Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
58. The Now, the Thing in Motion, and the Causes of Before and After
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/3-natural-hearing/058-the-now-the-thing-in-motion-and-the-causes-of-before-and/

[0:00] This as something he says, right, is the same, the thing in motion, huh? For it is a point. or a stone, And in a sense, there's a plenus especially spoken that way. so he's, you know the point. But on the strict sense of motion, as, we'll see in the sixth book, a point can't move. Okay, for is a point or a stone or something other this kind, but in account it's other.

[0:33] Okay, in position it's other. And notice even compares to what the sophists say, right? Just as the sophists take Cariskus in the Lyceum and Cariskus in the marketplace as what? Other, right? Okay. Notice that that distinction a little bit the way we do it, or take maybe even a thing maybe simpler to see in a way. You know the one. There's a knock on that door over there.

[1:04] I'd say, right behind us now, right? And I said, do you know who's knocking at the door? No. They open the door, and it's and it's uh, Ladrisco or something. Or your mother or somebody, right? Okay. You see, you didn't know who's knocking at the door, right? Right.

[1:28] Well, you don't know your own mother. You don't know your own superior. Huh? So, so notice you know your mother. As such, right? As your mother, right? That's what she is, but you don't know her as the one knocking at the door, right? Huh? Okay.

[1:59] Um. I knew my my my glass case, right? But not as in in the playpen. Right. Okay. So is the ball that's hit in the infield the same as the ball that's caught in the outfield?

[2:40] Yes and no. Yeah, yeah. As regards what it is, it's the same ball, right? Right. It doesn't become a football or basketball, as I said before, right? But as far as where it is, it's other, right? Right.

[2:58] Is it caught as it is in the infield? I said the ball was hit in the, you know, in case of the bat, right? And it hits the ball, right? Okay, and then it's caught in the outfield, right? Okay. Now it's the same ball that was hit in the infield and caught in the outfield, right? But was it caught as it was in the infield?

[3:34] No. And was it hit as it was in the outfield? No. No. So, so in some way it was other, right? Okay. But not as regards what it is, but as regards what where it is, right? Okay. So in some sense it was other, right?

[4:01] But this in being in one place in another is different. But the now follows the thing carried along as time the motion. So you see the proportion there, right?

[4:13] For by the carried along. We know the before and after in motion, but in so far as the before and after is able to be numbered, it is the now.

[4:27] Thus, in these as some thing, the now is the same, for the before and after is in motion, but its being is other, for the now is in so far as the before and after is able to be numbered.

[4:48] Are you numbering nows or are you numbering times? Well, let's ask the same question here. Take something more known. right? Suppose I want to measure the length of this continuous line, right? How many inches is it? Okay. Well, mark off inches along this line, right?

[5:19] Okay. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve. It's thirteen inches long, right? What was I counting? Inches or points? Inches. Inches by their lengths. Yeah. And I've recognized this as being other than that, right? So that this inch would be other than what that inch, right? Okay.

[5:53] But now he's going to see something very interesting there, huh? In the top of page seven, huh? And this he says is most of all known.

[6:08] Now again, going back to proportion, right? And motion through the moved, and carrying through the carried. What was he saying there? Do I know the baseball through the motion of the baseball, right? Or do I know the motion of the baseball through the baseball? No matter. Yeah. Yeah. Because the baseball is other and other, right? And where it is, right? That's how I know the motion. Okay.

[6:52] And because the now is what other and other, right? And therefore able to be numbered, right? Then time is what known, right? See. So going back to the example of the man who falls asleep, right? And the now when he dozes off, and the now when he comes to, right? He takes as being one now, right? And unless he he sees him as being two, he's not aware of a what passage of time right now.

[7:24] Okay. So in a way, he knows time through the now, right? In the same way, proportion as we know motion through the thing in motion.

[7:38] Okay. You see the importance of that proportion, right? In trying to understand this particular what problem, huh? Notice the reason for that. For the thing carried along is a this something, huh? Now that this something, the to de ti in Greek, huh? Hoc aliquid in Latin, huh? Was like a substance, right? An individual, right? But the motion is what is not, okay? It goes back also to the idea that motion is something of another, right?

[8:15] But motion is like an accident, right? But accident is something of another, but something of a substance, right? A this something, this something is an individual substance, huh?

[8:31] Thus, the now is in one way always the same, in another way not the same, right? For so also is what is carried along, or whatever it is that is in motion, right? It's in some way always the same, right? As regards what it is, but it's always other in its what position, right? Okay. The the first sentence there, and this is most of all known. What is most of all known?

[8:58] The thing in motion. The thing in motion. Well, of course you could say here also it means maybe the now, right? Yeah. Yeah, the now. Yeah, but proportionally the the thing in motion.

[9:16] When you say the now, so the now is the same as regards what it is. Yeah. But other in its position, right? Except that the now, unlike the thing moving, isn't a something. A this something. No, it's proportional to that, right? Yeah. Yeah. So I say you have to understand it by that proportion. No other way to understand it, huh? Now this is kind of kind of a mystery here because notice, huh?

[9:55] Notice, go back to the earlier proportion here, which is more different here. But now we say the now, in a way, is to time as the point is to what motion, right? Okay. That's a little different comparison, right? Because they were not thinking of the point as being in motion, right? But we're thinking of the fact that the image of the point in the line, motion of the point in the line.

[10:31] Now, the now is the time as the point is to the line. The point is not a what? Line. It's not an infinitely short line, as moderns might say, right? It's not a line at all, right? It has no length, right? Okay, and likewise, and furthermore, the point is not a part of a line, right? Okay. Okay. Well, then, how is it related to line? Huh? It's neither a line nor is it part of a line.

[11:10] But it's say what? It's a limit of a line. Yeah, it's a limit of a line, right? And also a division of a line, right? Okay. So, likewise, is the now time? No. And is the now a part of time? No, no. But how is the now related to time? Limit and division. Yeah, limit and division, right?

[11:41] And we speak, especially the now is dividing the past and the future, right? Okay. Okay, now he's giving a slightly different right thing, huh? But no, so I don't say the course here, but you can go on to. You can say that the now is to time as the thing in motion is to motion, right? Okay. Okay.

[12:28] Now is the thing in motion? Motion. Is it a part of motion? No. But doesn't isn't the unity of the motion, the continuity of motion, in a way, depend upon there being one thing in motion?

[12:53] Yeah. So in a way, the thing in motion makes the motion, right? But only insofar as it's always what other than other as to where it is, right? Okay.

[13:13] Just as you might say, the the ball in motion, right? In a way, makes the motion, right? By being always in another place, huh? So he's saying, in a way, the now makes time, right? By what always being other, right? And it then reminds me, you know, when you take up eternity later on, right?

[13:44] One proportion that Boethius will use, he'll say that the now that stands still makes eternity. The now that flows along, right, makes what? Time. Yeah. Yeah.

[14:06] So, in a way, now makes time, like the thing in motion makes motion, right? Without being motion, right? But motion is because the thing in motion is always other as to where it is.

[14:29] If the thing in motion was not always somewhere else, there wouldn't be any motion, would there? Well, now corresponds to the thing in motion, like time does the motion.

[14:50] And the now is other with regards to what? Can't say when it is. It's always before and after. There's, there's, like position, right? Yeah.

[15:05] But before and after, in what sense of before and after? Sense of time or the motion? Well, the sense is making it's it's making the before and after, right? It is time, but isn't time?

[15:30] Okay. But if we so what do we we say the the thing in motion is other and other with regards to where it is, but now is other and other with regards to. Well, in a way, it's yeah, perfectly time. We have to say because of proportion there. Yeah, yeah.

[15:55] Then it seems like you're presupposing time. In order to distinguish the nows, because this now is different because it's at a different time. Well, which are you putting first, though? That's what I'm wondering. Okay. Because

[16:18] in a way, the thing in motion and motion are more fundamental than the now of the time, right? So that the the now is what it is in a sense because of the thing in motion, right? And because the before and after in in time corresponds to the before and after in the what? Motion. In the motion, yeah, yeah. Now it's interesting, huh? I remember discussing one time with Monsignor Dionne here, and he wasn't prepared to go, you know, to Fernandina was saying,

[17:10] right? But. I was saying, is the before and after in the magnitude a cause of the before and after in the motion or the magnitude? And likewise, the before and after in the motion, right? A cause of the before and after in the time. Yeah. What would you say? I'm suspecting no. It seems like it is. But now, if you if you say that is is

[17:53] a cause, it seems to be a cause in this way, like the example is given here, right? You know, if I drive, let's say, from Shrewsbury to Boston, where the airport is, okay, and Framingham down here, right? Okay. Because Framingham comes on this road before Boston, right? But after Shrewsbury, right? Then my motion from what Shrewsbury to Framingham comes before my motion from Framingham to what Boston, right?

[18:30] And then the time in which I go from Shrewsbury to Framingham is before the time that I go from what Framingham to Boston, right? Okay. So is the fact that that Framingham is on this road before Boston, right? The reason why my motion from Shrewsbury to Framingham is before my motion from Framingham to Boston, it seems it is, isn't it?

[19:01] Seems like you. Okay. And is that also in some way the reason why the time it takes me to go from Shrewsbury to Framingham is before the time it takes me to go from Framingham to Boston?

[19:21] Or put another way around, the time which I go from Shrewsbury to Framingham is before the time which I go from Framingham to Boston. It takes me an hour to get in. It takes from nine o'clock in the morning to ten o'clock to get into Boston, right? And it takes from from nine to nine thirty to get to Framingham, and from nine thirty to ten to get to Boston.

[19:44] Rather than from nine thirty to ten, I got to Framingham, and then from nine to nine thirty, I got Framingham to Boston. Doesn't seem right to me, right? Okay.

[20:00] Now, what kind of a cause is that? See. That was the question that I raised, huh? There seem to be, as I say, that one is in some way the cause of the other, right?

[20:26] And therefore, if that's true, what kind of a cause is it? Matter, form, mover, or end? Seems the only possibility looks like some kind of a formal, yeah, cause, yeah. But now, if you go back to the formal cause, Aristotle distinguishes between the what he called the form and what he called the model, right? Okay, and the form is intrinsic, right? And the the model is kind of extrinsic, right?

[21:13] So which of those two would it be? Seems extrinsic. Yeah, yeah. I said, "Yeah, he wasn't sure he was going to go on with that, but but he wouldn't do that either, you know, huh? " He said, "And

[21:36] part of this came up, you know, when we were studying to the the first reading in the physics, huh? " Because you look at the text of Aristotle, the first reading, and he speaks of

[21:50] going forward from what is more known to us to what is more known by nature, right? And then he says, "Well, this road is inborn from what is more known to us, right? To what is more known by nature, right? " And so by kind of analogy to this, right, going forward is like the motion, right? And the road in our analogy, right, is like the road here, right?

[22:21] Okay, so that because the road is from, let's say, the effect to the cause, take a kind of example, then what in our knowing we go from knowing the effect to knowing the cause, huh? Okay, seems like it. So what sense is that? The cause, right? Well, seemingly this was the extrinsic, huh? Formal cause, huh?

[23:09] So the proportion was not merely a likeness of these two things, right? But the likeness is because one, in some sense, is a what cause of the other, right?

[23:32] So when we are, you know, we're said to be made to the image and likeness of God, right? You're not only saying that what we're like God in some way, but that He's what in some sense, another kind of cause of us, right? Right? He's the exemplar that we imitate in a sense.

[23:59] Um. No, when our Lord says there at the end of the sermon on the mount, there in in Matthew, um kind of like conclusion there, be ye perfect then. As your what, heavenly Father is perfect, right? Huh? Well, in a sense, he's saying what perfection of the Father is going to be what

[24:30] a cause of our perfection, right? But what kind of causality is he talking about there? Model exemplar. As a model example. Yeah, yeah. It was to imitate the Father, right? Huh? Right. Is that a kind of formal cause? Model. Yeah, yeah. Aristotle, you know, use those two words there, right? He speaks of I think it's eidos probably uses there eidos and then paradigma or something, but in English, in Latin, they'll translate forma and exemplar or something like that, right?

[25:06] Or form and model, English sometimes. But you know, distinction there between the intrinsic form, right, and the extrinsic one, right. And so, as I think I mentioned before, when you talk about the causality of God, you know, sometimes it's a footnote when I get through distinguishing the four kinds of causes and I finish. So, this is important to every science, right? And I sometimes make a footnote talking about God, and I say, now, in how many of these kinds of causes is God a cause?

[25:39] And I say the answer I give him is what two and a half. Two and a half. Yeah. He's not in any way a cause in the sense of matter, right? Okay. Um, but you know, when God says, "I am the Alpha and the Omega, " right, The beginning, and, the end, he's talking about his being the what, the creator, the maker of all things, in a way, the mover of them, and the end or purpose, right?

[26:05] Okay. So he's a cause in the sense of the third and the fourth kind of cause, but then when he says, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," right, then he's touching upon what he's being a cause in the sense of an extrinsic form, right? Okay.

[26:25] Um. So, in general, when you imitate somebody, they are a cause in the sense of what. Example. Yeah. Example. Yeah. yeah. They're not a cause in the sense of they're moving us, you know. Do this, Or yeah, They're not necessarily even commanding us, right? But we're in fact, in fact, we might imitate, you know, someone who's who's dead or something, right? They read about, right? You know, we imitate somebody that we see, but they don't even know that we're imitating them.

[27:01] Or we admire somebody from a distance, right? So we imitate this person, huh? So we're modeling ourselves on them. So there is somehow a cause of us, right?

[27:20] Now, sometimes you see sometimes a painter will copy a painting of someone else, right? And I remember seeing one of these paintings down at the Worcester Archmuse in there, and I kind of recognized it. Gee, who is that? I've seen that painting before, right? But you look up in the middle, you know piece of paper that identifies it. It says after so and so, right? In some sense, he's what copied somebody else's painting, and in a sense, it's a good thing to do maybe to learn how to paint, maybe.

[27:57] And so they make a better painting if they imitated the the masterful painting. You could have a nice copy of the you know some famous painting, you know, that someone has done a really nice copy of, right? It'd be kind of nice to have in your house, but but it would be what that original painting would be a cause in what sense? You

[28:21] can compare the model in the way when you trace something. In a way, you are doing that, aren't you? And you trace something, and

[28:41] this is kind of a different sense of an exemplar. We normally think of it as an artist. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I don't know what other kind of cause you could call that exactly. You know, I mean, it wouldn't it wouldn't be the the matter, right? And it's not really a mover or a maker, but in sense it's like the motion orbit is imitating before and after in that magnitude that's there, right?

[29:17] And the time, in a way, is imitating that before and after in the motion. So think about that proportion, right? That's we have to understand it as far as you can, anyway.

[29:50] With now, you say it's now is never becoming because it's now. Yeah. So if you were to say that now ceases to be, well, then you can never say it's now. Yeah. But based on these proportions, there. Yeah. And just as as the body in motion doesn't cease to be, right. It's the same ball that's in the infield and caught in the outfield, right? But it's always other and other as to where it is, right?

[30:23] So, but going back to what you were saying, this now is not that now. That's one way of speaking, but really now is now. Yeah, it always is. Yeah, it never ceases to be now. Yeah, now always is. Yeah, but it's always other. Yes, it's

[30:42] always the same. Yeah, yeah. But you have to understand by proportionally to the what to the body in motion, right? And you see that an unreal distinction. Well, then you go back into the Aristotle's manifestation by the sophistic argument, right? And you know,

[31:04] I don't know who's at the door. We open the door, and it's my mother or somebody, my brother or something, right? Well, I know my brother Marcus, but not as behind the door. See,

[31:23] and there really is a distinction there, isn't there? Right. And you know, if my wife called up and said, "Guess who's at the house? " I don't know who's at the house. You know, well, your brother dropped in. He didn't. You see, but I didn't know who's at the house. Who dropped in? Do I? See when she asked me that. See,

[31:52] well, I guess I know my brother Marcus, but I didn't know him as dropping in unexpectedly upon us, right? You see what I mean? See, so it's there is some otherness as being behind the door, as dropping in, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Right? Here's a real distinction there, right? It's still the same man, right?

[32:19] So you have to think about that, huh? This is the way Aristotle is is replying to the objection, right? Because if the now, as as regards what it is, really ceases to be, when does it cease to be, right? Then you have really an insoluble problem there. But if it's if it's not in some way other, though, right? Then there wouldn't be any what time. Everything would be simultaneous, right?

[32:52] Okay. But I think he brings in that sophistical thing in there to show that hey, there really is a distinction, right? I know my brother Mark is a man, but not as the one knocking at the door.

[33:28] Can we say just as motion is something of the thing in motion, time is something of the now? Yeah, we'll be kind of careful about that. You know, we're not, you know, be extending the analogy, the likeness, more than it should be, right?

[33:53] Because it seems like you can say, well, that time ceases to be, but it's always now. Yeah, now doesn't Seen the season Yeah, yeah, yeah. I say going back to what Waithe says there, right? huh He says the now that flows, right, makes time, right. Mm The now that stands still makes eternity. Interesting, huh? It's the same now though Well, that's what he says too. Yeah. Same now But but But see, the now that stands still is in no way other, right?

[34:26] Yeah. See. But the now that flows is in some way other, right? Okay. The ball that stands still, right, and spot is in no way other, right? But the ball that's been hit, right, is always other and other, right? In some way, right.

[34:54] It's never in the same place exactly, but it's the same ball that's never in the same place. I was trying to figure this out for two weeks or something. In part, I had this question. It seems like it's related. Relating motion to time is motion. The now relating motion to time is motion. No,

[35:29] he's he's making first of all a proportion, right? Now, you can alternate the proportion, say that the now is to time as the thing in motion

[35:54] is to motion. Okay. But this is more known to us, huh? Okay. Or knows more known to us how it is that the thing in motion remains the same, right? And how it's in some way other, though, right? Okay. Remains the same as to what it is, but it's always other as to where it is. I'd say, huh? Okay. Insofar as it's always other, it makes what motion, right?

[36:29] Okay. And it's analogous to that, right? The time, the now of time, is always the same as regards what it is, huh? But as where it is or when it is, right? It is always what other, right? Okay. If I tend to use the word where, it says you know it's position there, right? It's always other, huh?

[37:00] So I think you have to think about that proportion, right? And think about how this is, right? To see how he is really solving the difficulty about the now, huh? Right.

[37:17] Because if you go back to the difficulty, there's a difficulty in in denying that the now, and you said the now is just always the same, right? You know, it's always the same now. And everything, you know, the French Revolution taking place now and so on, right? And all these things are simultaneous, right? I mean, there's no time anymore, so that can't be so, right? But then, if if one now is being corrupted and another now is coming into being and so on, right?

[37:51] That has other problems, right? So there's got to be a distinction, right? That you're overlooking there, okay? And that distinction is hard to see, right? But you can see a similar distinction in the thing in motion, that that is always the same as what it is, but it's always other as to where it is, and the now corresponds to the thing in motion, as time to the motion.

[38:29] And so the now, insofar as it's always the same, right? You don't have to worry about it being corrupted, right? But insofar as it's always other, right? In some way other, it's making what time.

[38:48] Okay. What was your question? Yeah, I'm still. I maybe I don't want to take up any more time in the class. It's quite nice. Welcome. Well, I was saying in relating motion to time is is motion to now in relating motion to time is motion. I was thinking motion is of course motion to time. See. Yeah. You know, since you know the study of what of you know mathematics, philosophy first, it makes you aware of the fact that things in proportion you can what alternate the proportion, right?

[39:37] And then it's done in a very rigorous way in arithmetic, right? But you can see that with two is to three is to four is to six, you can alternate the proportion. And we're doing that with Shakespeare

[39:49] on angle two, remember? You know, we can say you know it's easy to see the chief good of man is to man as the chief good of the beast is to the beast, right? Okay. But then you alternate and say that as the chief good of man is to the chief good of the beast, so man is to the beast. So if the chief good of man is no more the chief of the beast, man is no more than the beast.

[40:09] But he is more than the beast, right? So I mean, it's very common to alternate these proportions for different reasons, huh? To see different things, huh?

[40:28] So the now is proportional to the thing in motion. Time is proportional to the what? The motion, right? Now you're asking with the number. Well, notice he'll speak of of of two numbers there in a way. Um.

[40:58] It is clear that if time be not, the now will not be, and if the now be not, time will not be. Just in a way as if what? There's not a thing in motion. There's no motion, right? And there's no motion. There's no thing in motion. He says the number of the moved and of the motion are together, just as the moved and the what? Motion, right?

[41:29] Well, the number of the moved is what? The now's. Yeah, the number of the nows, right? And the number of the motion is what? Time, right?

[41:44] And that's why you know the the now of eternity is compared not to a number but to one. Okay, the unity there, huh? It's not numbered, huh? Not numbered anyway.

[42:02] For time is the number of motion, but the now is as the moved, huh? As the unit of number, right? Interesting. And time is continuous by the now, and is divided by the now, and this follows right proportionally movement and the moved that we were saying before there. The motion is continuous because it's the same thing in motion throughout the whole, right? Okay.

[42:50] And motion is one by the moved, huh? So it wasn't the same bulk on the outfield that was in the infield. It wouldn't be one motion, but you know, two motions going on there.

[43:17] But in account, huh? The way of speaking there. It distinguishes the before and after in this motion by its being other in some way, right? An account means not as to what it is, but as to where it is.

[43:34] And this follows in some way the point, huh? For the point continues and divides the line, right? So we speak of what the point is being a division of the line, right? But also we speak of the point as being the end of one part of the line, the beginning of the next, right? For it is the beginning of one and the end of the other.

[43:59] But whenever you thus takes using one as two, necessarily it stands if the same point will be a beginning and an end. The now is always other in account of the move being in motion. Thus, time is. Not as a number of the same point, that is a beginning and an end, but rather as extremities of a line, because they're what before and after, and not as parts in account of what has been said.

[44:28] It would use the middle point so as two, so that the rest could take place. And further, it is clear that the now is no part of time, nor is a division of motion as near the point of the line. Again, now those things will come out more fully in the sixth book, right? But two lines are parts of one. As a limit, the now is not time, but happens to it as it numbers, as it numbers a number.

[44:57] For limits are only of that of which they are limits, but the number of these horses ten is also elsewhere. Now this is further the transition I had, but maybe next time we'll talk about a few more things that Aristotle talks about regarding time.

[45:17] And then we'll talk about what eternity. Yeah. Okay. Okay. We want to talk about in particular what does it mean to be in time, right? Or to be measured by time, right? You have to see that that's important to see in itself, but also to see when you talk about eternity, right? Why we are in time, but God is not in time, right? But you have to see what it means to be in time, right?

[45:50] And and why is what does it mean to say my life is measured by time, right? But God's life is not measured by time, yeah. Our discussion of eternity will be two weeks hence. No, next week we'll do it. Yeah, but we'll say a few more things about time, right? Okay. And and one thing is, as I said, what it is to be in time, right? To be measured by time.

[46:12] Another thing is is something we leave really to experimental science, but what motion do we take as the what standard for time, right? Okay. And then the other thing is

[46:32] going back to the original difficulty, right? About does time exist right? You say, and Aristotle you know raises later on the question: Would time exist without the numbering soul, right?

[46:53] Okay. Without the soul that numbers. He's going to answer time would barely exist without. See, but doesn't fully exist without the numbering, but he's going to make a distinction there between. He would say, you know, is there a number of trees in the forest out there without the numbering soul? Well, you can say more that there's a number of trees out there, even though we haven't numbered them yet.

[47:25] Then you can say that there's a number of days that we didn't number them, because all those trees out there—there's ten trees out there—they all exist together, right? There's ten trees out there, but are there ten days in the world around us? No, because one day is before or after another day. So where do you get ten days then, right? Unless they had the numbering soul, right?

[47:53] This is very important when you study the De Anima too, and Aristotle talks about how man is the animal that has the sense of time, and

[48:05] he's he lives in time in a way that animals don't. But when a man is in passion or something like that, he's like living in the here and now. He's not looking before and after. And at the text, I when I you know defend Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? The first time you see the use of reason, when a person starts looking before and after in what time, right?

[48:35] And my stock example of students is is that it seems to be. I haven't done any sociological survey, but it seems to be that freshmen, right, get sick drinking alcohol more than seniors get sick drinking alcohol. Okay. Now,

[48:58] without you know a very elevated idea of of what virtue is, right, you know, or what the good is, if you just think of the good as pleasure and the bad as pain, right, you know, and so you have like with the English utilitarians, the calculus of pleasure and pains, right. Then the secret to life is how to maximize your pleasures and minimize your pains, right? Well, if a person drinks to excess, right, and he's sick to his stomach all night long and feels lousy the next day and so on, right?

[49:38] He's not really maximizing his pleasures and minimizing his pains, right? For a little extra drinking for an hour, he has ten hours of misery, right? So if he stops, you know, at a point before he's sick, right, then he can get a good night's sleep and he can enjoy some more tomorrow. So this is not a very you know elevated use of reason or very elevated understanding, but it's kind of a an opening beginning, right?

[50:10] And what you're looking before and after in time, huh? The thing I used to notice about the little babies, you know, and especially when we had little babies in the house there, my wife would always, you know, you wait till the baby, you know, really gets a good cry up in the at night time, you know, make sure they really want their milk and so on, right?

[50:35] And but the order was that you would put the baby on the changing table, right, and change the diaper, and then the baby would be fed milk, right? Okay. Now you'd see the baby would be put on the changing table, and they continue to cry, and they cry until they get the milk, right? And then after I don't know how many weeks or whatever it was, once the baby was laid on the changing table, they'd stop crying because they had not yet received the milk.

[51:05] What's what's looking before and after now, right? They realize that changing table is the prelude to the milk, right? And and relief is is definitely on the way now, and you see. But I mean that's a very simple example, but it always struck me. I was always struck by the fact that that at first they would continue to scream and cry while they're being changed, but then as time went on, they started to, you know, the ones become the changing table.

[51:32] Then they started to calm down, like like the process was was started, right? The process of meeting all their little needs and so on, and that's that's say what that's before and after, right?

[51:48] And you you know as a child you kind of see that too, you know, think about time. That's kind of the first sign of the use of reason. As long as a person's living in the here and now, they seem to be very little different from the the beast, huh?

[52:16] And what's good here and now, or bad here and now? It's the same thing with with pain. There, you know, see, so the guy, you know, you've got the dental coward and sort of people, right? And they put off these things, right? And and and then all of a sudden they're in very what much more serious condition, and maybe more going to undergo more pain, you know, because of this delaying the treatment or whatever it was, huh?

[52:44] You see. So in a sense, a person says, "Well, no, its idea is let's go get that tooth wherever it is fixed right away before it gets abscessed or whatever it is, right? " You see what I mean? It was kind of calculus there of pain too, right? And you're looking before and after in time, huh? So it shows real connection there between time and the and the what and the numbering and so on, and that's kind of a difference between man and other animals too that they don't seem to go around numbering things so much, huh?

[53:22] Okay, so we'll talk a little bit about time and then eternity next time. If I have it, my computer, I'll get the thing on the textbook and give it to you next time. Reduce it or something. Okay. So, you've been a little bit distracted.

[53:45] You know what is virtue? Meno doesn't define virtue; he gives examples of virtue, right? And Socrates has to explain the difference between giving examples of a thing and defining it. Likewise, when he asked Euthyphro what is piety, Euthyphro gives examples of piety, and Socrates has to explain the difference between giving examples of a thing and defining it, right? Okay. Now, that's a you know, in the Theaetetus right?

[54:19] When Socrates asked Theatetus what is epistemic, right? It is science. he's examples of it, right? Yeah. That's natural because examples are closest to our senses, and that's where our knowledge begins. So, if you ask a little boy, you know, what is a nose? He wouldn't give you a definition of nose. He'd say, "That's a nose. That's a nose. That's a nose." Huh? Okay. So it's natural to give examples of the thing before defining it, huh?

[54:49] But there's also a road from examples of the thing to its what definition, which road is to compare the examples, separate out what they have in common, leaving aside their differences, right? And that's one way to arrive at a definition, huh? Okay. But now, after you have the definition, you might give examples to what illustrate the definition. See, the definition is something that the reason grasps, but the reason doesn't think without an image in which to consider what it's thinking, so that you need an example, right, in a sense to illustrate, right, the definition.

[55:43] So even after we've arrived at the definition, say of motion as the act of what is able to be, in so far as it's able to be, in order to understand the definition, you have to exemplify it, right? And so I was taking the simple example of a man coming into a room, right, walking into a room, okay? Yeah. And you can say the man who is out in the hall is able to be in the room, right?

[56:20] Okay. And when he's walking into the room, his ability to be in the room is in a way being actualized, isn't it? Yeah. Because as he's coming into the room, as he's coming through the doorway, he's already in part in the room.

[56:43] He speaks of the, tropos tropas, tropas, and then we're going trop again for going forward, right? Okay. And in Latin they translate that modus, the word she didn't, you know. But the Greek word is the same, tropas, with you know going forward, huh? But now, in English, we translate that. Sometimes we partner translate. We say "way of proceeding," right? We take our Latin word "proceeding." It's very common when I was coming and growing up.

[57:29] The Ptolemy and the Placius common. But finally, you know, fully because in English you say the way of going what forward. Now, the second word is you know the Greek word "progame," but it's the same etymologically. It's they're very close, right? Okay, but here the words are somewhat different. Okay,

[58:01] now the Greek word "tropas" it can be translated as "way," as some of its sense "tropas," but it also has the sense of what turn or turning, right? Okay, but maybe in this context it's more natural to translate as the way, right? Okay, but the etymology of "modus" is a little bit different. Thomas is always quoting Augustine. Modus

[58:32] is what mensura prefigit. It's tied with the idea of what Measure. of measure, right? You say, but then then it gets broadened in meaning, right? In in Latin, huh? Say, now the English word "way." The word "way" is a little closer to the word "road," isn't it? But sometimes you use the word "way" in kind of the way of doing something, right? You know, it's a little more terms of the activity rather than the road itself, right?

[59:07] But I think there is something to be learned in all of these words. It's like we get the ethics right, and as Shakespeare tells us, that part of philosophy that treats of happiness by virtue is specially to be achieved. And when I first read Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, I read it in the English translation. Of course, you have the word "happiness," right? Then you get Thomas's thing, and the word is what "felicitas."

[59:41] You look at the Greek, and the word is what "eudaimonia." Okay, and the etymology of the three words is all different. Happiness comes from "hap," which means luck. Happy go lucky, See?

[1:00:00] But "Felicitas comes from "Felix meaning fruitful. Oh, Felicitas. That's right. Yeah, Felix means fruitful. Okay. And then, uh, Eudaimonia means what you got. You're well-demoned.

[1:00:23] So I say, the three names kind of have a different etymology, right? And happiness suggests that this happens by good luck, right? Mm-hmm. Felicitas, that happens by what it's a natural result of your good actions, right? Like in a bad tree, you know, bear good fruit, no. Eudaimonia that depends upon an upper, or a higher being in some way, right? And I say, and Aristotle kind of, you know, seems to see an element of truth in all three things, all right.

[1:01:03] Because our happiness seems to depend upon what we do or don't do, right? And in that sense, it seems to be the natural result of what we've done or not done, right? Or we're in a sense responsible in that sense, right, for our happiness or our misery? But there seems to be some truth, you know, the things that happen in life to people, right? You get hit by a car and you're maimed, or you know, you know, your house burns down and you're poor now or something, right?

[1:01:39] So luck seems to have something to do with things, right? But then the idea that you know even the common man will say, you know, something nice happens. Somebody upstairs likes me,

[1:01:55] and so, but you see, the emphasis of Nicomachean Ethics is is upon what what you should do or not do in order to be what you know. But Aristotle's not neglecting the fact that there's things either by luck or by some higher power, right? You know, but these kind of we don't have the same control over them, right? Okay. But now, now

[1:02:29] you go to Latin and you see that they also have the term bona fortuna, which etymologically is similar to what happiness. And you go to Aristotle's book on poetic art. He didn't use the word eudaimonia there. He used the word eutychia, which means good luck, you know. And so you're talking about the the the fortune or misfortune of these characters in tragedy, and you know, eutychia, you know.

[1:02:59] And so, of course, you know, Shakespeare's always saying, you know, you know, Othello says, "I'm fortune's fool," right? You know, I mean, Romeo says, "I'm fortune's fool," right? And who can control his fate? You know, says Othello, and so on. Okay, I just mentioned that because. Because you have to be kind of sensitive to the fact that sometimes the words we use to translate things have a different what etymol etymology, right?

[1:03:30] And it's so suggestive about it, right? See, so English word, you know, we translate "nous" in Latin by "intellectus," which Thomas takes as "intellectus, from intus legere, but in English, we translate it by "understanding," which comes from "to stand under." So there's a little difference in there, right? And maybe something to be understood by each of these words.

[1:03:57] how "sapientia" means "sapida scientia." Thomas says "savory knowledge," right? And how Shakespeare touches upon that in the "In Roman Julia. Well, here we have something similar, right? Because the modus procedendi. Should fit the the matter right. So, in a sense, it's measured by the matter. So the word modus fits it very well, doesn't it? Okay.

[1:04:30] And you measure to make things fit, right? Okay, measure things to make them fit. So the modus per identity has to fit the matter. Tropos doesn't doesn't have that sense of measure or fit, right? Tropos has the idea of turn, right? Okay. Now, I was reading my favorite author there, Washington Irving, right? And I don't know if you ever read Montjoy, one of these little stories here, right?

[1:05:04] It's a marvelous story. It's about a guy who's got a poetic turn of mind, right? And he gets a teacher who also has a poetic turn of mind, right? And so he just loves his teacher, but he doesn't realize that he's confusing the this beautiful poetry for wisdom, right? And of course, he's he's kind of romantic too, you know. And of course, his father's always making fun of him, you see.

[1:05:34] And yeah, it didn't fall straight at all. It happened in Montjoy, huh? But but but anyway, you know, Irving speaks of his what? He had this this poetic turn of mind, right? Well, you can see what Aristotle is talking about there, but something that fits this that that when you go to different subjects, you need a different what turn of mind, right?