Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
42. Aristotle's Three Corollaries on Causes and Nature as Form
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/3-natural-hearing/042-aristotles-three-corollaries-on-causes-and-nature-as-form/

[0:00] Okay. Now, after Aristotle has distinguished the four kinds of causes, starting in the first paragraph in the bottom of page one, and the first two paragraphs in the second page, yeah, next two paragraphs, he's going to distinguish what we sometimes call corollaries, to borrow a word from geometry, some statements that at least the first two of which follow upon the distinction, right, of the four kinds of cause, and recognizing the four kinds of cause.

[0:38] Let's state these corollaries here. The first corollary, corollary in geometry is something that kind of like falls out right from what's already been seen, right? Okay. Now the first corollary is that there can be

[1:13] many causes, as such, of the same thing. Okay. Now when he says as such, huh? That's opposed to accidental, right? Okay. If. For example, the house builder happens to be a pianist, right? Okay. Then you could say the cause of my house is a house builder, right? You could say the cause of my house is a what? Pianist, right? Okay. But the pianist, as such, is not a cause of my house.

[2:06] Okay. But because there are many kinds of causes, in fact, as many as four, there could be many causes as such of the same thing. So the wooden chair, for example, the wood as such can be a cause of the chair, right? And the carpenter as such can be a cause of the chair, and sitting as such can be a cause of the chair, right? And the shape of the chair as such can be a cause of the chair, right?

[2:42] It's possible to have more than one cause than as such of the same thing. Cause is being said then in many ways. Oh, these four ways to begin with. It happens that there are many causes of the same thing. Now this doesn't mean when he says so. It happens. It doesn't. He's pointing out that not everything has all four causes or even more than one cause. In geometry, I might talk only about the what formal causes.

[3:13] But because there are these many kinds of causes, it can happen that there are many causes of the same thing, not by accident, not by happening. As the sculptor's art and bronze are causes of the statue, but the bronze as matter and the sculptor's art as the mover or maker, not according to something other accidental, but as statue, right? Yet not in the same way, but the one as matter and the other as whence the motion.

[3:47] Now it's important in understanding the corollary to not let someone make a false dichotomy or make a false choice, right? Stock example. I said suppose a student is walking across campus towards Taylor Dining Hall around Noontime. What's the cause of his motion? Is it electrical impulses and muscles contracting, or is it eating his lunch? Which is the cause that is moving across campus? Yeah,

[4:23] yeah. Now you shouldn't say try to choose one rather than the other in this case, right? You can say nerve impulses and the contraction of muscles are a cause that is moving across campus in the third sense of cause, the mover or maker, right? But eating his lunch is also a cause. Was going across campus, especially at this time, right? In the sense of what, for the sake of eating his lunch, he's going across campus at this time.

[4:59] You see that, okay? Um, so people who don't understand the four kinds of causes and this first corollary, they sometimes make the most serious mistake of trying to decide which one is the cause, as if they couldn't both be causes, as such, of the same thing.

[5:25] Okay. Now the second corollary, I think, is the most interesting one. The second corollary is that two things can be causes of each other, which sounds at first sight crazy, huh?

[5:48] Two things can be causes of each other, but by different kinds of cause. I wouldn't make too much sense to say I am your father and you are my father, right? Okay. But if a man, let's say, is exercising for the sake of his health, right? Is exercise the cause of health or strength, or is health or strength the cause of his exercising?

[6:44] Both causes. Yeah. But exercise is a cause of health or strength in the third kind of cause, huh? As a mover or maker. Health or strength is a cause of exercise in another sense of cause. It's that for the sake of which he does this, huh? Okay.

[7:05] Um. Make a little different example here. Say to students, if you go down Main Street and you ask somebody, "Is intercourse the cause of the baby, or is the baby the cause of intercourse? " What would he answer?

[7:29] Obviously, intercourse is the cause of the baby. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He knows that, huh? But notice he says that because that cause is a cause in the sense of the mover or maker, right? And it's what more known to us that cause, right? Okay. But if they had intercourse for the sake of a baby. Then the baby would also be a cause of intercourse, but a cause in the sense of in that for the sake of which, right?

[8:00] Okay. I say the student studies, right? Okay. Let us take the bad student. He studies to pass the exam. Okay. Okay. Now, is studying the cause of his passing the exam, or is passing the exam the cause of his studying?

[8:26] Studying is the cause of passing the exam. You'd probably say, right? But if he studied for the sake of passing the exam, then passing the exam in another kind of cause would be the cause of studying, right? See how subtle that is, huh?

[8:48] Take more from the discourse of reason there. If you wanted to know the the area, let's say a rectangle, right? What do you do? Well, you measure the length and the width, and you multiply the length by the width, right? So multiplying the length by the width of a rectangle is a cause of your knowing the area.

[9:13] Is cause is knowing the area, though in some way a cause you're multiplying the length by the width. Yeah. Why did I multiply the length by the width? For the sake of knowing the area, right? So knowing the area was in some way responsible for my multiplying the length by the width.

[9:38] We think of the syllogism, you know. We think of the premises as the cause of the conclusion, right? When I define reasoning, I say it's coming to know or guess a statement, right? Through other statements, right? When you say through other statements, you mean not just from other statements, but because of other statements, right? So we naturally think of the premises as being the cause of the what?

[10:04] Conclusion, right? Okay. But if you think of the fact that in order to draw the conclusion, you have to bring the premises together. Now, is the bringing the premises together, the cause of your seeing the conclusion, or is seeing the conclusion, the cause of your bringing the premises together.

[10:27] Or could both be true? See. Well, my bringing the premises together is a cause of my seeing the conclusion, in the sense of a mover or a maker. It produces that sight of the conclusion. But the reason why I go around putting together premises, statements, is for the sake of right seeing conclusions, huh? So all kinds of applications of this, huh?

[10:58] There's a prayer that goes, something like this: "Hail Mary, full of grace. The Lord is with thee." Right now, she's full of grace because the Lord is with her, or is the Lord with her because she's full of grace?

[11:17] What do you think? Or could it be both could it be both? Yeah, you could say her being full of grace is like a disposition to receive the Lord, right? And disposition is reduced to the material cause. Doesn't matter in that strict sense. But again, you could say the Lord being with her, the Lord is the efficient cause, right? Of grace right?

[11:51] Okay. So, a lot to be thought about there. It's a very interesting that second corollary, right? And see, when people see but don't understand this second corollary, when they see that this is the cause of that, they reject the idea that the reverse could be true.

[12:22] But now, when you come to something like the good, you know, we define the good as what all desire, right? And then we ask the socratic question: Is it good because we want it, right? Or do we want it because it's good? And the answer is: We want it because it is good. It's not good because we want it. See, so in that case, you have one is the cause of the other, but not vice versa, right?

[12:48] See. But what I say is, exercise, as he says, for the sake of strength. Is exercise the cause of strength, or strength the cause of our exercising. Well, in that case, both, but by different kinds of causes, huh? Not really the same kind of cause. Okay. I think that's a very interesting corollary, and it especially brings out that they're different kinds of causes.

[13:20] Now, the third corollary, I think you put some theory because it's not so tied up with the distinction of the four kinds of causes. So it's kind of interesting. Further, the same is the cause of contraries, right? And this is, in a way, a little modification of the the rule we gave before. It seems to be a probable statement, to say the least, that contrary causes have contrary what?

[13:46] Effects, right? And vice versa, contrary effects have contrary causes, right? We talked about that when we were reading the studying Empedocles in particular, right? And you had what, earth, air, fire, and water coming together, right? And then you had the opposite; they're being separated, right? So you see contrary effects in nature, and you say, "Well, is it the same thing that brings them together and separates them?"

[14:14] See, one would reasonably guess that it would be what? Not the same thing, but contrary ones, right? And if we saw that butter sometimes becomes hard, and other times that butter becomes soft, right? And hard and soft are contrary. Would you think that what makes butter hard makes it soft? No. And you would look for contrary causes of the butter becoming hard, and of the butter becoming soft.

[14:42] And so, for the butter becoming hard, we eventually say, well, the cold makes it hard, right? And the hot makes it soft, right? But hot and cold are contraries, right? So we get the idea that you have contrary causes for contrary effects and vice versa, right? But here and now, this isn't totally against that because there will be a kind of contrariety here. But sometimes we can hold the same person, let's say an example, are responsible for contrary things.

[15:21] And the example he gives there is that of the what the captain of the ship or the steersman of the ship, right? He can be responsible for the safety of the ship if he does his job and pays attention, so on, and he can be responsible for the what? how responsible for the ship going on the rocks, or you know, that thing happened in Oregon, or I mean, Oregon happened in Alaska, there, right?

[15:46] where the guy wasn't doing his duty, really, and he let some neophyte, you know, take over, you know, and and then they had all this oil spill and so on, right? Okay.

[15:59] Um. Now, in a way, there's contrariety there because he's he's present or absent, right, or by himself or not. But it's the same person who's being held responsible now in one case for the safety of it, and the other for the what destruction of it, right? So in one case, we might be praising him because he's a cause of our getting safely through these dangerous waters, right?

[16:21] In other case, you might be holding responsible for the shipwreck, right? Because he was drinking or wherever it was, right? So if I'm on guard duty, you know, guarding the camp, and I stay alert and awake, and I see the enemy coming, and I notify the camp and we give them a warm reception, as they say, I'm the cause in a way of the safety of the camp, right?

[16:43] But if I decide, you know, to catch up on my sleep or go have a beer or something, right? Go see my girlfriend or something, and the camp is surprised, I will be held responsible for the destruction of the camp, right? So in in a way, one is the same thing is is capable contraries, right? Can be held responsible for contraries, but there's some contrariety nevertheless because in one case he's doing his duty and then applying himself, and in case he's not, right?

[17:12] But the students always apply this to their knowing, right? The student by his presence and well, sense of presence, presence of mind as well as of body, is a cause of his what? Learning something, right? The student by his absence and either sense of absence is a cause of his own what? Ignorance, right? So I can hold you responsible, right?

[17:37] That's the third corollary, right? I'm interested in that third corollary. But it didn't seem to be as clearly tied, right? To the distinction of the four kinds of causes, as the first two are explicitly right, I think that's the right reason why Aristotle orders it last, right? Right? Because not the fact that there could be many causes as such of the same thing is because there are many kinds of causes, right?

[18:04] But there could be two causes of each other is because they can be causes of each other in different kinds of causes, right? But this third thing is a little bit a little bit different, huh?

[18:20] Now, what is he doing in the last paragraph, right? Is he just? Well, he's coming back in the last paragraph to the four kinds of causes, but he's going to do something different here. What does he What does he add here in this last paragraph when he comes back to the four kinds of causes that we didn't have before?

[18:50] He says all the causes just now spoken of fall into four most manifest ways. He's coming back to the four kinds, right? Is it a judgment of which is best? No. No.

[19:07] Notice what he does here with the first kind of cause. For undivided sounds, the syllables, and that's example of the material cause, right? And the matter of vessels, the examples he took earlier there of the cup and so on, right? And now he takes some examples from natural things, because for the Greeks, earth, air, fire, and water were causes of bodies, right?

[19:32] And then he says the parts of the whole, right? He's in a way generalizing the first kind of cause, right? That in a way any parts that compose a whole has some aspect of that first kind of cause, because you could say that any whole that is composed of parts, it's from those parts in some way, and they are in it,

[20:01] okay? And therefore, even in immaterial things, you might speak of this kind of cause, huh? But then you're making a very broad sense, right? And so immediately after he says from the parts of the whole, he adds what? And the premises of the conclusion. Okay. Now, sometimes Aristotle speaks of the premises of the conclusion being the mover or maker, and usually we think of that, but here he speaks of in a way the premises containing the matter of the conclusion.

[20:40] But even in the formal syllogism here, when we studied it abstractly, every B is A, let's say. And every C is B. You syllogize that every C is A, right?

[21:00] Now the conclusion has C as a subject and A as a what predicate? Every C is A. So the subject and the predicate are like the parts of the what conclusion, right? And C and A, the parts of the conclusion, are already found in the premises. So in one respect, the premises are like the what parts of the conclusion? They contain the parts of the conclusion, right?

[21:31] Okay. And therefore, they have something of the aspect of the matter of the conclusion. No, it's not matter in the ordinary sense, is it? Because you're in immaterial science here now, the science of logic, huh. But He's showing you how you can understand these kinds of causes in a very broad way, right? We're not just wood is the cause of the chair, right? But any parts can be said to be the matter of which something is made, right?

[22:04] I could say that a definition, the matter of a definition is the genus and what differences that compose it. All parts are like what matter in a way, huh? You see that?

[22:24] Incidentally, here the middle term B is not a part of the conclusion, is it? And B is what actually, but in a way unites C and A. So B is more like the mover or maker, but so sometimes you speak of the premises as having something like the maker or mover and something like the matter or the parts out of which it is made, huh? But the minor and the major terms, the C and the A, are more like the parts of the conclusion, right?

[23:00] B is not so much like a part of the conclusion, but as what unites those parts, huh? That's why we're comparing that earlier to energy, right? And here, it's just like fire a bit fire a bit, huh? Which is both the matter and the mover, right?

[23:24] So this is the difference you can see here, right? When he talks about the cause called matter, right? He's showing how you can kind of generalize this, right? So we could speak, for example, of the soldiers as being the matter of the army, right? Because they are the parts of the army, right? You see that? And we could speak maybe of the nine what orders of angels as the parts of the angels, right?

[23:56] Or you see the first hierarchy has got the what seraphim, the cherubim, and the thrones, right? Huh? They are the parts. They are the matter of the first. But notice, he's using the word matter in a very broad and loose sense, huh? But they have something of of matter because they are that from which something comes to be, and in it, right? Or if they don't come to be from it, I mean that they're created all of that way, right?

[24:21] They're like parts nevertheless, right? And parts seem to be like the matter. Okay. So he says some of these are as the underlying subject, huh? That's the matter, such as the parts, and then relative to that, you can speak of whatever pertains to the whole. As being like the what second kind of cause, the mover. I mean the the form. While others are as what was to be, the whole, and the putting together in the form, right?

[24:58] Okay. So sometimes we speak of the order of the universe as the what form of the universe, right? Then it comes to the mover. I notice the examples here and the significance of them. Instead of saying father, he now says the seed, right? But that's also an example from what nature, right? The seed produces a plant. And he gives two examples from reason: the medical doctor and the advisor, right?

[25:39] Now they correspond to the difference between making and what doing, huh? Correspond to the distinction between the two virtues of practical reason, art, which is right reason about making, like the medical art or the art of carpentry, and then prudence or foresight, huh? Which is right reason about doing, right? And the advisor is concerned with your doing, your actions, right? So significant that he says the doctor and the what advisor, right?

[26:16] Making and doing, art and foresight, huh? He gives the doctor first, perhaps because the doctor, in some ways, is more like what nature. That's why he calls it doctor, physician, right? Comes the Greek word for nature.

[26:33] Okay. And generally, the one making are all whence the beginning of change or rest or motion. Now making is a little footnote. When we say God is the creator, right? What kind of a cause is that?

[26:55] Yeah, we reduce it to the mover or maker. But if you go back to the original definition there of the mover as whence first there is the beginning of motion, well, creation is not really a motion, and it starts with some matter and transforming it, right? Say, but in the broad sense, right, of the mover or maker, God could be said to be a maker when he what creates, right?

[27:18] Even though he's not making the world out of some kind of matter that pre-exists, right? Like we make, huh? But you're kind of generalizing the sense of mover or maker to include even the what creator, right? Then

[27:37] finally comes down to the fourth kind of cause, further as the end and the good of others. And now he points out the connection between the end and the what, good, and that's extremely important for the whole of philosophy, for the whole of our thinking. Let's look at end and good here.

[28:04] The definition of end is that for the sake of which. As I say, if you want, you can add that for the sake of which something is or is done, right? The definition of good, which you find in the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, there, the good is what all desire, what all want.

[28:40] What is good? What all want? So the definition of end and good is not the same, but you'll see in the beginning Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies the end and the what, good. And here is identifying too.

[29:00] Now you see a connection between those two from the definitions, and sometimes we are said to desire the means to some end, right? But we desire the means to some end because we desire the end. So primarily and chiefly we desire the end.

[29:22] And if something is good, people will what aim at it, right? And vice versa, if they're aiming at it, that's a sign that it's good, or at least that they think it's good, right? Okay. So these two tend to be really the same thing, the end and the what, good.

[29:42] That's a very important thing to see, and part of the reason why we say that the good is in things, huh? And the good is not something you know relativist wishy-washy modern sense, right? Is that the good is basically the same thing as the end, right? And the end of the thing is tied with what it is. It's tied to what it is, to things themselves.

[30:12] So that's a very important connection, Aristotle is making there. For the that for the sake of which is best, the means is only good in a secondary way, but with reference to the end, and would be the end of others. Now when Aristotle says that it makes no difference to call the same a good or an apparent good, he obviously doesn't mean it makes no difference whether you're pursuing a real good or an apparent good, but he means what?

[30:44] Now one is always pursuing what. Seems to him to be good, right? Now it may, in some cases, be a real good; in other cases, it may only be what an apparent good, right? Okay. As he says later on, the apparent good is desired because it resembles what is truly good, right? So ultimately, you desire what is truly good.

[31:07] These then, and so many in kind, he says, are the what causes, huh? Okay. So he enumerates the four kinds of causes, you know, naming, to some extent, but defining each kind of cause, right, and simplifying them. Then he gives the three corollaries. Then he comes back to the four kinds of causes and shows how you can understand them in a very what broad way, right? Okay.

[31:42] Okay. Now, let's apply the the rule of two or three. To the four kinds of causes, see. And sometimes when you have more than than two or three, it's useful to divide it either into two or three, or at least one of them if you can, right? And sometimes you can divide it into two in more than one way, right? Um. So if we have, for example, in the room here, men and women and boys and girls, right?

[32:13] You have four groups, right? But you might, you know, divide them into two twos, right? And you could probably divide it here into two twos in two ways. You could put, you could divide the men and the boys against the women and the girls, and that'd be on the basis of sex, huh? But you could also divide the men and the women against the boys and the girls on the basis of mature and immature or something of that sort, right?

[32:43] Okay. So let's go back to the four kinds of causes, right? And divide them into two, which makes the most sense, there's perhaps seven ways you can divide them, right? Three ways you can divide them into two and two, and four ways you can divide them into one and three. Okay. And no one of these divisions is the correct division, right? Each one kind of reveals something by the likeness and the difference of the things that are put together or what separated, right?

[33:24] Okay. Now sometimes you'll see matter and form divided against mover and end. Okay. And what is the basis for that distinction? Putting matter and form on one side and the mover and the end on the other side. What is the basis for that division?

[33:58] The matter and the form are in the thing. Yeah, yeah. The matter and the form are inside causes, right? And the mover and the end are outside. We're thinking of form now, as opposed to matter, right? Okay. Have to

[34:19] you know qualify that a bit, right? But basically, we're thinking of form and matter as inside causes, and the mover and the end as outside causes. Okay.

[34:31] It's an important distinction, right? Now sometimes we put the matter and the mover. And we divide them against the form and the end. Now, what's the reason for putting the matter and the mover together, and then the form and the end together?

[35:10] Oh, oh, well, the mover would be like shaping the form, and the end would determine the form. Okay. But perhaps we usually think of the matter and the mover as being at the beginning of something, right? Oh. Or the form is definition of what was to be, right? And obviously, the end is at the end of things. So, if you study in, in let's say, the fifth book of wisdom, if you study the meaning of the word beginning, right, you get something like matter, let's say, in the third meaning of beginning, and something like the the mover in the fourth meaning of beginning, right?

[35:55] When you study the word limit or end in the fifth book of wisdom, translated Greek for end or end, form and end come in. So matter and mover seem to be in time at the beginning, right? So you have a carpenter and wood at the beginning, and then at the end you have what the form and the city, right? And

[36:25] that's why when you look at the Greek natural philosophers, with that odd bird, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras all they seem to talk about is matter or matter and the what Mover. For the most part, they kind of up front, right? Because you think of a cause as a beginning, and form and end don't seem to be beginning, but more a what an end, okay? Although in some, you know, there's a sense of beginning that can be considered beginnings too.

[36:57] But okay. Now, sometimes you see the form and the mover or maker put together, and that makes more sense than putting the matter and the end together. In fact, that's it. That question marks, right? What, what, and what way did the form and the mover or maker come together?

[37:41] Mover produces the form. Yeah, and the mover makes something like itself, right? So dogs produce dogs, cats produce cats, human beings produce human beings, right? So sometimes we say that the maker and the form, they're not the same numerically, but they're the same in what kind, okay?

[38:10] The mover makes through its form produces a similar form in the effect, right? Now, matter and end, in the context of that they seem to have nothing in common, right? They seem to be entirely what disparate, right? Okay. But there's a way in which we bring matter and end together. and when Aristotle talks about definition by different causes and demonstration, and he points out that

[38:50] a definition can be the beginning of a demonstration, or the end of a demonstration, or a demonstration in a way in a different position. What does this mean? Well,

[39:11] sometimes we define something by its end. So I might say that a knife is a tool for cutting. Sometimes we define something by its matter, meaning its parts. A knife is a tool composed of a what blade and a handle, right? Or blade inserted in a handle, right? So you speak of a definition by parts, by matter, in broad sense, a definition by end. Now you could demonstrate one from the other.

[39:46] You could say that a knife is a tool for cutting, and a tool for cutting needs a blade and a handle to be held. Therefore, a knife is a tool composed of a blade and handle, right? Okay. And when Aristotle defines demonstration in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, he first gives a definition from an end, the syllogism making us know the cause and that which is the cause and not the otherwise, right?

[40:16] And then he gives a definition of it from the what kind of premises that it's from, right? And he calls the first a definition from the end, the second a definition from the matter or the parts, and you can reason from one to the what other, right? From a definition from the end, you reason to definition from the matter or parts, huh? Or you can combine the two, like with the knife.

[40:40] You can say a knife is a tool composed of a blade and handle for the sake of cutting, right? Or in logic, right? Instead of like imitate Aristotle there in the Posterior Analytics, and you say, what is a definition? Well, definition is speech making known distinctly what a species is.

[41:03] That's a definition from the end, right? That's another definition of definition, which is from its parts. It's a speech, right, composed of the genus and differences of the species, right? Okay, but you could reason from the definition from the end to the definition by the matter or parts. You could say a definition is a speech making known distinctly what a species is. But speech making known distinctly what a species is has to give you the genus, what that thing is in general, right, and its differences, right.

[41:43] Therefore, a definition is speech composed of a genus. and differences And so Aristotle says, the definition can be the beginning, the middle term of a demonstration, or the conclusion, right? Or you can put the two together and make one grand definition. Say, a definition is species, right? Composed of the genus and difference, making known what the species is. Something like that, sort of, right? So, in that way, matter and end can enter into what

[42:15] these parts of a what demonstration, right? We just look at them by themselves; they more seem to have nothing in common, right? But here, the the the parent and the child is like each other, right? Okay, or even the artist, he may say what form like the form he's already conceived in his mind, right? So there's a real likeness between them. Well, here they seem to be no likeness at all, right?

[42:44] But sometimes these two are coupled together, and we talk about the definition from matter or parts, and the definition from end. Just like you might say, marriage is a society for what generating, nourishing, educating children, right? And such a society must be composed of a man and a woman, right? Okay, alone they can generate. Or you might combine both of those and make a kind of complete definition of what marriage is.

[43:22] So you have these two very clear. Very often these two, but this here in a way you can at least see the likeness here between these two, right? So those are the three ways you can divide them into two and two, and they all reveal something,