohr, right? Huh? And they're in Copenhagen, right? And they were what trying to figure out, you know, quantum theory, right? Huh? And they said, you know, they're almost in despair, the two of them, you know. Can nature really be as absurd, they said, as it seems to us in these experiments, right?

[49:40] Doesn't seem to make any sense, right? So what doesn't make sense is a contradiction, right? See? And you're always puzzled when when you have what's like a contradiction, right? Huh? And what to think, right? Okay. But you know where to go now, right? In the direction of untying that knot, and you know when you've arrived, the knot is in fact untied, right? So they get to, you know, they're driving each other mad, kind of, you know.

[50:14] So finally, Bohr said, "I'm going off skiing," you know. So went up into the mountain skiing, right? And Heisenberg stayed in what Copenhagen, right? Huh? And they both worked out a solution, right? And they came back. They compared the solutions, and they saw the compatibility, right? Huh? You know. But Heisenberg, you know, he gets so excited, he starts to solve the solution. He went back, and he started calculating, you know, on the basis of it, you know, and and he was making all stupid kind of mistakes.

[50:46] he knows better finally, he calmed down, and everything came out perfect. All the numbers, just perfect one number after another. You know, he knew he'd arrived, you know. Huh? You know, I just.

[50:59] Okay. So you won't know whether the thing has been found or not, right? Unless you saw the knot firsthand, right? Huh? For the end to this one is not clear, right? Huh? Okay. But to the one who was doubted before, it is clear now when he can untie it, right? The contradiction disappears, huh? And now the fourth argument he gives, right? Further, one is what in a better position towards judging if one has heard, right, the thing of the what the arguments of those disagreeing, right?

[51:39] Huh? Just he makes a comparison of the courtroom, right? So what do you have in the courtroom? One guy is trying to prove he's guilty, and someone else to prove he's not guilty, right? Well, if you've heard the reasons for thinking he's guilty and the reasons for thinking he's not guilty, right, presented by you know two different lawyers, you're in a better position to judge, right? If you just heard one of the lawyers, yeah, I hear one side of a marriage dispute.

[52:07] Yeah, yeah, I hear both sides. Yeah, yeah, because there's the advocacy writing and oral expression where you have the basic facts that you can't change, but you're putting a spin on it to favor your side. So yeah, that's why you have to hear both sides, especially in the law. But you compare it to what takes place in the courtroom, right? Well, there's a similarity between dialectic and what rhetorical reasoning, right?

[52:33] You know, there are reasons that you can give in the court for his being guilty, and the reason you can give for his not being guilty, right? If you heard only one of these, you might, you know, just go along with it because there's some, you know, likelihood, right, that he's guilty or likelihood that he's not guilty, right? But you're in a better position, to judge, if you're hearing both, right?

[52:54] So these are four marvelous reasons, right? Now Thomas, in in his commentary, if you look at it, there, um, explain these four again, you know, like I'm trying to do now, but he'll say for these reasons Aristotle uses dialectic only in the metaphysics, right? In the Third book here of wisdom, but he does it in many of the other parts of philosophy, right? It's only really in what geometry maybe and mathematics right, which are you know Euclid's almost only dialectic there, right?

[53:28] Because it's so what certain, yeah. But in all the other parts of philosophy, right, you need this dialectic. You can't be stuck.