Logic (2016)
46. God's Simplicity, Macbeth's 'Fair Is Foul' and the Two Roots of Error: Speech vs. Things in the Fallacies
Class of 2017-04-27
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/046-gods-simplicity-macbeths-fair-is-foul-and-the-two-roots-of/

[0:00] Name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, move us, God, to know and love you. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our mind, order enlighten our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Now, thinking about

[0:36] my knowledge, I'm not my knowledge, you know. True. I'm not my love, right? So, me and my knowledge are two different things. We're connected in some way, but and me and my love are not the same thing, right? But my knowledge and my love are not the same thing either. Even if I happen to know and love the same thing, right? My knowledge and love of that thing are not the same, right?

[1:14] So, if I know God and I love God, my knowing God and my loving God would not be the same thing, right? And that must be true. It seems to me, even in the next world, right? Even if I know God face to face and I love Him more than I could love Him on this earth, still my knowledge and my love of Him would not be the same thing, right?

[1:38] But now, in the case of God, now is there any distinction, any real distinction, distinction of things, right, between God and God's knowledge of God? Did you know that? In fact, that's why He knows everything He knows, right? Is by knowing Himself, huh? But is there any distinction in things between God and His knowledge of Himself? Same thing, right? And same thing for His love, right? Is God and His love of Himself two different things?

[2:14] That's very strange, right? And is God's love and God's knowledge two things? Yeah, yeah. God is something that is both what the knowledge of God and the love of God. You know, sometimes we see in Scripture it saying, you know, God is love and so on, right? But you say God is knowledge too, or God is wisdom, right? And the same thing. So He's something that is both knowledge and love.

[2:47] Why, in my experience of knowledge and love, they're always two different things, right? He's very strange, God, right? He's altogether simple, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. He's going to be kind of, you know, fascinating.

[3:09] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Can apply two to this thing here, you know. the text from thomas and the one from Macbeth here, right? Huh? They're both talking about how a mistake can come from what? The defect of reason, or it can come from the the will, right? Okay.

[3:32] Look for a minute, minute here at the Macbeth Air. Do you have all that text? You know. Start with the thing here. Macbeth, the play, opens with the words of the three witches, right? Those instruments of hell, right? The whole of Act One, Scene One is devoted to their conversation in twelve lines, ending with the couplet, which expresses with the brevity and beauty of Shakespeare, the two errors we can make about the good and the bad, and touches upon the two sources of those errors.

[4:08] This is the couplet: fair is foul, and foul is fair. Hover through the fog and filthy air. But before we unfold all this reason, we should concentrate our mind upon the words by looking at the poetic devices Shakespeare here, for there is rhyme as well as reason in these words. The lines, of course, rhyme fair and what? Air. And there is much alliteration beginning with the letter F, huh?

[4:42] Fair and foul, foul and fair, fog and filthy, right? Huh? And then he uses what kind of meter, huh? It's trochaic, right? It's the opposite of what? iambic. Yeah, yeah. And you know, Aristotle remarks how the iambic is closest to daily speech, and sometimes in daily speech, without thinking of it, we fall into iambic, right? Huh? But trochaic being the reverse, huh? Well, Shakespeare likes to use trochaic for something that's kind of not usual, ordinary, right?

[5:17] Um. Shakespeare, as he often does, for unfamiliar creatures, right? He's using trochaic, huh? And catalectic—that means you're leaving out one of the feet, one, of the one part of it. Okay. Now the first line touches upon the two possible mistakes about the good and the bad, huh? One can think that the good is bad, the fair is foul, right? Or that the bad is good, the foul is fair.

[5:49] If one can make the first mistake, one can also make the second, and vice versa, right? I was using that, you know, when I was talking about how Shakespeare—not Shakespeare, but Aristotle—says, you know, that a man can think he doesn't know what he does know, and he manifests it by the fact that a man can think he knows what he doesn't know. We can go in either direction, right?

[6:16] You know, so you can go and think that the fair is foul, and if you can think that way, you can think that the foul is fair too, because you can't tell them apart. But the second line, right, touches upon the two sources or causes of the above errors. For the cause of error is either on the side of the what mind, the defect of the mind, as Thomas will say, and this is signified by the word fog, right?

[6:46] So our mind is off in the fog, confused, right? Okay. Or on the side of the heart, and this is signified by the word filthy, right? Shakespeare emphasizes these words fair and foul and the possible confusion of the fair and the foul when he has Macbeth just before he and Banquo meet the three witches say, "So foul and fair a day I have not seen." Just gets the thing the way he is.

[7:16] And after the witches have hailed Macbeth with present and future titles, right? He's going to be king, right? Banquo, right, says, "Good sir, why do you start and seem to fear things that sound so fair?"

[7:33] We have said that by the word fog, Shakespeare signifies metaphorically the cause of error on the side of the mind. This is made explicit in the hilarious scene from Twelfth Night, where the simile of fog is used. Malvolio has been locked up and tricked and you know this play should be a very great play. Huh? When the last time I was reading Twelfth Night, you know, I had two, three copies of it, and I just read the whole play in one copy, and I took the other copy and read the whole play over again.

[8:09] It's a magnificent play, right? One of the love and friendship plays. Magnificent play. Malvolio has been locked up, right, and treated as a madman as a result of the prank played upon him in the subplot of the play. Malvolio is locked up in a dark room. That's the way they treat a madman, right? And has the following conversation with the clown impersonating Sir Topas through the door.

[8:37] I am not mad, Sir Topas. I say to you, this house is dark. The clown, huh? He's imitating the priest there. what it is madman, thou heiress. I say there is no darkness but ignorance, in which thou art more puzzled than the Egyptians in their fog.

[9:01] Similar images are used by Shakespeare in the following passage from *The Tempest*, where he speaks of darkness and ignorant fumes and the charm that Prospero has cast upon Alonso, right, Sebastian, and Antonio.

[9:19] Prospero speaking: The charm dissolves apace, and as the morning steals upon the night, melting the darkness. Beautifully said. So their rising senses begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle their clearer reason, right? Beautiful. You couldn't say it better than that, could you?

[9:44] Shakespeare's words: "The ignorant fumes that mantle their clearer reason." Clearly confirm that fog or something like it signifies a cause of error on the side of reason or the mind,

[10:00] because. That's why you are deceived in your dreams, right? Because you're cut off from your senses. And you wake up and you have your use your senses again. You realize, oh, thank God, just a dream.

[10:13] Okay. We have said that the other alliterating word used in the couplet from Macbeth, alliteration now refers to what the beginning of the words, right, as opposed to accent. I mean, rhyme at the end. The word filth signifies the cause of error on the side of the heart or the ability to desire, right? When the heart becomes vicious, or we acquire a moral vice, our reason is blinded by this filth of our heart.

[10:43] And that I'm not making a wild guess about the meaning of the word filth in this couplet from Macbeth can be seen from a magnificent passage in Antony and Cleopatra,

[10:57] where Shakespeare again uses the word filth in describing how reason is blinded and led into error. Antony is the speaker. But when we, in our viciousness, grow hard, it's kind of like a habitual thing, right? Oh, misery on it, right?

[11:17] Thomas says in the Summa Contra Gentiles that error is a major part of misery. Oh, misery on it. The wise gods seal our eyes. Okay, the old spelling. In our filth, drop our clear judgments, make us adore our errors, right? Laugh at us while we strut to our confusion.

[11:45] The first line, when we, in our viciousness, grow hard, speaks of us when by repeated bad acts we have acquired the habit of moral vice. Huh? For habit, being a disposition that is difficult to change, is suitably described by the word hard. The next words, oh misery on it, suitably precede the description of the process by which we come to adore our errors, as is said in the fourth line, since as Thomas Aquinas observes in the Summa Contra Gentiles, error is a great part of misery.

[12:20] Huh? Thomas says we can't be can't be perfectly happy in this life, right? Part of it is because of error, right? That's a great part of misery. The line, the wise gods seal our eyes, is suitable because he who does not live in accordance with reason is suitably punished by being deprived of the act of reason.

[12:44] The next part, in our own filth, drop our clear judgments, make us adore our errors, should be contrasted with the above phrase from the Tempest: the ignorant fumes mantle their clear reason.

[13:01] Ignorant fumes is on the side of reason or the knowing powers, while our own filth refers to the viciousness in our heart or desiring powers. When our clear judgments have been dropped in our own filth, we proceed to the absurd conclusion of adoring our own errors. It's marvelously said, and making ourselves laughable as we proceed to our own confusion. Confusion here is the opposite of glory.

[13:30] The above passage from Anthony and Cleopatra seems to speak of the filth of our heart as the cause of the error whereby we think the foul is fair and the bad is what good. There's another passage in Shakespeare where the filth of the heart is spoken of as the cause of the reverse error, where the good seems bad or the fair to be foul. This is in King Lear.

[13:55] After Albany is upbraided as evil and unnatural wife, Goneril, she's one horrible creature. No more. The text is foolish, right? It's like you're quoting the Bible, huh? And notice what Albany says. Wisdom and goodness to the vile seem vile. Filth savour but themselves.

[14:18] Now, if you want a contemporary illustration of what Shakespeare is saying in the witches' couplet, you could not take a better example than that of the errors about abortion. Those who support abortion are saying, are trying to say that what is foul is fair. And when they attack those who oppose abortion, they are saying that what is fair is foul. But notice the fog that surrounds our position.

[14:45] Pro-abortion is called pro-choice. The painful murder of the unborn, termination of pregnancy, and those who oppose to abortion are said to be interfering with the rights of women. Anything to avoid calling a spade a spade. The fog is so thick that it would take the knife of reason to cut it. Such a smokescreen is thrown up before the eyes of the public, so that in the words of the Tempest, ignorant fumes mantle their clear reason.

[15:13] Likewise, on the side of their heart or desiring powers, there is the filth of two of the capital vices in which to drop our clear judgments. The most fundamental vices, the vices that draw other vices and sins into the service of their ends, are divided according to the goods of man. Pride is concerned with the good of the soul, lust and gluttony with the good of the body, and avarice with the exterior goods.

[15:39] The force behind abortion, like that behind the hard pornography run by the mafia and the more insidious pornography pushed by Hollywood, involves a union of two capital vices: avarice and what? Lust. There is avarice in the part of those who perform the abortions, and lust behind those who have them, and sometimes avarice in those who kill their offspring. To avoid having to stretch the paycheck to provide for another mouth.

[16:08] In the union of two capital vices, then there is more than enough filth which to drop our clear judgments. If we add the unnamed glory of the politicians who seek abortion lobby money, we have a union of three capital vices covering the whole spectrum of human goods.

[16:31] Yeah, yeah, yeah. The great questions about evil, right? You know, the most complete treatise. If you're interested in evil, that's the thing to read. We want to really know why evil.

[16:48] Okay. So let's look at the first of these ones here, which is touching upon the goals of the sophists and how they are achieved. Just a little bit here.

[17:05] We can see, we can perhaps see some of the order of the goals of the sophist in the *Parmenides* of Plato. Refutation of the respondent is his first goal, right? Get you to contradict yourself, right?

[17:24] The student says, "Professor, first you just contradicted yourself. That's ready to get the good things up. Then next best thing is getting the respondent to say something false, right? Third, getting him to say something paradoxical. Next to say a false That's a defect of what grammar, right? Solecism And fifth, repeat himself. Okay. Anyway, we want to come to the main thing here: the distinction of the ways into what?

[17:55] Two. Now Alexander, who Alexander of Aphrodisias so that's the name of the Greek sound named after Aphrodisias, he has a commentary on the thing here. And sometimes they divide these into what?

[18:14] Fallacies from speech and fallacies from outside speech. But then later on, Alexander corrects the second, not corrects, but says explicitly from things, right? Okay.

[18:29] The author of the *De Fallaciis*. Now, this is a work attributed to Thomas. It's in the the Marietti edition of Thomas's philosophical short works. But there's some question about it, you know. Some think he wrote it right after he was, when his brothers kidnapped him or something, you know. He's writing for his his his fellow students there, you know. But we're not too sure. Not altogether sure, but it's a very interesting work.

[18:55] And Albert and Thomas, you understand the second group are from outside of speech, right? As from what things, right? So Alexander is saying that too. Now this also corresponds to the distinction order of the second and third and perhaps fourth tools of dialectic, because the second tool of dialectic was to what? Distinguish the senses of the word, right? And the second and the third and the fourth seem to be looking at things, right?

[19:26] Finding the difference of what? Things, right? And then considering the likeness of things, right? You know, when you're thinking about something, especially when a philosopher is thinking about something, what's his goal? What's his end or purpose? What's the purpose of thinking about something? Understand? Understand? Again? Understand? You could say, yeah. Yeah. Knowledge. Yeah. But maybe more precise to say. We think about things for the sake of thinking them out.

[20:06] Okay. What do we think out, right? Well, maybe seven things, right? The first might be to think out a distinction. And then there are thinkings that are not divisions, right? But we can also think out a division, right?

[20:31] And then the third thinking out is thinking out a what? Definition. So you put those three together: thinking out a distinction, thinking out a division, thinking out a what? Division, right? Division and a definition, I should say, yeah, yeah. But you can see, in a way, a definition is a division, right? Because you divide square into its what? Genus and differences, right? But not every division is is a definition, right?

[21:01] And division is a is a kind of distinction, right? That's a distinction in particular of the parts of some what? Whole, right? So you're thinking out those three things, right? A distinction, a division, or a definition. Now, what's the fourth thing?

[21:25] What comes after distinction? Order. Yeah. So thinking out order. Yeah. And maybe an order of the senses of the word, equivocal by reason, right? It might be the order of what? In goodness, right? Of things, right? It? Might be the order of which things are known, right? To think out in order, right? A good example of the two being separated there in Aristotle and Thomas in the fourth book of Natural.

[21:56] hearing, the so-called Physics, right? Because Aristotle thinks out the eight senses of what? In. But in the text that we have, he doesn't what? Think out the order, right? And Thomas says, We're going to think out the order, though, imitating Aristotle in the fifth book of what? Wisdom, right? " Okay. And Aristotle has given the clue that the first sense of in is to be in this room.

[22:27] And Thomas therefore thinks out the order, starting from that, right? Then. All the way to lift my heart in San Francisco, right? Okay. Remember that? Okay. So that's the fourth kind of thinking out, right?

[22:44] Well, then I thought, you know, gee whiz, maybe the fifth one should be what? I mean, the second and the third tools are thinking out a distinction, or thinking out right, a division, or something, right? But what about the fourth one? There is that thinking out a distinction or a division. Aristotle, you've got to consider the likeness, right? You're thinking out the likeness of things, right? That's the what fifth thing you think out, right?

[23:29] Okay. What's the sixth and the seventh thinking out? Hmm. Difference. Well, difference is is already involved in thinking out distinction, right? Think out a distinction. Think out a division. Think out a definition, right? Think out order, right? Think out what. Like likeness? Yeah. Think out a statement. Okay. And then the seventh one is to think out a what? A conclusion. Conclusion. Yeah, yeah. Okay. Of course, it's a different sense of thinking out in these cases, right?

[24:22] You think out a conclusion. What sense of in is that? Corresponding to that sense of out. Which one is it? Do you think? Thinking out a conclusion is. Yeah, out is as many senses as in, right? So what sense of in there is opposed to out?

[24:49] See, if out is the opposite of in, out has as many meanings as in, right? As Aristotle says, one of the tools and one of the places to look, right, to look at the opposite of the word, right?

[25:02] What is it? Power. Well, yeah, I bet you and my power, right? See. And you might say that the premises of the syllogism, for example, contain an active ability, right? The conclusion, right? They give rise to it, right? Okay. Even, of course, the definition of the syllogism, right, is speech in which some statements laid down, another follows necessarily because of those what laid down, right? But you have to think out some statements, right?

[25:40] Even not as conclusions, right? But as what beginnings, right? So Berquist was thinking about before and after. He thought out the statement that nothing is before or after what self, right? And then he thought out the conclusion that you must see a distinction before you can see order. That's the sixth and seventh, right? Seven is a symbol of what wisdom, right? So you're getting some kind of wisdom here, right?

[26:14] By thinking out these seven ways, huh? Now, right now we're concerned with thinking out the what ways the mind is deceived, right? Okay, and

[26:36] Aristotle and Alexander following him, right? And Albert the Great and Thomas following him, saying they could distinguish them into what the ones from speech, right? And the ones outside speech, right? Okay, and that's kind of distinction by opposites, right? Okay, it's kind of interesting to see that.

[27:04] You see kind of the opposition there to the second tool there, you know? Okay, speech, very deceptive thing, right? Okay, so then he's going to what distinguish the ways that we are deceived by speech, right? And the ways we are deceived from something outside of speech, right? From things, right? Okay, okay, but we have to go bit by bit here, right? Okay. I take

[27:48] the quote there on the bottom of the first page here, the Sophistical Refutations Chapter Four, right? From these two things it happens for a man to be deceived, because something appears something, right? And is not it, right? Hence the locus sophisticus, by another name, is called what? Fallacy, deception, because it is the cause of what failing or deceiving, right? As such, right? Although someone is not deceived by it in act unless he has some ignorance, right?

[28:37] Now just as the dialectical places are distinguished according to diverse relations from which most of all is caused the firmness of argument and arguments taken there, so also the sophistical places or fallacies are distinguished by the moving principles, right? From which there appears to be firmness in sophistical arguments. Yeah. This happens in two ways. In one way, ex parte voces, right? When an account of the unity of the voice, one believes as the unity of the thing signified by the voice.

[29:14] Just as those which are what is the example of the dog, right? It's a kind of common example and very familiar with them. Okay.

[29:28] Another way on the part of things, right? From this that some things in some way come together, simply they seem to be one. This has been said above about the subject of the accident. Okay. Now,

[29:45] here you have Albert the Great, the Commentaria in Libri, the book of Sophistical Refutations of Aristotle, right? Sophistical refutation, not a real refutation, but you appear to be refuted. Okay. Now, see, he speaks of the two ways there, right? Secundum apparentiam, exceptum in dictione, right? In speech, right? And the other modes are extra, outside of speech, right? But you could also say affirmatively, secundum rem, excepti, right? Okay.

[30:32] Yeah, yeah. So they sometimes divide them into those from speech and those from outside of speech, but the second is also said to be from things.

[30:48] So a little text from Albert there, and therefore at the end of it he says, the beginning of deception is in speech, and the fallacies in what? Diction. And the fallacies outside diction is taken from it's in the thing originally, right? Okay.

[31:10] Now in every fallacy, both in diction as well as outside diction, there is generated deception from this, that one cannot discern the same thing and what? What is the same and what is other, right? Okay. Now go back to the thing we talked about, huh? With Shakespeare, huh? We said that he defines reason by the ability to look before and after, right? But you can't look before and after, unless you can look for what?

[31:41] Distinctions, right? Huh? Okay. Now, what does it mean to say that things are distinct? What does that mean? One is the same. Yeah, one is not the other, right? Okay. So the question is the same or other, right? Okay.

[32:01] Now, one reason why the second and the third tools come before the fourth tool, right, is that likeness is a great cause of what? Dissections. Yeah. And if you don't see the differences of things, right, then you can be what? Deceived. Yeah, yeah. I mean, just take those eight senses of in, right? They're very similar, right? And you could be what deceived, right? Because of the likeness among the senses, right?

[32:35] And therefore, if you don't see the differences, you know, likeness is a cause of deception. So he puts those before, right? That's part of the reason he does. He's got probably many more reasons. The purpose to see them. Perceive that, right? Huh? I think it's kind of interesting that he says that, right? Okay.

[32:56] It also fits in with with played with Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? Because order presupposes distinction, right? Remember what I was saying before? You know how I love to torture students. You know, what sense of before does one sense of before come before another sense of before? Peter Piper picked a peck of pickled peppers. So it's bad enough to torture people. Yeah. Worse to love torture people.

[33:25] Yeah. I say, what's the what's the distinction? Order, distinction, order. That's another one I'd love to do, huh? Well, you see, things are distinct distinct when one is not the other, right? Things are in order when one is what before the other. Before or after the other, right? Okay. Now, what's the order of distinction and order, right? Distinction, order. Yeah, yeah. See what I mean? So you're kind of coming back upon yourself, right?

[33:56] Okay. But this is characteristic of logic and of reason, right? Um, you know, there's a book on in logic that Albert has on division, right? And you divide what division, right? You know, there's a division of a composed whole or integral whole, right? There's a division of universal whole, right? Huh? Okay. So there's a division of division, right? Then we talk about definition. There's a definition of definition, right?

[34:29] See. And there's a what order of order, right? Sense of order, right? Okay. And so on, right? Okay. And of course, if you if you go back to the what to the categories there, right? Huh? Before he takes up before and after, he takes up what word? Before, before and after. Together.

[35:00] No, that's after. That's after. Yeah. What's before? You're looking. You're looking after instead of before. Yeah. My gosh. What a. All right. Opposites. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And that's the basis of what formal distinction, right? Okay. Now, if you cut a straight line in half, if there's a theorem of geometry to bisect a line, you know, I'm sure you're all familiar with that. Well, you have a distinction now between the two two parts, right?

[35:35] But it's not really a formal distinction; it's what they call material distinction. The division of continuous, right? The continuous is divisible forever, so you see how important or frustrating that division might be. But formal distinction is opposites, right? How would you distinguish between a dog and a cat?

[35:58] Well, I'm not too bright, you know. So I'd say, you know, well, dogs bark and cats don't bark. I never see a cat. I've had much experience with cats, and I never heard a cat bark at me, right? See. Came close. Lucy used to do that. You see, come forward. She gets mad. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And the cat meows, but the dogs don't. Say what's contradiction, right?

[36:25] Yeah. Bark and don't bark. Meow and don't meow. Okay. And then the dog bites you. The cat scratches you. But mainly scratching, you know, huh? Okay.

[36:43] So it's by opposites, right, that we distinguish the dog and the cat. Okay. Now I differ from the dog because I'm two-footed and he's not two-footed. Yeah. He's four-footed and I'm not four-footed. Yeah. Okay. Page two. Bar on page two. Now in the fallacies outside of diction, right, the cause and the motive to deceiving is not sermo right? Speech said res, right, things. Although we use what speech as a tool to expressing that thing, right, huh?

[37:24] Okay. Another quote from Albert here. It's not unfitting that in the same bad argument, the paralogism, huh? There are many causes and modes of deception. Sometimes I can really be followed up. So you read Aristotle's there, reputation, at least it's right. Conclusion doesn't follow, and the premises are not improbable. Okay. Now this is kind of a what ad bonitatem doctrinae doctrinae, which is going back to something more general, right?

[38:06] Huh? But similar to what Macbeth was saying, right, or what Shakespeare's bringing out. This part of me, but this passage might be in our library in English, but I didn't have a computer, so this is a commentary on the first ten. Okay. The root of error is twofold, right? Now one of the things is in the appetite, right, huh? And the other, the defect of the understanding, right?

[38:33] Now I was saying before at the beginning of class that the my reason is not my is not me. I'm not my reason, or I'm not my knowledge, right? I'm not my reason either. I'm not my will, and my reason is not my will, right? So you wouldn't have this in God, and there wouldn't be different things, but they are in me, right? And they both didn't cause me what?

[39:02] Yeah, yeah. Okay. So comparing a little bit the sick man there, right? Your mind up. Mustn't build that paragraph. Thus, also in the understanding, when a man does not have a foundation in truth, right? Nor does he have the power by which he's able to judge the truth. By just any difficulty of a question, he falls into what error? huh? Whence he's said to be languens, sick about questions, right?

[39:45] Okay. Some of you easily picks up a cold or something, right? It's like that, right? Huh? You know, he's always catching a cold as kid or something, you know? Huh? If you know, maybe you're like that I don't know When I was in grade school. I Used to blow my nose from. Time I arrived at school until about noontime, then it stopped. I don't know why Yeah

[40:12] Yeah For as Boethi said says, so the intellect is to reason as the what circle is to the center. For reason runs around, right? discursion Shakespeare said, right? Yeah, yeah, runs around, considering acts and the defects and the relation of one thing to another. Now, unless it resolves to an understanding of the true, right? Vain is reason, right? Huh? Does reach its goal? Okay. Whence, when it takes the what truth of the thing, it has it as word like the center, right?

[40:55] But some people run around and do not attain the truth, right? Always learning and never coming to a knowledge of the truth. Okay. Interesting ways of speaking here, right? What does he says here? And he says, "Questiones," right? Because in some things the doubt comes about from the what? Ex parte re, right? In aliquibus ex parte verborum et nominum, right? That's the same distinction, right, that we met in Alexander and in Albert, yeah.

[41:36] Okay. He's kind of applying it to this text here, right? He says, "Questiones," because in some things the doubt comes about from the part of the thing, and others in the part of words and names. Okay. And so, as regards the first, right, he says, "Questiones" about things which questions do more than what building up of God, which is in faith. And secondly, the pugnas verborum, right?

[42:06] huh? You're fighting with words, right? Huh? Okay. Who only follows words has nothing, right? In the Book of Proverbs, right? And it calls the pugnas verborum when the dissension is from words only, right? Huh?

[42:30] Okay. Another little text here at the bottom of page three there. The fallacy is sometimes ex voce, sometimes ex re, right? Huh? So many texts here. to make sure this is the teaching, right? Yeah. What does he says here on page four? Now it's kind of interesting text. Likewise, right, faith can be what corrupted by fallacy, right? The heretics, just as any science can be corrupted. But as has been said in the first book of the

[43:19] Refutations, that's the abbreviation, of the quorum, right? Fallacy is sometimes from what speech, from voice, vocal sounds. Sometimes from the thing. Once was the fallacy in diction, in extradiction, right? Again, always saying those two ways of saying it.

[43:41] Unless faith is sometimes corrupted through some disordered what vocal sounds, as Jerome says. That's a famous quote: "verbis inordinatis prolatis," from words put forth what in disordered way that comes about heresy, right?

[44:03] And he says avoiding what profane newness of voices, right? She shouldn't be called the mother of God, but the mother of Christ. You know, watch out for these guys, right? Everything. Okay. So he gives example there, Dostarius, right? Christotocus, huh? You know, Theotokos, huh?

[44:29] Camerini said that he invented that word with his father, the devil. Saint Paul speaks there at the end of that paragraph: "Formum habens sonorum verborum," right? Healthy words, huh? Which you have heard from me in faith and love in Christ Jesus. Profanas vocum novitates et vaniloquia debita. Sometimes we're corrupted by reasons that are reales sophisticas, right? That means some things, because real comes from what res, huh?

[45:07] Some things.