Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
3. Levels of Universality, the Via Negativa in Theology, and Particular vs. General Equivocation
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/3-natural-hearing/003-levels-of-universality-the-via-negativa-in-theology-and-particular/

[0:00] But now come back to what Aristotle said there. You might think that because he's going to consider things in general before particular, he's going to remain the confused, right?

[0:29] But if you look at the different kinds of examples he has, there's really two movements from the confused to the distinct, and one you might call on a horizontal level, on the same level of universality, and the other the vertical when you descend to the particular. Let me give you an example of what I mean. When I go from triangle to equilateral triangle, an isosceles triangle, scalene triangle, I'm going from the general to the particular, and therefore from the confused to the distinct, right?

[1:04] Okay. When I go from triangle to the definition of triangle, something like a plane figure contained by three straight lines, I'm moving from the confused to the distinct too, from the name to the definition, right? But I'm staying on the same level of universality. Because every triangle is a plane figure contained by three straight lines, and vice versa, every plane figure contained by three straight lines is a triangle, right?

[1:43] When I go from triangle, equilateral, isosceles scalene, when I go from quadrilateral, say, to the definition of quadrilateral as a plane figure contained by four straight lines, right? I'm on the same level of universality, right? When I descend to the square and the oblong and the rhombus and the rhomboid and the trapezium, right? I'm descending from the general to the particular, right? Okay. So you have two movements from the confused to the distinct here, right?

[2:18] One on horizontal level, staying on the same level of universality. And we talked about going from the whole to its parts, right? A composed whole to its parts. You're staying on the same level of universality. When you go from the universal whole to its parts, you're descending, right? Now, which of those movements should you go through first?

[2:45] Should I move from the confused to the distinct, going from the general to particular first, or should I go from the confused to distinct, staying on the same level of universality first? Same level, universality. Yeah. Yeah. Why? Why should I do that first? You still on again?

[3:10] Yeah. So you know what you're dividing. Yeah. In other words, if I don't know distinctly what a triangle is, I cannot understand the basis for this distinction here, right? Because in equilateral triangle, those three lines, those three straight lines, are all equal. In the isosceles, two of them are equal. In the scalene, none of them equal, right? So unless I knew distinctly that you have a plane figure contained by three straight lines, I couldn't understand the very basis of this division.

[3:43] You see that? Okay. Have to understand the genus, right? Okay. Take another example of the same thing. Let's talk about the most famous literary poetic form. Let's talk about the sonnet, right?

[4:06] The sonnet is divided, as you know, into the Italian sonnet and the English sonnet, and sometimes they name them from the greatest practitioner, the Petrarchian. Sonnet and the what Shakespearean sonnet, right? Okay. Now there you're going from the general to particular, right? Okay. So now if you define the sonnet in general, you'd say it's a poem in 14 lines, right? Okay. But there's two forms or two species, right, of the sonnet: the Italian sonnet and English sonnet.

[4:48] Okay. So should you move from sonnet to Italian and English sonnet first, or should you move from sonnet to a poem in 14 lines first?

[4:59] Yeah. And then you can understand better the distinction between these two, because in the English sonnet, the 14 lines fall into what three quatrains and then a what couplet that completes it, right? In the Italian sonnet, you have an octet of eight lines, right? Answered by a sestet of six lines, huh? Okay. But

[5:31] if you don't understand that a sonnet has 14 lines always, you wouldn't understand the basis for that division, right? Okay. Do you see that? Okay.

[5:49] You're talking about the syllogism, right? Should you go from syllogism to demonstration in dialectical syllogism, or should you go to syllogism, the definition of syllogism?

[6:14] Definition of syllogism, right? Then you'd see that in any syllogism there are at least two statements laid down, right, which no one follows necessarily, right? But then in the demonstration, the two ones are seen to be necessarily true, right? In dialectical one, they're seen only as being what probable, okay?

[6:42] So Aristotle in the eight books of Natural Hearing is going to be moving from the confused to the distinct, but on the what level of the general, right? And then he would descend to the particular, huh? In the book on the universe, in the book on generation and corruption, the book on the soul, and the other books on living things, huh? Okay. So in a sense, what the moderns do is they jump from the general to particular without going that first movement of becoming distinct, huh?

[7:15] On the general. Could you give some examples? Well, I mean, when they study natural things, it's where they begin with chemistry or physics or biology, right? You're already talking about a particular kind of change, huh? As we'll see, natural philosophy is mainly about change, right? So Aristotle's going to be talking about what's involved in change in general, and then we're going to talk about change of place in particular, right?

[7:50] Okay, change of quality, growth, and so on. But the moderns will jump right down and talk about change of place right away first. They are satisfied with the confused knowledge of what they're studying in general, right? And they descend to a particular kind, huh? Okay.

[8:17] I mean, they might do it to some extent because it knows in a confused way what the general is, right? But maybe you should have a distinct knowledge of the general before you try to descend to the particular, right? So they go from a confused knowledge of the general, trying to get a distinct knowledge of the particular. Some more thoughtful ones come back to the general later on.

[8:41] You know, if you read Heisenberg's books, right, he often has a chapter in the early Greeks, right? He often, you know, discusses Plato or Aristotle, right? But they need to go back to this to see in perspective, you know, what he's talked about as a young man in a very particular way, right?

[9:05] Now, to some extent, too, they can do this because they're they're studying natural world mathematically, right? So they don't have to talk about what these things are; the mathematics has to work, right? But then they end up by saying the mathematics is wiser than we are. That's what Heisenberg says, and Max Bohr and other people. We didn't know what it meant. Okay.

[9:46] But you notice that all the way through the modern mind that you know, people talk about you know, metaphor and figures of speech. What is a figure of speech in general?

[10:00] What does it mean to speak figuratively in general? They can't tell you. See, I asked my colleagues, you know, what is reasoning? They can't tell me.

[10:16] You can't redefine it, right? You don't have a distinct knowledge of what is general to what they're talking about in particular. Now sometimes you know hear them saying, you know, well, well, if we stop to get a distinct knowledge of the general, we never get to the particular. Maybe some

[10:45] truth to that, right? It takes a long time for the mind. But Aristotle did descend to particular after he got gained distinct knowledge of general. Chesterton said about people who say it's fiddling while Rome burns, and he said, "Well, somebody wasn't fiddling while Rome burns. We would have never had that theory of hydraulics, and we would never

[11:14] have made fire trucks." So with this, you know, I call these kind of secondary readings. You know, I would you don't want to examine the students on them, you know, but you don't stop and realize, right? Huh? You know, the point of what Aristotle is seeing here, right? And then you see that Descartes is denying that, right? You realize what a what a basic mistake that is.

[11:41] Honestly, grand mistake, a great mistake, right? You know. But you know, a mistake about something that's the beginning, as fundamental as this, right? Is going to what? Further you go, the more you'll be off. So they say he gets two kinds of mistakes in the one basic mistake. You read Descartes. He said, "I think, therefore I am." I'm sure I'm thinking. Therefore, I know exactly what thought is.

[12:07] Doesn't follow at all. You see, and. Be sure there's a God, so he has a clear and distinct idea of God, right? You know. Thomas was famous for being in class, you know, always saying, "What is God?" He was sure there was a God, but he wanted to know more distinctly. So far as he can, what is God, right? You know.

[12:35] What is the incarnation, right? An old professor, Syracuse remarked about the way Fra Angelico you know, was a fraternization, I guess, huh? But he represented the very saints there, you know, and facing the cross, right? And most of them are, you know, you know, very devotion and sorrow and everything, you know. Thomas, they're trying to figure out what does this mean, you know? Why is Why is God dying for us and so on, you know?

[13:08] And some too, right? Kuro diosomo, why is God a man? Why did God become a man, right? So trying to understand these things, right?

[13:18] So he can be very sure about something without what knowing exactly what it is, right? But vice versa, then when something is clear and distinct, you've got pictures you can see; it's everything's clear and fits together. Then you think it must be what true, right? And you find this in the moderns sometimes, huh? Like Descartes and others, huh? That they'll have something very clear, and then they'll say, "Well, it must be true," right?

[13:49] You know, sometimes I explain a little bit what this idealization means. I use a little analogy. Suppose you go down to the the theater this Friday, and and King Lear is playing by Shakespeare, right? Okay. And come home, and someone says, "Now, what does Shakespeare tell you about life? Well, life is tragic. That's what you learn." Next Friday, go down to the theater, and the merry wives of. It's all right.

[14:19] The Comedy of Errors is playing by Shakespeare, right? And what does Shakespeare tell us about life? It's a comedy, right? Okay. Was life a tragedy or is it a comedy? It's a mixture. Yeah, in other words, tragedy is what more precise than life really is, and comedy is more precise than life really is. It's something a little more indeterminate, right? See, so in a way, tragedy is in a way an idealization of one aspect of life, right?

[14:57] Bringing that aspect of life into such sharp focus, right? Okay. My comedy is an idealization of life, bringing into focus another aspect of life.

[15:10] But the more you try to say life is is is, that's exactly what life is a tragedy, or that's exactly what life is a comedy. The more you you what seem to be departing from the reality, right? And there's some limitation in in saying this, right? Well, if you say it's both a tragedy and a comedy, you seem to be like a contradiction, right?

[15:41] But no, there's there's a precision there in tragedy and comedy. There isn't in these other kinds of fiction, right? Right. Life is a little more ambiguous, huh? See, it's not so clear what life is. It's

[15:56] probably something of both, right? Huh? The people who've been in the army or the navy is something they can tell you horrible stories, but they can tell you some very very funny ones, right? My cousin was in the navy, you know, and this one guy he he wasn't getting good reception on his radio, so he went out and he breaks into where the ship line was, and then he drilled a hole inside the ship so he could stick his his thing out.

[16:21] Well, the ship had not been loaded fully yet, so it slowed down. The part he thought was above the water level was actually under. Can you

[16:31] imagine? I mean, often the funny things happen like this, you know. And he came back, you know. because he may have been in the navy too, and see, every time I told one of these funny stories, Kasurik would top with another story, even funnier, you know, about what happened to him in the navy. See, so I mean, that's what war is, you know. It's kind of a you know comedy, right?

[16:50] There's something you know comical about it, right? But I mean, there's obviously, another aspect, you know, and you can you know emphasize one rather than the other, but you're not. You seem to be kind of what departing a bit from reality when you make it just a tragedy or just a comedy, huh? It's both, huh? And you know, suddenly, you know, in the midst of something that bothers us, we start to see a funny side of him.

[17:18] We start laughing, you know. Which is it? You know, it's not exactly one or the other, right? Do something. So, our friends' trouble suddenly strikes us as funny sometimes. You almost kind of think you want to be serious about what's happened to them, you know. But

[17:42] you've got an idea what you mean by idealization, there, right? We see the laws of Boyle fit the idealized gas right now. The real gas, but idealization is necessary for the precision. That's that's kind of a special reason to what you're doing in science, right? Why the precision doesn't have what Certitude, right? Mm-hmm. Because it the precision is by an idealization, and that's something imagination. You smooth things out more than they really are.

[18:17] Something that behind at least another theory that I forget his name that wrote a book on Darwin's black box. Michael Behe. That he said that he said that's what so many of the biologists just have an imaginary. They can picture how easy these changes are from one species to another because it's only a few little changes. They can picture it real easy. Yeah. But they don't understand the complicated mechanics of the biochemistry.

[19:00] Heisenberg, you know, we'll come back to. We look at the second page here, but Heisenberg was talking about something interesting, I think, and it's kind of a sign at the bottom page four again. Keeping in mind the intrinsic stability, the concepts of natural language in the process of scientific development, one sees that actually. It's about in physics, attitude towards concepts like mind or the human soul or life or God would be different, right?

[19:27] From that of the 19th century, huh? Well, no, as part of this is now when you study God, we'll come back to this next time. But when you study God,

[19:40] you often know him by the via negativa, right? By way of negation, God is the unmoved mover, right? God is simple; that is not composed, right? He's unchanging, huh? Now, when you know something negatively,

[20:00] is it better if you can negate the general or the particular? Let's take a simple example, right? If I'm knowing the number seven, let's say I know the number seven affirmatively.

[20:19] When I say it's a number, am I as close to seven as when I say it's an odd number? Or if I say it's a prime odd number, the more particular I get, the closer I get to seven, right? Okay, number separates seven from everything that is not a number, right? But it could be an even number, for all we know, right. Odd number starts narrowing down, right?

[20:48] Prime odd number even more so, right? But suppose I was knowing seven negatively, right? It's not four. It's not even. Which is closer to seven? Not four or

[21:09] not even? Not even. Yeah. Not four separates seven from four, but not from anything else, right? Not even separates seven from two, four, six, eight, and all the other even numbers, right? So notice the difference here, right? I'm getting closer to seven when I negate the general.

[21:33] I'm getting closer to seven when I can affirm the particular. Okay. So we're closer to God, for example. We say that God does not walk. God does not grow. Or we say God is unchanging, which is closer to God. Unchanging, huh? Which is closer to God to say God is doesn't have two atoms of hydrogen, one of oxygen, or God has no parts. No. Yeah. So we can negate the general.

[22:09] We're closer to God if we know him by way of negation. That's the way we know him in theology. It's in the via negativa we know him. As he is, huh?

[22:20] Now you can't understand negation if you don't know what you're negating. So, which is more useful in theology: to know what a whole and parts are, or to know that an atom, a molecule of water is H2O? It's more important. Yeah, he's not going to bother to say that God doesn't have two atoms of hydrogen and oxygen, right? Or C6H12O6, whatever it is. He doesn't have six of these and twelve of those and six of those, right?

[22:47] No, we're going to say he has no parts, and we're going to give a reason why he has no parts, right? So, a knowledge of the general is more useful in theology, for the most part, than a knowledge of the particular. It's useless in theology, really, to know that water is H2O.

[23:09] But it's very useful in theology to know what whole and parts are. It's more useful in theology to know what change is than to know what chemical changes of some particular kind, right? Because you're going to be negating change in general of God, right?

[23:29] But if those general things were replaced by the particular, then you'd have no way of knowing God in theology, huh? But if the general is more certain, more sure, then you have what things you can use in knowing God.

[23:57] Now, why do the moderns jump into particulars so soon? Part of it is for practical reasons, right? We saw back in Aristotle's *proemium to Wisdom* that knowledge of the particular is closer to action, right? Than knowledge of the general.

[24:16] But theology is not primarily. Theology primarily about God, and He's unchanging. You can't make anything of God. You can't do anything to God. You don't want. But you can't understand some things about God, right? But in this life, we have to understand the creatures and therefore it always involves some kind of negation, right? But we know it better when we can negate the general than the particular. But we can't negate the general without understanding it distinctly.

[24:51] And the moderns you know, they say they jump from the general down to the particular, so they never know the general distinctly, and therefore they can't understand distinctly the negations they're making. And why are you making these negations?

[25:10] So there are consequences for theology. We're not doing these things, right? But even you'll find the great physicists, you know, they want to go back to the Greeks, and you see in Heisenberg especially because they want to see in some perspective, right, the particular thing that they did, right, as a younger man. And so, in some sense, if you if you read, I have a whole bunch of you know Heisenberg books in my office.

[25:39] But you go and read them from the earliest things to the later ones, right? He sees more and more clearly what he accomplishes as a young man, the older he gets, right? Because he sees it more in this and turns something more general, right?

[26:04] So got to one page. That's pretty good, huh? Okay. Now, when you study this next page in common and private experience, I often tell the students when I teach this,

[26:22] we're taking up these things, you know, primarily for natural philosophy, but you'll find these things extremely useful for understanding all kinds of other things. So the distinction I make on the next page between common and private experience, it's very important to understand what we mean by the philosophy of nature, but it's very important for understanding experimental science. It's very important for theology. You see the passage there from Paul VI, huh?

[26:49] So we'll stop today, huh? 10 minutes to 5, huh? Okay. Yeah. And we'll start with the second page. But now, what is the connection between the first page and the second page? Yeah. The knowledge is more known. Yeah, you might expect that a knowledge based on common experience is more general than a knowledge based on private experience, right? Okay, so if the general, or knowledge of general, is before knowledge of the particular, right, then knowledge based on common experience, or which common experience is sufficient experience, right, is before knowledge based on what private experience, okay?

[27:37] But the distinction between general and particular is more general than the distinction between knowledge based on common experience and private experience. I think that's like even an objection. I'll see if you can solve this. Okay.

[27:53] Aristotle agrees that the basic road is from the senses into reason, right? Okay. So the basic road is from the senses into reason. Aristotle talks about the senses, but the senses know what particulars, right? You don't see man in general; you see a particular man, like this man or this man, right? Okay. And reason knows the general, right?

[28:24] So if the senses come before reason, then the particulars before the general. Aristotle contradicts himself, right? Right. So I've now, overthrown Aristotle, right? You see how great I am. That's what the sophist does, right? He he tries to, you know, refute the greatest mind around he can find, and if he does so, he's above that mind, right? Therefore, he should be honored, admired for his apparent wisdom.

[28:58] Now, I give this to students in class, right? Sometimes, huh? And oh yeah, Aristotle contradicts himself. Yeah, the contradiction between his saying that the senses come before reason, right?

[29:10] And what he's saying in this chapter here. Different senses of before. No. Now apparently contradicts where, he says here, general before the particular, right? He says the particular before the general. Aristotle, himself, you can find you can find a text, in Aristotle, where he says the particular is before the general. It's going to be start with that census, right? So how can he say here the general is before the particular?

[29:51] Okay, it's all mixed up, right? The particular generality and the general particular error is what it is. It's not easy if it's going to be deceived, huh? By the fallacy of equivocation, huh? I mean, everybody I think it's because, they all think he's coming to himself. Well, notice, huh, they can't distinguish the two senses are particular.

[30:30] Here, the word particular means what? It means a singular, an individual, nothing universal at all. Okay, it means a singular, individual. And general here means what? Universal, universal, Common to many, right?

[30:58] But now, when you say, in the reading we just had, that the general is before the particular, particular means the less universal. Okay. And general means the what? More universal. Okay. Now notice, we do use that both ways. We can say Socrates is a particular man, right? Meaning an individual man, right? We could also say that the dog is a particular kind of animal, but a dog is nevertheless not a singular; it's something universal, instead of many, right?

[31:39] Okay. You see that? So, what we're saying is that singulars, right? Singulars come before any universals, just as the what senses come before reason, huh?

[32:04] But among universals, the more universal comes before the what less universal. Okay. Equivocation comes in because we call this particular, right? And we call this particular, right?

[32:28] Okay, and we call this general, and we call this general, right? Okay. So when Aristotle says we go from the general to the particular. He means from the more universal to the less universal. But When he says we go from the particulars to the general, he means from singulars to universal. You see that? Okay. Now, the sophist of course he comes back with his second objection now, right?

[32:57] Okay. Okay, you got it on that one, he says. But which is closer to the singulars, the more universal or the less universal? Which is closer? Less universal. Yeah. So if you start with the singular, wouldn't you come to the less universal next, not the more universal? But. Notice he's forgetting the fact that we know things in a confused way before distinctly. So when we begin to know the universal, right?

[33:26] We know it in a confused way first, and therefore in a more general way than particular. Now I usually show there with two simple examples, huh? I say suppose we're going to classify, you're going to classify the vegetation on campus, right? All the plant life, right? Not take anybody's word for it. Well, all your knowledge would start with your senses, right? The individual trees and bushes and grass and so on that you saw, right?

[33:53] So singulars would come before any universals, right? But now among universals, would you first see the difference between two kinds of grass, or two kinds of bushes, or two kinds of trees, or would you see the difference between grass and tree? Grass and tree. Yeah. Same. You'd see the more universal before the what? Less universal, right? Okay. And another reason for that is that the difference between two kinds of grass is not as great as between the tree and the grass, right?

[34:27] So you're more apt to see the difference between the tree and the and the grass, and between different kinds of grass, right? When I get a you know grass and, they have you know the composition of different kinds of grass. I don't know what the hell he's talking about, right? Okay. But even with trees, right? When I was in college one time, we had gone in botany class there and classified the trees, right?

[34:49] We got a little chart and identify the trees. Well, the broadleaf and, the needle tree, you never confuse those two. But the Norway pine and the other kind of pines, I still don't know the difference between them. You see, but the but the broad differences I know, right? Another example was we were going to classify alcoholic beverages. This is always a popular example, right? But take nobody's word for it, right?

[35:13] All your knowledge would start with individual glasses of beer and wine and whiskey and so on, right? Okay. So singulars would come before any universals, right? Okay. But not on universals, would you recognize the difference between, let's say, Budweiser and Miller beer first, or between beer and and wine? Yeah. Or beer and whiskey, right? Huh? You see, and then between Scotch and rye whiskey and all the rest of them, right?

[35:40] You see. So though singular glasses would come before any other ones. You'd first recognize the difference between beer and wine before the before Cabernet Sauvignon and Pinot Noir. You see what I mean? It's because you know things are confused way before distinctly. You see how easy it is to be deceived, though? So it's nice at the very first reading here to be able to give a sophistical argument from mixing up two senses of the word particular and two senses of the word general, right?

[36:12] And catch everybody in class, right? You know, it's a lot of fun, you know. You know. But you got to solve it otherwise they'll go away thinking Aristotle's been refuted right? I? Remember one time I was teaching Hegel, you know, and I said, "Why don't I show you how Hegel's method is much superior to Aristotle's syllogism?" Right? And I thought it was a big joke, you know.

[36:35] Went out after class and this guy was come along and says, "Gee, there was some lecture today," he says, "You know, you know, finding someone has improved an Aristotle." So I'm like, "Gotta go back in there and scare these guys out." I think they're taking this seriously, you know. So they're a mark, you could go in there and tell them just about anything you know, and they believe it, you know.

[36:56] But you know, they have a hard time. They they can't they can't separate those different meanings of particular. That's that's not the most difficult example of equivocal word, right? Huh?

[37:13] Okay. The knowledge of reason is a knowledge of reason. What are the two senses of knowledge of reason? in that statement? The knowledge of reason is a knowledge of reason. Two different meanings of knowledge of reason. Typically, the knowledge of reason is a knowledge of reason. About reason. What The knowledge about reason. Is a knowledge that belongs to reason, but it's not the only knowledge of reason.

[37:41] The knowledge of reason is not the only knowledge of reason, right? Right? It also has the knowledge of triangles, the knowledge of God, it's the knowledge of the other things, right?

[37:59] I see it. In theology. Raymond Brown says we should start by saying, "that the church, just because the church says there's no errors in scripture, that there are no errors, " he says we should just start by trying to find errors. And if we find errors, then we know it's wrong. And he says, and he's found some. But then his examples, you know, are, you know, are doubtful.

[39:00] Yeah, yeah. He's more certain of that he's found errors than the church is right about it. Yeah. Something like that. It's more certain of the theology of what the church says than. One time, uh, uh, they invited me down to BC, there you know they... I'm going to give a lecture who's denying the existence of God because of evil, right? The Holocaust and so on, right? So I said in that discussion today,

[39:32] it seems to me that you are basing yourself upon the statement I said. You don't see a reason why God would allow these evils, right? And there is no reason why God could have allowed these evils. We don't want to admit that, right? That's why you are basing yourself off, right? I mean, I mean, you know, why did God allow the Holocaust, right?

[39:57] And he didn't see reason why God would allow the Holocaust, right? Therefore, there's no reason why God. I mean, you know, you go back to human things. You see, and I give the example, you know, where Kasurik forced me to take Greek, right? You know, you know, if you are Greek, I told you that story, and it's a Greek. Okay, so there are things that that

[40:28] other men know the reason why, but I don't see reason why I should do this, right? But they they see reason why I should do this, right? And uh, wait for God. you know, given the infinite distance of our mind, right? The reason why God will allow things could escape us, if even the reason why you know, you know, some men see the reason why some things should be done, as well as they see why.

[40:52] There is one example. They say Bobby Fischer, when he played chess, he could see like sixty moves ahead. Yeah. And he would think, you know, if he did that, yeah, but you wouldn't know why he's doing that because you can't see it. Yeah, yeah, it must seem like a dumb move, but I used to be pretty good at checkers when I was a kid, you know. And finally, one of my my my my cousins came there.

[41:27] She's a good player. She beat me in checkers, right? You know. I said, "No, sorry, but I was pretty good. I lost too, though. You know, Take me down a peg or two you know. " But I mean, it's not actually the longest way to win, you know. but that might be good for the kid, right? To realize that he's not the world's greatest checker player, you know.

[41:53] Someone said that you know, when the planes crashed in the towers, they said God must have been asleep. Yeah, yeah, Why would he? Yeah, yeah, yeah. yeah. We don't know.

[42:07] Why the innocent suffering, so, you know what I mean? But in a sense, I was playing down by saying, you know, you're saying that if you don't see reason why, then there's not a good reason why. You don't want to get that feeling because it's a little difficult in saying that, you know. but but, uh...

[42:29] I mean, to him, the Holocaust is so horrible that you know it's per se no to him. You know, there could be no reason why this would be allowed by any reasonable person. With the private and the common? One thing I've wondered about is sacred scripture. It seems to be using

[42:56] a lot of private experience. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because it's using this experience of one people and their, you know, their experience. You know, it does kind of use private experience. Yeah.

[43:15] Seems a number of things to understand them. You have to study it. Yeah, but scripture. I mean, even in its metaphors, you know, we use things like "the Lord is my rock." You know, use something that's common to everybody. Has some experience of a rock, right? You know, the Lord is my shepherd, right? I'm experiencing these things. you know I see it Yeah. Yeah, yeah. But some of the metaphors, though, seem to be private.

[43:46] Yeah, yeah. Some of them we we probably need more, you know, help with, you know. But for the most part, I mean, the things that they're taken from. It's a high mind still running water, you know. All the ones about this parched earth, you know, staring God. You know the Psalms of thirst, right? These are more common in scripture. I'm not saying you don't have some, some need for private experience, yeah.

[44:26] I mean, but you need something different here, right? I mean, the prophet, that says, you know, God uses intermediate human intermediaries for us in revelation, right? Reveals he doesn't reveal everything directly, immediate to everybody, right? Reveals something to Moses or the prophet, right? And the prophet to us, right? Yeah. Christ taught the apostles, and the apostles taught their successors, and down through the line, right? Tradition. But

[45:07] you come to define articles of the faith, then you use thoughts that are tied to see Pope says there, right? If you had a chance to read that yet, or, but yeah, yeah. But he speaks of universal and necessary experience, right? So

[45:24] you're using thoughts that are tied to universal necessary experience to express the articles of faith, like God has no parts or whatever it is, or three persons in God, so that you don't have to, you know, change these as private experience grows, right? You know,

[45:47] you don't have to be using quarks or molecules to talk about God, you know, particles and so on, quantum jumps, talk about God, right? So these, you know, concepts in science change, they're not really going to affect theology.

[46:10] I think that the main reason in theology, I say, why common experience or universal necessary experience is more useful, is that you know God by the via negativa, and to negate the general is more useful than to negate the particular. So you show in theology that God is unchanging, we don't show that God doesn't walk, doesn't run, doesn't jump, doesn't fly, doesn't swim, right? Doesn't grow, doesn't.

[46:36] he is unchanging in general, right? So that sense, the knowledge of the general is more useful in theology than knowledge of the particular. God has parts. they know what a part is, what a whole is. Doesn't know anything about H2O H2O is useless knowledge in theology, seems for the most part, right? But whole and part is very important in theology.

[47:10] That's why it's providential that God and Thomas being the place we could get this, huh? You could never have this to do with theology without them. When you explain the definition of eternity, you negate many things that are found in the definition of time and in our understanding of the now of time.

[47:34] Maybe later on in this course, we take up time, you know. Then we'll talk a little bit about eternity, right? We take up change in the first book. we'll show you how theology uses this. I wonder if Thomas shows it in the eleventh reading here. Haven't given yet, but... Mm-hmm.

[47:55] This would be also part of the providence of the church and the fathers, being educated, St. Thomas, then finally the great philosophy. I think it's not by chance that

[48:16] I mean. There's nothing opposed to be chance. I mean, why is it? Is the New Testament written in Greek? You know, see, divine providence extends down to those things, right? I mean, you can give all kinds of historical reasons why it was written in Greek, right? You know, like Alexander the Great conquered the world. You know, but I mean, God wanted it to be Greek

[48:41] and that has to do, maybe with facilitating theology, right? The Greek language is a better language for theology than Hebrew is, you know. The way

[49:02] to bring together Greek philosophy too, right? The revelation is facilitated by the fact that it's Greek, there, right? You know, resist the Greek influence. I mean, this is part divine providence that I think written official texts would be in Greek.

[49:31] So then, the knowledge, like particular knowledge, scripture studies, come to know more facts and things about the times of the patriarchs. It seems to me, you know, when you read when you read the modern scriptural scholars, they don't really illuminate the scriptures as much as Thomas does or Augustine does or church fathers. They don't seem to know what's most important. You know, I'm not saying they have made some contribution; they have, but but not as obviously.

[50:21] It's not much of a contribution to understanding scripture.