Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
40. First Matter, the Five Attributes of God, and the Four Kinds of Cause (Reading Five)
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/3-natural-hearing/040-first-matter-the-five-attributes-of-god-and-the-four-kinds/

[0:00] together. Moderns can't fit things together. Let's look at the last paragraph here now, page seven. Now, the consideration of matter belongs most of all to the natural philosopher. The consideration of form, which Aristotle is here, belongs somewhat to the natural philosopher, but even more so to the wise man.

[0:37] So in a way, he's been after matter here, and he's distinguished matter from form, right, as we saw in the critique of Anaxagoras, and now matter from lack of form, right? But now he's coming back to the thought that we met in Anaximander but it's in all the early Greeks, that whatever is the first matter in some way remains throughout, but all change, although under different forms.

[1:02] So he says, it passes away and comes to be in one way, but another way, it doesn't come to be or pass away. As regards what is in it, it passes away through itself, for it is a lack in that in it that passes away. However, according to ability, not through itself, but is necessary for it to be ingenerable and incorruptible. For if it comes to be, it is necessary for something first to underlie it.

[1:29] But if this is the first matter; nothing underlies it, right? Okay, and since he's going all the way back to what we saw in Anaximander, whatever is the first matter is also what that to which things what come back, right? You remember how he concluded from that that the first matter, in a way, is what eternal, right, and doesn't grow old, right? Okay, they kind of reflected, you know, in a way, in modern science where they make the what conservation laws, the what most basic laws, conservation of energy, conservation of momentum, and so on.

[2:10] And so they're saying, you know, the amount of energy always remains the same, but under different what forms, right? Okay. Now, let's just you know, from back from over here, go back to the first two philosophers that we saw, who were Thales, remember, And then uh, and Axumena, right? And in Thales,What stands out, first of all, is the fact he's looking for one beginning of all things, right?

[2:43] And secondly, he takes something that, at least to our senses, appears to be simple and homogeneous. So he takes something like water, right, rather than orange juice, you know, with a pulp on the other part, you know, he seems to be. So you get the idea that the beginning of all things is one and what simple, right? And then you come to Anaximander, and he speaks of the beginning of all things as being, unlimited right, Unlimited, right, Okay, Or infinite.

[3:20] One of these Latin words, okay, and then he points out, like Aristotle is pointing out now, that in a way it's what, changeless, right? Okay, incorruptible in a sense the first matter, right? Everything comes to be from it, and we're broken down, to it, right? So in some way it's unchanging, right?

[3:52] Aristotle he talks about the infinite there in the third book. He says that that all the Greeks when they talked about the beginning they thought that it was being unlimited in some way, right?

[4:04] So it's very interesting that these are four of the five attributes of God, though they have different meaning in the set of God and the said of matter. But God is one, simple, unlimited, or infinite, and unchanging. Okay.

[4:24] Now, when Thomas takes up the substance of God in the Summa Theologia, everything he says about the substance of God he leads back to five things, and these are four of the five things. What is the fifth thing he leads it back to?

[4:43] Perfect. Perfect. Yeah. Yeah. Now, if you study, you know, both Summas, the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles, you'll see that he considers first the existence of God, right? Okay. Shows that God exists, and then he considers what he calls the substance of God, right? What God is, right? And then thirdly, he considers what God does, the operations of God, right?

[5:16] And even though these three might be the same thing, in reality, the existence of God, what He is, and His understanding of it, right? In our knowledge, right, we have a separate consideration of that. Okay. And then to that you can add a fourth consideration, which is that of the of the what Trinity, right? Okay.

[5:38] But as far as natural reason is concerned, huh? Yeah, just the first three. You consider the existence of God, what He is, and what He does, right? The substance and the operation of God. The existence of God, the substance of God, the operation of God. But then, theology, revealed theology, you have added to that a fourth part, which is on the Trinity.

[6:04] Now, as you study those four parts, you see that one is naturally presupposed to the other, right? If you don't know that God exists, you don't ask what He is, right? But you ask in sense what He is before what He does, right? Okay, you have to know the understand the understanding of God and His will before you can understand the Trinity, right? So far as we can.

[6:27] But anyway, notice that someone in the twelfth book of Wisdom too, where Aristotle picked up the substance of God before His what operation, right? But now we're looking at the substance of God, and Thomas leads everything back to those five.

[6:51] So when he talks about God being good, that's attached to consideration perfection of God, right? He talks about God being eternal. That's attached to God being unchanging. We talked about God being in some way everywhere, right? That's attached to His being unlimited, right?

[7:14] So everything is is led back to arranged around these five things. So here you have the number five rather than the number what three, right? But four of these five they rise so naturally since you're only Greeks, huh? These four, but because you're thinking the first cause is being matter, right? That they don't see it as being what perfect, right? Once you realize the first cause is not a cause in the sense of matter, but a cause more like form or like mover or or in, then you realize you have this fourth one, specifically.

[7:52] But it would be hard, right? It'd be hard to maybe demonstrate and give a reason why these five are the five, right? Because anything you can say about the substance of God, that wouldn't be one of these five or attached to one of these five.

[8:11] I was looking just the other day at the the the first chapter there in Vatican I, you know, where it talks about God and a whole bunch of things said about God, right? And

[8:25] but they all seem to be led back to one of these five, unless they're talking about his understanding, which comes the next part, right, the operation. But there's nothing said there that doesn't go back to these five.

[8:39] So it's kind of an interesting text, but but it's kind of double compared to this, you know. You look at the text; it shows you the text. So, but nevertheless, it has you know authority the Catholic doesn't have, right? But but everything that's said there was backed up with these five, right? Kind of you know if we have to be a sign here of the of the completeness of this, I mean, some said, you know, well, show me if that's complete.

[9:05] I don't know if I could give you a reason, right? But when I come to it from the Greek philosopher, is this seems very what natural, natural, yeah. And these four, you know, rise very naturally, and then the fifth one, right? Which is the different cause. The order of

[9:36] the two supras is a little bit differently, right? Different, isn't it? Because in the Summa Kondi Gentiles, he shows this first that he's unchanging, and then that he's what simple, and then he's perfect, and then he's one, and he's unlimited. But in the Summa Theologiae, he does what simple first, then perfect, then unlimited, then changing in the Summa Theologiae I gave a paper one time that for different order he does, and something is brought out in each different order, right?

[10:16] It also be a little reason why the order is so different too. I don't try to say one is correct order; one isn't because he just. But still, revolves around those five, right? It seems kind of necessary. We'll see to talk about the simple before we talk about it being perfect. So, no, sir. I was

[11:01] touching here upon the first matter in a way as being a remaining plot, all change, right? Yeah. They say that's reflected in the modern science the conservation laws being the most basic. The idea to understand in some way the what changing by the unchanging, huh? Is that necessary or what?

[11:28] Well, if the ball is hit in the infield, right, and caught in the outfield, it should be the same ball that was hit in the infield, caught in the outfield. You know, the something has to be made the same, right? In order for there to be that change of place, right?

[11:46] The ball ceased to be after left the infield. Make the game impossible, among other things, but it also makes motion impossible, right? You know, and you talk about a stone falling to the ground, right? Well, the stone has to remain, right, in order to fall to the ground, right?

[12:10] Aristotle, you know, in the biological works, he gives the example. I guess is a common one for the Greeks. You know, they have a pile of grain, and I guess if a mouse gets in the pile of grain, it gets, you know, can't move because the grain keeps on what giving way as it tries to walk. So you depend upon something that doesn't move, right, in order to walk.

[12:30] That's why you can't walk in the water unless you're God or something, right? It gives way, right? You kind of? Go back to something unchanging, huh? It seems to to have changed, huh? So the mind is kind of inclined. to the idea that the first cause must be in some way what unchanging, right? Now matter is not in every way changing because it's always under a different form, right?

[12:51] But in some ways, persists, though it all changes. But God is much more unchanging than that. Okay. But now he says, "But about the beginning is form, whether it is one or many, and what sort it is, is the work of first philosophy, which is the way Aristotle often calls wisdom, first philosophy, to determine a certitude But concerning natural, and corruptible forms, we will speak in the things to be shown later.

[13:24] Let it be determined thus by us that there are beginnings and what they are and how many in number. We shall speak again, starting with another beginning, huh? And he starts to talk about the beginning of science.

[13:38] Now, let's pass out the next reading here, huh? Okay. Just passes around. I got about ten copies there. I think I got enough. I'll just say if you wouldn't by reduction to this reading five, huh? Reading five is a very in book two. It's a very universal text on cause, right?

[14:30] Aristotle there is going to we're going to meet there is the distinction of the four kinds of crops. Now Plato in a way anticipates this a bit if you read the the figure, right, huh? But it's not as clear as it is in Aristotle, right? Okay. So we're going to meet the distinction of the four kinds of causes, and this is also a distinction of four senses of the word cause.

[15:21] Okay. But these are not. Each of them is said to be a cause in exactly the same sense, right? Okay, it's not entirely what univocal the word cause, right? Okay, that's kind of a strange thing, huh? Kind of a strange thing.

[15:56] Let me contrast this with my geometrical example. Then Euclid, if you recall, in geometry, he distinguishes many kinds of quadrilateral: the square, the oblong, the rhombus, the rhomboid, and then the trapezium. kind of keeps the rest, right? Or if you want to take just the first four, along we find that they're parallelograms, right? Okay. Now there are four kinds of, or five kinds of quadrilateral he distinguishes, right?

[16:32] Or four kinds of parallelogram, right? Is that five meanings of the word quadrilateral? No, because each of them is a quadrilateral in exactly the same sense. Okay,

[16:54] but here, right, he's distinguishing four kinds of cause, but each is not a cause in exactly the same sense. Okay, that's kind of strange, isn't it? What is the univocal? Well, it's not going to be

[17:14] purely equivocal to the word quadrilateral. In fact, we will give a definition of cause. In fact, we can give this definition of cause. We can say a cause is what is responsible

[17:36] for the being or becoming of another, right? Okay. It's what is responsible for the being or the becoming of another. Okay. And that other, of course, we could call the what? Effect. Effect, right? Okay. So you could say the effect depends

[18:15] upon the cause, right? For being or becoming, right? For its existence or its coming into existence, right? Okay. Now, though we give a kind of a definition here of cause, you'll see as you go through the various kinds of causes that. Depend. There seems to have not exactly the same meaning in each case, right? See, I take an obvious example here. If you have a wooden chair, right, is wood and the carpenter responsible in the same way for that chair?

[18:54] See, and so sometimes you know people want to limit cause to just one of the kinds of cause, because they they kind of sense that that's not exactly the same meaning, huh? See, okay. They want to collapse all four meanings into one, or yeah, or just keep one of the four, right? Okay, see. Now, you might want to say, you know, what's the cause of the chair?

[19:25] Well, the carpenter is the cause of the chair, right? Okay, but doesn't the chair, if it's a wooden chair, doesn't it depend in some way upon wood? Right. And would have come into existence without wood, right? No. See, but at first you might not think of the wood as being a cause of the chair. You think it's the carpenter, right? See, but in some sense the wood is responsible for the chair, or metal is responsible for this chair, right?

[19:49] You see, but in a different way than the than the metal worker or the carpenter is. Yes. See, and is sitting in some way responsible for chairs? Yes. Well, sitting doesn't do anything to bring a chair into existence, does it? Right. But isn't it sitting in some way responsible? Yeah. That's very why. Yeah, Because for the sake of sitting, that carpenter made the chair, right? That's why he gave the chair the shape that he did, right?

[20:17] See, in some way, sitting is responsible, right? We get the way in which sitting is responsible for the chair, and the carpenter seems so so different, doesn't it? You might want to say that one is responsible and not the other, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. See, as you study these four kinds of causes, you get the you get the so to use the word feeling that is not exactly in the same sense that each of them is called a cause.

[20:49] Yet in some way, right, they're all responsible for the thing. See. That is kind of an unusual thing to see, that, huh? Yeah. And perhaps other examples of that, huh? When Aristotle distinguishes the word "part" there in the in the metaphysics, he distinguishes four meanings of the word "part," right? Well, could you speak of four kinds of parts?

[21:27] I think you could. Yeah. Yeah. Um. But. Exactly, parts in the same way, huh? If I give you some examples, let's do this off. take the word "cat," right? What are the parts of the word "cat"?

[21:58] C A T. Yeah. Okay. Now, what are the parts of the word "act"? Yeah. Okay. But you know, if you first think of C A N T as being parts of the word "cat." Now, but isn't there something in the word "cat" besides the letters? Yeah. Yeah. Now, could you say that the parts of the word "cat" are the letters and the order of them? Yes. Isn't that using the word "part" in a somewhat different sense? Yes See At first, if someone says that the order of the letters is a part of the word, you might say that's kind of strange.

[22:44] You say that, right? You think first that C, A, and T are the parts of it, right? Okay. But yet, you know, if a part is that out of which something is made, or it's what composed or something, right? You know, it seems that the order is is part of it too in some way, right? But I use the word part in different sense. So when we say that that the quantitative parts, and we speak of matter in form as parts, in this case the form being the the order, you seem to use the word in a different sense, right?

[23:21] Okay. Or else, I'll talk about the parts of the definition, right? Okay. So the quadrilateral and equilateral and right angle are parts of the definition of what?

[23:40] Of a square, right? Okay. Are they parts in the way that C, A, and T are parts? I can say the square is equilateral, right? Can I say that the word cat is the letter C? No. I can say the square is equilateral. I can say the square is right angle,

[24:16] right? I can say it is an equilateral right angle quadril, right? What about the word cat, I say that C, A, and T, and it is C, and it is A, and it is T. You see that? See, it must be a different sense of part, right? Right. But still, is it purely by chance that we speak of these as parts of the definition of square, and these as parts of the word cat?

[24:41] You see, there's some likeness there, right? It's not simply by chance we call both parts. And then when I say, you know, that the particular is a part of the general, right?

[24:59] Is that? Is dog a part of animal? What would you say? Well, I mean, is animal composed of dog and cat and horse? Like cat is composed of C, A, and T.

[25:19] No. Is is it defined by them? No. It seems to be the word part in a different meaning, right? And yet, why do we speak of these? as, you know, we use a word derived from part, like, particular, right?

[25:50] But in some way, it's a part. There's some likeness there, right? It's not simply by by chance to use the word part. So we end up with four kinds of parts and what? Four meanings. Yeah, yeah. Why quadrilateral is not four meanings of quadrilateral? They're to be exactly the same meaning, right? In in arithmetic, if I distinguish between odd and even number, or prime and composite numbers, right?

[26:21] Different kinds of number, right? Are there different meanings of the word number? No, no. See. How many kinds of things are there in the world? Ten. Yeah, but if I be a little more strict, you say there are four kinds of things, right? There are substances, right? Quantities, qualities, relations. It's four kinds of things, right? Right.

[26:58] Aren't there also four senses the word thing. Excuse me. Is a man? Is the body and its health? You know, is the health the thing in the same way the body is the thing?

[27:16] Is the clay a thing in the shape of the clay the same sense? So, when you say you got four kinds of things: substance, quantity, quality, relation, and four kinds of things, but I also have four senses, four meanings of the word thing. But it's not pretty equivocal because quantity is the size of substance, right? And quality is a disposition of substance, and relation is substances towards something, right?

[27:58] So they're all connected. These meanings, right? It's kind of a strange thing to see that, right? Virtue and vice are two kinds of habit, right? Two meanings of habit. No. Dog and cat are two kinds of animals. Two meanings of animal.

[28:28] But here, just example I'm giving you, right? Four kinds of part, but also four meanings of part, right? I notice, I'm not saying that the distinction of kinds, an distinction of senses, is the same kind of distinction, but they correspond in this case, right? Right?

[28:55] It's kind of strange the way these different kinds of distinctions sometimes correspond. Let me give you a little bit of an example of this, but it's relevant to what we were saying before. Would you say that the body and its health are the same thing? Would you distinguish the body and its health? You know what justifies your distinguishing between body and its health? The body can be sick.

[29:23] Yeah, sometimes the body loses its health, right? And sick, right? Okay. So it's it's change, right? Most of all, reveals to us that the body and its health are not the same thing, right? So we make a distinction between the health and the body, right? Okay. What is that kind of distinction? Is that?

[29:49] Well, some might say, well, the body here is a substance, a thing that exists, but not in another subject, right? While health is what we call accident, right? It's a thing that exists only in another, isn't a subject, right? It's apart from that, right? But could you also say that the body is what? In a way, the body is able to be healthy or to be sick, right?

[30:21] So the health, in a way, is the what The form. The form of the body, right? Okay. It's an accidental form, but the body could be said to be what matter, right? Okay. Let's take another example of that. Let's take the spherical shape and you've got the clay, right? Okay. What kind of distinction is that? It's a distinction between substance and what accident, right?

[30:56] There might also be distinction between what form and matter, right? Like the sphere, cube, and cylinder, right? So is that the same kind of distinction? Is it?

[31:15] Because later on, as we saw in the part we just went through, within substance itself, you could distinguish between what. Form and matter, the different senses of form and matter, the substantial form, and so on. But this distinction is found even within substance. Well, obviously, we find this distinction here within substance, right? So we need two different kinds of distinction, right? But they kind of reflect materially; they coincide in this case, right?

[31:43] Right. And so, you know, if you want to understand the distinction between clay and the shape of the clay, or between the body and health, you might have to see that it's both in a way a distinction of substance and accident, right? But it's also a distinction of matter and of form, right? Or the distinction of, say, of the body and the soul. We say man is composed of body and soul.

[32:12] That's a distinction of form and matter, but not of substance and what accident, right? Um. So Aristotle distinguishes the four kinds of causes here, right? Is a distinction of four kinds of cause, or is a distinction of four senses of the word cause? I'd say in a way it's what both, right? Okay. Or when Euclid divides quadrilateral into those four or five, he's distinguishing five kinds of quadrilateral, but not five meanings of the word quadrilateral.

[32:55] You see that? It's the same thing at work here when, when all of a sudden we're starting to talk about here more beginnings, whereas last time we're talking about beginnings too. You see, you see, up to this point Aristotle was trying to understand nature, right? And nature is a cause within, right? The beginning and cause of motion and rest in that which it is, right? And first, such and such a happening.

[33:31] So, the interest is what's intrinsic to these things, right? What's found in every change, in every becoming, and then we see the distinction of matter and form, which are the two basic meanings of nature, right? But now here he's looking at completely universally, you know, at cause, right? So the text we're going to read now is useful for every part of philosophy, right? For any knowledge, we look for causes, right?

[34:01] Because if Aristotle has distinguished all the kinds of causes there are, right, then any science that looks for causes will have to look for one or more than one of these kinds of causes, right? And there may be, you know, some science that will look for only one of these four kinds of causes, and some as many as four, right? Okay. And then Aristotle will ask the question afterwards: Which of these kinds of causes are found in the actual world, right?

[34:32] Okay. Okay. But, that's the question you could ask: Which of these causes are found in geometry, right? If you're talking about God, what, which of these senses is God a cause, right? You know. Okay. So this is going to be useful for for geometry or for natural philosophy or for theology, right? For any science, right? Any knowledge that tries to understand why, any knowledge that looks for causes, right?

[35:01] And he makes the same thing in the fifth book of wisdom, right? Okay. Now I think if you go back to the to the definition that we gave, kind of cause, that a cause is what is responsible for the being or the becoming of something, right? Well natural philosophy is this is the knowledge of becoming, right? And wisdom, you find out, is the knowledge of being, right?

[35:27] So it's kind of relevant to both of these to talk about what it causes, huh? But he distinguishes exactly the same four kinds in the fifth book of wisdom, and in the second book of natural hearing physics as they call it, is universal. Right.

[35:45] So something extremely universally useful. Can you give an example of a distinction of senses of a word which is not distinction in kinds? Well, obviously, you take the word that's you know equivocal by chance, right? Okay, if it's equivocal by reason, like in, many senses of things, like kinds of being kinds of being in. I mean, if you're distinguishing back into the baseball bat and the flying rodent, right?

[36:23] You wouldn't call them two kinds of something, would you? No, no, it's really just two meanings of the word bat, right? But here there seems to be more unity than that, right? So you could speak of many kinds of what cause, right? It seems to be a kind of common notion, but one that's claimed of what not said equally, right? Exactly same meaning of all.

[36:53] I would think, normally of kind as species, but that's not really right. Well, kind can be used for species or for genus, right? There's a species, a particular kind of thing, right? And the genus is a general kind of thing, right? Yeah. So I say there are four kinds of things: substance, quantity, quality. We're talking about four genera, right? They're not species, but they all seem to be.

[37:24] You know, you can say each species has something there, right? But it doesn't seem to be something or a thing in exactly the same way.

[37:38] So far as the person goes, is a man and a dog the same thing? They'd say what? No, is a man and a shape two things like the man, the dog are two things. Okay. Yeah, they kind of hesitate, right? You see, is your nose the shape of your nose two things? Your nose and your ear, those are two things, right? But your nose and the shape of your nose are those two things.

[38:03] What do you say? You probably say no at first, right? They'd say no. It's nothing if I find it in your nose? Well then, the shape of your nose is something, right? You know, is it? But he kind of hesitates at first to say that the shape of the nose because it doesn't seem to be a thing, and you know, the same with the ear is right.

[38:25] You know. So the the the nose and the ear are two things in a way that the nose and the shape of the nose are not two things, right? But in some way the nose and the shape of the nose are two things, aren't they?

[38:42] If you're a certain nose like Cyrano de Bergerac The nose is longer than the other men's nose, right? That's something. Bother you, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[39:02] The English guy's got a story there. He had his very long nose, you know, everybody, you know, who saw it, they were what? They'd wonder, you know, is that really his natural nose, Is that some kind of a traction he's got on, right? And so everybody had an idea they wanted to. We can imagine if you had a nose at that people wondered whether there was a nose or some kind of a tricky head on there, and they wanted to feel it.

[39:25] you'd get irritated after a lot. of people picking your nose all the time, right? You'd get very defensive after a lot. So that is something, right? To be longer, right? Huh?

[39:41] The girl likes to dance with the man who's what? At least as tall she is. You know, she dances with the man shorter than her usually, right?

[39:50] Occasionally, you see a couple like that, but usually you see the man who's a little bit taller than the woman, right? And so that that's something, right? Taking into account, right? See. Right. So

[40:12] being taller than or shorter than is important, right? So essentially, you're going to be forced to admit that these are all something, right? And therefore, the way that they are a thing, but you seem to be using the word "thing" in a kind of what?

[40:30] completely univocal way, right? They're? Not completely the same. right? Substances we think in a primary meaning, right? And the other things are something of this basic thing, right? But they are something, not nothing. So Aristotle is

[40:57] going to distinguish then four kinds of cause. We'll see here. And as we study these four kinds, we're going to he's going to define each of the four kinds, okay? And he's going to give examples. and he wants to see the definition and the examples, right? But then, after we've gone through them, we're going to ask: Is there a certain order in which Aristotle has distinguished these four?

[41:29] Now after he he goes through the four kinds of causes, then he goes on to the three corollaries, which start at the bottom of the page, right? And the first two paragraphs on the second page, right? Now I call them corollaries because at least the first two clearly follow upon the distinction of four kinds of causes. They're very important for many reasons.

[41:56] But then in the last paragraph, what is he doing in the last paragraph? See if you can tell what he's doing in the last paragraph. He seems to come back to the four kinds of causes, but is he just summarizing, or is he doing something new there? He comes back. Okay.

[42:15] Well, as you'll see, he is doing something new there, but read carefully, you know. So we'll look at this reading five next time.