Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics) 68. Student Questions on the Continuous, Kant, Natural Law, and Shakespeare https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/3-natural-hearing/068-student-questions-on-the-continuous-kant-natural-law-and/ [0:00] Now. So I'm wondering about the meaning of continuous. Here, suppose if points could touch, then you would say points could compose the continuous. Yeah. Then what do you mean by continuous? You know, [0:30] I suppose I suppose you're falsely imagining as if you know you could have the points touching, and and then you know, stopping outside each other, right? You know, you're kind of falsely imagining the point to be something very, well, [0:47] small, right? Yeah. Like a small circle, but still something with some definite magnitude or size. Mhm. What would what would be the definition of continuous? [1:00] in that case. Well, I suppose you know the modern mathematician who says a line is composed of infinity points. He would say it's infinitely divisible, right? You know, there's always more points there, right? [1:17] I mean, you divide the line in half, you've got infinity points there, so you can divide, you know, always divide into infinities, all right? No matter how small the line gets, you still have infinity of points there, right? Now. I should talk to one of the mathematicians at the school. There might be more. We've kind of been mathematicians sitting in a math class sometimes, you know. And, uh, I mean, he still thought that the line was composed of infinite points, right? [1:47] You know. But in a sense, he saw there's no next point right You see So always between two points is infinite points right? Mm-hmm. It's kind of they're kind of you know result the kind of imagining. [2:08] I'm just wondering. It seems like in this first paragraph that maybe there's equivocation on the word continuous because he defines continuous in one way continuous is divided against touching and next, but in another way he says is. [2:34] But then why would you even? No, I think I think I think like it's a little bit like we're saying here earlier about the isosceles, right? Huh? You know [2:45] that um uh if you talk say about the the the left and the right part of a line. Right, you know, between the line which is the left side of the line, right, and the line which is the right side of the line, that part of the line, right, there's no line in between, is there? So you can say that's the next line, right? Okay. And then you can say that the, [3:18] you know, the end of one line is together with the beginning of the other line, right? No way you can say that, right? Now maybe, maybe you know, there's a question of you know, how can you say that? Are there really two points there, right? You say. Well, strictly speaking, no. We're saying that the the point which is the end of the left side is also the point which is the beginning of the second one. [3:52] Is that two different points there, right? But nevertheless, you could you could say that that point is is two in definition in a way, right? It's the end of the left side and the beginning of the right side, right? There's some distinction there because, [4:10] you know, if you cut cut away the right side, right, then that line would be that point would be the end of the line that was the left side, but wouldn't be the beginning of the other one, right? You know. So there is something in in a way [4:32] you could say. I mean, kind of carefully say, I suppose, but the end of the left side and the beginning of the right side are together, right? Although it's maybe maybe more true to say that one. So so in a way, these things are a little bit like um like [4:52] uh beginning cause element right element, right? Okay. Everything continuous. We might say in a circle, right? If you draw the diameter of a circle, right, you might say that the two semicircles are what touching, right? Okay. So everything continuous is touching, but not everything touching is continuous, right? Or you might say that everything is continuous or even touching is continuous with or touching what is next to it, right? [5:29] Right. So you know, if you take my house to the neighbor's house and you move them together so they touch, still the next house, right? Say. Okay. But but here they seem to be taken kind of separately, aren't they, right? Okay. So it's like I was saying, you know, you can say that I am an animal, right? Or you can say that I am not an animal, I'm a man. [5:59] I'm not an animal. I'm a man. You know, right? Okay. So to here, they seem to be taking, you know, now you seem to be taking nix there for something that is not touching or continuous, right? Okay. That it's just nix, but not touching or continuous, right? But I mean, you can still, in some sense, you know, as they say, what is touching is nix too, right? [6:34] but it's more than that, right? Say. No, that's that's not so. No, but then the question is, why would you even bother to discuss whether a point can be next to a point or not? It doesn't matter, even if a point could be next to a point, it won't be continuous; it'd just be. It's true. It's true. That's true. But I just want to be overkill, you know. [7:19] I mean, it's going to go when he gets into the next second part of this book, right? You know, Thomas makes the first division there between the first four readings, right? And then the fifth reading, right? And the fifth reading is about the division of motion, right? But kind of presupposes this, right? These first four readings, in a sense, are the philosophy of the continuous. But then, starting in the fifth reading, he's going to be talking about some more detailed things about motion, but presupposing, right, all this that has been said here about the continuous, right? [8:01] Okay, he's going to go into bring out some of the interesting things about it now. Okay, he's going to bring out the fact that that [8:14] before you have moved any distance, you are moving some distance, right? But whenever you are moving some distance, you already have moved some distance, right? See, so before I have I have walked a mile, I have been [8:32] walking for a while, right? Okay, but when I am walking a mile, but haven't walked a mile yet, I have walked already a foot or a yard or half a mile or something, right? Okay. So, so I'm walking a mile. One time, I have walked. I have walked. You know, a half mile. But then I was walking a half mile before I had walked a half mile, right? [9:04] But when I was walking a half mile, I had already walked some distance, hadn't I? Hence the consequences of the infinite divisibility of the continuous, right? That [9:18] I'm always walking some distance before I've walked it, right? But when I'm walking some distance, I've already have walked some distance. So, which comes first? [9:35] Are you walking some distance before you have walked some distance, or have you walked some distance? But have you walked some distance without walking first in that sense you see? what I mean there's some odd consequences here of the fact that this is, you know, he's going to bring those out as he goes on, right? So, and this this is part of the basis for, you know, in the Summa Contra Gentiles and in the similar books here, the reason that motion depends upon mover, right? [10:12] There's nothing first in motion. Or if something's really responsible for itself having something is going to have to belong to it. That thing first of all. [10:35] But anyway, so I mean, this this about next is important, you know, and and it does say something about the continuous, right? That because in substance there's an indivisible in the continuous, right? Even though it's not composed of the indivisible, right? Yeah. Yeah. And and that indivisible that is in the continuous is more than one, right? But none of those indivisibles that are somehow in the continuous are next to each other. [11:20] Right. So it is part of the understanding of the continuous, isn't it? Yeah. It's amazing, you know. I mean, how how how fundamental the continuous is in all our thinking, and where is the philosophy of the continuous? You know, these other guys. And have they learned about the continuous from Aristotle? I don't think they have. What are they doing? [11:57] This isn't being taught. No, I think I think the Berkeleys. It doesn't make any sense. they're going to be divisible forever. You know. You know they seem to have no credit with the basic things. You know. So we were talking about Kant the other day. There. You know, and and Kant. [12:27] Does Kant understand the good? You know, his starting point is you know. The only thing unqualifiedly good is goodwill. You know. But is a goodwill as fundamental as good? It's measured by that. Yeah. He said the only thing that is quantifiable is good will. No, the only thing that's unqualifiably good, right? Unqualifiably. Yeah. I mean, some. You see, he sees the element of truth, right? You see. You know, and Aristotle and Thomas, you know, saw the element of truth more clearly than he did, right? [13:14] You see. Um. Uh. As Aristotle points out, you know, you can misuse knowledge, right? I can use my knowledge of logic to deceive you, right? Huh? I can use my art of cooking to burn the meat, right? You know. So all these other things, I can use my strength, you know, to rob you or kill you or something, right? You know. Um. [13:44] I can use my money for all kinds of horrible things, like people, you know. Say. And so the good use of my hands and my money and my knowledge, all these things, they all depend upon the goodwill, right? And and the will moves all the rest of us, right? [14:03] That's why charity is, you know, in particular, it's an important right charity in the will. So the good use, you might say, of all our parts and so on. Now the quality depend upon the goodwill, right? So, you know, Kant sees this, but didn't say it very clearly, but you know. So he wants to understand the goodwill, right? But don't you have to understand good before you can understand the goodwill? [14:40] You know, when they say to our Lord, you know, you know, they call him good there in one place, and he says, "Why do you call me good? God alone is good, right? " He's God alone. You know, Kant about unqualifiedly is good, right? Huh. But even if you and I were trying to understand the goodness of God, like Thomas does in the Summas and so on, you have to have some understanding of good in general before you could. [15:06] Understand that God is good, and that He's goodness itself, and He's the good of every good, and He's the summum bonum, right? But all this presupposes an understanding of what. Good. Where do you find that Kant? Right. You know. He's starting in a sense with the less known, right? [15:30] That's why it's a kind of abstract way of approaching it, right? You know, categorical imperatives and these sort of things, right. Or you know, you know, Thomas will often quote Dionysius, right? You know, for man to be good is to be reasonable, right? And since I say to students, you know, I say, what is a what is a good human act? It's a reasonable act, right? You know, [16:10] it sounds like an understatement. What's wrong with murder? Well, it's unreasonable. You know, and you got you know, see, see, why it's unreasonable? But, but, let's see. Um, but suppose I, I, you know, suppose I started with that. All right, [16:33] to be good means to be reasonable. Is reasonable the basic meaning of good? You'd say you know, makes sense to that for man to be good means to be what reasonable, right? Huh? [17:14] Is that the starting point for one's understanding of good? See, the starting point for what I always say is, is Socrates was to take the slave boy and ask him what is good. You know, the slave boy would say, candy's good, pizza's good, horse is good, horse is good, vacation is good, holiday is good, right? And Socrates would say, well, why do you call these things good? [17:55] Why do they all have in common And all you could think of would be the fact that these are all things he wants, right? So you come then to the first definition of good. The good is what all want, huh? That's where it all begins to begin ethics, right? It manifests in that kind of induction there, and therefore they say, well, the good is what all want, right? [18:20] And and then you ask the Socratic questions of good because of why, right? You know, and so on, and you gradually, you know, come to an understanding of good that's more deep, right? The good is the same as the end, and so on, and but before you find some kind, right? You see, [18:44] you know, he can't say that a good will is a will that what wills the good, because then he'd have to. No good apart from the will in some way. [18:59] Yes. I had something about the intellectual custom. I was listening that tape again, and something that really basic, maybe to two places, Aristotle in in the in the book called the Topics, you know, which is a book on deductive reasoning, right? And he's discussing what is a dialectical problem what is a dialectical question in a sense, right? And something that there is some doubt about, right? Some reason to doubt to think that it is so and is not so, right? [19:44] Yes, that's right. And he says now, if somebody though he says wonders whether snow is white, right? He's not really in need of argument; he's in need of a sensation. And then he says, if someone wonders, you know, whether one should honor your father and mother, right? He doesn't need an argument. He says he needs punishment, right? In other words, that he should just say, "Naturally, know this, right? [20:15] That you should honor your father and mother, right? " And it's not something that you would reason about, he says, huh? You see, you see. [20:27] And if somebody, hi, and if somebody, you know, questions this, right? It's they're in that mental state of thinking they don't know what they do know. [20:43] Okay. It's interesting that that's his example there because that that's the the fourth commandment, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. So Aristotle is taking that as something that a man would naturally know. Now the other example that's interesting is is in Nicomachean Ethics in the second book, right, where he's bringing out that virtue is a what mean between two extremes, right? But then he says there is no what mean of the extreme, right? [21:25] So he says if the question is about adultery, he says, right, you know, not a question of do you neither too much nor too little, but just the right amount, the right person, and so on, right? He says any adultery is wrong, right? Okay, but notice that that gives a very clear example of an act that is that has no mean, right? Because by definition, in the extreme, right? [21:51] It's a little bit like you know when Aristotle you know approaches this, he takes something more known. Which is in the arts, right? That the good is between two extremes, right? Yeah. So, if I cook the meat too much, right, that's bad. If I cook it too little, that's bad, right? Cook it just the right amount, okay? Mm-hmm. And now, if someone says, [22:21] "Oh, you mean therefore that if you if you burn the meat too much, that's bad. If you burn the meat too little, that's bad. If we're just the right amount," you say, "Well, no, no, no, because burning the meat is by definition, right, cooking the meat too much, huh? You see. So [22:43] it makes no difference whether you you burn it a little or too much, as far as being bad or good, right? To burn it at all is bad, right? Mhm You know, it's worse for you to burn too much than too little, right? You know, I mean, but there's no what mean of the extreme, right? Mm-hmm. So he's making that point, see? Um. [23:08] Uh. But but when he gets into the moral matter, there, the example he gives is that of adultery, right? Huh? Is that that was a what altogether clear example on his part, right? You see, of something that would be, um, by definition something bad, huh? Mm. You see. Um. The same way you could say murder, right? And you know, you know, murder defined as killing the innocent, right? [23:37] Mm. You see. Well, it's bad if you murder too much, or bad if you don't murder enough, too little, but murder just the right amount, murder people. [23:50] No. In the same way, with, you know, you know, you take stealing as an example of the same thing, right? Huh? You know, if I steal too much from you, that's bad. If I steal too little from you, that's bad. Steal just the right amount from you. No, I see. You know, in other words, this is an act that is already by definition what? Uh, pertaining to one of the extremes, right? [24:15] Mm-hmm. You see. And it's interesting, you know, in in Plato's great dialogue, there, the Symposium, the dialogue on love, right? Mm-hmm. And the the one man is defending love. All love is being good, right? Right. [24:40] And uh, make no distinction between a good love and a bad love, right? Huh? So any love could be good, homosexual love like that, if it were done, you know, too much and too little, but in the mean, right? You see. But then the other thing you say, well, no, there's a good love and a and a bad love, right? And they so they have more distinct knowledge, right? [25:07] The second speaker is, you know, there's a good love and a bad love, right? Mm-hmm. Um. But anyway, Aristotle is taking adultery there and taking honor your father, and mother, in, the other place, right? Mm-hmm. Is something that would be outside of question, you know. He's actually taking what we would regard as two of the commandments, right? You know, the sixth commandment and the and the fourth commandment, right? [25:39] See, but it's kind of saying that that reason naturally knows those things, right? Because Aristotle is not exposed to the mosaic law or the prophets or to the to Sinai, right? Huh. Okay. And the child will know murder is wrong because he hasn't reached; he's not able to reason yet. Well, no, but but but he naturally knows it, or naturally comes to know it at least, right? [26:05] Once he realizes what it is. Well, I thought the implication on the tape was that he won't see it. I mean, all these people believe abortion is okay. No, but in a sense, they're they're saying they, um, they don't know what they do know. Oh. [26:33] Okay. Deep, deep, or you know, you know, I remember seeing. Oh. Or, or you know, they, um, I remember seeing what's it? What's his name? Was it the thing in the Hudson Institute there? Callahan, right? You know, the the man is worse than the wife. You know, like this more poor life, but but you know, I remember seeing it something by him on abortion, right? Huh? You know, even now, let us, you know, at the beginning, you know, um, um, you know, set aside, you know, the obviously extreme positions, right? [27:04] You know, the one which says that all abortion is is should be allowed, right? The other one that says that no abortion should be allowed, right? You know, you know. [27:15] Like you know these are out of the question, obviously, you know, you know. I see. Okay, And now let's try to find the mean here, you know. [27:26] You know, in, in a sense, he he he's assuming that um, um, every act is of what has a mean, right? Is good, right? So he's looking for a mean of the extreme, right? Say, which is it? He's looking for, um, you know, uh, the right right amount to burn the meat, right? You know, see, or just the wrong note in music, or something, right? You know. [28:08] The note is is not too little off or too far off, or just the right amount off. You know. You know, and see. The key is they don't know what they do know. Deep deep down, they they they know that this is wrong, or they they're blinded by this custom. Well, you know, yeah. I would say that when they were interviewing the, uh, uh, that was the woman, the woman, trying to appoint to the Supreme Court, right? [28:40] You know, and thing about abortion came up, you know, and of course, uh, well, obviously, you have to allow? Abortion because you know, you know, equality of men and women demands this, you know. [28:54] Well. The point is, obviously, you know, the woman's burden, you might say, you know, of carrying the child nine months and so on, and they're being tied down by this and so on. It's obviously unequal, right? That's nature, right? Nature has not given men and women the same burden in bringing a child into this world, right? And [29:25] so, but if your premise is that men and women must be equal, right? You see. Well, then you have to right to abortion, right? Okay. [29:43] It's like saying, you know, you know what? What child should have the right to go to bed whenever he wants to, right? The parents say, "You go to bed now." [29:54] Well, this is obviously inequality here, right? Because because daddy goes to bed or mommy goes to bed when they want to go to bed, right? And if the kid has to go to bed when mommy or daddy wants, them because they should go to bed. Well, that's obviously, you know, unequal. You know, I mean, people are really getting crazy out there. I mean, that's absolutely crazy. I mean, you know, once you touch a kid, you know, huh, you know, you know, you still can't hit him, you know, and you know these crazy cases, you know, where somebody gives a kid a little whack there in the parking lot when he's misbehaving, you know. [30:28] They call the police, you know, and now you hear these horrible cases, you know, where they, you know, where you can't spank your kid or anything, you know, and so [30:42] and there's a big thing. this in the morning paper today. was the morning paper today. I guess there, there's some book about being published there by University of Minnesota Press. There, you know, which is in favor of sex with children and all kinds of crazy created a fury, you know, see, we're saying, "you know, they should fire everybody in that printing office." It's going crazy, you know, huh? [31:05] See, But I think it was saying, you know, that you know that you know that kids got complete rights, you know, independence of his parents and so on, right? You see, well, I mean, you could say that naturally, parents and children are unequal, right? In many ways, right? [31:32] In some sense, the kids, you know, make more demands upon the parents and vice versa. You know that that that that's that's equal, right? Huh? I mean, the parents do more for the kids than the kids do for the parents, and. [31:51] I mean, there's many kinds of inequalities in the parents and the kids, you see, and and I mean, she's reasoning from the what, less known or the unknown, right? You see, Mhm. You know, Charles De Koninck said one time, you know, you can do the whole history of modern philosophy as denial of the more known from the less known, and [32:25] or denial of the what, the known by the customary or something, right? You see. So, see, the woman, you know, is not as free to pursue her career if she's, you know, bogged down. With the child, right? Right? He said. So she gotta have the the choice of abortion, so she can choose freely to continue her career if she wants to, right? [33:07] Always a man would be free to, you know pursue his career, you know, and she wouldn't be, so that would be inequality, right? So I mean, it's it's denial of nature, you see. Mm. It's it's it's like that. I guess it's a true story, but it's kind of funny, but it's you know, there's there's some New York, I guess, one of I was. Rather than buy her daughter a doll, she bought her a truck. [33:34] You heard about that? And and the daughter was was putting the truck to bed like a baby. You know, it's like these these parents who won't buy their kid a toy gun, right? The kid is a gun, you know, some kind of a thing, you know. You know, I mean, we all did as a kid, you know. You didn't have a gun, you you invented something, you know. [34:06] You have maybe the the map, you know, the wooden map of the United States, and you got Texas or some states like that, you know, or Florida's not that your gun, right? There's the there's the daughter putting the truck to bed like it's a baby, you know. Why the hell did you buy her a baby, you know? And every one time you know watching the kids, you know, because my daughter had the dolls, you know, and one time the boys picked up the dolls, and said, "hey, the dolls, see, you know," and I said, "I'm not going to say anything. [34:34] I just watched you know, and basically get bored of the doll, you know, they go to something else, you know." Just just natural, you know, huh? You see, and the the, uh, the one of my old nieces, there, older nieces, there, my sister, in-law here. You know, she's crazy about the babies when when Maria comes with the babies I'm like that, you know, and she's been saving up her money from babysitting, you know, so she can fly out to see the babies. [35:07] You know, I mean, I mean, she did all that maternal status, love to see that, you know, but you can't let. It's hard to just hide the sparks of nature. It's kind of natural. It's a thing, you know. Brothers, and there were four of us, and my sister was the youngest. Yeah. We used to try to make her act like a boy. Yeah. And she she was just a little. [35:38] She says she would say to us, "Girls are different than boys." She would tell us. Baseballs and dolls. We couldn't do it. Yeah, yeah. [35:56] So I mean, there are natural inequalities, and it's life. I see another account there. you know, some woman was giving an account of the of the now speaker at Harvard. There was, you know, and you know, the first principle was the autonomy of the individual, right? Autonomy means actually what? Make your own law. You [36:35] know. Everybody's got a right to their own conception of the world and what their, you know, the Supreme Court said that I guess. You live your life, and I'll live my life. Yeah. I always joke about you know these bumper stickers. You know, you see for a year, they're longer. You know, challenge authority, challenge authority, right? And then after a few years, I begin to see a new bumper sticker called "Challenge Reality." [37:15] He's gone. He's gonna put challenge authority. You don't face up to reality. Just missed out my jacket over there. Have you read Harold Bloom's book on Shakespeare? No, no. Just got through reading a book though, "The Shakespeare: The Evidence." It's kind of a [37:55] pretty good account of the life of Shakespeare. You know, so far as we can figure it from the various sources, right? And when the plays are written, of course, and so on, and it's kind of interesting because he brings out a lot of you know Shakespeare's Catholic sympathies, right? And the Catholics that he was associated with, huh? And of course, nobody knows, you know, for sure what what Shakespeare's religion was, right? [38:22] But even Rouse, you know, the the Oxford scholar who you know is adamant, about Shakespeare not being a Catholic, right? You know, admits this is a very good book, right? You know, and he's not leading anybody astray, you know, as to what the facts are about Shakespeare's life. You see, and all kinds of things, you know, the connections that you see, you know, Shakespeare's association, like you know, Shakespeare had twins there, Hamnet and Judith, right? [38:49] And they were named after the couple that were acted as the godfathers for them, right? Well, they're both known to be Catholics, right? Okay. And Hamnet, of course, died, and he's pretty young, you know, people think that in his days. And Judith didn't make too good a marriage. Shakespeare, we can tell it from his will, right? You know that he left most things in charge of his other daughter Susanna, right? [39:15] Well, Susanna appeared on the recusancy list, you know, those who are not, you know, obeying the rules, you know, about receiving communion in the England Church, right? So you know, and this couple they were the godparents, right? So there's all kinds of things like this, you know, running through the whole life of Shakespeare, huh? And [39:36] of course, you know, they have the the Shakespeare's father's will, you know, is made out in the Catholic form rather than the Protestant form, you know, in the form of Saint Charles Borromeo, who was brought over. And and anyway, you know, at the end of his life, there, you know, it's kind of strange that Shakespeare did, you know, he he was buying land in Stratford, getting ready to retire, right? [40:00] And he was you know moving out to Stratford, right? And all the time he'd been in London, he always rented, right? And at the end, he buys the Blackfriars gate residence there, and establishes somebody in there, right? And this man Robinson becomes one of the what witnesses to his will. Of course, this is the most notorious place in London for hidden Catholics, right? And where the mass was being celebrated, right? [40:30] And so, so why does Shakespeare suddenly buy when he's sitting down to retire in Ox, right? This of all places, the place associated, right? In fact, later on, there was you know after Shakespeare died, there was a in the Blackfriars there, which would be the old Dominican place, right? Blackfriars, you know, one of the floors, or 200, 300 Catholics said a secret mass, and the floor collapsed, you know, kind of a tragic thing, you know. [40:57] Because there's way too many people, right? I mean, this is a notorious place for these things to go on, right? You know, all kinds of you know things where he seems to be. And you know, I mean, there's you know one of the scholars at the time there, you know he died a papist, you know. Yeah. I don't know what what his evidence was for it, but I mean, you know, you know they have the you know all these things being shown up, you know, you know so and you know the way Shakespeare, you know, in the plays, he represents favorably the Catholic priests, you know, like Friar Lawrence. [41:33] I'm going to give a talk there to the to the what he calls the legionaries, you know, every year I give a talk, I give a talk. This is Friar Lawrence on stumbling. That's what it's going to be on. I think I told you that. But but he presents the Franciscans and the Catholic priests, you know, as as wise and noble people, you know, right the. The Protestant ministers are all bum bumbling nincompoops, you know. [42:00] You know, really? Yeah, yeah. So I mean, all the circumstantial evidence. I mean, nobody can say you know that they know what Shakespeare was exactly, you know. But I mean, between, his father's will and and his daughter Susanna leaves everything to almost, you know. You know, people he selects the godparents, you know, all kinds, you know, people he associates with, you know, and who writes these plays. [42:25] So. Is it your opinion he's Catholic? I think so, yeah, but I mean, yeah, nobody can know for sure, you know, and but it's kind of interesting. I mean, you know, you know that he puts on the beginning. You know, this is one of his. He happens to be a Catholic. the guy writing the book, yeah, also, But he calls himself a liberal Roman Catholic, whatever that means. [42:45] Uh, but uh, you know, but but as I read Rouse on Shakespeare, and Rouse is very adamant, you know, about Shakespeare not being a Catholic. Catholic, you know, and trying to, you know, dismiss this, you know, but but he praises even this book, you know, but even but but the other books, you know, that are that have dealt the same subject, you know, and he refers to some of them too, you know, but [43:12] it's hard to know Shakespeare the man, you know, to himself, somewhat you know, and there was a conference there, you know, a couple of summers ago there, was something in Shakespeare, you know, and you know what, you know the Shakespeare, you know, all kinds of Catholics in the area came from, you know, and and t here is reason, you know, the so called lost years there, you know, that Stratford until he becomes prominent in London, you know, There's, I mean, it's suspect that he was tied with the Catholics, so who knows, I mean, it makes some of the English extremely nervous, you know, that's our greatest writer, you know, that's the greatest writer of all time, you know, poets and the, you know, [44:09] the Catholic, you know, they just, you know, scandalous, but just you know these these two statements, I just kind of finished reading out. Do you want to say more or less about the first statement about stumbling, you know, and can't say any more time wise, you know, but I am working, you know, I don't see what the second one, but that's incredible Shakespeare does in the second second second one, huh? [44:49] It's the words, you know, where we talked about those words, you know, are not so valid on the earth, doth do, but to the earth some special good doth give, not so good but strained from that fair use, revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse, right? What's the last part there? Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse, right? Who does he mean by true birth, right? See, [45:19] he seems to be extending the word birth like the Latin word nature or the Greek word physis was extended eventually to what a thing is, right? So you revolt from your nature from what you are really, right? Then you stumble on abuse, right? Huh? See, and you know it's not limited to the first sense there for birth, right? Huh? Although we always keep that in mind, you know, huh? [45:47] You see, um. But that's what this woman wants, you know, abortion for equality, you know. They're obviously revolting from birth, even the original sense of the word, right? But you're revolting from your nature as a woman, right? You're revolting from nature, demanding inequality. It's unnatural, right? [46:28] You know, Shakespeare talks about women, you know, he always puts the most beautiful words about mercy in the mouth of woman, you know, like like Portia there in the Merchant of Venice, right? And [46:42] when a woman is cruel, it's more against her nature than for a man to be cruel, right? But you see this in the Middle Ages, you know, when they speak of Mary, like in the Hail, Holy Queen, Hail, Holy Queen, Mother of Mercy, right? She never said to be the Mother of Justice, right? [47:00] And you know, Mary, Christ came first in mercy, right? And he comes through Mary, right? You know, and it's Mary who, speaks to Christ about they're running out of wine and so on, right? Huh? You see? And I just seen a little pamphlet the other day that the church there about the La Salette, you know the appearance of the La Salette, I don't know much about those, but you know Mary's saying to the children, you know, I can no longer hold back. [47:36] the arm of my son like he's got, you know, but it's very, very vivid, though. I mean, and very, very concrete way of speaking there, you know. And [47:48] when Christ comes a second time, he's going to come in what? Justice, right? Huh? You see? And he says, "The apostles, you will be, you know, sitting there judging, right? You know. " But it doesn't seem to attribute any role to Mary in that judgment, does he? You know. Um. Mary's going to be sitting on the thing there, you know, and saying, "So you can kind of see, you know, how the woman is by nature more merciful than the man, right? [48:18] " But the man is by nature more what? Just, right? You know. Now I remember a case, you know, a kind of a serious case at Assumption there, where someone had been s sending what, Threatening letters to a girl student, right? Okay. Threatening terrible things, and [48:42] they suspected, you know, somebody was one of the class of hers, right? And so they got specimens of the handwriting of the students in that class, the male students. And they made use of the FBI, which has a a a service, you know. And apparently it's pretty reliable that that they will, unless they're pretty sure, they won't say that you know this handwriting is this, right? So anyway, the handwriting identified one of the students as this, right? [49:09] So there was you know kind of almost judicial thing in this, you know. And and the father and the mother of the boy came, you know. And well, his uncle who was a DA. Of course, [49:24] this is not really like a legal proceeding. I mean, like you know, doesn't go that far, but but but the FBI evidence was there and so on. And the father was willing to admit that his son was guilty of this, you know, these threatening letters, you know, but the mother just couldn't, you know. That's true. And you can see the father's, you know, you know more objective. [49:44] You want to say more just. You know, the mother just can't admit that your boy could do this. You know. I mean, I mean, I mean, I don't hold it against her. They see that you know, it's just that that's the mother, you know. Yeah, interesting. And it's like the mother, this Moussaoui you know, the the terrorist that they caught there, you know, this being on trial in Virginia, there, you know, this mother's trying to intercede, you know, her boy can't, you know, he's not. [50:07] Especially, I know his boy, another guy, is going to be on the airplane, you know, but he was stopped because you know circumstances, right? [50:17] But I mean, a father more apt to disown the son than the than the mother will, right? You know, the son doesn't measure up to what the father thinks he should be. Mm-hmm. [50:30] That's just the nature of the one, right? Mm-hmm. I mean, you know, the the commentator there on Boethius' Consolation of philosophy, you know, philosophy comes down to Lady Wisdom, right? You know. And she represents a woman because the woman is more consoling than the man, right? You know, so the child tends to run to the mother when he gets bumped, you know, before the father, right? He's more consoling with the mother, but that's that's the nature. [50:58] That's nature there. You know, people are revolting from nature, right? And and and you know, abortion. I mean, killing your own child, you know, to begin with, there. That's really revolt against nature, huh? Because you're you're you're abusing the medical profession, everything, right? you know, it's. I mean, Hippocrates who wasn't a Christian, right? But you know, the Hippocratic Oath there, you know, abortion was explicitly forbidden, right? [51:38] You see. Hmm. I