Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
77. Physics Book VI: The First in Change, Contradiction, and Relation in the Trinity
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/3-natural-hearing/077-physics-book-vii-the-first-in-change-contradiction-and-relation/

[0:00] very annoying to see this, but anyway, okay. Now he's first going to show in what way there is a first in change. Since everything changes, changes from something to something. Something we saw back in our first studies there, right? Back in the first book of natural hearing, the changing necessarily is in that which it has changed when it first has changed. Okay, that's going to be a first there, right?

[0:35] He's going to manifest this, huh? And he's going to go on to show that that first is something indivisible. For the changing leaves behind that from which it changes, or it itself fails. Huh? Now why does he have that dichotomy there, well, when I leave my house and come here, right? My house doesn't cease to be, but I leave it behind, right? But when I go from sickness, say, to health, does sickness remain?

[1:16] No, So two different kinds of change, right? Okay. Got that? And to change and to leave behind are either the same, or leaving behind follows change, and to have left behind, to have changed, for each has itself to the other in a similar way. It's interesting there, Thomas. in the. Commentary. He speaks as if

[1:52] it's called change from the term to which it goes, right? Okay. And it's called failing or leaving behind from the term which it leaves, right? Okay. Now I've talked about this to you before.

[2:12] There I put change on the side of the term from which remember that okay. Now, when I talk to students about this, I often take the example. I said,

[2:27] "Are you going home for Easter vacation? Are you going home for whatever the holiday is, right?" And you speak, you know, you say to your roommate or it is your friend that you're going home, right? Okay. And meanwhile, back home, your mother is talking about your coming home. Okay. Now, first thing I ask is, are you and your mother talking about two different trips or not? No.

[3:03] Okay. Well, the next question is, they're talking about the same trip. Is your mother Just speak a little different language, a little different vocabulary. You have is that the reason why she says it right? Say.

[3:22] And we say there's some difference here in meaning, although not in the reality, huh? Say. Because you are at the point of departure, right? And that's why you say going home. Your mother is at the destination, so she says you're coming home, right? Okay. Even though it's the same trip, right? Okay. So that's clear enough, right? Okay. Now, when you use the word becoming,

[4:00] there you're thinking of what? The term. to which. And you can see that clearly because the word becoming is right in the meaning of it, huh? Okay. So we're studying Aristotle in the twelfth reading, there, if you recall, and he's talking about how everybody speaks about becoming and so on, right? And he wants to manifest, right, that in all becoming, there are three things and so on, right?

[4:34] And he takes for granted that in all becoming, there's something that comes to be that wasn't before. And then he wants to show, he shows briefly, although kind of like an afterthought, that what comes to be comes to be from something. You don't start from nothing, right? Hmm. But the main thing he tries to bring out is that what you start from in one way remains, in other way is lost, right?

[5:06] Okay. So the thing that he takes and doesn't try to show at all is obviously on the side of the term to which, right? Okay. Okay. Now, sometimes I say if I contrast out the word change,

[5:25] is the change referring to the same reality or not, huh? If I talk about the soft becoming hard, is that any different from the change from soft to hard? Say. You put the butter in the refrigerator, right? The soft is becomes hard, right? Okay. Or there's a change from soft to hard, right? Okay. Is that change from soft to hard anything other in reality than the soft becoming hard?

[6:05] No. Say. Okay, but are these just synonyms, or do they have some little difference, like these two, right? See, well, here you are looking at it from the point of view of that to which you are going, so when you have change, it's not clear from the word, but you are thinking more of the what you are leaving. See, huh?

[6:38] Because when you say that, you know, everything changes, right? Are we thinking of the fact that nothing stays the same? Seems like. Are we looking at from that point of view more, or when I when I go to somebody's house and I haven't been there for a while and the little child has what? I say, mind's changed, right? Aren't I thinking that he's departed from the way he was?

[7:21] Huh? He's not the same, right? Okay. But now in this text here, in Thomas's commentary, you seem to be saying the opposite of what I am saying now about the word change, right? Because he's saying change and or Aristotle, he's using words of Aristotle there. Change and what departing are the same reality, right? But departing is in terms of the starting point, right? Leaving that behind, or it's ceasing to be, and change, you are changing into something, right?

[7:59] Okay. Now is he contradicting me or not there? Wouldn't have to be. If you added, not going home, you could say leaving school. Right, leaving school, going home, coming home, wasn't it? Yeah. Yeah. Say, we say

[8:24] leaving school is changing your location. Well, again, the word change may not be as explicitly one or the other, right? So it's in between, right? So if you contrast change with becoming, change seems to have more of that from which, right? But if you compare change with um leaving behind, right? Okay.

[8:55] Then change seems to have more of the other, right? See, just like the lukewarm compared to the hot would seem to be cold, right? But compared to the cold, it would seem to be hot, right? Now the old thing we're supposed to have three pails of water and one's hot, one's cold, one's lukewarm, and you put one hand for a while in the hot water, and the other hand in the cold water, and you put them both in the lukewarm, and you're supposed to be getting a different what?

[9:22] Sensation. Sensation, right? So the one hand it seems cold, and the other hand it seems hot. Hot, you know. You had these sudden changes in weather that we had, you know, the last week or so. I'm feeling, oh, it's so hot, you know, and the kids were in there complaining to me about the heat. when you take the heat back to Worcester or something. And but I say, it hits you more, right?

[9:46] You know, first day, your body's not adjusted to the warmer weather, right? So maybe he's not contradicting me, right? Okay. Okay. So notice what you're doing when you're changing from,

[10:16] let's say, soft to hard. You're leaving soft behind, right? Or soft is disappearing, right? And so when that change is completed, then what you left behind is complete the what? Left behind, right? Or complete the lost, huh? Now he wants to manifest that when the change is completed, one is in the what? That to which he was changing, huh? And in no way in that from which.

[10:47] He's going to manifest, as Thomas says, first in change between contradictories. And incidentally, the Greek word there for contradiction is just like the Latin word contradiction. Interesting. Contradiction, huh?

[11:10] Contradiction is often given as one of the four kinds of opposition, right? But it means what? Said against, right? Contradiction, huh? And the Greek word is "antiphasis which is "contra," and then "phasis," "antiphasis." It's kind of interesting that he names that way, right? Because another kind of opposition that we've talked about earlier, remember in the course, we're talking about changes between contraries, right? Okay. And contrariety is another kind of what opposition, but they both come from the word "contra" or against, huh?

[11:58] But contraries are a different kind of opposition, huh? So the opposition between, let's say, black and white. Is an opposition of contrariety between virtue and vice, right? Okay. But the contradictory would not be between being, let's say, white and being black, but being white and not being white.

[12:30] Okay. But usually Aristotle, I think in the Aristotle I think in the textbooks, right, they would even talk about this opposition of contradiction. Usually do it in terms of statements, right? Okay. And then we bring in the contradiction, right? But you could also say with simple terms and say, right, the opposition, the contradictory of being white is what? Being white. Not being white. Oh. So yeah, the contrary would be being black, right?

[13:05] Huh? See. Okay. And then when they apply it to statements, you see. The contradictory of every woman is beautiful. see I'm using class is what? It's the contradictory of every woman. is beautiful. Yeah, yeah. See, which is equivalent to saying some woman is not beautiful, huh? Okay. But the contrary of every woman is beautiful is what? Not as nice a statement. Yeah. It's no woman is beautiful, right?

[13:37] See. Okay. Yeah. Those statements seem to be furthest apart, right? But in terms of truth and falsity, they could both be what false? See. Okay. Every man is good. No man is good, right? Every priest is good. No priest is good. Those are contrary, right? Okay. and it could both be false, right? Okay. But the contradictory of every priest is good is. Some. Some priest is not good, yeah.

[14:09] And the contradictory of no priest is good is some priest is good, right? The contradictories cannot both be true, and they can't both be false, huh? See. But some priest is good and some priest is not good. They can both be true, right? So they don't seem to be opposed at all, right? See.

[14:33] So, one the same person could think, right, that some priest is good and some priest is not good. But no one, no one person could think that every priest is good and no priest is good. See. And he couldn't think that every priest is good, and some priest is what not good, right? Okay.

[14:59] But the man, but one man thinks every priest is good. Another man thinks that no priest is good. They could both be mistaken, right? Mm-hmm. But if one man thinks that every priest is good and another man thinks some priest is not good, one guy is saying the true and the other guy the false. And you know that even you know without knowing which is true, which is false.

[15:20] You know that one is true and one is false, huh? See. See that? Yeah. Okay. So that's so he's talking about now a change between contradictories, huh? And is there anything in between the two contradictories?

[15:44] You either are a sphere or you're not a sphere, right? Huh? You either are a man or you're not a man. So when you change from between contradictories, huh? You change from not being a man to being a man, or you change from being a man to not being a man, and you die. When the change is completed, which term are you in? Which limit are you in?

[16:19] Which? Now, when I change, when I when I die, when I change from being a man to not being a man, right? When I've died, then I'm not a man, right? Okay. When I was generated, I had a change from not being a man to being a man. And when I had been generated, then I was a man, right? Okay. So he's going to talk about that.

[16:53] Since then, one of the changes is that, according to contradiction, when something has changed from not being to being, it has left behind non-being, right? It will therefore be. It will therefore it will be therefore in being, right? For everything necessarily is, or what is not. See. And sometimes Thomas there, like the text, I think is the the Posterior Analytics, you know, but he puts those as as two fundamental statements, huh?

[17:28] It's impossible to be and not be, and it's necessary to be or not be. And sometimes the first one people want to call the law of contradiction, you know, or the law of non-contradiction. I don't know what to call it because the ambiguity of oh, right, you see, and

[17:55] but and the other the law of excluded middle or something, right? And I think I mentioned how how it was Weizsäcker there wanted to have new logic to avoid the law of excluded middle in talking about some atomic affairs, right? And it's because you know the old difficulty of understanding what ability, right? Okay. And they wanted to avoid having to say that the particle is here or it's not here.

[18:26] But they couldn't really quite understand what the potency of ability, right? But Heisenberg, you know, understood the potency of ability, right? That's what he admired so much in Aristotle. Yeah.

[18:52] So I sometimes call these two axioms the axioms about being and non-being, right? But it's really two of them, huh? You can't both be and not be. And Aristotle makes it more precise: you can't both be and not be at the same time, the same way, right? And you must either be or not be. Taken to be or not to be in the same sense, same time, right?

[19:16] Okay. And those are the more most fundamental of all statements. People are kind of amazed when you say that they are. But notice, any other statement is going to be either affirmative or what? Negative, right? You are going to say that something is, or you are going to say something is not, right? But not both. So in a way, this is presupposed to every other what? Statement.

[19:49] So two and three, when you distinguish two from three, yeah, that would be just based on contradiction, opposition. Well, you see, contradiction will enter into the other kinds of opposites, right?

[20:13] But you see, you get to the next kind of opposition, which is privation or lack and and having, right? Well, then lack is really none being in a subject, right? Able to what? Able to have it. Yeah, yeah. See, so everything either sees or doesn't see. If by doesn't see you mean simply negation of that, right? But not everything sees or is blind. See, and therefore the opposition of having and lacking is not as great as the opposition of contradiction, because you have something in common in a subject, right?

[21:04] Able to have something, but doesn't have it, right? See, and then when you go to the next kind of opposition, which is that of of contraries, right? See, then you have, in addition to a common subject, you have a common genus, right?

[21:27] So if I have the virtue, then I lack the vice, right? If I have the vice, I lack the virtue, right? But the vice is not simply a lack of the virtue, but the vice is also a habit, a real, honest to goodness. I mean, I mean honest to goodness, but a real habit, a real disposition, a real inclination, right? To go to excess or defect or something, right?

[22:00] See, so it's not simply the none being or the lack of the habit of the virtue. So in vice, then you have a common subject. And the common genus, right? So you have some things in common, right? Okay.

[22:23] And and the opposition of a relative is much different from the other three, huh? Because in the case of relatives, one doesn't really take away the other. So if something is double it doesn't take away something being half. In fact, if something is double, something else has to be half, right? See, see. Virtue eliminates vice, right? Blindness eliminates, you know, sight, huh? But double doesn't re-eliminate half.

[22:55] In fact, it it requires to be a half. And vice versa. It just I can't be double to myself. I have to be double something other than myself, right? So there's some kind of distinction there, right? And. So the distinction between the father and the son in the Trinity and so on is really based on what—that's a relative thing.

[23:23] That's why it's so significant as we're saying in the Gospel of St. John, right? You know, when you look at the actual Greek text, it seems to me that the Latin and the English translations don't lose something, you know, because it says we translated in English, in the beginning was the word, and the word what was with God, the word was God, right? But what's the Greek there for with God?

[23:52] What's the preposition in Greek? Pros. Pros, yeah, yeah. What does that? mean? Well it means toward, right? Toward. Yeah. Now Aristotle talks about relation, right, in the categories. He's much more concrete than the abstract word relation, huh? Oh, interesting. Yeah, what he calls that is pros ti, towards something, right? Oh. Okay. That's that's much better than the word relation, huh? The word relation is too abstract, you know.

[24:27] And sometimes people, you know, speak of you know there being a relation between us, right? Say there's a relation something in between us or something, you know? Say no, I am towards you a teacher. You are towards me a student. I am towards you a father. You are towards me a student. I am taller than you. You are, you know, you are shorter than me. So it's towards something, huh?

[24:48] And in logic, when they translate that pros ti they translate into Latin as ad aliquid, right? See. But when they translate pros ton theon, right, towards God, they translate with God, right, and kind of loses the sense, huh? But if you know the logic, and you know something about relatives and so on, that Greek word pros ti, right away jumps out at you, you know. My teacher, Kasurik, never pointed out to me in particular.

[25:23] I think about the Gospel Saint John, but he always pointed out to me how concrete Aristotle's way of speaking was in the categories, huh? That he never called relation; he called it towards something. You see, and how good that way of speaking was Aristotle had there, you know. So he kind of impressed upon my mind, you know, that this is to be towards something, right? It's not something absolute.

[25:48] It's towards something, right? Am I double or is for double or half? One itself, you couldn't say one or the other, could you? But it's double towards two. It's half towards eight, right? Am I taller or shorter? What would you say? In myself, by myself, it's nothing absolute, is it? Towards, see, towards somebody, I'm taller. And towards somebody else, I'm shorter, right? You see, that really gets the idea.

[26:15] It's towards something, right? You see. And so you read the Gospel of Saint John, which is maybe you know the most important text we have there in the Trinity. There, in the beginning, was the Word, and the Word was what towards God, right? And the Word was God, right? And then he goes on, you know, that though he was God, there's still distinction, right? This was in the beginning towards God.

[26:39] He comes back, right? You know, you know. I I don't know. I can't have been the first person to see that. I don't think. You know, but I don't remember Thomas ever, you know. Yeah, it's curious. And and or even Augustine, you know. Yeah. You know. And it seems to me they would have, you know, St. Thomas knew the logic, right? So he would have been known, you know, what antiquity was.

[27:07] I mean, Albert has that, and he talks about. Would he have had the Greek text? Well, I mean, he doesn't, you know, work with those other Greek texts and how much Greek he knows. But I mean, occasionally Thomas does stop and talk about the Greek word. And I see him do that in the commentary. He says, "Yeah." And the Gospel of Saint John is, in some sense, the greatest work, right, of the Bible.

[27:31] Sure. And you know, like Pius XII said, "No one can be a Thomist if he doesn't know Thomas's commentary on the Gospel of John." You know, this is kind of the high point there. You know. Sure. Of course, Thomas is following, you know, very closely, especially Augustine and John Chrysostom, right? And he's always, you know, saying what they say about the passage. You know, talks about you know.

[27:58] But. I think Chrysostom would have picked it up. Yeah, but I said maybe somebody did. You know, may not claim to be original. You know, I mean, things enough, but but it's it's certainly it's an important thing to see that you know. You know.

[28:17] Sometimes you know the Greek has something surprising. Yeah. Sure. I think I mentioned that too about about commandment of love. You know, in almost all the translations I've seen, you know, you should love the Lord your God with your whole heart, with your whole soul, and so on. Right. And and they use the same preposition with all four or three or four, wherever it is. But then, when you get to the Gospel of St.

[28:46] Luke, if I remember correctly, the word he uses, the preposition he uses with heart is different than when he uses with all the other ones. Oh. See, you should love the Lord your God from your whole heart, and with your whole mind, and with your whole soul, and so on. Right, your whole strength. See, but use the word "from" with the heart. See, that's interesting, huh? Because love.

[29:13] That you are talking about there, which is love of charity, that love is in the will; it's not in the mind or in the other parts, but all the other parts, all the other powers of man are commanded, you might say, right? Are moved, right? Informed by that love, right? Nevertheless, that love is related to the heart in a different way than it is to the mind, right?

[29:38] See, because the love is in the heart. You see, and so the Gospel of Luke there brings it out more clearly by saying, "Thou shalt love the Lord your God from your whole heart, and in your whole soul, and in your whole strength." You know, so they use a different preposition, right? So little subtle things like that, you know. It's good to know the the Greek, if you can.

[30:06] You know, a little bit. I never get around to learning Hebrew, you know, but but you say you read Cornelius a Lapide or something like that, you know, and the parish used to read sometimes a book of the Old Testament and the translation you have, and even the ones going back to the Septuagint, the the, Hebrew tends to be much more concrete, and so you know, instead of saying something like, you know, I was kind to the blind man and I guided him across the street, you know, like we might say, he would say, you know, I was an eye for the blind man.

[30:44] Yeah. So it's not really, you know, false translation, but it lacks the the piquancy of the of the Hebrew, you know. It's you are kind of struck by that, you know. So, but

[30:58] Hebrews, I just never never learned Hebrew. Didn't get that far. Hard enough for me to learn for every Greek I learned, you know. You should you should come earlier on Wednesday, Father Ratham comes down to teach Hebrew. The, uh, well, one assumption is to learn some Hebrew, you know. so I decided to go to him and ask him about a word there, you know, and that's as far as I'll get, you know.

[31:23] But Father Peter was my Greek teacher, right? And only one other guy; just two of us in the chorus taking the Greek. Me and Warren Murray, and uh, Peter come in, you know. and recite your Greek irregular Greek forms, you know, and you are stumbling around walk back and forth.

[31:51] And he asked, "What you want in Greek?" I said, "I want to read Aristotle." He said, "Well," he says, "I know a young man who wanted to read Aristotle, but he never learned any Greek, so he never." But whatever Greek I learned was, you know, got started here with Father Peter, anyway. He's a good man. So that distinction between nature and reason—what kind of you're making a distinction?

[32:15] So you're using some kind of opposition. Well, again, it's there's obviously opposition that Aristotle talks about that nature is determined to one, right, and reason is what open to opposites, right? So one is determined to one, and the other is not determined to one, right? Okay, but that's not the whole story, right? See, because reason is a nature too. Okay, but it's not just a nature, so it is determined to something.

[32:57] Then you're considering reason as a nature, okay? Just like there's a two within three. So notice when you say three is. Not two. Well, there are various ways you could say. Because three, you say three is odd, and two is is not odd, right? Okay, three is half of six, and two is not half of six. Or two is half of four, and three is not half of it, right?

[33:28] But none of that means that that there's not a two in three, is it? The three includes two plus one. See, there's no way there's a two in three, right? And there could be a two without a three, but not a three without a two. See, so reason is in nature, and Thomas has various ways of explaining that, but that's one way.

[34:00] When you say any distinction, I would just say it's kind of based on opposition, but it's not. There could be more than opposition to make a distinction. Is that right? Well, what is Christ say? The Father and I are one, right?

[34:22] Yet there's a distinction between them, right? So you misunderstand the distinction between the Father and the Son, right? There's no distinction in what is absolute in the divinity, huh? Only what is towards another.

[34:50] So there's no distinction between God the Father and the divine nature, and there's no distinction between God the Son and the divine nature. So the Father is in the Son, and the Son is in the Father, right? Father and I are one, one God, huh?

[35:14] But yet towards each other, right? Very distinct. The Son is from the Father, right? Could you give a definition of distinction? I don't know if I give a definition of it, but but it always got to be. Well, actually, you know, we distinguish two kinds. It's really a equivalent word. We distinguish two kinds of distinction, right? What they call a formal distinction, right? Which is based on opposition, and the distinction that we meet here in the continuous, huh?

[35:55] You know, one point is here, another point is there, right? Okay. See, and. But you see, when you study the Trinity and the distinction among members of the Trinity, Thomas or St. Augustine always proceeds by an either-or syllogism, right? And you say, well, is it a formal distinction or material distinction? The material distinction is to have the continuous. God is not continuous, right? See, so there can't be a material distinction in God, right?

[36:32] Okay, then you then you're down to the four kinds of opposition that the philosopher distinguished, right? And then you can't what distinction between being and non-being? That can't be the distinction. And I am who am? And that enters into the distinction between what having and lacking, right? Because that's distinction between being and non-being in a way too, right? And the lack enters into the contraries we saw in the first book, right?

[37:05] Okay, so it can't be one of those three oppositions. So the only one left is it must be what? I think Justin taught us, and Boethius, right? Pros. But there's a clue to that in in the very Greek there of Saint John's Gospel, right? That the logos is pros ton theon, right?

[37:30] But then theon there, when you say pros ton theon, theon is standing for what? The Father, for the Father. Yeah. So you see in the creed, there God from God, light from life, true God from true God, begotten, but not made. One in substance, one in being.

[37:54] Okay, we better not get talking about the Trinity here because that's the that's the end of our studies, right? Okay. So it says, since then one of the changes is that according to contradiction, when something has changed from not being to being, it has left behind non-being. It will be therefore in being, for everything necessarily is or is not. Yes. It is clear then that in the change according to contradiction, what has changed will be in that to which it has changed, right?

[38:39] And if in this, also in the others, for as in one, likewise in all, right? Well, as Thomas says, it begins in that particular change because it's more clear. So all the others means besides between contradictions. Yeah, yeah. He's going to kind of talk about in general in the next paragraph, but it's particularly clear there because there's nothing in between, right? Say. But I mean, it's not too hard to say that when I go from Worcester to Boston, when I've gone from Worcester to Boston, where am I?

[39:15] Between Boston. Oh, in Boston, I. Yeah, when I when I when I have, you know, when I have traveled from Worcester to Boston, where am I? Boston. See, okay. Now, obviously, I'm not in Worcester because I haven't begun yet. See, see, well, why couldn't I be in Framingham? I've gone from Worcester to Boston, right? Well, if I'm in Framingham, I still have to go from Framingham to to Boston, right?

[39:44] And so, wouldn't I have been my journey yet, right? But you wouldn't even give the objection when I go from being to non-being or from non-being to being, because there's nothing what in between, right? So either I'm at the starting point when I've completed my journey, or else I'm what in the destination, right?

[40:07] Okay. So when I've gone from Worcester to Boston, it's most clear I'm not in Worcester anymore, right? Not quite as clear, but pretty clear I'm not in Framingham, right? You see. But there's not even that other that alternative to being in Worcester or Boston. You go from what? You're dying, right? Say. Or when you're being generated, huh? And

[40:37] you've got to be in the term to which. Okay. You've changed it all. So what place to change to? Can't change anything else. Further, it is clear to those taking up each one, if that which has changed is necessary somewhere or in something, since it is left behind. You know, that's why it can't be where you where you you what started from, right? Because you have left that behind, right?

[41:12] Okay. So it doesn't make any sense to say you're still there, because change and leaving behind are the same thing, reality, right? Further, it is clear to those taking up each one, if that which has changed is necessarily somewhere or in something, since it is left behind, that from which it has changed is necessarily somewhere. It will either be in this or in another. It will either be in the what the term of the change or somewhere else.

[41:39] If then it is in another as in C, what has changed to B again changes from C to B, for B is not next the change being continuous. Thus, what has changed, what it has changed, changes to that to which it has changed. But this is impossible, right? Okay. That's what I've gone from Worcester to Boston. I'm in Framingham. Well, then I've still got a what? Go to Boston, right?

[42:08] So I changed, and still what? Changing, and I've already changed. But this is impossible. Necessarily, then, what has changed is in that to which it has changed. Okay. It is clear then that what has come to be, when it has come to be, will be, and what has ceased to be will not be. In general, then, every change has been spoken about, and it is especially clear in the one according to contradiction.

[42:37] That's why you begin from that. Therefore, it is clear that what has changed, when it has first changed, is in that to which it has changed. Okay. Now we have to stop here by five o'clock. But what he's going to point out now, next though, this first is kind of almost obvious. This first thing, but he's going to show that

[43:00] when it has first reached its what goal, right? That this is something indivisible. Takes no time. See. So when I go from Worcester to Boston,

[43:16] when I've gone from Worcester to Boston, I'm in Boston, right? Now when I'm first in Boston, how long is that? When I'm first in Boston?

[43:28] What? zero. See, if you say I'm first in Boston during this hour, right? Then you say, well, what about the first half hour of that hour? Was I in Boston or not? See? Well, if I was already in Boston during the first half hour, I was in Boston. Then that hour is not when I was first in Boston, was it? See? So he's going to be bringing this out, right?

[43:55] Okay. So in this way, it's going to be a first we'll see in change, right? And something indivisible. But then he's going to go look at the other at the other end, right? When I set off from Worcester to Boston, right? Is there a first distance that I go?

[44:16] Is there a first part of my motion? Well, now in terms of the understanding of the continuous being divisible forever, you're going to have a hard time having a what? First distance, huh? I first go a mile.

[44:34] I have to go a half mile before I go a mile. So I first go a half a mile. Okay? Well, no, I have to go, you know, a quarter of a mile. before I, go a half a mile. And this thing is going to be divisible forever, right? Okay. So it's not going to be a first distance I go, huh? See?

[44:55] Or a first time in which I what? My motion starts, right? See? This is going to set the stage then that in now the first year it's going to set the stage for seeing this before and after in change that

[45:15] before you've gone some distance, you're going some distance, right? And before you're you're going this distance, you have gone some distance. And before you've gone some distance, you're going some distance. And this goes on forever, right? Is it? Okay. And and again, they say this is going to be a starting point that there'd be no first year for saying that nothing moves itself. We'll see that when we look at the arguments from the seventh and eighth books.

[45:46] But we'll look at Thomas's summary of those arguments there in the first in the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles right? Where he does it much more at length than he does in the Summa Theologiae, right? It's going to be kind of a summary of important things in the seventh and eighth books, huh? But in the seventh and eighth books, you know, you want to get to the idea of the dependence of motion upon a mover, right?

[46:10] And eventually, the dependence of move movers upon an unmoved mover, huh? And you're reasoning to the dependence of motion upon a mover, partly from the definition of motion, and partly from what's being seen in this book, right? And this is the most manifest as Thomas's argument for the existence of God God. But you know, with Descartes, they gave up the attempt to even define motion. Descartes thought you couldn't define motion, and John Locke, you know, follows from that respect, huh?

[46:43] And they don't do the sixth book either, huh? So, consequence of that is you can't know that God is by reason. The first argument, so very serious, huh?

[47:05] It's kind of interesting. You know, De Koninck said one time, you know, the philosopher doesn't really ask, "Does God exist? " The theologian asks that question, right? The philosopher is studying motion, and all of a sudden, as he understands motion better, he realizes that motion depends upon a what? Depends upon a mover, yeah. And then he figures out later on that a move mover is