Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
41. The Four Kinds of Causes: Matter, Form, Mover, End
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[0:02] Now, what I attach to that is Aristotle's arguments for saying that end is a cause in the natural world. but we'll get into that when we get. Don't forget to get into that yet. Just that first reading is enough, right? Reading five, and

[0:23] very useful for understanding many things. Actual hearing, and in this reading, Aristotle is going to distinguish the kinds of causes, which is also a distinction of four basic senses of the word cause. Now we could give a kind of common notion of cause.

[0:54] The Greek word for cause, aitia, has the sense of being responsible. If we hold you responsible for something, that means that you are considered the what cause of that, right? So we could speak of a cause as what is responsible

[1:21] for the being or becoming of another. What is responsible for the being or becoming of another, not of itself? Okay. Of course, the other here can be called the effect,

[1:53] and so the effect you could say depends upon the cause for its being or for its what becoming, right? Okay. Or if you wanted to, you could say the cause is what is responsible for the existence, right, or the coming into existence of another.

[2:29] Now we say both of those words because something could be responsible for the coming to be, for the coming into existence of something. But once that thing is in existence, it can exist without the thing that brought it into existence. So the wooden chair over there came into existence because of the carpenter, but it can be now without the carpenter. So there's a little distinction there, right, between depending upon something for becoming or being.

[3:08] Now, it's possible too for something to depend upon something both for its being and its becoming. So the wooden chair over there wouldn't come to be without having some wood to begin with, but it also depends for its being now upon the wood that is inside of it.

[3:35] Now, the first kind of cause that Aristotle talks about there after that first paragraph, he talks about. You know, it's important for natural philosophy, but it's of more universal importance. The first kind of cause we could name matter,

[3:56] and this kind of cause is defined by two things. It's that from which something comes to be, but then he adds a second part, existing within it.

[4:29] That from which something comes to be, existing within it. Now, why is that second part there necessary in the definition? Well, as we saw in our study of matter and the contrary and lack of form and so on, one speaks of something as coming to be from its opposite too. So the hard comes to be from the soft, right? And the wet from the dry, but the soft is not in the hard, right?

[5:03] So the second part here separates matter from the what? Lack. The lack, or from the contrary, right? So you need that second part. We also though, to a less extent, we might say the chair came from the carpenter,

[5:22] but the carpenter, to the best of my knowledge, is not inside the chair, and so that existing within it separates it from the what? Mover or maker, as well.

[5:38] And sometimes we even say that something comes to be from the whole, which it is a part. So I might get a well-to the used car lot there and get a part of the car I need. So this part came from that car over there, right? And yet the part is said to come to be from the what? whole in a certain way, right? If I ripped a page out of a book, well, it came from the book, right?

[6:07] That's where the page came from. But the whole is not, of course, in the part. So that second part of the definition then is necessary, right? To separate matter, especially from the contrary or the lack of form, but it also separates it from the mover or maker, or even from the whole.

[6:34] Now, the examples that Aristotle uses in describing this first kind of cause are taken from artificial things rather than from natural things. The bronze of the statue, right, and silver of the cup, right, or glass of the glass, right, okay, or wood of the chair, like in my example, right. Now, Aristotle's choice of examples is always significant, as De Koninck used to say. You know, if a modern Thomist gave examples, I wouldn't look very easy for the significance of examples.

[7:14] But Aristotle, you do. Why does he take examples from artificial things here rather than from natural things? Well, since we make them, we see the matter. Yeah, so they're more known in a sense to us on the artificial things, huh? And the natural things.

[7:43] So that's the first kind of cause. We should know the name of that cause and know the definition of that cause, and then be able to give examples, right? Okay.

[8:00] So the chemists are right. Hydrogen and oxygen, right, are the matter of water. That's less known to us, obviously, than than the examples that he gives there from artificial things. huh? The chemists and the gainer of these. Well, like metal, let's say, instead of bronze, right? Oh, sure, okay. Okay. Or if I say this is an oak desk, you know, and I say, well, wooden desk, right?

[8:28] We're still talking the same kind of cause. Suppose if you said that. Suppose you had that water came from hydrogen, oxygen, but it was a substantial change, so that hydrogen and oxygen weren't really in the water. Yeah. It is really compositional as a matter, is it?

[8:50] So that would distinguish it too from them, but not in them. Yeah. Just like we said, a sphere comes to be from a cube. You know, sphere played from a cube, but when the cube shape is no longer there, when the sphere is there. Now the second kind of cause we can call the form, okay.

[9:13] And the Greek word there, which I translated this text here, account is logos, right? So you could say it's the account or the what, definition really, of what was to be,

[9:32] the account or the definition. The definition of what was to be. Well, notice the contrast there. Looking back to matter, he says, "Of what was to be, huh? What was to be from the wood was, let's say, chair, right? Now, if you define the chair, you do so more by its form than by its matter, right? So we might define this thing. if you ask what is this?

[10:04] I'd say it's a chair. And that thing over there, what is it? It's a chair, even though this is made out of metal and this is made out of wood, right? And this desk or table, we'd call it a table rather than a chair, even though it's made out of the same matter, generically at least, as that desk as that chair over there, right? Okay. So the idea that the form in a way completes the definition of what the thing was, and that's also something like that.

[10:32] What Aristotle talks about, nature as being both matter and form. Well, by matter you have a natural thing, only an ability. By form you have a natural thing, actual. So nature is more form than matter. Okay. Now,

[10:56] notice the the example that he gives there, right? What's significant about that example? Two towards one of the octave, the diapason in Greek. Where'd that example come from?

[11:14] Pythagoras. Yeah, Pythagoras who discovered that there were simple numerical ratios underlying harmonious sounds. We saw that thing by Ratti there. It had some of the other ratios in there. Was it the fifth? Was what three to two? I guess, and so on. So it's a what compliment? You might say to what Pythagoras, right, who introduced the second kind of cause. He kind of stands out as odd compared to Thales and Anaximenes and the poets who spoke of Mother Earth or water, air.

[11:55] He says talk about two to one, right? Yeah. Now going back though to the beginning of this, he says another way the form and the model.

[12:10] We just call form period, but notice he says the form and the model. Well, what is the distinction here between form and model? Well, the form is intrinsic to the thing which it is a form, right? The model is like an extrinsic form that you imitate, right, or copy.

[12:39] So in my father's factory, they made farm wagons, and you get an order from the office, the number 500 wagons, whatever the wagon was called, and the men who were experienced down there, they had these patterns on the wall, right? You take these patterns off and you copy something according to that, right? Make it in the shape of that pattern. So it's an extrinsic, right? Okay, thing that you are what, in a way, imitating, making something like that.

[13:17] If I I copy that painting or something, right? Huh? I you know, okay. Models with clothing a lot, right? But the one who, the woman who models the dress, right? So I like that. The buyer says, you know, but you're probably not going to get the dress that she's wearing. You're going to get a dress that is what like the one that she's drawing, right? But that's kind of the pattern we're going to what imitate, huh?

[13:49] In making other dresses, so that's considered to be a cause in this second sense, right? But there's a distinction there between the intrinsic form and the exterior one that you're imitating or copying, in a sense, huh? Okay.

[14:08] See that? So man learns by imitation, right? Huh? Okay. So we tend to imitate our teachers, we imitate our parents, and so on, right? Grandchildren imitate their parents, huh? Children imitate, you know, and you see something like what the parents say, not exactly like what they say, but, something like it, right? Okay. So in a sense, the form of their speech is the form of the parent's speech in a way is a cause of the what form of the child's speech because they're imitating the way of speaking and the accent, so on.

[14:54] So this is the second kind of cause he talks about, right? And significance of the example there. In some ways, it's not as easy an example to understand as the ones under the first one, but it's kind of a tribute there to what Pythagoras, right? And when Aristotle talks about the four kinds of causes in the first book of Wisdom, it's primarily Pythagoras and Plato who talk about form.

[15:23] So, of course, in mathematics, this is the only kind of cause you really have is the formal cause in strict sense. Now the third kind of cause is called the mover

[15:41] or maker. Usually, just say the mover. And notice the definition he gives now. Whence the first beginning of change or rest? Huh? He adds that, right? Whence first there is a beginning of change or rest. Whence

[16:17] first there is a beginning of motion. Change or rest, and that's why he says those words there. You might say, why doesn't he say what's there is a beginning of motion or rest? Why doesn't he say when first there is a beginning of motion or rest?

[16:53] Well, you could say that in the the wood becoming a chair, it begins with wood, doesn't it? See, but the wood is just going to sit there without the carpenter, isn't it? So, once first the wood starts to get molded into a chair, is due to the carpenter, right? So that word first, perhaps, is not simply what

[17:20] repeating what the word beginning means, huh? But it's bringing out right what's necessary to separate, in a sense, the motion from the the matter, because change begins with something, with some matter that can be what formed or molded in some way or pushed around or something, right? Huh? But it's the mover, the maker, who initiates the the change in the in the matter or the matter becoming something, huh?

[18:03] No, it's like in the definition of nature. Nature is defined as the beginning and cause of motion and of rest, right? In that which it is first as such, and not for happening. So it's due to the nature of the tree and the nature of man and the nature of the cat and so on. Not only that they grow, for example, but that they stop growing at a certain age, right?

[18:31] It's natural for his grandchildren to grow, right? Huh? Okay. The more they grow, the more they eat, and the more they eat, the more they grow. Is what I always say. But it's also natural for them to stop growing at a certain what time, a certain height, huh? Okay.

[18:52] And it's natural for different you know kinds of animals and plants to stop at different heights, huh? So when you get a pet tiger, right, they grow too big before they stop growing, right? Apart from the eating problem, trying to feed the darn thing, but but boy, the kitchen wouldn't wouldn't naturally get that. So I stop before he gets as big as a tiger, right? A little safer in the house that way.

[19:20] It's hard enough with Tabitha, you know. Tabitha, kind of put her downstairs, you know, safekeeping in the evening, and she, you know. She give you a rough time. I used to say, "Marcus, you put her down." But Mop is much more docile. The one that's there now, she's docile. Go downstairs.

[19:44] Now, what's significant about the examples here? He says, "As the adviser is a cause, and the father of the child, huh? Okay. His two examples, and one is drawn from nature, the father of the child, right?

[20:07] And the other is taken from reason. The adviser is a cause, right? Okay. And these are the two movers or makers that are what clear to us in our experience, huh? God is what sort of hidden, right? Okay.

[20:30] From that division we had of the order, you know, in comparison to reason, and we talked about the order not made by reason, and the order that stood out that's not made by reason is the one made by nature. And then we had the orders made by what reason in its own acts and in the acts of the will and the exterior matter. Remember that? But notice, touching upon there's being two main what causes, huh?

[21:00] In our experience, huh? Reason and what nature. Yeah. So that's very significant, huh? And notice, secondly, is it significant that he takes the father as an example here rather than the mother?

[21:30] Yeah, because the mother is associated with the cause called matter, right? So the oldest opinion, kind of, of the first matter was its mother Earth, right? And in Latin, if you look in the dictionary under materia, the word for matter, they'll refer back to mater, the mother, right? Huh? Yeah. And you could say that

[22:00] most of the matter of the baby, right? When you have when the baby's born, those nine months, it comes from the mother, right? Huh? Because when the father gets through with his role, there's not much to show for it.

[22:16] And even after the child is born, the mother, by nature, has milk, right? Again, to feed the baby, right? So the mother is more a cause in the sense of matter, right? And notice, this looks back to Heraclitus. Heraclitus is the man who emphasized motion and change in the world around us, and that's perhaps the reason why he he guessed fire is the beginning of things, because he was thinking of the cause of motion.

[22:47] But he also spoke of war is the what father of all things, right? Didn't say mother of all things, the father of all things, and that use of the word father there is a sign that he's thinking of another what kind of cause, huh? Than than matter, right?

[23:10] And this is the reason also why we call God a father rather than a mother, right? Because God is a cause in the sense of the mover or the maker, but he's not a cause in the sense of matter, right? So, what's the all the significance then in these two what examples, right? One is taken from reason, and the other from nature, the two main movers or makers, right?

[23:42] When I look around this room, most of what I see is artificial. artificial, made by art, and therefore by human reason, right? It's just your faces and hands, more or less, that are are natural, right? If I went for a walk in the woods, most of what I see would be natural, except for somebody's beer can or something, right? Okay. But that's what you see around you for the most part, right?

[24:04] Either natural, or artificial things, huh? And that ties the things made by nature and the things made by by art or by reason, huh? And so he gives an example of each of those here, right? Okay. But then the particular significance of his giving in the second the example of the what father rather than the mother, right? And he says then in general the one making of the thing made, so we put the maker under this kind of cause, a mover or maker, and the one bringing about the change of the thing what changed, huh?

[24:44] So it's the third kind of cause, huh? Is it significant at all that his examples are like persons If I was your father and it says the one making and the one. I suppose that's more known, yeah. Yeah. Okay.

[25:02] Now finally comes the fourth kind of cause, which is called the end, huh? And the definition of end is that for the sake of which,

[25:20] huh? Now, if you wanted to, you can add, but it's really not necessary. You can say that for the sake of which something is or is done, right? Okay. But that's just kind of breaking it down, right? So the chair is for the sake of sitting, right? My walking is for the sake of my health, whatever it might be, okay?

[26:00] So the definition of end then is that for the sake of which, okay? Now, um, he kind of shows here more at length that in fact end is a cause. This is a more obscure cause in a way than the other causes, huh? So after he gives the example as health of walking around. For an account of what does he walk around? Why does he take exercise every day?

[26:35] Right, in order that he may be what healthy we would say, right? In speaking thus, we now this is not the editorial we. This is not we, the Greek natural philosophers, but we meaning men in general, right? We think that we have rendered the cause, right?

[26:57] Okay. Now he goes on to point out that one can consider not only the very last thing an end, but you can have many ends in a certain what order, right? And he gives an example here from medicine, being the son of a medical doctor, is you know. And whatever things he says, another moving come to be in the middle for the end, as thinning or purgation or drugs or tools.

[27:34] Suppose I had a tool for making what a drug or a medicine, right? Then you can say that the drug or the medicine is the end of the what tool. But I take the the drug or the medicine for the sake of what the purgation of my body, right? Okay, To eliminate certain things, right? And therefore purgation could be said to be the end of the what Drug.

[28:03] Or drugs or medicine, and the purgation is for the sake of thinning me down to the size I should be. Okay. For all these are for the sake of the end, but they differ in my example from each other as some being deeds, right, and others being tools and so on, right? Okay. So suppose I have a headache, right? And so I want to take some aspirin to get rid of my headache.

[28:33] I don't have any aspirin. Well, then I want to go to the drugstore so I can buy headache, right? I mean buy buy aspirin, right? Um. So what's the end here? To get rid of my headache, or is it taking aspirin, or is it getting aspirin, or is it walking to the drugstore? What is it? Well, you could say my walking to the drugstore is for the sake of buying aspirin, right?

[29:05] My buying aspirin is for the sake of what taking it. My taking is for the sake of getting rid of my headache. Maybe that's for the sake of something further too, right? So you could have a series of end, right? Now though the last. Of them would be most of all the end. You can still speak of the other ones as being what ends, right? Okay.

[29:38] So Thomas Aquinas says, "I study the body so I can what understand the soul. I study the soul so I can study the angels, and I study the angels so I can study God. That's it.

[29:53] So what's the end? Huh? Well, the ultimate end there is to know God, right? Huh? But he's studying the body nevertheless for the sake of knowing the soul, and he's studying the soul for the sake of understanding the angels, and he's studying the angels for the sake of understanding God. Huh? So there is more than one end there. So it's not the last thing that could be said to be an end.

[30:16] Okay. Now, notice that same thing could be said in regard to other causes. Huh? You say, "What's moving the the the page there? Right? Is it the folder or is it my hand? " Say, well, you could say in a way both, right? You say, "It's maybe more my hand than than the folder, but the folder is in some sense the mover of the paper. It's pushing across the table.

[30:43] You see that? " The same way with with matter, you might say that the paragraph is made out of what sentences, right? And the sentences out of words, and the words out of syllables, and the syllables out of letters, right? So again, you they're all matter, but in a certain what order, right? Huh? Okay. Aristotle goes on, and we don't have here to talk more explicitly about that, right?

[31:09] But you can see the same thing in the other causes as as here, huh? Okay. So, is there a distinction between end and object? Well, object is is a is not as clearly naming

[31:30] a kind of cause as end is, right? Okay. Yeah. Like I was just reading something by St. Thomas, and this thing with commentary on Hebrews and the the definition of faith, and then he speaks about theological virtue, and he speaks about the he uses both words end and object as being God, but I was wondering why he made the distinction, use both terms, if he was if that was significant.

[32:01] There is a distinction there, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So the the basic way to distinguish distinguishes is what object is just more obscure than what. Well, it doesn't is well. I would think it doesn't name a kind of cause explicitly, right? Okay. Okay. If you if you look in in the fifth book of wisdom, you'll see the different meanings of the word end or limit, right? Okay. And the object, in a way, is a limit.

[32:34] Okay. Yeah. Usually, we talk about objects in in Aristotle is when you talk about the powers or abilities of the soul, right? And we distinguish the powers of the soul by their acts, and the acts by their what objects, right? So, because color and sound are not the same thing, then seeing color is not the same thing as I mean, sensing color is not the same thing as sensing sound, right?

[33:05] Yeah. And therefore, the ability to sense color is not the same as the ability to sense sound, right? Hmm. So the object there. Yeah. Would you say you know that color is the end or purpose of the eye? Well, I feel a little more natural saying "to see" is the end or purpose of the eye, right? Yeah, it's what they actually. But to specify what seeing is, I'd have to say it's sensing color, right?

[33:37] Right, right, right. You know, so object and end don't, you know, might run together in some way, right? Mm-hmm. Like in the theological virtues, right? The object of theological virtues is God, and He's also our end, right? Right. But the fact that the object is the end doesn't mean that the word "object" didn't" mean the same thing. Right, right. They don't necessarily mean the same thing.

[34:03] So it seems to be more natural to say that seeing is the end or purpose of the eye than to say color is the end or purpose of the eye. Say, but you have to specify, you know, what seeing is using color, right? Yeah, it sounds like the end is more like the having to do with a verb or something like that, an object, sort of thing or something.

[34:33] Well, in the in the fifth book of a wisdom, right? The first meaning of end or limit is in quantity, right? I speak of this is the end of the table, right? Okay. And then you speak of what the end of a motion, right? And then you speak of the end of intention, and that's really the sense of end we have in mind here, huh? That for the sake of which, huh?

[35:00] Okay. But you got to be careful with that word "end," Okay. You know, as, I say to the students, "What happiness is the end of life? The end of life is death. Therefore happiness is death." right. Whereas Thomas points out, that you know, in the Nicomachean Ethics, you have two different meanings here of end. And I mentioned how when we take up the question later on, does nature act for an end.

[35:29] One student was arguing against this, saying that if nature acted for an end, all things would come to an end. But things keep on going. Nature does act for an end. But he's really kind of, you know, misunderstanding what sense of end we have in mind when we say nature acts for an end.

[35:47] Okay. And I was mentioning how kind of an interesting thing there, where the student was talking about the importance of the question. You know, how is it important to consider whether nature acts for an end, and you know, if nature acted for an end, you know, life would be rather pessimistic, right? We're all we're all going to die. They kind of mixing up the two senses together, right?

[36:14] Okay. He says the causes then are perhaps said in so many ways, and Thomas comments in that line. Well, within each one of these kinds of causes, you can make certain distinctions, right? That's what he's kind of hinting at there, right? Like we're saying, for example, within the end, or even within the mover, or within the matter, you can have before and after there, right? Okay.

[36:46] And then there are other distinctions you'll make, you know, between per se and per accidens and so on. We'll talk maybe about those later on a little bit. Okay.

[37:00] Now, having distinguished the four kinds of causes, we might ask ourselves: Is there a reason for the order in which Aristotle has distinguished these?

[37:20] Going from the one end to the last. Yeah, that's kind of a hint of that in the fact that when he gets to the end, he stops to manifest that it really is a cause, as if we were less manifested it as a cause, huh? Now, I think you could say two things about this order. One

[37:43] is that, to a large extent, this is the historic order, right, in which these causes come to light. Now, if we go back to the history that we saw of the fragments, the poets spoke of Mother Earth, and then mainly spoke of water as the beginning of things, and Anaximenes of air, and so on. And they were looking for what kind of cause as the beginning of things.

[38:18] Yeah, material cause, matter, right? Huh? And then comes in Pythagoras, right? And he introduces a kind of cause he's accustomed to in mathematics, namely the what form, right? And then with Heraclitus, you get a hint at the mover when he says, "War is the father of all things," right? Maybe his choice of fire as the matter was his kind of thinking of fire as being the mover too.

[38:49] So he's kind of doing that, but then you get to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, you have the mover more separated, right, from the matter. So for Empedocles, the matter is earth, air, fire, and water mainly, and love and hate are the what movers, huh? Although sometimes he has love and hate getting mixed up with. it. I don't like to hear it. But Anaxagoras, is, even more distinct because the mover him is the greater mind, and that's in no way mixed with matter.

[39:22] Okay. And you can see in Empedocles, I mean, he talked about numerical ratio in bone and flesh and blood, right? That he has three kinds of causes, right? He has a cause in the sense of matter—earth, air, fire, and water—which is the way it comes from his predecessors, and then he adds to that with Anaxagoras with the numerical ratio, second kind of cause, and then he has the third kind of cause, the mover or maker, right?

[39:52] Now, Anaxagoras, huh, is still dealing with those three kinds of causes, but Socrates, huh? You read Socrates in the Phaedo, for example. He got very enthusiastic when he first read Anaxagoras, right? But he thought that Anaxagoras would go on and talk about end or purpose once he had talked about a greater mind, because the mind does what it does with something in mind, maybe some end or goal, but Anaxagoras didn't develop that, right?

[40:26] So then Socrates, right, and later on Plato started talking about the end of the good and so on. So Socrates and Plato and Aristotle introduced this fourth kind of cause, the end. So to some extent, one could say this is the historic order, right, in which the four kinds of causes come into prominence and are spoken of, right? Okay. But perhaps more important is this other order of the more known to the less known.

[41:00] But also, you can say it's perhaps the order in which reason can best be forced by truth itself, right? To say there are these four kinds of causes, huh? Okay. And I am going to show that in a moment. So this will exemplify something that's good about Greek philosophy, and that is that to some extent in Greek philosophy, and to a large extent, the historical order is also the order in which you can best learn these things.

[41:42] This is not true of the history of modern philosophy. I think the reason why it's true for the Greeks, apart from the excellence of the Greeks, is that they are the first philosophers, and so one naturally starts with what is more known to us, and goes on to what is less known to us, huh? But after men, after philosophy has been around for centuries, right? A guy could begin just anywhere because he usually starts because he picks up a book on philosophy, and whatever that philosopher or that author is talking about is where he begins.

[42:26] It could be anywhere. Or he takes Professor X's course, right? Whatever Professor X is talking about is where he he begins, and that by no means would necessarily be where you would naturally begin. So um And you see that divine philosophers they tend to begin before the guy before them began, right, or left off, or something, right? So to some extent, the historic order for the Greeks, which they thought, corresponds more closely to the order in which we should actually learn these things.

[43:03] Okay, I'm going to try to show this here by forcing your mind. I always take a simple example of the word "cat," right? Okay. I say. Now, what is the most known, and therefore the most undeniable dependence that the word cat there on the blackboard, green board, has? What's most undeniable that it depends upon for its existence, the word cat there? Chalk. Yeah, but more closely, C A and T Isn't that most obvious dependence in ass?

[43:57] And if someone says it doesn't depend upon C A and T, well, let's take away C and A and T. Does it depend upon them anyway? It's altogether obvious that it depends upon C A and T. It would be laughable, right? If you take away C A and T, there's nothing left there. It would seem to be the only thing it depends upon is C A and T.

[44:23] So you're forced to admit there's that kind of cause we call matter, right? Because the word cat came to be from C A and T, and they are what? They are inside it, right? Inside the word cat, huh? Okay.

[44:44] But then, when you see that there's a word like act, which is not the same word clearly as cat, huh? But has exactly the same letters, right?

[44:59] Why is that the word cat, and this the word act? Is it because the letters only? Or why is this the word dog, and this the word god? That's what the small g says. Same letters exactly, right? Now you're forced to say that the word cat, or the word dog for that matter, right, depends upon something besides the letters. And what is it in this case? Order.

[45:39] Order, yeah. That's the second kind of cause, huh? The one we call form, right? Form means not only shape, but it means order, the ratio, right? Okay. See how you're forced to the second one, right?

[45:57] Now, once you realize that the same letters get into different orders, do the letters C A and T get in this order because they are those letters? You can't say that because sometimes they are in this order, right? Okay. The same way for this,

[46:24] so now you're forced to say there's a third kind of cause, the one that in this case orders the letters, right? And that's the writer in this case, right? So now you're forced to the third kind of cause, huh?

[46:40] If those two letters always, you know, came in that arrangement, you might say, well, it's just natural that the letters go in that order, right? When you see that the very same letter is going to have a quite different order, then you realize that that order doesn't come from the letters, huh? Now you're introduced to the third kind of cause, the mover-maker-the writer in this case myself, okay?

[47:07] But now, if I put the the letters in this order, because I have the ability to order the letters, I could order them in this way here, or I could order them in this way here, T N, C and so on. Is my ability to order the letters explain why I put them in that order rather than this order or that order over there?

[47:37] In other words, my ability is for more than the orders I gave them. So why did I give them that order among the possible orders? Well, it's for the sake of talking about my favorite pet or something, right? My favorite animal, right? Or for the sake of talking about act and ability and matter and form and how, or God is pure act. I want to talk about that, right?

[48:01] So I put them in the order A C T, right? So I'm forced to that fourth kind of cause, now, right? That's the sake of it. It's exactly the order there, right? That you have. I could

[48:25] take a second example, right? Suppose we had a wooden chair there, right? If you took all the wood out of the chair, maybe some metal in there too, and the screws, you took all the wood and metal out of the chair, nothing would be left, right? So obviously, and most undeniably, the wooden chair depends upon the wood, right? Okay. So that's the first kind of cause, huh?

[48:55] It's most known and most undeniable. But then now, this to what we have here. Suppose the table has got the same kind of wood that the chair has, yet the one is a chair and the other is a table. Well, now you're forced to say that the chair depends upon something besides the wood. If the wood explained everything about the chair, then the table would be a chair, right?

[49:24] Wooden chair. It's wooden, but it's not a wooden chair. So now you're forced to say there's a second kind of thing involved, right? And that would be the shape of the chair, right? And the shape of the desk and so on, right? Okay. But now, once you realize that the same matter, that wood, can get into the shape of a desk or the shape of a table and so on, now you realize the need for a third kind of cause.

[49:52] It doesn't get into that shape because the shape of a chair is wood. Otherwise, your desk would be a table. Your desk would be a chair.

[50:03] You have to constrain it, right? So it doesn't turn into a chair. So, so now you're forced to a third cause, which would be the mover, a maker. In this case, would be the carpenter, rather than the what? Writer, huh? And so the ability of the carpenter to shape wood explains how the wood got into the shape of a chair or table. But

[50:27] is the carpenter's ability to shape the wood limited to that shape? He can only work it slightly obtuse angles, for example. Couldn't he make a chair like this? Sure. And couldn't he make the bed instead of this shape? Couldn't he make the bed this shape? Or couldn't he make the bed?

[50:54] See, his ability to shape the matter doesn't explain why he gave it this shape. He's not limited to that shape. He's able to give it this shape or that shape, huh? He could give the roof of the house instead of this shape. He could give it this shape, right? A V instead.

[51:18] So why did he make this at a slightly obtuse angle? He's not limited to that obtuse angle. It's for the sake of what? Sitting, right? If it was acute angle, the back, he had a lot of back problems. It's supposed to be sitting, right? If the bed had this shape here, you'd be rolling off the bed all the time. see? Just standing here, you'd have a rather rocky sleep, huh?

[51:41] If the house had this shape here, it would what? Not keep the rain and snow out. You'd have to think. In Shrewsbury, there, on the built a new drugstore up in the center town. And one winter, you know, with a lot of snow, snow, so everybody on the thing, everybody got a drugstore. The roof collapsed. Oh no! So you can imagine that when they rebuilt the drugstore, they didn't make such a flat roof, huh?

[52:07] But for a short, he had this, you know, inverted V, V-shaped thing. You'd have a. You know, he could make the roof that way, right? It was on

[52:17] South Dakota. Yeah, they had side by side like that place we were looking at. So, you see how you're forced from one cause to another, right?

[52:29] Exactly the order that Aristotle gives them. This is both the historical order and the order in which reason can best be forced to admit there are indeed these four kinds of causes.

[52:56] Now, no one has been able to add another kind of cause to these four kinds of causes since Aristotle did this in the fourth century BC, huh? And even in the most famous discussions of causes, say in modern times, like the one by Hume, right, that influenced Kant so much, huh?

[53:19] He doesn't even see all of these causes, right? And Hume actually begins with. Or the third cause, right? So he begins with the what less known, right? So he he knows less kinds of cause than Aristotle does, and he knows what he does know out of order. It doesn't say too much for the moderns, but that's it's life in the modern world, okay? But no one has been able to add other causes to these, huh?

[53:57] Okay. So any question about the four kinds of causes? Yeah. Is is there any I don't know what we call it the the third cause? Is there any? How are we referring to it? With matter, form was the third thing. Oh, the third cause, the mover or the maker, yeah. Okay, can you have a mover or a maker that's who's not a person, or is it intrinsic?

[54:30] It has to be a person. You could have a mover or a maker. You know, the fire could what melt the butter, right? Oh, of course. Okay.

[54:41] Just that phrase, "what was to be"? Yeah. That's Aristotle's hangup. You know, he always calls that way. But I think he's because he's thinking of the fact that you start with the matter, right here, and then what was to be would be at the end of the generation, right? So he started with wood, and what was to be was a chair or a table or something, right?

[55:11] So I suppose he's contrasting there. Okay. I mean, suddenly you speak of the definition is is really of what is, right? Yeah. But I think it's because he's begun with the matter, and he wants to contrast this at the end of generation. Exactly.

[55:30] It's going quite to the four causes, but you said in passing something. Can you say something more about that? Nature is more form than matter. Yeah. Going back to the definition of nature, right? That's a cause of motion, rest, in that which it is first as such, and not by happening. It can be a cause in the active sense or in the passive sense. Let me give an example of what I mean here.

[55:57] I take the the beleaguered mother here, who has an inquisitive little boy, right? And notice, out in the yard, you have a tree and you have a stone, right? And as the years go by and so on, the rock stays the same size, but the tree what grows, right? Okay. Mummy, the little boy says.

[56:23] Why does the tree grow? Why doesn't the stone grow? Right? And her asked mother says, "Well, it's not the nature of the stone to grow, right? It's the nature of the tree to grow, right? " Now you could say in one way she's not really answering his question, right? See, but is she completely ignorant when she uses the word nature as the cause, right? Well, the point is, everything on the outside for the tree and the stone are the same.

[56:58] They're both in the same soil, right? With the same nutrients. They're both rained upon by the same rain, right? They both have the same sun shining on them, and so on, right? They both have the same air around them, right? Everything on the outside is the same, right? So it must be due to something within the stone, right? And something within the tree that the one grows and the other doesn't grow, right?

[57:27] Okay, and that's what we call nature, right? Okay. Now take the second example, though. Suppose Daddy puts a log in the fire, right? And the little logs burn up, you know, and turn ashes. And the little boy takes a rock and throws it in the fire, right? And that doesn't burn up. Mummy, why did the log burn up? Why didn't the stone burn up? And the poor harassed mother says, "Well, it's the nature of wood to burn, huh?

[58:01] It's not the nature of the stone to burn. " Well, you say again she's not really answering in any complete way this child's question, right? But is that word nature saying anything about the cause of the log burning and the stone not? Well, again, the outside is the same, right? You have the same fire or flames licking the wood and licking the stone, so the outside is the same, right?

[58:30] And yet the one what burns up and crumbles, and the other doesn't, huh? So it must be due to something within the log, right? That it can be acted upon by the fire in this way, and something else in the stone whereby it resists being acted upon that way, right? So nature can be a cause in an active sense, like the cause of the tree growing, right?

[59:02] Or nature can be a cause in a passive sense, whereby it can be acted upon in some way, as when we say nature, the nature of the wood to burn in ordinary what fire, right?

[59:17] Now that passive sense of nature is really that of matter, because matter is what is able to be formed, right? Able to be acted upon, therefore. And the active sense of nature would be the what form, okay? And a sign of that is that things are not able to act in this or that way until they have their what form, right?

[59:45] Now, nature you could also say is that by which a natural thing is a natural thing, right? But by matter you have a natural thing only in what ability.

[1:00:03] Or by the form you have an actual natural thing, right? So form is more nature than what matter, yeah. But it's matter and form now in the genus of what substance, huh? Okay, because nature is what is first in the thing, right?

[1:00:28] Okay. Just like in artificial things, right? You could say wood is this artificial thing called a chair only in potency or in ability, right? It's actually a artificial thing called a chair through its what form, yeah. So which is more retained, art in a way, the matter or the form. form? Or the form, yeah. Well, it's like that elegantly with nature, right? The matter which is able to be a man or a dog or a tree or some other natural thing is one of those things only in ability.

[1:01:25] Through the form, it's actually one or the other, right? So through the form, it's actually a natural thing. Therefore, form is more nature than what matter.