Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
80. Q&A: Motion and Rest in the Now, More Known to Us, Purgatory and Baptism
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/3-natural-hearing/080-q-a-motion-and-rest-in-the-now-more-known-to-us-purgatory/

[0:00] Okay. Um. Let me come back to to something that you raised before. You know, you were saying that there's a difference in the now, whether you're in motion or at rest. You're trying to say that. Trying to say. Yeah. You know,

[0:25] it seems that there's a difference there, right? You know, someone is saying, "Okay, let's say this body is at at rest, right? " And this body is what going through, right? Okay. And in the now, where this body is here, right? This body is there. Is any difference in the body in motion in that now and the body at rest in that now? Is any difference?

[1:02] The body is at rest in this place, and the body is going through that place. Is there any difference between them in the now? There, right? You're indicating there is.

[1:16] But is there, huh? What would be the difference between the two? See, well, the one is only there imperfectly. Because if we use the definition of motion, it's only an imperfect act, which is

[1:48] ordered to a further act. So, your example of the man who's only standing in the door, and the other one's walking through the door. When he passes the one that's standing in the door,

[2:05] he's only in an imperfect act, a state of imperfect act, which is also going to be further. Yeah, if one is neither in motion nor at rest in the now, right? How can there be any difference between the thing in motion and the thing in rest in the now? Something is neither in motion nor in rest in the now.

[2:39] Is he trying to say that the the difference is what in the body or your position? You're just talking about position. Because they're in the same position, there's no difference. So you're thinking, in fact, this is going to stay there, right? And this is not going to stay there, right, huh? Okay. But they are there. But in the now, what do you mean by staying? Right? Is it at rest in the now?

[3:11] It can only be at rest in time, and this can only be in motion in time. So if there's neither motion nor rest in the now, how can there be a difference between what is in motion and what is at rest in the now when there's neither motion nor rest in the now?

[3:40] Because, insofar as there's a difference between perfect act and imperfect act, well, you can say this now here is in the time, right, that this body is at rest, and this now here is in the time that this. Body is in motion, right? But then you're really thinking of something outside the now, aren't you?

[4:12] Yes. Notice when those who think, those who think of time as being composed of nows, right, of indivisibles, right, then for them there's really no difference between being at rest and being in motion.

[4:36] And we don't think that, right? But if we think of the now, can there be any difference between the two? It seems there can be any difference between the two.

[4:53] In a sense you're. Saying uh the body at rest is here in the now in a different way than the body of motion is here. What is that difference?

[5:09] It's maybe it's like the difference between a point on a line when I've made it actual and when I haven't. Okay, there's something to that, yeah. Something to that, yeah. But these bodies are both actually there in the now. The only difference could be it's in time, since now is not time. But at first, I remember Thomas said there, in one paper where he had, the two bodies moving, right?

[5:49] You wanted to prove that that a body has moved, right? Before it's moving, right? And he has two bodies going the same speed, and one body stops here, right? And the other body continues, right? And he's kind of manifesting this by that, right? And Tom says the reason why Aristotle does that is that this is more actual, right? Because it's stopping there, right? And this is is going on, right?

[6:18] You know, maybe, maybe there's some difference there. Could we say that if that one's in motion, and at this particular now, where they seem to be side by side, time ceases to be? See, I'm arguing that in that now, there's neither motion nor rest. So how can you speak of a difference between what is in motion, what is at rest, in the now when neither of those things you're comparing are in the now?

[6:58] But I think it seems like the difference between you know stopping there, right, and continuing, as you say, right. It seems you got almost think of what's coming later, right? To say it's continuing. It's not continuing in the now, right?

[7:26] It almost always seems like when we're saying now at that point, it's moving. Our mind wants to make some bit of a little time maker. yeah. You can't really imagine this thing. There is no time at that point, so. I think the question, you know, can you imagine a point by itself? Where is everything you imagine continuous?

[8:06] Can you imagine a point? I don't think so. If you try to imagine a point by itself, you kind of imagine a little circle or something like that, right? So it may be that the I remember talking to Kymas one time. One time, you know, and it seemed to be good, but I was thinking, you know, I said you can't really imagine the point by itself, but you can co- imagine.

[8:33] That's so you can imagine a finite line, right? Okay. The same way you imagine the line, right? Can you imagine a line without any width?

[8:49] So you can't draw, obviously, but you imagine, right? But you can imagine a square or something that has a an end, right? So you can imagine, co- imagine, imagine it with that which it is limited, right? But maybe not by itself, right? There's a couple different types of imagining. Because, like, like here, when I you think, oh, imagine a square, right? I'll try to imagine the point.

[9:16] Well, you get that problem of like dot or something, but you can say, imagine a a five million sided polygon. We can imagine it intellectually, but not visually. You can accept it. I see. Imagine intellectually. Are you maybe imagining and thinking of the same thing? You're not having this this image per se, is but as though you're looking at it. But I guess the word "imagine" isn't the same that you you can think of it.

[9:56] That yeah, imagining and thinking not the same thing. So maybe the thing with this is that you don't want to be imagining at that point. You just have to think it, or whatever that word is. Cuts your brain and all that stuff. And imagination is going to take you back. If you're you're resting here and stopping here, then you make it think continuous, right? And here you're going through, right?

[10:08] You know, so you tend to imagine something that's continuous, right? So you can imagine maybe the rest of time, the rest of motion, when you're imagining time.

[10:49] Aristotle will say later on there in the books on sensations, that we don't think without images. And therefore, we don't think without the continuous and time, right? But he points out that when we think about the indivisible, even in the sense of the point, we think about it negatively, right? Oh yeah. So as you go from the body to the surface, we start to negate, right? Has length and width, but no depth, and then we go to the line, and has length but no width, and then we get to the point, and has neither length, right?

[11:23] Has no parts at all, right? So we seem to know the point negatively, maybe because we can't imagine it, or can't imagine it by itself anyway. Can maybe imagine a finite line, huh? So what do you think about that? Using that.

[11:50] Well, I think there's there's some little difference that's what suggests to me. there's some truth in what you're saying, you know, but I'd be very careful about that, mostly, because there's neither rest nor motion in there, right? Okay. So there's neither rest nor motion in the now. How can there be a difference between things at that? There.

[12:15] There's no rest or motion in the now. Yeah, it also seems that if you're going to say, well, they don't exist in the same way there. I mean, something either is or isn't. But then, if you were to say, well, the thing that's moving, its existence is really less than something that seems to be sitting still because of all these streams of now. I mean, if you're going along that same line of thinking, you know, as soon as something's moving, it doesn't.

[12:41] I mean, motion, you can say is what was that thing we were saying about motion before? With is barely motion itself, or something that is barely there. It exists. Yeah. But the object itself exists perfectly. You know. I say, you know, like when I divide the line, right? Bisect the line. Am I making those two halves the line more actual than they were before?

[13:14] No. Or is that point there? Well, it seems to me you're making them to some extent more actual than they were before. As far as you're calling two halves, but yeah, the line itself, nothing's changed about that, other than yeah, but but the two halves the line are more actual now than they were before. The line. Or into the vertical. Every time I divide the line, I'm making actual point that was there before only a liability.

[13:50] Well, you're making actual halves, and now the thing that we call what is a half is existing. Yeah. By saying, if I'm making actual point that was there an ability before, right, and that point is is a division of those parts, right, that I'm actually dividing those parts, right, so I'm making actual in some way the parts in a way that they weren't before.

[14:20] So it's completely what you're saying, right? In a sense, you're saying that that's why Thomas says Aristotle reasons in that way, right? That act is more known to us than potency, right? See, so the thing that stops here, it's more clear that it has moved, right, to a distance, and the one continues to. And he sees manifesting potency by act, right? Because act is more known to us.

[14:47] That's what he's reasoning that way. So he says it's completely what you say, right? But I wouldn't want to make too much of a difference. Part Partly because I say there's no motion or rest in the now, right? But secondly, also by thinking that those people who think of motion as being made up of of indivisibles, right, or time being made up of indivisibles, they don't really have a distinction between motion and rest, right?

[15:12] As if they wouldn't differ unless they have something continuous, right? And when Aristotle argues that there's no motion in the now, it doesn't seem to use his his definition of motion.

[15:31] Well, no, he he argues from from these things that well, I could argue. Something's going to be argued from the fact that there's faster and slower bodies, right? Yeah. And so, if the slower body, if the faster body, no, excuse me, if the slower body goes a certain distance in the now, during the now, you can say during the now, then that same distance the faster body would go in less than the now, and therefore you have to divide the indivisible, right?

[16:06] Put that way. Is it possible to argue from the definition of motion? Well, in a way, the way I understand it, there's something to be argued from there, yes, yeah.

[16:26] But even you go back to the idea of change. The thing is is different now than it was before, right? That implies some kind of divisibility,

[16:39] right? We see a thing as changed when it's different now than before, right? So that's going to imply some kind of before and after there. Yeah, it seems that's what Aristotle's thinking of here. Change here, but he doesn't. Well, it's interesting when Aristotle takes up time in the definition of time. He says time is something of motion, right? Okay. And then he then he wants to figure out.

[17:09] I mean, begins by saying that time is connected with motion, right? Okay. And then he argues that time is not motion, right? Okay. But you don't perceive time without perceiving motion. Therefore, time is something of motion, right? And then he seems to say that time is something of the before and after of motion, right?

[17:33] Rather than something of the definition of motion, right? Yeah. Okay. But is the connection between those two? Yeah. Well, I see how there's a difference between these in the now is. Is that well? If you do have bodies, and in actuality, reality, the one's moving, the other isn't. And here you are taking a look at it, at it particular now. Well, they happen to occupy the same position, but the reality of it is that the other body is moving.

[18:12] Yeah. Yeah. So there is a difference there, even in the now, because if you were to say that that the one isn't moving, I mean, that if it stops moving in the now, well, in the string of bunch of nows together, then it won't be moving at all. Yeah. So I guess that would be that. Yeah, there is a difference in reality. Yeah. But was the original question: Is there a difference between the two nows?

[18:40] Isn't wasn't that the original? No, no, no. Is there a difference between the two objects? These two are in the now. The two in the now. Okay. So I don't want to exaggerate the difference, but maybe there is some difference. Okay. Okay. Like like you were saying, in the line, like you were saying, between the the line before and after has been divided, right? Okay. The point is more actual, right?

[19:03] After it's divided than before. Just like in that paradox of of the Democritus, there, you know, if you cut a cone, right? I can't draw very well. If you cut a cone parallel to the base, right? You look at the two circles are they equal or unequal? I don't get to say they're equal, right? Okay. But then you have to, in a sense, say that you have what made actual circles that were there only potentially.

[19:39] If you make all those circles actual, then they're all equal. A cylinder and not a cone, right? The same way here, if you make if you cut a a triangle, let's say it's not a triangle parallel to the base, and you look at the line at the end of this one and the one's end of this one, they have to be what equal, right? But aren't you making those lines equal?

[20:07] Otherwise, you say, you know, well, let's figure out where it can be cut as thought experiment of Democritus, kind of figure out where it can be cut. Then you have to say the same thing, right? That all you get is is equal straight lines, right? And then you end up having a rectangle rather than a than a triangle, right? See. So this was what I was going to do later on.

[20:34] You know, with Zeno, you know, there are books that Zeno was saying, you know, I have to go half of the way to the door if I go the whole way. I have to go half of the half and do that, right? And it's infinity of points. I've got to go what through, right? How can I go through infinity of points? Never get through them all. So another point I have to go through.

[20:58] But he's making more actual the points than they really are, right? In motion. That's what would be the problem with the cone when you cut that. You say, oh, well, both lines have to be equal. Cut it now in a different place. Well, now you're you're moving as far as in dimension there. If and it's almost as though you're looking at the line as something thick at that point.

[21:21] So at any given point where you cut it, yes, both lines on each side would have be equal, but still those lines aren't occupying any width at all. No, but those lines actually there before you cut it. See, if they were, then you got infinity of lines right on top of each other here, right? All being equal. Right, but those lines don't occupy any any width or.

[21:48] That's true. That's true. Yeah. And as always, you see, in reality, there's potentially always a line between any two lines, right? So the lines are next to each other. We have a problem, right?

[22:03] There's a note lines above and below. Can't keep slicing like the butcher down the machinery. But but but when you cut it, it's like the line above and line below, or two different lines now, right? But they were what? Had nothing in between them, right? I say, and

[22:25] so you're making the the lines in a sense what next to each other as they can be. Oh, back to Father Anthony's original question. I guess I'm trying to understand. Were you thinking that the the difference in the two objects is that one of the objects isn't existing as perfectly as the other?

[22:50] No, that how it's existing in the in the place of the object itself. How it is? Yeah. What's the connection between the definition of motion and the before and after motion? Well, thing that struck me about Aristotle going back there, he's saying that he reaches the point where he knows that time is not motion, but it's something of motion, right? Okay. And the next step is to see it's something of the before and after emotion, right?

[23:33] Yeah. And that's not therefore something of the definition of motion, is it? Say, but there's a connection between the definition of motion and the fact that there's a before and after emotion.

[23:50] Okay, they're they're in harmony those two truths, right? But the definition of motion is not in terms of before and afterwards, in terms of act and ability. Now I was kind of thinking that in terms of what Aristotle does in the metaphysics there, where he says he shows in the beginning of the fourth book that wisdom is about being as being, right? And then right after that, he shows that it's about the one and the many, and that these are in a sense the same thing, although they're a little different in meaning, right?

[24:29] Okay, being and one. And then when he gets to to book five, and he's talking about the multiplicity of meanings of the word being and one and so on, right? Act and ability are one distinction of meanings of of being, right? But he takes up opposition, which is the basis of distinction, and before and after, under the names pertaining to the what one. Interesting, right? See, and it strikes me here, you know, something like that.

[25:15] When you go from the definition of motion, which is given in terms of act and ability or act and potency, and then you go to what the before and after, right? And you tie time up with the before and after emotion, right? It's the same reality you're talking about, right? But it's you're thinking more of the what the order, right? Okay. I just think I was defining distinction earlier there and saying, you know, things are distinct when one is not the other, right?

[25:49] I think about that the other day, you know, what distinction was, but it seems to be tied up with the one in the many, doesn't it?

[26:04] See, when Aristotle, you know, critiques Parmenides and Melissus, right? Parmenides and Melisus are trying to say a little too well, but they try to say that everything is one. There's no multiplicity of all the world. Everything is one. And Aristotle says, well, now if you say that, you're doing away with any beginning. Because he seems to be using an axiom, that nothing is the beginning of itself, right?

[26:34] So you've got to have some multiplicity. You have to have a many, meaning more than one, to have what a beginning. And I argue the same way when I try to show what Thomas says that distinction is presupposed to what order, to before and after, right? It seems to be having axiom there that nothing is before or after itself.

[27:02] So you can't have a before and after without having many, right? That kind of makes me see how, by Aristotle and Thomas, would put

[27:16] opposition, which is the basis of distinction, and fundamentally that this is not that, right? And order or before and after among the names pertaining to what the one in the many in some way.

[27:34] It's very striking there, you know, when Aristotle, you know, says it's a property of one to be a beginning. Of course, you can see that in the first meaning of one for us, which is not the one convertible with being, but the one that's the beginning of number, right? It's very much a what beginning the little number, and so he ties so he ties up the beginning not with being but with one, even though it's connected with being in some way, right?

[28:03] But he speaks of being a property of the one to be a beginning, see? And then he takes up distinction, I mean opposition, which is the basis of distinction among the names, secondary names of one, and he takes up before is tied up with that, see? So I mean it's kind of interesting, huh? That the definition of motion is in terms of act and ability, right? And then later on you look at the before and after in motion and and go into all this talk, and time is tied up with that before and after, right?

[28:36] But time is is a measure, right? And involves the one to many, right? So could we say then with with Father Anthony is saying about these two bodies here in the now, he's saying there is a difference. Now, if we were to say that motion, a body that's in motion, it's an act, it's in the act of motion. So if you were to say at a particular now, what's the two differences?

[29:10] Well, yeah, you you can't stop this body from going. No, no, no, but you can say that you know in Aristotle's comparison, right? What argument we saw there, where he's trying to show that if has moved this far, right, even though it's doesn't stop there, right, it hasn't moved that far, he compares it to another body going at the same speed that stops there, right? See, and it's very clear that this body has moved that distance, right?

[29:39] And Thomas says he manifests that this body has moved that distance because the equally fast body that stops there has moved that distance, right? And this being equally fast as that, will have gone that same distance, right? So the way it has moved that same distance is this one thing has. Why is he manifesting through this? He said, well, because act is more known to us than than ability, right?

[30:04] See, so that to to have moved is to motion a bit like the point is to the line, right? Or the now is to time. It's a division of this thing, right? See, but just as this is not composed of points and time is not composed of now, so motion is not composed of has moved, right? It's more the division of it, right? But then

[30:35] just as the point in a sense is made more actual when you divide the line, right? Well, then you can say maybe the has moved is more actual, right? In the body that stops there, right, rather than the body that is continuing, right. Yeah. Well, let's say the body is moving. It's moving. We're saying it's moving. It's moving in time. Yeah. Anywhere along that line, it's moving.

[31:06] Yeah. And if we were to say now, the reality, although we kind of, it's almost as though we're stopping it by saying now, but at that point, which has no time. Yeah.

[31:25] There is a difference in that body because the reality of it is we're taking a point in time and calling it the now. There, there's a difference between those two bodies because it's moving. Otherwise, if it, I mean, you can't say it's moving now because this now has no time. But I, I mean, I see that there's a difference. But even if you know the body has stopped moving in this now here, right, this is the end of the motion, right?

[31:57] Say. Um. Uh. And this is, in a sense, the beginning of its rest, right? Say. Why this here is not the beginning of rest, right? This now, right?

[32:16] Um. I'm taking a less extreme example. The body is not at rest for some time; it's beginning to rest, right? To say this is the beginning of its rest, right? That's true. To say about it that now is the beginning of its rest, right? But the now here is not the beginning of this body's rest in that place. So then, does that does that difference, right? That the now in the one case is the beginning of the time which this is going to rest.

[32:48] The other is not the beginning of the time which is going to rest. But it's probably more fundamental to say that it's more actual here than right than in this case here.

[33:05] So hard thing to understand, motion, right? But Aristotle would say, that in Boethius, you know, following him, Thomas following Boethius, that the cause of difficulty is not in us, but in the thing itself.

[33:22] We try to imagine this to be more actual than it really is. A Heisenberg student, there, by Sacha says that when we imagine something, we make it actual in our imagination. We kind of make these things more actual than they really are. This is

[33:51] strange, yeah. Of course, it's not impossible to be, but it's. Heraclitus said, "Now men do not understand the things they meet every day, although they think they do. Right? It's one of the fragments they have. That's what you're kind of anticipating, The great Socrates, right? I think of Socrates as being characterized by that discovery, you know. But it's already in the fragments of Heraclitus, you know. You can't know for sure, you know, what the whole man's thought was, but that's certainly true about motion and time.

[34:33] Men would think they understand motion and time because they they experience them every day, right? But they don't. So it's like like the young people who have. Sex, you know, you know what sex is all about. Yeah You know what it's all about. It's all about children, but you know that. We don't know that. We

[35:07] don't know what it's all about. I think you do. You don't know the first thing about it. So we'll see a little bit of seeing those arguments next time. Now, do you have for the Summa Contra Gentiles? Do you have an English copy of that? Are not here at the school at the monastery? I mean, particular kinds of change, you know. Okay. With the scientists, I mean, you know, the the light behaves in some experiments like a particle, and other pinpointed particle in other experiments like a wave, you know.

[36:13] Yeah. Okay, those kinds of contradictions. As far as my like my general arguments, others that you want to. Those were discussed and out of my mind, you know, but

[36:37] when you develop the definition of motion, you run into these difficulties of defining it right without defining it by by itself or defining it. Yes.

[36:59] I mean, I suppose somebody could argue, like you know, Aristotle does a bit there with time, you know, that time doesn't exist, right? Because the past doesn't exist anymore. Future doesn't exist yet, and there's no time in the now, right? So, one might argue, you know, that if motion takes time, well, then part of the motion is in the past and doesn't exist, and part is in the future and doesn't exist, right?

[37:28] All that there is of motion is in the now, but there's no motion in the now. That's all you're talking about, right? And it's so interesting that that Aristotle, in a sense, doesn't really answer those objections against time, right? But later on, he'll he'll say this is showing, as if he doesn't take them as as. You know, as objections against the real existence of time, right? But as objections that force you to realize how time is, right, and how barely it is, you see.

[38:04] And Aristotle goes so far as to say, you know, there wouldn't be time without the numbering soul fully, right? That the number which is time,

[38:18] which is a numbered number, right? That number doesn't exist as much as the number of chairs say in this room. So all these chairs exist together, right? So you can more say there's a number of chairs in this room even if we never counted them, than there's a number that is time if we never counted it, because the things that being numbered don't exist in time, right?

[38:44] So. So he says there wouldn't be time without the numbering soul. Not fully, no, no, No. I think Thomas says cum quae ends right, but it's a barely, barely is, you know.

[39:04] So it's the least real of all acts is motion. It's the least actual of all acts, but it's as he says in the ninth book of wisdom. There, it's the act that is what Seen is most real to us, most known to us. So we go from the act which is least actual but most known to us, to the act which is most knowable, but least known to us.

[39:30] God, who's pure act, right? And then Muburak argument, we're going from a beautiful example going from what is more known to us to what is more known by nature, but kind of the extreme examples, right? Because this is the least known motion, because it's least actual, but most known to us, and God is the most known, the most knowable, but least knowable to us. Shows the imperfection of our mind, right?

[40:01] The chief difficulty knowing is is our mind, because Aristotle says if the chief difficulty was in things and not in our mind, we'd know what is more knowable. What's more knowable would be more knowable to us, right?

[40:17] And just like if I, you know, love love the private good more than the common good, right? Common good is more lovable than the private good, but not to us at least in the beginning, right? You know, and and so the fact that what is less lovable is more loved by us

[40:41] is a sign of the weakness of our heart, huh? Right, Christ even speaks there, you know. One place, God alone is good, right? Why do you call me good? You know, God alone is good, huh? And

[41:08] only God, in a sense, is fully lovable, right? You know, but we love the sense good. You know, we love candy before we love wisdom, right? Don't love wisdom at all. I am kidding. When I was a little boy, they said, "You know what, candy? You want wisdom? " And we said, "Candy. "

[41:31] On starter, yeah. What is more loved by us is less lovable. What is more lovable is less lovable to us. But that's an example of that distinction too of simply in some respect, huh? So we

[42:01] run through these things. The kid rather drink soda pop than wine, right? But the soda pop is less tasteable, less tasty than the wine. More tasty, to him.

[42:24] That's true of all these kinds of education, right? A hundred push-ups is more productive of strength than ten push-ups, right? But for the weak person, it's not. Doing ten push-ups is more productive of strength for him than doing hundred. Is it? That's because his body is imperfect and he needed development, right? So we

[42:56] have to go from what is more known to us to what is more known. Do you have a definition for like the lovable? Like, you know, I got some concepts. It's good in itself. Well, something is lovable because it's good, right? Yeah. So the more good something is, the more lovable it is, right? Now we can reason out that the common good is is a greater good, is better than the private good.

[43:31] Just as the whole is better than the part, right? So the good of the whole is better than the good of the part. Now I read another portion of that is of the lovable that it's more lovable is able to impart that good to you. Which kind of makes sense? Is that well? That's kind of more something more most fundamental aspect of it, right? You are saying something is is good in itself, right?

[44:02] That's part of being good in itself. You can impart that. Yeah, yeah. I see. I see. You are saying something is good because it causes the good. Then there is a second sense of good, right? Yeah, I see. Second sense. Second thing

[44:27] about it. Uh huh. You know, well, once you see God face to face, you know, as He is, you know, it would be so. Preoccupied. I wonder if we'll get each other's attention, right? You know, I've got to shake at somebody in order to get their attention, you know. You know, once you see God face to face, I don't know if we're going to be, we're going

[45:11] to be preoccupied. Yeah. Now, Benda Crochet was saying that purgatory is the second best place. Will be second best place to be, and it is. I can see where it is in a sense, but will be the second happiest, so to say. Did Saint Thomas say anything about purgatory? I mean, some people say it's a place of torture and torment, in a sense, it is. Yeah, he talks about purgatory, you know, but doesn't go into great details of it, right?

[45:40] You know, read that Saint Catherine of Genoa; she talks about purgatory. She seems to say that. I think that's what Benda Crochet. Yeah, yeah, she gives us an insight into purgatory, what it's like.

[45:53] Okay. I imagine purgatory completely cut off, kind of, from the distractions of this life, right? Huh? You know, and and a certain clarity as to what this is all about, right? Huh? You know, and you want to see God, right? Huh? You know, and so you must be in some kind of extreme what agony, because you know, because you want to see him, but you want to be purified at the same time.

[46:30] See. That would imply some type of knowledge about was deeper knowledge than we have now of what heaven's like. Yeah, yeah, but I mean, you know, even C. S. Lewis speaks of the peculiar clarity that hell affords.

[46:46] But the same in in, in purgatory, see, I think what you have to realize, in a sense, is that in the beatific vision, we not only see God as He is. God's not only what we see, but is also the the form by which we see. Right, because God is to be joined to our mind. Right. So it's both that what we see and that by which we see.

[47:15] Ah. Okay. God is the form by which we see. Yeah. Yeah. Because he's joined our mind. Yeah, we can't see him by a created species, right? We don't do that. So.

[47:29] That's incredible. He's joined to our mind. Yeah. But notice, Scripture speaks metaphorically as a kind of marriage, right, between our mind, huh? Okay. But but it's much more intimate than than than marriage, right? Huh. You see, I think but the metaphor is useful in a sense because you want to. Unite yourself in marriage to just anybody, right? You know, there's got to be a a love between you and so on, right?

[48:01] And so God's not going to join himself to us until we're completely what purified of all these extraneous what affections, right? All these disorders that we built up in our in our life, huh? Nothing defiled Yeah, huh? I see. St John of the Cross says, you know, even if a thread is holding you down, it's it's you got to start to break the thread right? You know.

[48:38] Then how is it that? It's sometimes said that when some right when they're baptized, if they died, they wouldn't have to go to purgatory. They wouldn't have to know, but they they died. But

[48:59] if I was baptized thirty or something, I was after I baptized that day. I still have the attachments to earthly things that I had the day before I was baptized. It's more in your body than in your soul, mostly. On your body, so. But don't I still have some vices in my soul? If if I was had even pride or envy, that's a vice, and I got baptized.

[49:40] I'm still being kind after my baptism. No, but I don't. I don't think you know. There's any impediment there to the vision. I have to baptize baptize them up. But then, in purgatory,

[50:02] isn't then to purify those? I mean, Tom says, you know, I mean, if one's love of God was strong enough, it would, what? Not only eliminate purgatory, but eliminate, you know, the necessity of any reparation, right? In itself, right? That's the essential thing there to love God, huh? So that love of God was so intense, right? You wouldn't burn up all the disordered affections, huh?

[50:39] No, it would be possible in that situation. They wouldn't have as high a degree of glory as some saints who maybe spent, maybe some people spent a long period of time in purgatory, right? That's true. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Would it be because maybe, like Father Anthony says, I see that that makes sense. That basically they would, after the baptism, because they still have those vices, they could never possibly die.

[51:05] God wouldn't allow it, so to say, quick enough, so that they didn't commit some type of sin. I mean, what's the part of music why so many people was a constant time? Somebody would delay their baptism until the last moment, you know. And then, by an Arian. Yeah, yeah, yeah. There's a true story a man who was a uh, he was like a drunk or something, and he went to confession and killed himself.

[51:37] He left a note because he said he wanted to die after he made confession. No, I guess he was kind of expecting that. Yeah.

[51:49] But isn't that difficult? I mean, when you sometimes they explain purgatory as like the purification of our attachments and vices and things. But there's something something about about the effect on my soul, though, of my repeated bad acts, right? You know that the person who baptized doesn't have. You know,

[52:17] he's born again, really. See, born again. It's hard. I mean, there's still vices are unchanged. Well, maybe what's infused there is overcomes that, right?

[52:43] Infused is so strong there. This is this is special grace. The baptism that it actually takes care of those vices initially. Yeah, or counteracts. Yeah. Yeah. There's a, point there of the spiritual exercises of St. Gertrude the Great. Have you ever seen those? Very interesting. One exercise is to regain the innocence of your baptismal day, right? Interesting. That's just one of the seven meditations, yeah. The seven exercises she has is to regain innocence of your...

[53:29] So that's part of the grace of baptism. You get this supernatural power to overcome whatever vices you had. Wow, that makes sense. It's a one time thing. So then, you can see that even if. You couldn't even really judge of yourself, even though you might perceive yourself vices and attachments. You got to really think of what baptism really is. It really is a what? A birth, right?

[54:14] You're saying a theory, now. I mean, you know, there's a first incident you're born, right? I mean, I mean that's not that's not a exaggeration if Christ says it, right? Unless a man be born again, right?

[54:43] He is born to new life. So then, there's even after someone's baptized that they still require. In this life, purification of things in themselves that aren't purified,

[55:06] you know, they'd have to go through these purifications and things of their soul. But then it seems those purifications that the person still has to go through, sometimes it's said those are the same as purgatory in this life. But it seems they're different.

[55:28] You have to purify the roots of these habits and things that you still have. But it would seem from this, just because the person baptized can go straight to heaven, even though they haven't, might still need to reach greater sanctity. They have to go through dark night and things like that.

[55:58] But those things really aren't correctly compared to purgatory. It's something different. They're doing something different in your soul than purgatory would. Because the person baptized would still need want them, but they wouldn't need to go to purgatory. But they still need to go through dark nights if they're going to get to sanctity.