Logic (2016)
48. Who Is Sylvia? Shakespeare, the Wisdom of Reason, and the Fallacy of Figure of Speech (Seeing Is Not Kicking)
Class of 2017-05-04
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/048-who-is-sylvia-shakespeare-the-wisdom-of-reason-and-the-fallacy/

[0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God of enlightenment, move us, God, to know and love you. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, enlighten and illuminate images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. I thought I'd begin with Shakespeare, you know.

[0:34] So on. Now you're all acquainted with the two gentlemen of Verona, and I remember once when the English professor was kind of surprised that I liked the two gentlemen of Verona you know. It's kind of a nice little thing, huh?

[0:53] Now take the the song here that's praising Sylvia, right? Who is Sylvia? What is she that all our swains commend her? Holy, fair, and wise is she. That's quite a

[1:11] nice. Just to say, holy, fair, and wise is she. The heaven such grace to lend her that she might admired be be. Now struck by what it says here, the heaven such grace to lend her right now. If you're thinking about her beauty, I think the word lend is especially good, right? Because God gives a woman sometimes his beauty, great beauty, but she's going to lose it as she gets older, right?

[1:37] Huh? So it's appropriate to say that it's lent her right now. But reminds me a little bit of of of all things, Rush Limbaugh, right now. He says, "With brains unloaned from God, that's that's his common one of his common phrases, right now. You know, with his brains tied behind his back, you know, make it fair, you know, half his brains. But I like the one; I always thought was kind of nice, you know, with brains unloaned from God, right?

[2:02] And the same thing here, right? Huh? Now, so there you had holy, fair, and wise. That's almost says the whole thing, right now. Is she kind as she is fair? For beauty lives with kindness. How well that's thought, huh? Love doth to her eyes repair. You know how we say love is blind. Love doth to her eyes repair to help him of his blindness, and being helped, inhabits there.

[2:39] Well, love is in the thing. What love? So, but knowledge is the cause of love, huh? And so when he's helped from his blindness, huh? Love it happens there, right now. Then to Sylvia let us sing that Sylvia is excelling. She excels each mortal thing upon the dull earth dwelling. To her let us garlands bring, huh? I said, you know, if you look at the meta at the the rhyming here, huh?

[3:11] The first and the it's a quintet, huh? In the first and the third and the second, the fourth, rhyme, right, huh? I should say the first, the third, and the fifth, and then the second and the fourth, right? I could help but think about this damn dictions, right? Because excelling and dwelling are the good morning, good afternoon. Excelling and dwelling are got the same ending, I-I-N-G, right?

[3:40] But excelling and dwelling would not be in the same category, would they? No, so I just got this this darn thing on my mind, you know. Okay.

[3:52] Now take another little passage here. Now, if you know the the thing here, huh? In beginning the play, Valentine is going off to study under the the Duke, you know. He's fallen in love with Sylvia, huh? And but Proteus is at this time in love greatly with Julia, right? And so he's always kind of making fun of him a little bit, Valentine, right? Well, now the thing is turned around because Valentine is taken up with Sylvia, right?

[4:22] Okay. Oh, gentle Proteus, loves a mighty Lord, and hath so humbled me as I confess, there is no woe to his correction, nor to his service no such joy in earth. Now no discourse except to be of love. How can I break? Now can I break my fast, dine, sup, and sleep upon the very naked name of love? Proteus says, enough. I read your fortune in your eye.

[4:54] Was this the idol that you worshiped so? Even she, and is she not a heavenly saint? And Proteus says, no, but she's an earthly paragon. Valentine says, call her divine. And Proteus says, I will not flatter her. And Valentine says, oh, flatter me, for love delights and praises, huh? Now I was pointing out to my student there at the monastery there, love delights and praises, huh? And I was talking about the prayer there where we say, um, the Anima Christi, right?

[5:34] What's the last line there, right? Yeah, yeah, praising God, right, huh? Okay. Well, when you see God as He is, face to face, Thomas says you will love God, right, huh? More than you ever did in this life, right? And you can't love God as much in this life as you can when you actually see Him face to face, right? Well, then go back to Shakespeare says, huh?

[6:05] Oh, flatter me, for love delights in praises, right? And I'm always praising Shakespeare, you know, because I love his plays. I'm always praising Mozart, because I love, you know, I praise Thomas, I praise the Syrik and the Chromatic and the Diatonic and so. on. You love to praise what? What you love, right? So when you see God as He is, face to face, your love will be so great that you praise Him forevermore.

[6:30] You never get tired of praising Him, right? See, that was beautiful. the way he says that now. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. So he says, "Oh, flatter me, for love delights in praises." Protea says, "When I was sick, you gave me bitter pills, and I must minister the like to you." Now, this line kind of struck me. Then speak the truth by her, Valentine says. If not divine, yet let her be a principality.

[7:12] What that means? Well I think the angels Yeah, that's the third order of angels, right? Yet let her be a principality, sovereign to all the creatures on the earth.

[7:26] Yeah, yeah. I usually call them the princes, huh? And the archangels and the angels are lowest, right? But the princes or principality is another name for that. They are what might be in charge of a whole country, right? And there's some things in Scripture, right, where where the angel is in charge of this country, right? Now it gets into another discussion, shall we say, with another angel, right?

[7:50] And the footnote in the on that line there in the you know Shakespeare, right, is very good. You know, just go to principality, right? A member of the seventh order of celestial beings. The hierarchy of these beings may be arranged as follows: one, the seraphim; two, the cherubim; three, the thrones. So those three in that order are the what first hierarchy, right? Four, the dominions, the virtues.

[8:33] Six, the powers, right? Now that's the second hierarchy, and then seven, the principalities, right? Eight, the archangels, and nine, the angels, right? That's amazing, you know. No, you can't call her divine. Well, at least call her principality, right? You know,

[8:59] that she might be principality, sovereign to all the creatures on the earth, right? Okay, so I was struck with that. I didn't know. I didn't know that. I just said, "It's amazing, huh? How Shakespeare knew that." Okay. Now,

[9:15] I remember one time annoying my friend Warren Murray by saying, "What one line in Shakespeare? What one line in Shakespeare best describes heaven?" You can hit me. with a couple of these things, you know, huh? But I was struck by the very last line in the whole play. Do you know that? Remember that? But it's you know, they go through many changes of affection, so on. And at the end here, the Duke has been with Valentine.

[9:50] Have been rescued, you know, by Proteus who's taking over this group of thieves and so on. Anyway. So Valentine says at the end, these are the words, but it's the last line, that I'll. Come to, he says to the Duke, "Please, you, I'll tell you as we pass along, that you will wonder what hath fortuned. Come, Proteus, 'tis your penance, but to hear the story of your loves, discovered.

[10:23] That done, our day of marriage shall be yours. You know, two weddings. Now the last line: one feast, one house, one mutual happiness. Doesn't that best describe heaven? You know, we speak of you know eating under the father's house, right? In metaphorical terms, but one feast, one house, one mutual happiness. Isn't that the best line describing heaven? You know. So I know why this guy thought that you know strange.

[10:52] I like the two gentlemen. I mean, I might like some of the plays even more, but I mean it's. the only play the subjective one. Shakespeare is probably Titus Andronicus, you know, but it's very popular in the time. He throws everything in there, you know, horrible things, you know, between people getting their tongues cut off and and people, you know, being served up their children or something in a feast.

[11:11] You know, just like the horrible, big stories, you know. And what edition I had of Shakespeare? you know so this disgusting play. Dear, said about you playing Shakespeare. What? Which play was it? Titus Andronicus. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I think I met somebody at one of these conferences. There he was talking about. He was kind of trying to write something Shakespeare, you know. He's going to write something Titus Andronicus because nobody else has written on it.

[11:39] I wonder why. Yeah. Okay. Let's torture ourselves some more here. Figura dictionis, right? Okay. As you recall, there was a what a distinction of the six kinds of fallacies from speech, right? Into what three categories? Actual. Potential. Yeah. Imaginary. Yeah, yeah. And under the actual, there are what two?

[12:26] Equivocal. And amphiboly, yeah, yeah. Now, what's the difference between equivocation and amphiboly? Equivocation is one word, and amphiboly is a. Yeah, And amphiboly is speech, right? So in both, you have the case of one name that actually has many meanings, like the word "before," right? Okay. The word "being," right? Huh? All kinds of words, huh? Okay, my teacher DeConick used to say, every respectable word in philosophy is a word equivocal by reason, right?

[13:10] Okay, and then you have what speech, right? That actually means many things, right? And I was talking there about my favorite examples of that. One was the word of God, right?

[13:26] And the word of God could mean what the Bible, for example, right? Or it could mean the Son of God, right? And just like in the case of an equivocal word, right, by reason, there are some amphibolies, right? that are like that, right? So you could say the word of God is about the word of God most of all, right?

[13:52] And you'd be saying that the Bible is about the Son of God most of all, but the Son of God made what flesh, right? And the Word of God, the Bible, is the Word of God made flesh in a sense, as the Vatican Council said, right, in Verbum Dei, that just as Christ took on human flesh, and became truly a man, right? So the Word of God takes on the human way of speaking, right?

[14:20] And therefore has words that are equivocal by reason, has metaphors and other things that human language has, right? Or I'll take an example of how I like the Shakespeare's word for the philosophy of nature, which is the wisdom of nature. And the wisdom of nature could mean the wisdom about nature, in which case it would mean the same as what we call the philosophy of nature.

[14:51] Or it could be the wisdom, you know, that God has poured out into His creatures, and therefore the wisdom that you find what nature does, right? And I like to quote the the great what Heraclitus, right? He says, "Wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accord with nature, giving ear thereto Of course, the ear is the sense of what learning from your teacher, right?

[15:25] So giving ear thereto right? huh Which is not doing much these days, okay? My friend Warren Murray is writing an essay on, you know, the neglect of nature there in the moderns, right? Okay.

[15:42] But I was giving another one there that I kind of like too, and I would say that the the wisdom of reason. What does that mean? The wisdom of reason.

[16:00] Yeah, so we could say that first philosophy is the wisdom of reason, right? Okay. Theology is more the wisdom of God, right? It's kind of sharing the wisdom of God, but first philosophy is the wisdom of reason, the wisdom that reason can acquire by what? It's natural abilities, right? But could wisdom of reason have another sense, right? Well, I was reading Thomas's commentary in the third book of the De Anima, right?

[16:32] The third book about the soul, and he says, well, do they begin a new book here in the Greek? Yeah, the third and last book, right? Because from this point, Aristotle is now starting to what? Instruct us about what reason itself is, right? Okay. And it's really beautiful. where Aristotle leads into that, right? And you finally find out that reason is not the brain. That reason is is what something immaterial, right?

[17:01] It's not in the body, right? And this opens up the door, you know, for seeing the immortality of the human soul, right? And for Aristotle, seeing in his later book there on the generation of animals, right? That the human soul doesn't come from the parents, right? The soul of a dog or the soul of a tree comes from the parent. And your body comes from your parents.

[17:28] It Comes from God, but but through your your parents, your mother and father. But the soul comes immediately from what? God, right? So I tell my students the mother and the father begin this body, right? And then God creates the immortal soul that fits that body in particular, right? So my soul can't take over your body and make anything of it, right? And I think I mentioned the horrible story of of Ligeia there, right?

[18:05] Who's that famous guy, the American writer, who wrote the horrible? Yeah, Edgar Allan Poe. Yeah, Edgar Allan Poe. I think it's called Ligeia. I think his name was. The man is married to this woman, right? Who's a very intellectual woman, right? A very powerful mind, right? But finally she dies. But she's, you know, her mind is really grasping to get a reality. And he marries another woman, right?

[18:36] Huh? And if I remember this story right, it's been so long since I read it, you know, that she this other woman. He writes, you know, she starts to act more and more a little bit like Ligeia I think that she's taking over the body, right? With this great mental power that she has, you know. So that's why I ruined the story, anyway. I think you'd be back to read it again, but.

[19:00] One way is a good thing. Yeah, I mean, this is a horrible thing. We've got a horrible story, right? But Thomas says, you know, that you know Aristotle talks about the the soul. He says you have to see that the the reason why the soul of a man can't be go in and be the soul of a dog or a cat, right? like Pythagoras was saying that, right?

[19:25] Somebody was beating a dog. Stop, stop! You know, you recognize his friend. You know, his soul. That's the story, anyway. You know, and even Shakespeare talks about that, right? In some of the plays, right? You know, this is not orthodox. But you know, one argument Aristotle gives is the soul is defined as the first act of a natural body composed of tools, right? So if the soul, in some way, is to the bodily tools that that it's composed of, as an art is to the tools of that art. Right.

[20:01] Well, one art can't take over the tools of another art and use them. Right. My example is always that my my wife and my brother in law, brother in law is a carpenter in his spare time. He uses a hammer and a saw. My wife sometimes makes a dress or something. She uses a you know scissors and a and a needle and so on. Well, my brother in law can't take the needle and and sew the wood together.

[20:27] My wife can't take a hammer and you nail and make the dress that way. So Aristotle is very concrete, right? Huh. But the soul fits this kind of organic body, right? Huh. Well, the more you study the connection between body and soul, that's immediate, right? This one fits that, and so extends even down to the what. Not only can a soul of a man not become the soul of a dog or cat, but even the soul of my body, right, can't take over the the soul they take over your body, right?

[21:03] Huh. So, if you're not satisfied with your body with you. I mean, you can't take over somebody some of you more handsome or somebody stronger or more healthy, whatever it is, it doesn't do good. I I yeah yeah yeah. And so it's kind of interesting, you know, that your mother and father began a body, and God creates your immortal soul to fit that body. So if you had not begun that individual body, then God would never have created your immortal soul, right?

[21:35] When you say this, I got the soul here. I got body to throw it in. It fits. It fits that one, you know. Yeah. I'll find somebody else. Oh, there. Yeah. Yeah.

[21:48] So Thomas says in the third book, the idea that Aristotle is beginning now to approach anything about the soul, and he's already in the premium section of the question of whether the human soul can survive death, which we very much want to know, right? Depends upon whether it has any activity that is not in the body, right? And then Aristotle shows you know eventually that the activity of the what universal reason is not in the body, right?

[22:18] And this is partly known, you know, from the fact that it knows things universally, not in a singular way. But couldn't you say that the third book on the soul, then at least that part that deals with reason, is the wisdom of what reason? If Shakespeare can use the expression the wisdom of nature, right? Which for wisdom about nature, right, as well as the wisdom that nature reveals in its behavior, you can say that the wisdom of reason could be what.

[22:54] Wisdom about reason. Yeah. Yeah. And it's really in the third book of the soul that we really learn the nature of reason is something you know that's not the brain as people think you know but it's something okay but then there's the third sense of the wisdom of reason would be what

[23:15] the wisdom that oh we already said now that wisdom that reason acquires is one Right The wisdom yeah that'd be first philosophy right is the wisdom of reason right various other so this is not the wisdom of God right that that would be something You would have wisdom that's infused into reason given to reason from the outside by God Yeah but that wouldn't that would be the wisdom of God right so you're taking the wisdom of God by faith right huh see but what about they call this science logic they call it in Latin you know rational philosophy right well this is the philosophy that directs what reason right

[24:05] you know Hugo's definition of reason remember that huh we have these two definitions of reason and one is the great definition Shakespeare right and Shakespeare's definition of reason is the ability for large discourse

[24:36] looking before and after they don't want to add in that definition You're gonna lose the brevity of what wisdom right huh you know as you ascend up the what angels you know from we got them there from the angels the archangels princes right powers the virtues the lords uh dominions they call them sometimes and then the thrones and then the what remember yeah yeah when Thomas is is uh start we're talking about this uh when Thomas talks about God right how does God nobody knows right well he shows that God understands himself right he's the only one who understands himself perfectly right completely right huh and everything else he knows is by understanding himself right Both is the cause of other things, right?

[25:55] And the exemplar, everything else is modeled after, right? So God knows Himself perfectly in every way He can be imitated. He's imitated, even by the stone, more so by the tree, more so by the cat, more so by man, even more so by the angels. And then he talks about the angels, right? But the Greeks, you know, said know thyself, you know. That's that's just a man, not not to the angels, right?

[26:27] Because what an angel knows primarily is himself, right? But Thendico, right then, in knowing himself, he doesn't know everything else. So to know everything else, right, in some way, the angel needs, in addition to knowing himself, suit another understandable forms, another thoughts, you might say, right? But as you go up the hierarchy of the angels, right, they have fewer thoughts in addition to their own what substance.

[27:04] As you go down, they have more thoughts, right? They get to this miserable human mind, this intellectus abumbratus you know, the the overshadowed reason, right? Well, you need kind of a a little thought for everything you want to think about, right? And you have to go running from one to the other with this discourse, right? And that's why you have to there's no discourse like that in the angels, right?

[27:30] And so as you ascend the angels, right, they get what more perfect? Because with these fewer thoughts, they understand more than the lower angels do with more thoughts. Okay. And Thomas, you know, says something like that. Human beings, you got a student is not too bright. You got to multiply your examples and so on. And that's true, isn't it?

[28:01] Yeah, yeah. And Saint Dionysius is always you know is always, you know, talking about manuductio, right? Leading by the hand, right? I was thinking, you know, of how Thomas has, you know, five ways, you know, for proof of the essence of God in both Summas, you know, and he said that is really leading by the hand.

[28:23] Then he talks about the substance of God. He has five parts, right? In both Summas right? Leading by the hand. But Thomas says, you know, leading, you know, the mind with propositions less universal, right? Got to break things down, right? from people, So if you added in this definition, you're going to lose the brevity of wisdom, right? But the brevity of God's wisdom, of course, is the most, right?

[28:54] As you go up to the angels, the brevity gets, what, get wiser and wiser and wiser. The seraphim are the wisest of all, right now. And but they have what, fewer and fewer thoughts, right now. So you got to respect that in the definition. Okay. Now Hugo's definition of reason was what? Reason is an ability to understand reason, understand reason, and direct itself

[29:36] and others. Okay. Now Hugo's definition of reason is obviously involving, you know, plagiarism a little bit there, you know, because Hugo was thinking of what Aristotle says, huh? That the abilities of the soul must be known by the acts for which they are a what. Ability, right? And the acts have to be known through their what? Objects, right? And so this is kind of a general truth there that you find out in the ninth book of wisdom, right?

[30:15] huh That is reason's wisdom, which is that ability is known through act, right? Ability, ability is known through the act, which is an ability, right?

[30:29] And so in reading Thomas's proemium to logic and so on, Thomas will speak of the act of reason as being what? Understanding or reasoning, right? Okay. But then he distinguishes two understandings, right? Understanding what something is. And Aristotle wrote the book called the Categories for this purpose. And then there's understanding the true or the false, right? Which Thomas often calls composition and division, right? Because you're putting together or separating in negative statements what you've understood in the first act, right?

[31:12] So Berquist you know, not Berquist excuse me Hugo Hugo you say, well, if understanding is the first act of reason and there's two kinds of understanding, you unfold and then reasoning itself right? the third act. We should obviously define reason, right? By its acts, right? Its ability for to understand and reason. But you might think of reason as kind of you know sitting by itself in the corner or something, understanding and reasoning.

[31:44] You got to realize that it can direct itself and others, right? And Thomas says it's the art of arts. huh? Now why is he called the art of arts? Logic, huh? Why does he call it the art of arts, logic? Why does he call it the art of arts? It's the knowledge of directing

[32:04] all the other sciences. Yeah. So in all the other arts, your reason teaches you, right? Or reason learns how to direct the hand or even the feet, right?

[32:19] So and had a quick steak yesterday for how many people now? Nine, nine, eleven, thirteen, fifteen people. Steak, you know, a lot of steak. I had just nice steak, you know. I didn't know that. I didn't know that. Did you make the fries too? No, my wife made some special potatoes. Broccoli we had and so on. We had these. Just let me know next time you're gonna.

[32:56] Next time you're gonna. Give me a call. Yeah. So in Hugo's definition, we had it directs itself and then others, right? Right. Meaning other what abilities of the soul, like the will, right, and the motions and so on, right? And then the hands and so on, the feet and so on, and even other people sometimes, right? Like the parents do or the government does, huh?

[33:35] Okay. So going back to the amphiboly, right? The wisdom of reason could be what? It could be the third book of the De Anima, right? It could be first philosophy in another sense, or it could be what logic, right?

[34:00] So at least three senses of the word of reason, excuse me, the wisdom of reason. So I'm very fond of those activities right I don't stop and think about them huh.

[34:23] So let's come back here to the fallacy of the figura dictionis, right? Let's look at the first page here, right? Then look at the species or modes here in the second text. There, I don't care much about that first mode, huh? 'Cause I don't like that Greek and Latin male and female, right? Yeah. But take the second mode, right? From this that some diction signifies through the mode of one predicament seems to signify through the mode of another, right?

[35:08] Well, take the example I was taking from Shakespeare there, that I N G, right? Okay. In what category would you put walking? Which one of the ten categories you put walking? Walking. Yeah.

[35:30] Changing place What? Changing place Place. Where. I just want to be careful about that place stuff now, because place is put in the category of quantity under what continuous quantity. So you put it under place. You're. all mixed up. Yeah. I guess it'd be kind of ox field action. Oh my goodness! You see, he's fallen into

[36:00] a trap. Oh, my God. He fell into a trap. That's right. We did this last week, so we're kind of prepared for this. He's confident.

[36:09] Walking is in the category of where. Where? You remember my my great teacher there, Roman Kasurik, right? I showed you his picture. I got his picture. You want to see his picture? But he only can be joining us.

[36:26] This is all we're looking at, sir. You know. But Casurić, you know, knocked into my silly little head when I was freshman in college. In the categories, Aristotle doesn't call these categories place and time, right? Place and time are actually species of continuous quantity, as we said. But he names them what concretely? Where and when, right? And I remember also insisting, you know, that he didn't say that one of the categories is relation, like all the logic books would be saying, right?

[37:00] But Aristotle calls it what? pros ti, right? And my friend Albert the Great, there, right? In his thing on the categories, he'll translate pros ti as ad aliquid, right? And that would be translated into English as toward something, right? And there's a reason why Aristotle says that, right? Huh? Rather than relation, right? Because dictionis in part, right? Huh? You know, relation seems to signify towards something in the manner of something absolute, doesn't it?

[37:39] That's a very strange reality. This towards something, right? Very strange. You know, what is it to be double or to be half or to be a grandfather? You know. Towards my wife, I'm a what? Husband, yeah. Towards my son Paul, I'm a father Yeah. But towards these nagging little ones around the house, Grandpa. Yeah, first thing they want is to bring down the what? Little plastic things.

[38:14] Old Legos. Yeah, yeah. The whole dining table is covered with. I said this. I said I said to them, this looks like a world fair. I said, what is this? All these things, you know, towers and things and kinds of things, huh? Okay. So, so I'm and towards you guys, I am a teacher, right? Huh? That's a very you know very kind of reality, you know. Towards something, right?

[38:46] And then I'm you know correcting Thomas of all things, right? Poor man. He was he wasn't entirely at home in in Greek. I guess he was he was Augustine. There's some awareness that they have of Greek, right? Huh? But in the Gospel of Saint John, what word do they use in Latin, right? Apud Yeah. Apud is maybe not the. Because the Greek says what, an archein, what, Yeah it's a word En archein ho logos right?

[39:23] Kai ho logos in what, Pros ton theon, right? It was toward God, right? Then, well, that's already indicating what Augustine would teach and what Boethius would teach and Thomas would teach, right? That the members of the Blessed Trinity are what? Distinguished by relation. Relation. I'm sorry. towards. them. Oh my goodness.

[39:58] He can't help himself, right? I know I can help? him See See He wants to he wants to uh make towards something be something absolute, right? Because you just can't descend to the to the lowness of yeah, yeah, yeah.

[40:21] And you know when you're when you're around children and grandchildren and so on, and sometimes a child, what, especially immigrants, he'll he'll get taller than his mother or father, right? Huh. And

[40:38] so you can be taller than your child, and then all of a sudden becomes shorter. No change at all in you, but because he grew and he had better food than you had or something. If you're an immigrant or something, right? And so you see these, you know, tagged and you know, you know, did have kind of rough time coming up. But the the offspring are taller than the mother or the father, you know.

[41:05] You know. But how can I go from being taller, say, to being shorter with no change in me at all? What a strange reality this is, right? Now, Thomas, when he takes up the distinction of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, he says that it can't be a material distinction because that's based upon the what continuous, right? Huh. And so, in our good friend Euclid teaches how to bisect a line, right?

[41:40] Huh. You get what distinction of two lines now, right? And you can bisect them again. You go on doing forever, big deal, but it's divisible forever, right? Huh. But there's no what quantity in God of that sort, right?

[41:58] And so it must be by a formal distinction. Yeah. And a formal distinction is by opposites, huh? And then Thomas says, well, the one who says I am who am, it can't be by being and unbeing. It can't be by lacking and having, right? It can't even be by contraries, because one contrary is lacking in something in comparison to the other one, right? So it must be by what?

[42:27] Relatives. But towards something, right? Huh. See it, right? Huh. So. So walking is in the category of what? Still doesn't make sense to me.

[42:52] Well, you see, Aristotle in the fifth post predicaments, right. No, the fourth post predicament right The fifth post predicament is to have, right? Yeah. What if you are walking on a treadmill and you are not moving? What category is that moving Yeah But emotion is put in some category, right? But it's something imperfect in that category, right? Okay. So when I when I am walking into this room, right, I am not entirely here.

[43:40] You wouldn't be here if you were all there. He looked up a funny thought. He's not entirely here. He said about somebody. He said it's not all there. Yeah, it's not all there. Yeah. Isn't that strange? That means that, huh? Beautiful. So when I am walking, you know, into the room, right, I am not what fully there, right? But it's in the category of where I am changing where I am.

[44:05] You might say, right now, I am getting to be somewhere, right? I am coming to be somewhere, but I am not what there. Yeah. So it's put in the category of where, right? Okay. Now what about

[44:22] standing? What category is that? I mean, same thing. Standing, right? Walking, standing, you know. Position. Position, yeah, yeah. And standing would be what? Position. Yeah, yeah. It would be position again, right? Standing, okay. But warming up would be what?

[44:48] Hmm. Yeah. Yeah. What about learning? You guys learning anything? Yeah, it'd be different species of quality, wouldn't it, learning and warming up, right? Okay.

[45:08] About being, right? Coming to be. Coming to be Put in what category? Well, coming to be. in some sense, right? Okay. The fallacy can be involved in here, right? Fallacy outside of language. Okay. So you can see, you know, you are imagining something maybe to be in the wrong category, right? Or to be in the same category as something else because it has the same ending of ing, right?

[45:50] Okay. But walking and running might be in where and thinking. I don't know where that is. Do you? Free thinking. Now, another thing like this is this thing that a lot of these things, they say, I don't understand the importance of this fallacy, right? But

[46:37] take this here, my kicking you as one of my favorite examples, right? Now, there's some connection between us, between my result of my kicking you, right?

[46:54] But what would you say about my kicking you? It proceeds from me into you, right? So kicking is in between me and you, isn't it? It's from me into you, or hitting you, right? Hitting proceeds from me into your face or something, right?

[47:21] Okay. What about my seeing you, though? See? Well, this dummy here might say, my seeing you, it proceeds from me into you, towards you, right? It's the other way around, I think.

[47:46] His seeing in between me and you, my seeing you, just like my kicking is between you and me, in more or less sense between us.

[48:05] What Thomas says in knowing, right? Huh? Like seeing, or even in loving, right? Huh? Knowing or seeing or or loving, right? Proceeds from what? Me to you?

[48:31] Or is there already a union of you and me, right? From which proceeds seeing, right? Because your color and your what size, right, and so on, have acted upon my what? Eye. My sense of sight. And the result of that union, right, of your color and size with my eye, results in what? Yeah. Yeah.

[49:03] But because I see you, right, seems to be like I kick you. I might imagine, right, I see you to be like I kick you, something from me to you,

[49:25] like as if seeing goes out of my eye towards you, into you. You know, that's kind of interesting, right? I bet if you went out and talked to the average guy in the street, that has never had his mind corrupted by philosophy, right, he would probably, you know, think of I see you like, yeah, yeah. And he has some, you know, think of this a little bit like that, right now, is if seeing is going out from the eye, you know, to the object, right? You Know when we talk about color, sometimes Aristotle talk about it as being the end of the transparent.

[50:10] So the eye goes out to the end of the transparent, and there's the color, right? Doesn't seem go from the eye out to the end of the transparent? See,

[50:25] my eye has gone out to that painting over there. Mm hmm My eye is studying that painting. Is it the studying is from my eye to the painting, right? Definitely can understand that. There's a little danger in this sort of thing, right?

[50:54] Makes sense, doesn't? Now we've got some text, you know, that sort of thing, right? Look at the example on page two here, right? From the De Veritate, right? It's amazing I had this in my thing here. I just got through rereading the. I just finished it in time when the grandchildren descended upon me you know, Let's read the Latin there, huh? Praeterea, movens. The same cannot be agens et patiens, right?

[51:45] The mover and the moved, right? Unless in this way, the one part of it is moving or acting, and the other moved or what undergoing. As is clear in animals, as is proved in the eight books of Physics or Natural Hearing. Sed intelligens et intellectum se habent ut agens et patiens right? See, we're talking about here, right? The definition, right? Ergo non potest esse ut agens totum se intelligat.

[52:23] So what fallacy is being made here, right? You're imagining, right? It to be like acting upon and undergoing, right? See, kicking is in what category? Yeah you're actually acting Yeah. And I like to call that category acting upon, right? Aristotle used the word what? poien, right? the word for making too, right? That thing poiein paschein, right? Acting upon and undergoing.

[52:58] To the third, should be said that intellectum et intelligens non se habent ut agens et patiens huh? What is this Thomas talking about? He's talking about the fallacy of what? Diction, right?

[53:15] Said ambo, but both have themselves as one what? Agens right? Quamvis quantum ad modum loquendi Right? videantur ut agens et patiens, right? Significare, right? Okay. Videantur means what? Imaginative here, right?

[53:49] So, that like. the known thing is not an agent Yeah, I mean, he's saying that the understanding and the understood, right, are not like what? Agent. Agent patient, yeah, acting upon, undergoing, right? See. A kicking and kicked are like acting upon and undergoing, right? And kicking.

[54:18] Yeah, yeah. See, but understanding and and you know, understood, not not like acting So when I know the table does it undergo my knowing Yeah yeah. What? So if I know the table, the table doesn't undergo anything. But he's talking about Yeah. The understanding itself. What's I'm trying to understand, I thought if we take the senses. I'm acting on that painting when I see it, right? You know.

[54:50] See. So seeing the painting is not like what kicking you or not acting upon hitting you or something, yeah. But isn't the painting acting on you? Maybe so, yeah. Yeah. But but the seeing of the painting arises from the what union of the two, right? Huh.

[55:11] So it's not that that the one understanding or seeing is acting upon the thing understood or seen, right? Huh. But it seems to what? Secundum quantum ad modum loquendi he says, right? Huh. I think he's talking about this kind of a fallacy, right? huh. What do you imagine this to be because grammatically it seems to be the same, right? Okay. I mean, why does our what does that what does our what does that tell us about?

[55:43] our knowing these acts? which is more known to me, kicking what it is or seeing what it is. Yeah. And we kind of imagine, yeah. Okay. Now, that was in question eight, article six, objection three. Now, objection eleven, and not eleven, right? huh?

[56:14] Moreover, operation falls between the agent and the patient. Like I was saying, right? Kicking is between you and me, in a couple of senses, right? We're enemies now. And, but sed intellectus, et intellectum se habent ut agens et patiens. Okay. Since therefore nothing falls in between a thing and itself. Oh, magnificent. It's impossible that an angel understands himself.

[56:50] Can you kick yourself? One part of you can kick the other part, right? But but can I hit my? you know, I can hit, hit this fist, but can I hit this fist with this fist? But that's clapping with one hand. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[57:12] To the eleventh, it should be said that the operatio intelligendi, right, is not a media secundum rem, right? Now he doesn't repeat the thing that he said in the other reply there, but you know, but it's in the modum loquendi, right, that it seems to be that, right? So you you dummy, you imagine something to be other than what it is, right? Okay.

[57:39] What's his name? He was a poet there, Shelley, right? You know on the poetry, right, and so on. That the imagination delights in the likeness of things, right?

[57:54] Reason wants to know the differences of things, but but it shows you kind of how imagination can be a cause of error, right? Because likeness is what. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I I was reading the play of Shakespeare. I always read Shakespeare's plays, of course, but but the Comedy of Errors, right? Okay.

[58:19] And what's the basis for the Comedy of Errors, right? Likeness of the twins. Yeah, yeah. And he kind of doubles up in the Roman ones because he has two pairs of twins, right? So people are being mixed up, right? And so one of them is married to this woman, and they confuse the other brother with the husband, right? So he goes to eat dinner with the other woman.

[58:44] He's kind of falling in love with the sister of the other woman. He's paying attention to her and kind of ignoring. it. He says, "you shouldn't be, you know, complimenting me. You know, you can take care of my sister, you know, and be a faithful husband, you know." And he's falling in love with his sister, right? And so this is one thing after another, right? Comedy of errors, right?

[59:07] And of course you have the word of course, the native English word in there too. You mistake somebody right for somebody else, right? Ever mistake somebody? Yeah.

[59:21] I remember one of the plays there at the Tribune. There, the two sisters, one of them was in the play, and the other sister looked alike, you know. And it was a very good play, you know, and so on. So I once wanted to congratulate the congratulating sister. Oh, that's my sister.

[59:40] So I mean, these things are funny, right? Huh? And and they say you know sometimes you know girls who really were you know twins are very much alike. they switch dates, right? And see what it's like to go out with the other guy, and and hear his his platitudes and so on. Yeah, he's got a wonderful sense of humor, though. You know, I mean, kind of. You know, only only you know, girls that really, really do look alike.

[1:00:04] You know, it wouldn't be that way, you know. Even my brother Mark and I weren't twins, you know. My brother Mark, he's a year and a half older than I, you know. I'm very close. We're not twins, you know. He's the older brother, you know. But I mean, the students again mix up, you know. This is a, you know, deeper question, deeper question, you know. The schedule courses, you know.

[1:00:23] Who's deeper question, deeper question, you know? Occasionally, you get students who mix up, you know, mix up the two of us, you know, and it's kind of funny, you know.

[1:00:34] One of our, one of my brothers is a twin. Yeah. And I asked him once. I said, "Are you identical twins?" No. Says, "My brother's ugly."

[1:00:47] So he says, "Tertio ad decimum operatio intelligendi right is not a medium secundum rem, right? Secundum rem, he said, right, As opposed to Secundum modum loquendi, right, where it seems to be something that it isn't, right? Very tricky, huh? Okay.

[1:01:09] So it's not secundum rem media in the middle between intelligence and intellectum, right? Well, you might say secundum rem that kicking is really in the middle between you and me, right? Okay. Said procedit, right? From both, it proceeds from both, according as they are what, united, right? So I bet most people don't know that, right? And they kind of imagine, right, huh? But seeing goes out of my eye, over to you, right?

[1:01:41] I think the other way around. Things going. Yeah, well, you're often smart, you know. Now, if he if he was kicking me, I know he's acting upon me, you know. But he's seeing there, you know. Yeah.

[1:02:00] I mean, did you ever use the expression "my eyes fell upon"? Nobody in daily life, you know. You're looking for something. My glasses, right? Yeah, and you know, so my eyes fell upon it, right?

[1:02:21] People speak that way, don't they? You never say that. I'm sure. As you said, it's probably more true to say that my I was struck with her beauty. I look for sight. Now,

[1:03:08] another article. We're going to jump to another article, right? De Veritate, question eight, article eight. Whether the angel is knowing material things through some forms, or by the essence of the one knowing, right? I was talking about that earlier, right? Okay. The angel knows some things by knowing himself. He doesn't know everything, right? So he needs these other forms, right? So.

[1:03:39] Well, this is objection ten, and the odd ten, right? Now, the objection contains the fallacy in the in the reply. You know, that's where Thomas has seen this. For more efficacious is the angel in knowing than the fire in, yeah.

[1:03:57] But the fire burns without this that something combustible be in it. They are the same thing as before. To the tenth, it should be said that the one knowing does not have himself the knowable as the what burning combustible, of which one is the agent and the other is the patient, right? Huh? How is it really? But the knowing, the knower, and the knowable have themselves as one beginning of what knowledge.

[1:04:33] In so far as from the what knowable and the knower coming together in some way, in some way there comes about what knowledge, as is clear from the foregoing, and therefore ratio non secutor, right? Okay. So your imagination makes it seem like there's two different. acting other things Yeah. Yeah.