Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
33. Reading 13: Only Two Causes, and Lack versus Contrary (Virtue, Vice, Ignorance, Error)
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[0:00] Now, in the thirteenth reading, he's going to become strong now, much stronger in these three things. And there's going to be some things in the thirteenth reading that are altogether new. Other paragraphs will be

[0:24] kind of summaries, you might say, various statements and restatements, right, of what we've seen here, right? Okay. So in the first paragraph of the thirteenth reading, there's something new, very new. And in the fourth paragraph, there's something very new. And in the fifth paragraph on page three, there's something very new, huh? Okay. But the second and the third and the sixth paragraph will be more what kind of summaries and restatements of things, huh?

[1:08] Various ways of saying them. Okay. Now, what he's going to do in the first paragraph of the thirteenth reading? He wants to show that of the three things found in every becoming,

[1:29] only two are causes as such of what comes to be, huh? Of the Three things found in every becoming; only two are causes as such

[2:05] of what comes to be. Okay. Now, how does he show this? What are those two? Well, he says if you examine, if you take apart, that is to say, what comes to be, you'll find that it's composed of the underlying matter that's remained throughout the change of becoming, and the form the act has been acquired in. But the opposite in no way enters into the final product.

[2:44] So take some examples of that, right? When I put the soft butter into the refrigerator, what comes to be? You could say hard butter comes to be, right? Okay. Now, if you take apart hard butter, what do you find? There's butter there, and there's hardness, but there's no what. Softness. Yeah. So the softness is not found at all, is it? Okay. And if you wanted to be more complete, you could say, nor did the softness make the butter to be hard.

[3:20] It's being opposed to hard, right? So in no way is it a cause of the hard butter, neither within the hard butter, right? It's not found in the hard butter. Nor is it even extrinsic cause, like a carpenter is a cause of the chair, I would say, huh? But the carpenter is not inside the chair, right?

[3:42] But Aristotle is more concerned with showing there's not a cause within of what comes to be, because he's trying to manifest what nature is, right? And nature is a cause within, huh? And so matter and form are the two senses of nature within, huh? But the contrary opposite in no way is a part of it, huh? So it's not a cause as such of hard butter. Nor is it even an extrinsic cause of the butter becoming hard.

[4:18] So although the butter is necessarily soft before it becomes hard, the softness is in no way a cause of the hard butter. It's obviously not, as he shows here, a cause within, because if you take apart and examine hard butter, there's butter there and there's hardness, but there's no softness. But you could add to what he says there, as they say, there's not even an extrinsic cause.

[4:48] The softness didn't make the body to be hard, and certainly not that for the sake of which the butter is hard. Okay. See what he's doing? Huh? He's becoming strong, stronger. In in the twelfth reading, we realize that there are three things found in every becoming. But now we see more distinctly that only two of them are causes as such of what comes to be. Namely, the underlying subject, right, or matter that remains, and the form that's acquired.

[5:24] And the third thing, the the contrary opposite of that form that's acquired, that was from which you, right? We use the word from with that is in no way a cause.

[5:41] The same way, if you take, you know, you take, you know, multiply these examples just to consider it. When the dry cloth is put into the water, what comes to be is a wet cloth, right? Now you take apart wet cloth, and what do you have? You have a cloth, and you have dryness, right? But the dryness in no way enters into the wet cloth, does it? It's?

[6:01] Not a part of the wet cloth. Nor, for that matter, did it what make the wet cloth to be wet? Did it? How could dryness make the cloth wet? So in no way is dryness a cause the wet cloth. So only two of the three things found in every becoming are causes as such, of what comes to be. And here's, as I say, a hint at what the two senses of nature, matter and form,

[6:33] the active and the passive sense. We see later on of nature. Okay. Now in the second paragraph, as I say, I don't think there's anything particularly new there, right? But he's merely restating things that we've seen. The underlying subject is one in number, but two in sort, or in definition, as he said before. For the man and the gold, and generally the matter, can be numbered. The one is more this something, and what becomes does not come to be from it by happening, but the form is one.

[7:16] Here's kind of restating things that we've seen already. Now in the third paragraph, he's talking about various ways we can say that the beginnings or causes are two or three.

[7:39] Whence it is on the one hand that the beginnings ought to be said to be two, while on the other hand there are three. And it is that in one way they are contraries, as we saw before, and in another way it is not, for it's impossible for contraries to be acted upon by each other. That goes back to the eleventh reading, if you recall, right? But this is untied the difficulty we saw, right, to the apparent contradiction change that Heraclitus pointed out, due to the underlying subject being other.

[8:13] For this is not contrary, huh? So butter is not by definition hard or soft, but it's able to be both, right? But not at the same time.

[8:31] Thus the beginnings are neither more than the contraries in a way. If you take the contraries, what? Concretely, right? Like hard and soft, right? Or hard kind of implies what? Hardness and whatever the hardness is in, right? Then hard and soft is all you need, right? But if you look at the contraries. Purely as hardness and softness, then you need a third thing, which is the what, butter, right?

[8:55] Okay. So in some way they are two, and some way they are three. Thus the beginnings are neither more than the contraries in a way, but two so to speak a number, nor again entirely two, because to be other belongs to these. For to be a man, to be a musical other, and to be unformed, to be bronze other. Well, I think he's bringing both of the readings here, the earlier ones and these ones, because here we see, right, in a way there are three things, right, in every becoming, but another way there's only two, right?

[9:28] Only two are beginnings or causes as such. But if you begin the thing that happens to one of them, right, then you have three. Okay.

[9:42] So just speaking of various ways, you can speak of two or what, three, huh? Okay. As I mentioned before, there are other places where you can speak of what, the same thing as being two or three, right? Aristotle sometimes speaks of the plot as having what, a beginning, a middle, and end, right? Other times he speaks of the plot as having just two parts, tying the knot and untying the knot.

[10:16] Okay. Sometimes you say the family has what, parents and children. Sometimes he says a father, a mother, and children. Okay. No big deal, but I mean there are different ways we sometimes speak. It was a two or three, right? Sometimes going back to my logical example there, right? Sometimes we say there's only what,

[10:45] names said univocally of many things, and names said equivocal of many things. Huh? It's only two. Either a name is said of many things with one meaning in mind, right? Or more than one meaning in mind. That's all there is.

[11:02] But then they are often subdivided equivocal, into what, purely equivocal, and then what they call analogous sometimes, right? Equivocal by reason, right? Okay. But sometimes you divide them like Thomas does, maybe into three. When one name is said of many things, sometimes you have entirely the same meaning in mind. Sometimes entirely different meanings in mind. Sometimes partly the same and partly other meanings, and then he divides it into what, three, right?

[11:35] Okay. How many commandments of love are there? There are ten or two. Yeah, we always say two, right? And one is to love God, right? And the other is to what?

[12:00] Yeah. Okay. But now, if you stop and think about it, right? You distinguish these by the object of love, right? To begin with. But just a minute now. It says you're supposed to love your neighbor. As yourself. Yeah. So the way there's three, you're supposed to love, huh? Say. So the

[12:26] way there's two, but in a way there's what? Three, right? Okay. But since it's natural to love yourself, it seems less need to have a command there, right? Huh? Say. But notice if you look at the commandment to love your neighbor as yourself, it presupposes that you love yourself, so that does fall into charity, right? And then there's truth in saying that charity begins at home, right?

[12:54] Is it? Okay. Now, in the fourth paragraph, though, he has a new thing here now, and now he's going to correct and determine the truth with complete necessity.

[13:17] It has been said then how many are the beginnings and the becoming of natural things, and what way? How many? And it is clear that something ought to underlie the contraries, and the contraries are true are two. Going back to ten, eleven. In a way, the other is not necessary, for it will be enough that one of the contraries make the change by its presence and absence.

[13:42] Okay. Now you see the significance of what was hinted at back in the eleventh, in the tenth reading rather, that one of the two contraries seems to be lacking something in comparison to the other, like the empty with respect to the full, but even the rare with respect to the dense, right? And the segregated with respect to the mixed, and so on. Okay. Now, I sort of like to stop and manifest this a little bit.

[14:14] It's very brief here, Aristotle, and the difference between the contrary form and the lack of the form. Okay. Because contraries, in the strict sense, as you define them as species or forms that are furthest apart in the same genus, huh? Like the example of the genus of habit,

[14:52] as you mentioned before, in ethics we learn about virtue and vice. In books what two through six, if you know the about in ethics, in books two through six, actually the beginning of book one you start to learn about human virtue, but and then goes through the human virtues in books two through six, right? And he describes each of the virtues and the opposing what vice or vices.

[15:25] But then in book seven he takes up things that are either what not quite a virtue or a vice, or there's something more than a virtue or a vice. But among the things he takes up there is what is called continence and incontinence.

[15:46] Okay. Now, what's the difference? Well, the virtuous man is to some extent confirmed in goodness, and the vicious man, in some ways, confirmed in evil. Right. The confident, incontinent man is a struggle going on, right? Huh? His reason and his will, and maybe his emotions on the other hand, are what opposed, right? Huh? Okay. And the continent man, the reason, the will, but with the great struggle, right, went out, huh?

[16:25] Like the man, the alcoholic, anonymous person, right? You know, who has a struggle to avoid going back to the bottle, right? But he, he, his reason and will went out, right? Okay. Incontinent man, he gives in, right? Okay, but then he regrets and he gave in, right? He feels remorse and so on, right? While the vicious man, he does evil and he what rejoices that he succeeded, right, in doing evil, right?

[16:55] You know, the photographs of Bin Laden now, you know, with the smiles and talking about blowing up the the heads on TV now, I don't see TV, at all but they've had the Bin Laden tape, you know, you know, where he's rejoicing over over what happened in New York. So the vicious man,

[17:14] Don Giovanni, right? He's got the vice now, right? Okay. So he doesn't have any conflict because his will is as bad as his emotions, huh? So virtue and vice are the habits, the species of habit, the forms of habit that are furthest apart, and therefore they're called what contraries, right? Now,

[17:38] vice is not just the lack of virtue. Vice is something what real? It's a habit, and it's a real habit, right? So the man who has the vice, he has the real inclination to do bad things.

[17:56] Um. But now, speaking my grandchild there, Mary Rosa, the newborn baby, do they have the virtue or the vice? Neither. Neither, right? See, they lack the virtue, right? But they also lack the vice, right? Okay. Now, if you brought up this new grandchild, huh, to be virtuous, right? She would go from the lack of virtue to virtue, right? Huh. Right. Without ever being what vicious, right? Huh.

[18:36] Okay. But now, a person at our age, if we're not, we don't have the virtue, we probably have the what, Opposite vice, huh? Okay. And it's much more difficult to take someone who's already got the vice. And to what teach them the virtue, right? So if you have a thief or a criminal like that who's been robbing and so on, it'd be harder to make him what just than to take a newborn baby and bring them up to be a just person, right?

[19:12] Because that criminal is going to what resist your attempt to transform him, right? As they find out in jail. The same way, easier to take the newborn baby girl there and bring her up to be chaste, let's say, right? And to take, let's say, a prostitute who has the vice, you know, the standard example of the priest trying to convert the Paris prostitute, right? Because they very easily relapse, you might say, into the vice that they have.

[19:42] Because the person has the vice is going to resist you. You see? Do you see that? So before you come to be virtuous, are you necessarily vicious? No. But you necessarily what lack the virtue before you acquire, right? Because even the person who has the vice before they have the virtue. If you have the vice, you also lack the virtue, don't you? But not everybody who lacks the virtue has the what?

[20:21] Vice. Yeah. You see? So what is necessarily before the coming to be a virtue? Lack of virtue. Yeah. Not necessarily the vice, huh? See? So change doesn't necessarily begin from the what? Contrary, right? In many cases it does, but not necessarily. But it doesn't necessarily begin from the lack of the form that you're going to acquire. See? I can't come to have virtue; I already have.

[21:06] So Aristotle is now determining the truth with necessity, and he's saying change is not always between contraries, huh? Not always between two forms, that are poised, huh? But it's sufficient that you what lack the form before you acquire. it. Now another example. to. Show that.

[21:39] You've all read the Meno, huh? Okay. Now before the slave boy comes to know how to double a what square, right? He's in fact what? Mistaken, right? He thinks if you double the side, you're going to double the what? Square. Now, is it the same thing to be mistaken and to be ignorant how to double a square, right?

[22:21] What's the difference between a mistake or error and ignorance? First would be wrong knowledge, and the other would be lack of knowledge. Yeah. So when a person is mistaken, he's not thinking nothing. He's thinking what falsely, right? Okay. So if someone you know says, "Is Berkus standing now?" Right? And if someone in some other place in the world says, "I don't know," how am I supposed to know where he's standing or not?

[23:00] Right? See. But if someone says Berkus does not stand, right? He's what mistaken. Yeah, yeah. Now the person who thinks Berkus is not standing is ignorant of what Berkus is doing, right? Is everybody who's ignorant mistaken about Berkus?

[23:22] Is President George Bush is he standing now? I don't think that he is. I don't think he isn't either. I just don't know. See, I'm merely what ignorant, right? Okay. So everybody who is mistaken is what ignorant, huh?

[23:46] But is everybody who is ignorant mistaken? See. Now, is it easier to convince somebody who's ignorant or somebody who's mistaken? If somebody's ignorant, you have to remove the mistake from the mistaken person. Yeah, mistaken person is more difficult, right? More difficult. Yeah, yeah. Okay, and he may what resist your attempt to teach him, right? So Socrates has to show the slave boy that he's mistaken, right? And then he turns to me and he says, "Have we done him a good turn, right?

[24:27] " Before he would have gone and told the whole world the way to double a square is double the side, but now he knows he doesn't know, right? And now he'll want to know, right? Okay. But if the slave boy had merely said to Socrates, "I don't know how to double a square," right? Then Socrates could have begun as he did in the second conversation right away.

[24:49] So years ago, when I was at St. Mary's College there, we were teaching my brother Mark there, you know. And afternoon, Pete DeLuca called us up on the phone and said, "Can you bring his cousin over and his cousin's friend?" And sure, sure. So, they came over and we got talking, you know, and so on. And they're educated men. One had a his cousin had a master's degree from in economics from Stanford University, and his friend had a master's degree in in physics from Harvard, you know.

[25:22] And the other guy there was his wife who had a degree in math and taught math in one of the colleges around there, something like that. So we got talking, you know, and and going on, And then I realized that opened to the Ayn Rand school. you know, Ayn Rand, the novelist, you know, that one who smoked cigars and hit the dollar sign. And you get some good things about her, but I mean, she has a crazy, you know, view of morality.

[25:51] And they picked up. her idea of morality that the whole basis of of moral obligation was your free agreement, huh? That you're morally obligated to that which you freely agreed to, but only that—that was the whole basis of moral obligation. Yeah. So after talking to them for some time, I kind of didn't see their position. So I said, finally, now I'm going to write down your position here, in basic clear English.

[26:18] And I put it on a piece of paper, and I said, now we want to change the wording of that. And they said, no, no. So that was their their position, right? That you're morally obligated. So let's see. If you went to college, say, are you morally obligated to study? Say, well, no. But if, say, your father said to you, "You know, pay or pay part of your way through college, " but you've got to, you know, work, you know, then you have a moral obligation to do so, right?

[26:44] That was one of the examples that they they gave. So I said to them, well, well, then you have no obligation to your parents, huh? For bringing you into this world, huh? Because you didn't sit down with your parents and freely agree to go into this world, and and they're willing to admit that consequence of their position, right? That you have no obligation to your parents, but then then they brought this example going to school, right?

[27:11] If your parents, you know, you know, helped to pay for going to school with the understanding that you would, you know, pay attention to your studies and so on, right? Then you have an obligation, right? And I said, and you have no obligation to God, either. You can sit down and make a deal with God to be, you know, created. No obligation to him, right? Okay. So that was kind of perverse both of those So I was searching for something that would get them into a contradiction, right?

[27:41] So I found out that they were quite firm anti-communists, right? And I said to them, okay, but now the communists have freely agreed among themselves to overthrow our government. Therefore, according to what you your principle, they're morally obligated to overthrow our government. I don't want to accept the consequences of their position, and then I said, and furthermore, you shouldn't criticize somebody for doing something that you yourself say you're morally obligated to do.

[28:10] So I got to cop them, say, and then I said, and suppose the guy down the block here says Burkist, I'll pay you a thousand dollars to rub out, this and I freely agree to rub you out for a thousand dollars, right? Then according to your principle, I'm morally obligated. Of course, they wouldn't accept that. So that just got

[28:31] to try to see what morality is really based on, right? I see. But had to remove that error first, right? It was kind of marvelous. I mean, you know, it's one of the perfect examples, you know, almost of Socratic conversation that I've had in my life, you know. Oh. Because most time people will not, you know, follow the argument, right? Oh yeah. You know, and the the men were willing to follow the argument, the wife was not.

[28:53] Oh. And and and the cousin told the wife, you know, just. Shut up! You know, we're going to have the conversation. Otherwise, you don't remember it. But no, there is a real difference between someone who's mistaken, like the slave boy, or someone who's been married in school, and someone who's merely what ignorant, right? They're going to resist you. There was a student who came to St. John's years ago, you know, and he had read some philosophy books on his own, right?

[29:24] And therefore, he thought he'd be kind of ahead of all the other philosophy students, right? But of course, he'd picked up all kinds of mistakes and errors from reading the philosophy books that he had read, and so he told him, "Actually, you're behind everybody else because we've got to remove all these mistakes and errors in your head before we can teach you anything." So he thought he was going to be ahead of everybody, but that's the difference between being mistaken and being ignorant.

[29:52] So everybody who's mistaken is also ignorant, right? But not everybody who's ignorant is mistaken. So you necessarily are ignorant of something before you come to know it. You are not necessarily what mistaken about it, huh? Very often people are right, but you're not necessarily so, right? So Aristotle is determining the truth here with necessity, right? That was the second difference that I was talking about in regard to what he's doing here, right?

[30:25] In twelve and thirteen, he hadn't done in ten eleven, right? Ten eleven had had some necessity, right, but also some probability, and it corrects this idea of contrary forms, right?

[30:41] A lot of people don't see that distinction between contraries and lacks; There are two different kinds of opposition here. In addition to those two kinds of opposition, there is also what we call what contradiction, too. Okay, and then there's relatives or kinds of opposites that we talk about.

[31:04] Another example, very much like this, is the idea of persuasion, right? So if I'm going to persuade someone to vote Republican, now, because Republicans are more pro-life, right? It's going to

[31:21] be easier for me to persuade someone who's uncommitted, right, than someone who's Democrat or decided not to vote Republican, right? He's going to resist me, right? See, so just in terms of time, the persuaders are trying to target those voters who are what Undecided, right? undecided, right? Because they're going to make more converts there than among the Democrats, right? You see, because the Democrat he thinks he should vote for Republicans, right.

[31:55] That's a sad guy. He doesn't know whether to do or not, right? He just doesn't have his mind yet, huh? So, but even you can see the Democrat is not persuaded to vote Republican, but the undecided voter is not decided to vote Republican either, right? They both lack the persuasion, right? But the one has this contrary thinking, right? They're making resist you, right? So that's something new in the fourth paragraph, huh?

[32:28] And you can see the difference there, as they say, between this and earlier part. That is trying to determine the truth without complete necessity.

[32:42] Now, the fifth paragraph is also new and it's the most difficult of all.