Logic (2016)
47. Actual, Potential and Imaginary Double Meanings: Equivocation, Amphiboly, Two Senses of 'Before' and How Premises Cause a Conclusion
Class of 2017-04-27
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/047-actual-potential-and-imaginary-double-meanings-equivocation/

[0:00] Now, next thing to see here is the way Aristotle and commentators divide the places, you know, deceiving people from language, right? And how many ways will Aristotle distinguish here? Six? Six. Now, I don't want your mind to break down.

[0:44] You know, you know, you can't, you can't possibly understand distinction six, right? It must be two or three. Or both. And then the two or three must be subdivided, right, to get the six, right?

[1:04] Okay, so we're going to meet the meeting here. Okay. So at the bottom of page four, you're all there. Locorum ejitur sophisticorum, sive fallaciae, right? Quaedam sed in dictione, quaedam extradictionem, right? Now he's going to subdivide the first of those two, right? That's distinction into two, right? Okay. In dictione quaedam locus sophisticus fallacia. This is the one now from speech. Quando principium motivum sive causa aparentia est ex parte vocis, extradictionem vero quando est ex parte re.

[1:46] Okay, that's a fundamental. That's a distinction of two, right? Ex parte autem vocis est principium motivum sive causa aparentia ex eo quod unu vox multa significat,

[2:02] quod quod contingent per multiplicationem vocum est autem multiplex, triplex. Okay. So he's going to divide the causes of all fallacies into two, and the first one into three. Yeah. And what do they call? Actual? Potential? Fantastic. Yeah. Imaginative, right? Okay. Now, what the hell does this mean, right?

[2:32] Well, sometimes a word or a speech actually has many what? Meanings, right? And that gives rise to two kinds of fallacies: equivocation, right? Or the word "before" actually has many meanings, right? The word "in" actually has many meanings. The word "being" is actually many meanings, et cetera, right? Okay. The word "cause" has many meanings, right? As De Koninck said, you know, every respectable word in philosophy has many meanings, right?

[3:07] Okay. So it actually has many meanings, and sometimes a speech has many meanings, right? Okay. Now, let's do some of my favorite examples of that.

[3:30] Student, huh? You sure let the student in there. The hairiest student you ever had. You know the ones I like from theology, right now.

[3:50] You say the word of God is about the word of God. So the word of God is not a name, but it's speech, right? It has parts that signify something by themselves.

[4:16] But does the word of God in the beginning of that and at the end mean the same thing? Unless you're saying something like Socrates, is Socrates, But otherwise no. Yeah.

[4:36] So in Vatican II, you have a document called Verbum Dei, right? What's it talking about? Word of God. Yeah, but what sense is it talking about Scripture Yeah, yeah. So you could say the Bible, right,

[4:54] is the Word of God, right? Okay. And so, if someone asks, "What is the Bible?" Short answer, I would give, right? It's the Word of God,

[5:07] and it's chiefly about what, The word of God. in the sense of the Son of God, right? Okay, the Son of God, And perhaps the Son of God made man, right?

[5:30] Or the Word of God made man, right? But so this has actually got two meanings, right? Okay. There's a beautiful comparison of the two, though, in scripture, right? In Dei Verbum right? But they say that just as the Son of God, the Word of God, in that sense, was made flesh, right? So the Word of God takes on human language, right?

[6:04] the real what likeness there, right? they got that likeness, huh? The Word of God became flesh, right? Word of God became man, and the Word of God, in the sense of the thought of God, you might say, right expressed in human ways, right? Okay. With words, equivocal by reason, speech, equivocal, all these things.

[6:31] The Second Vatican Council says that even among the books of the New Testament, right, the Gospels have a primacy, right? Why? Because they're the chief witness to the words and deeds of the Word of God made flesh, right? Okay. So you could say that there's a connection between these two, right? Okay. Now the other one I was talking about was in Shakespeare's, huh? He calls the philosophy of nature.

[7:01] He calls it the wisdom of nature, right? I could say the wisdom of nature is about the wisdom of nature. Does the wisdom of nature mean the same thing here?

[7:28] Here you mean the what we usually call the philosophy of nature, right? But Thomas says, you know, if you want a synonym for philosophy, you can use the word wisdom. He says, sapientia.

[7:44] So the wisdom of nature is the wisdom about nature, right? Okay. But over here, I always go back to what Heraclitus said, right? Wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accordance with nature. Giving ear thereto. I think it's very concrete, right? So in a sense, in the wisdom of nature, in the thoughts of nature, you are what? You are listening to the wisdom which nature gives us, right?

[8:17] But what it does, huh? Okay. So you know, I was reading. that, I mentioned this, with my students there on Wednesday night. we were Reading Aristotle talking about reproduction there in plants and the animals. And both Plato and Aristotle said that why do they reproduce? Well, to be like God. God is immortal and eternal, right? And these

[8:47] plants and animals aren't immortal. But they get some kind of immortality by reproducing. They're what? They're kind, right? So in Shakespeare, in the sonnets, right, urges this guy to get married, right? Now, this were to be new made when thou art old. And see thy blood warm when thou feel'st it cold, right? Old man, is getting a cup of cold, right? And uh thy mother's glass, and she in thee calls back the lovely April of her prime right?

[9:23] Okay. Um. they call one of my daughter's little girls little little Maria, you know, little Maria. My daughter's named Maria. One one daughter is pretty like her, you know. It reminds us of the brave hero, the Chivalry. that very real but. They call her Little Maria. So in a sense, you know, Henry the Eighth, you know, really wanted a male heir, right? Why? I mean, kind of immortality, right?

[9:48] Kind of continuation. But sometimes the father makes a mistake of trying to maybe force the son to take up his what? Profession. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I always tell them my father seemed to, you know, see that that was a mistake, right? He said you could go have a better life than I had he said. you know I said of course I said, but I had to work in the factory in the summer, you know, and my father came through with one of his business friends, you know, and so I kind of stopped and chatted with him a little bit, and so he stopped and chatted with us.

[10:22] He said learning from the ground up, he'd say, you know, to me, you know, you can, you know because I'm really down there in the factory you know, working, You know, so my father thought, you know, you know, that's kind of common, common thing, right? You know, I'm going to succeed him, you know, and so then remember my father told me, I told you about this business friend of his, had all these plans for his son, you know.

[10:47] So he got him into Amherst, which is kind of a prestigious school out here. And his son, you know, flunked out in his first year there. You know, he wasn't fit for Amherst, wasn't fit for college at all, right? So he comes home in this quasi-disgrace. Father says, "What do you really want? " He said, "You want a filling station, right? You know, like cars and so on.

[11:06] " So his father set up a filling station because he had, the money, right? " I mean, my father's kind of given this example of the man's life. Yeah, but I mean, it wasn't the father, though, right? Because you know, you can see that the father and the son is not, you know, for one reason or another suited for exactly the same. How about

[11:39] the knowledge of God is a knowledge of God? Well, God knows nothing else except by knowing Himself, right? So God's knowledge is primarily a knowledge of God. Okay.

[12:11] So knowledge of God means what in the first part? What God knows. Well, what he has, the knowledge he has. right And and second one tells you what it's knowledge. of. Okay.

[12:36] Uh, when reason defines reason, right? The knowledge of reason is a knowledge of reason, right? Now I wouldn't want to say it's the same way as God because we don't know everything else by knowing what reason is, right? But you can say the knowledge of reason.

[13:07] It's reason that knows the definition of reason, right? So the knowledge of what reason is is a knowledge that reason has, right? Two different senses, right? But they are what connected, right? I'm kind of struck by that because it's similar to what I discovered: with words that are equivocal by reason, right? The words that are equivocal by reason there's a connection among the meanings, an order among them, right?

[13:38] In words that are equivocal by chance, right? There's what Just by chance, right? You know, you know. Um. Well, you have this amphiboly there, right? There's a connection, right? Sometimes, huh? It's kind of interesting to see that, huh? Just like you have with words that are equivocal by reason. How about something like

[14:12] the wisdom of reason? What is the wisdom of reason? Is it the third book of the De Anima? You know, Thomas says at the beginning. We're looking now at the third book of the De Anima there, in my... Wednesday... night class. Thomas says, rightly does they this called the third book, because at this point Aristotle starts to investigate reason. Right is distinct from the senses, and so he begins, you know, clearing out the the things like, are there any senses besides the five senses, and then are there any inward senses?

[15:12] Right, he wants to do that, and then start to say reason is different from all the senses. Okay, so you could say the third book about the soul is a wisdom about what? Yeah, and there you find out that reason is not a what body, like the eye is a body, right, or the ear is a body, or the brain is a body, right. You know, reason Aristotle's going to prove that reason is not a body.

[15:45] You know, that's quite a thing, right? To to prove, right. So this is kind of wisdom, right? You see, and this is kind of the starting point for realizing that our soul has an existence that's not entirely immersed in the body, right? Because it has a an ability and an operation understanding the universal, right, understanding all material things in some way that show that it's something immaterial, right, and therefore the it's in the soul not as a part of the body, right.

[16:27] So this is where you get the, the found the, the immortality of the soul. Aristotle says in the beginning of the Ethics, you know, in the prelude, that we want to know very much whether the soul survives death, the human soul, right now, and depends upon the question: Does the soul have or do anything, right? Not in the body. If everything it does is in the body, then the soul is tied to the body in its existence, right?

[16:57] And Descartes is true in saying cogito ergo sum, right? I think therefore I am. So that if the soul has it can do something, right? Then, that's not in the body, then its existence is not entirely in the body.

[17:16] That's where Aristotle, later on, in the generation of animals, he says that the human soul doesn't come from your mother or your father. The soul of a of a plant, the soul of a dog or a cat comes from the parents, right? Comes from God, I mean, but through the parents, right? But I got my body from God through my parents, but I didn't get my immortal soul through.

[17:44] My parents. My parents began my body, right? And God created an immortal soul that fits just my body. It doesn't fit your body, or your body, or your body, or your body. And every one of us has a soul that fits our body. And so I can't, you know, my soul can't leave my body and go into your body, and your soul leave your body.

[18:12] Husband, wife, or two in one flesh, but the soul of one can't go and be in the other one's body, right? And so on. This this is horrible story, you know, of Edgar Allan Poe. did. I tell you about that story. Ligeia was something like that. She's a very, you know, tense woman. You know, he's married too, right? And in very powerful mind, right now. And but she's dying, right now.

[18:37] And then he finally after she's dead, and so on. He he marries another woman, right? And then gradually, so the woman starts to act and behave a little bit like like she used to do. And she's gradually taking over the body.

[18:53] This is all his. Yeah, yeah, it's kind of a horrible story, you know. You you tell what's going on, you know. Yeah, maybe. But the power of the mind, you know, I mean, it was just he's imagining something that can't take place. So your your soul was created by God to fit your body in particular, right? And but so your your mortal soul would never have been created without your parents having begun this body, right?

[19:37] Speaker last night at the at the visitation house, this you know that they everybody brings food, right? So my wife made bourguignon, you know, so rice, and someone else brings vegetables, and so on. And then we all contribute money, right? Bishop was there, and and a lot of priests from the different parishes, ones that we know from other, were at our parish at one time, or you know, just known for other reasons.

[20:06] But the woman who's who the speaker was a woman who had survived an abortion, right now. But her her her her mother didn't know that she'd survived it, right now. You see, and you know after she'd come out, you know, had taken out. Some of the nurses had seen, you know, she was breathing or something. She got this good help, and and and so much later in life that she found out her her real mother.

[20:36] I mean, she knew she was adopted, you know, find out the real mother. They didn't know she had survived the abortion, you know, and very but she's talked very good about. You know how you know foster parents or you know something you know give the love right and even you have to you know reconcile with with your real mother you know and so and very very interesting she's very well but anyway

[21:08] so you could say the third book of the soul right is about the wisdom of what reason right find out that reason is something what quite different and not the brain

[21:25] and then you and then that's why reason why Aristotle drawing the book on the generation of animals so that we don't get this soul from our parents right in the case of the animals that get this soul from their mom and daddy huh Okay

[21:44] But now what about logic huh logic you know they call it rational philosophy isn't isn't logic the philosophy of reason that's not the third book of the of the soul so so the wisdom of reason in the sense of the third book of the soul is wisdom about the nature of reason what it really is right and what the rational soul there really is but logic is a wisdom about reason not about so much the nature of reason but it's it's the wisdom that that directs right reason right now Aristotle says it you know sapientis est ordinare in the Latin they say it belongs to the wise man to order things right now so wisdom orders things right

[22:41] and Thomas gives us the reason why wisdom orders things is as the highest perfection of reason and reason knows order and so on okay so you could say that logic is a kind of wisdom of reason right it's the wisdom that directs the three acts of reason right so that's a difference meaning of the word wisdom of reason isn't it

[23:08] So Aristotle's Organon is the wisdom of reason right the wisdom that directs reason helps you to avoid mistakes is this all okay in other sense it means the third book about the soul right any other meaning of wisdom of reason

[23:35] Wisdom that reason has wisdom that reason has yeah yeah but Aristotle calls first philosophy right now now philosophy names more the wisdom that man can get by his natural reason right. So we wouldn't speak of God's wisdom as being philosophy right now. So the famous uh, Pythagoras there, right, and they said, you know, they called him wise, right, because these wonderful theorems that he found, right. He says, "Don't call me wise, right?

[24:06] God alone is wise, right? " Aristotle is in that same tradition because he says, you know, either God alone should be called wise, right, or only God could be called wise, what fully, right, and in some imperfect way, we, you know, kind of wisdom. So you might say that wisdom or reason is the wisdom that reason can get by its natural powers, right? And this is really what we call first philosophy, right?

[24:35] We call it wisdom, meaning wisdom in human knowledge, right? But in a more precise way, we say that wisdom or reason is first philosophy. So. Wisdom of reason has at least what three senses, yeah, yeah.

[24:55] And are they connected? Yeah, yeah. Because then you find out that your soul can exist, you know, after death, right? Then you realize that there can be what immaterial substances. There can be separated substances, as the philosophers learn to call them, right? Huh. So Saint Thomas says, "I think about the souls. I can think about the angels, right? " Huh. So it kind of opens the door to being some knowledge that has more the character wisdom than natural philosophy does, right?

[25:32] Okay. But does logic help us to get to wisdom too? Yeah, yeah. In fact, when you get you know in wisdom, wisdom is about causes and especially the first causes, right? Or the first causes are just one first cause, right? And then wisdom is about what is what

[26:02] is suitable, and mainly about being and what one, right? But also about true and and good, right? Truth is primarily in the mind. The good is primarily in things. Aristotle points out in the sixth book of wisdom. But you know, books six through through what nine are all about being, right? But one of the main divisions of being is being according to the what? Yeah. And belongs to logic to know the way one thing is said of another.

[26:40] So logic contributes one of the main distinctions of being, right? But natural philosophy kind of introduces us to act and ability, right? Which is the other main division of being, right? So anyway, but going back to the senses of wisdom or reason, right? You can say in one way, right, a knowledge of the soul contributes to wisdom, right? And another way, logic contributes to it, right? So although we have three senses, there is some connection among the three, right?

[27:16] That famous argument for existence of God from things like you and me that are able to be and not be. He says there are things that you know this is in the summas right? Things able to be and not be. There must be something before them, right, provided they are rather than not be, and that'd be something that is, but necessary to be, right? But then Aristotle points out that something can be necessary but be necessary through something else.

[27:59] And how does he manifest that? The conclusion of the demonstration is necessary. It's necessary because of something else, right? Okay. Distinction, like I can take the example: distinction necessarily comes before what order, right?

[28:18] And why is that so? I guess nothing is before after itself, right? So one necessary thing can be the cause of another thing being necessary. So if things are necessary through another, there must be something that is necessary. What? Yeah. And that's what God, yeah. But notice he manifests it from the fact of the demonstration. One necessary thing is the cause of another thing being necessary. So something there is necessary through another.

[28:50] He manifests it through logic, right? Of course, Thomas, you know, will use the fact that God is necessary to be through Himself, and He must be to be itself,

[29:11] because one, after all, is what through being that one is what is. So if God is not being Himself, then he wouldn't be being; he wouldn't be necessarily being to Himself. God doesn't do any of those things. But notice how logic, you know, helps him to, you know, to lead you by the hand, right? So Thomas, you know, points out that sometimes Aristotle in the in first philosophy, right, in the wisdom of reason, the reason contained, sometimes he leads you by the hand from logic, right, when he leads you from the way one thing is said of another, right, and sometimes he leads you by the hand from what natural philosophy, metaphysics, right, when he what leads you from motion, right?

[30:10] Motion is the act which is most known to us. Things in motion sooner catch the eye, than what not stirs? But the first proof for the existence of God comes from what motion. It goes from the act that is most imperfect but most known to us

[30:30] to the act which is what pure act, right, and in no way imperfect, that's universally perfect, right. Magnificent the way he leads you in from natural philosophy, but sometimes from logic, right? So he's taking up substance, right, in the in the seventh and the eighth books, right? And the seventh book is leading you from logic, and the eighth book from what? Natural philosophy from matter and form.

[31:02] So it's kind of amazing this this, but this is what not equivocation, but what amphiboly, terrible, terrible words, right? What can you do? The Greeks are the guys who can figure these things out, right? See, And of course the Latin word is amphibologia Pronounce it.

[31:26] Okay. So he's going to what? He divides deception from speech and outside of speech, right? And from speech, he's going to divide that into what? Three, right? And the first of all is what? The bottom of page four here, right? Is triplex: actual, potential, and fantasticum, right? Now he's going to subdivide actual into one word, right, a name that has many meanings, right? Okay. And into what amphiboly, right?

[32:09] Where you have speech, right, that is what has many meanings, right? Okay. So it goes back to your understanding of the distinction between name and speech, right? Which is fundamental to logic. Name and speech—they're both vocal sound, right? Signifying by human agreement, right? But the name has no parts that what? signify by themselves. Yeah. But the what?

[32:43] At least two parts, right? Okay. Someone asked us to give a ride to a lady last night there, and I think she's Lutheran, you know, but her name was Anderson, right? Huh? So

[33:00] Chris, talking about name Berquist, right? You know, which put together from two things, right? It means you know Bergquist was originally she knew there was originally a G in my name, right? Which means mountain berg and and thing on quest branch, right? See, but when I'm said to be Berquist, does it have two meanings? No, two parts of meaning. See, why speech has more than what one part?

[33:29] I was telling her about Minnesota we had a governor Elmer Anderson, and then Anderson, you know. Elmore L. Anderson, right? Just the L before and after, isn't he? Two different guys, right? They both got elected. Really used to have a Scandinavian, you know, governor, Bjornquist and so on. And these people, but anyway, that's how. That's my father got, you know, Swedish. My mother Irish. Cause Saint Paul had an Irish mayor, you know, and the state had a Scandinavian governor, so they represent the state of Minnesota very good.

[34:02] Okay. So he subdivides the first actual into two, right? Okay. Now, what's the second thing here, right? Well, potential, right? Okay. On the top of page five, he's going to subdivide that. Okay. You can see that Latin word there for amphibology, amphibologia. Oh my God. Okay. And the common example is the book of Aristotle, right?

[34:37] Yeah. But you get talk that you know, you talk about my book, you know, the book that I wrote, right? Or my book, the book that I own, right? Now, what does potential mean, right? Well, it means a vocal sound, right, that doesn't actually have any meanings, right? But by the way you what say it, the accent, right?

[35:08] Or sometimes they call pronunciation, right? This is one way. Or because it can be combined differently, right? Okay. Now, give an example what I mean here. I saw you laying down. What does that mean?

[35:26] Well, if I compose laying down with you, I saw you laying down, right? Laying in your bed or something, right? But you can put it with me too, right? Because I could be, you know, laying down in my bed and I see you come in, right? So I saw you laying down, right?

[35:47] How do you group them? Yeah. I I heard you walking. Well, was I walking when I heard you? Or did I hear your the sound you were making when you were walking? Right? I heard you walking. So that's called potential, right? Huh? You can put together or divide, right? Huh? So they call this composition or division, right? Depending on which one is deceiving you, right? I kind of kind of lump them together, you know, but composition, division.

[36:20] But that's with speech, right? Huh? Okay. Punctuation would be a way of bringing order to statements so that they're. Well, a word can be pronounced in more ways than one, right? Huh? And it has a different meaning when it's pronounced this way that way. Sometimes people, you know, mispronounce, you know, the thing and make kind of jokes, you know, because it means something, you know.

[36:52] What would be a good example of that? I'm thinking of one I think it might be one. I didn't say you were stupid. I hate the word awful, you know. It can have two meanings, right? God is awful, you know. You might misunderstand what I mean by saying you know, huh? My wife is awful.

[37:26] Ravish is another one of those. What? Ravish. Yeah. Has a positive and a negative. Yeah, yeah. it's not too common. It doesn't seem to be a too common thing. Composition, division is more common, you know. And they tend to to mention composition and division before, right?

[37:48] Accent or pronunciation, right? Is if it's more a cause of deception, right? Why they mention what equivocation before amphiboly, right? Just reverse order, right? I mean the the name as opposed to the what speech, right? That deceives you, right? Why in the case of the potential the speech that deceives you, composition and division, before the what name that deceives you, right? Your pronunciation or accent.

[38:25] I used to know my, brother Marcus." You know, I say "Marcus." I didn't appreciate, but I'm pronouncing it a little different, right? Then you know, you usually say Marcus, you know, and then Marcus.

[38:47] Our friend Jerry Page, who calls himself Abdul from Istanbul, and I always say with the accent on bull. Just a sort of humorous real life uh situation. There was a young lawyer from China, or Chinese, whose name was Sue Me.

[39:15] Yeah. That's like that's like they had to kick me on my back, Sue me. Yeah. yeah. Okay. So the multiplex potential, right? A lot of these Latins, you know going on the way they pronounce the word right, huh? Short and long, cute songs. Anyway, it's a question of the name, right? Huh?

[39:52] In in ratione vero secundum compositionem et divisionem, duo et tria sunt quinque. Right? Was two five? Yeah. I wouldn't have thought of that one Yeah

[40:07] yeah. That's why they say. We would say two plus three are five or make five. They say French. Yeah. In Latin, two and three are five. So two is five, three is five. Is that what that means? Yeah. That would be in Latin. Yeah. You say the man.

[40:35] The man sitting now stands up. Can the man sitting be standing up? How about the one with the scriptures? Christ made the blind see.

[40:55] Can the blind see? How do you do that? The dead came to life. Okay. Now the last one is the what? Yeah, so the second one here can be divided into three if you separate composition and division, but they're similar, right? huh? Okay, but they'll say that which is deceiving you the composition or the division, you know? So you can maybe divide them into three: composition, division, and then the what?

[41:30] Fantastic. You're still on the second one. Yeah, then we could say accent or pronunciation, right? Okay. Okay. Now, the fantastic, right? Huh? Well, it doesn't really have more than one meaning, right? Huh? Actually, nor even potentially, right? Huh? But it appears to have a meaning it doesn't have, right? Because the way you what your imagination is carried along, right? Okay. Okay. Now, what would that mean? What would that mean?

[42:11] Huh? Can we give it third dimension? One more. When you get into the species of this, they talk about mixing up categories, right? And

[42:31] what category would you put walking and running and loving and so on, growing? They all have the same ending, right? Ing, right? They should all be in the same category, right? Walking, running, right? Warming up, cooling off. They're all the same thing, right? Are they?

[43:05] What category would you put walking? Hmm? A- action. So you might be tempted to put action, right? Because of the of the ing and so on, right? Huh? See, but actually, walking is what changing your place, changing where you are. So it's something imperfect in the what? In place. In where? In where? Yeah, place places is in the category of quantity, right? Okay. But walking is reduced to where.

[43:47] Falling, changing your place, right? Now, what about growing? What category do you put that in? What? Quantity, yeah, yeah, yeah. How about cooling off? Warming up. When the fire the fireplace, still warm. Warming up. What? Quality, yeah, yeah, yeah. But, but, uh grammatically, they all seem to be the same, don't they? Warming and running and so on. Okay. How about kicking? Kicking. There's action. There's action upon, right?

[44:35] Yeah, yeah. I have to translate those last two categories in Greek. They're called poiein and paschein right? Poiein is the word for to make. too we get the word for the poet? Right, the maker, but I like to call them acting upon and undergoing or being acted upon, right?

[44:55] But you would express grammatically, you know, acting upon probably the ing word, right? All these different categories, right? They might club them together because they seem to what? They seem to be the same? Yeah, because of the ing, right? But you imagine them to be the same. They're not really the same, are they? Because walking belongs in where and kicking, you know, kicking you belongs in acting upon, right?

[45:28] Walking home belongs in where. What about understanding? huh? Is it quality? Yeah, I guess so. Habit or disposition, right? But that sounds like the same. Yeah, but now how about standing? Where does that belong? Or is that below Can you call it position What? Position. Yeah, yeah. Standing, sitting, right? Order of the parts. Yeah, yeah.

[46:05] Laying down, right? Sitting, standing. Okay. You see how how it's kind of what you could imagine to be something other than it is, all right?

[46:17] What are you doing? I'm lying down. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. My nieces and nephews are famous. What are you doing? Nothing. Standing here for so much time.

[46:41] So sitting and doing something. Is being not doing is it? Being a nuisance sometimes. No it's undergoing So the this is the distinction he gives them, right? Into three, right? Actual, potential, and what? Imaginative. Yeah.

[47:20] And he subdivides actual into what? Two, right? Which are what? Yeah. He subdivides potential into what? Maybe three if you make composition division separate, right? And accent or pronunciation, right? Okay.

[47:47] And. Magisterial doesn't subdivide it, right? Second Thomas divides the categories, right? Substance not subdivided, right? It's one genus, but the other ones are subdivided into two or three. They get them all, okay. Okay. And that's what

[48:22] Albert says now in this next passage from Albert here. Because actual multiplicity is before what potential multiplicity or fantastic ones, equivocation and amphiboly are said to be what actual multiplicity. The other fallacies in speech are what either a potential multiplicity, right, or a fantastic or imaginative one, right now. Therefore, first we're not to treat of what the paralogisms, right? That means the not this pronounced spelled right there.

[49:08] Um, equivocation and amphiboly, right now. And because equivocation is in dictione, or name, amphiboly in oratione or speech or speech. First, we ought to speak about equivocation, then amphiboly, right? Okay, but maybe you could say, "Well, why is he reversed the order then, and take the speech first when he gets to the second kind, right? " Well, we'll see.

[49:45] Okay, now we got another text here, right? This is really terrible stuff. Still got another half hour, right? Okay. First, we're not to speak about equivocation. Equivocation is the what diverse signification of one and the same what name, right? It actually does have more than one meaning, right? So the word "in" or "to be in" has actually what, at least eight meanings, right? Chief senses, right? Or the word "before" has four senses, right?

[50:44] I was reading. The question was at twenty eight there next to the last question there in the De Veritate. It's on, it's kind of crazy, but it's on the justification of the impious, right? You know, and you get into the question, you know, of of does the repentance of the sinner there come before the infusion of grace? You know, but the order, right? But Thomas, you know, he goes into going back to the senses of before in Aristotle, right?

[51:24] And of course, he's pointing out that in the fifth sense of Aristotle, gives there the cause before the effect, right? Something can be said to be before in what

[51:41] according to one cause and after according to another cause. That's kind of you know. So he realized that not only do you have these four central senses, which one is attached or laid alongside it, the cause before the effect, but two things, as Aristotle says when he gives the distinction of the four kinds of causes, two things can be causes of each other, right? Yeah, yeah. And so he gives the idea, you know, of healing the sick, right?

[52:11] You know, where the end is the cause of the action and vice versa, right? But in different ways, right? So does learning come before knowing or knowing before learning?

[52:30] Well, learning is for the sake of knowing, so knowing is the end or purpose of what? Yeah. So it's the cause in sense of that for the sake of which you do this, right? But learning what? Yeah, but learning is a cause of knowing in what sense of cause? Like a material No Like a maker, maker cause. Like a maker, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's producing knowledge, right?

[52:58] Learning, producing knowledge, right? So it's more like a maker, right? Okay. Learning makes you know something, you might say, right? Okay. So is learning the cause of knowing, or is knowing the cause of learning?

[53:15] Different way. Yeah, two different senses of of this, right? Okay. So learning is before what? Knowing in one sense, and knowing goes first in what? You go to school to learn, right? But for the ultimate your purpose is to know something, right? That you wouldn't know. Otherwise, you didn't go to school. Yeah. And then they talk about matter and form, right?

[53:50] Um. Which is the cause of which? Is each a cause of the other? What What makes this a chair and this a table? Different shape or form Yeah, yeah. So the form is the cause of this wood being actually a table, and the wood here being actually a what? Chair. But the shape of the chair and the chair shape of the table and the shape of the you know bookcase or whatever it might be

[54:42] can't exist by itself. It's got to exist in. Matter, right? So I can't take the shape of the chair here and send it over here and leave the wood over here, can I? No, it can only exist in there, right? So the matter, in some sense, sustains the form, right? But the form makes the matter to the wood to be actually a table or a chair. So they're both causes of each other, right?

[55:14] So what comes first, right? Penance or the infusion of grace? It goes into these things, you know. Something can be before in the genus of what material cause, sometimes, right? And be after in the more fundamental one.

[55:39] Of course, the end is said to be the cause of causa causarum, right? The cause of causes, right? So simpliciter Thomas will say that the end and the mover are before, and the end's above before everything else, right? Because the the the mover acts for the sake of the end, and then he makes the matter and the form be united, right? But really gets involved, right?

[56:20] So learning comes before what? Another example of material too, right? Because learning is disposing your mind to know, huh? And disposition is like on the side of matter, right? And it's also this is just my guess. You need some knowledge or something before you can even learn, right? Yeah. It's another kind of disposition. Yeah. But are are the the axioms? You know, what kind of a cause are they?

[56:54] of the conclusion. I think uh like a rule of baker. Yeah. When you define the syllogism as speech in which some statements laid down, another follows necessarily because of those laid down, right? What's more, what? Like the what?

[57:17] Yeah, yeah. But of course, it's kind of subtlety there too, you know. Just going back to the the form of the syllogism, right? Just take the formal syllogism. for the sake of simplicity, there. We we won't out of your way.

[57:53] Now. If you lay down every B is a and every c is b, what follows necessarily? Every C is A. Every c is a, okay.

[58:07] And it's because of the statements laid down, right? Okay. I remember I always quote Shakespeare there, and I say, "This above all, to thine own self be true. It must follow as the night to day. thou canst not then be false to any man. "

[58:28] Well, let's look. They use the fourth tool of dialectic, right? Consideration of likeness here, right? Does night follow day in the same way as being true to other men follow being true to yourself?

[58:54] Let's take the example there from marriage, right? Huh? And Thomas was saying, just reading Thomas, the texts are the same, you know, that the the

[59:09] consent of the husband and wife, right? Huh? You know, is the cause of it being married, right? Huh? Okay. And so I always say to students now. does does a priest say, you know, do you have wonderful feelings about each other? Well, then I can tell you, husband and wife. No, no, it's it's not an act. presuming you have emotions about each other, but that doesn't marry you.

[59:38] But what marries you? Yeah, and choice. The act is choice, right? So you're mutually choosing each other, right? So you're choosing each other as husband and wife, right? Okay. So

[59:55] if you're false to your wife or vice versa, right? Huh? later in marriage, then you're not being true to your own what choice, right? You chose this person as your husband or your wife, right? Okay.

[1:00:12] But now is that true about night and day, right? Huh? This above all, to an own self be true, and it must follow as the night the day. though canst not then be false to any man, right? I say, consider the likenesses, as Aristotle said, right? What way do you like? Well, you can say that being true to another person follows necessarily from being true to yourself, right?

[1:00:39] Um. And um. You're true to the other person because you're true to yourself, right? Okay. But what about night following day? Another choice. See, you say night follows day necessarily, right? But because of what day is? Why

[1:01:12] does night follow day necessarily? Because of our understanding of the universe, whether the sun goes around us or we turn on the axis. Yeah. It's just more familiar experience Yeah. yeah. Natural order Yeah. But the third thing you might say, right, is the Earth. Let's say the Earth turns on its axis. That's I can't read that out there. So, but. It's such a neat day. Right here.

[1:01:41] because I would be sobered It's the same as such a day. Yeah, but if that's but but then you're saying that's not day or night, is it? That the Earth turns on its axis, right? But the third thing is the cause of night following day necessarily, right? See, when Aristotle defines syllogism, right, he says it's speech in which some statements laid down another follows necessarily, not because of some third thing, but because of these statements what laid down, right?

[1:02:11] Then, so, in what way is Shakespeare's likeness there? In what way are they alike? Well, it's a likeness since that just as this follows necessarily from those, right? Then, so, right, night follows necessarily day, right? But this follows necessarily from that because of these, right? Night doesn't follow necessarily from day because of day, but because of the Earth, a third thing, right? Okay. So it's like in one way, but another way, unlike, right?

[1:02:48] Huh? You see that? It's kind of a beautiful. comparison. here. Okay. because. Now, in what sense are the premises a cause of conclusion? The cause has got four senses: matter, form, mover, and end. What sense are they a cause and conclusion?

[1:03:13] Yeah. But Aristotle sometimes says the matter. He says mover, and sometimes he says matter, because all parts are like matter, right? That conclusion is put together from C and A, right?

[1:03:33] And they're in the premises. Okay. So the matter out of which the conclusion is made, right? The parts that is to say out of which the conclusion is made, C and A in this example, right? Are in the premises. So in some sense, premises are a cause of the conclusion, sense of what? Matter, yeah. But

[1:03:59] important, it's a cause in the sense of what? A mover, a maker, and we call this the what? Middle term. Middle term, which really unites A with C, right? But is it a part of the conclusion? No. Okay. Should the carpenter be a part of the chair he makes? Not usually. I hope not. Well, it's kind of so, Aristotle would see that in some way the premises, right, are a cause in the sense of the mover or maker, right?

[1:04:33] They move you to think this or make you think this, right? And this seems to follow necessarily, right? And it's especially tied with the middle term, right? But in some sense, it's also the what? Yeah, it's kind of strange, you know. Right?

[1:04:52] So the parts out of which the conclusion is is put together are in the premises, right? It was that middle term that made them hammered them out, made them get together, right? Okay.

[1:05:13] If you had no b is a, and every c is b, conclusion would be what? No c is a, right? Okay, you have the same what? The matter, right, is in the conclusion, but the middle term now is what? Separated c and a. Yeah. It's the cause of their being separated in the conclusion, right? It's the cause of their divorce. Yeah. that's sad. So

[1:06:03] we've got to study equivocation and amphiboly next time here. Okay. Okay. Now I can give you some more stuff. here. I'm sure you're you're...