Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
85. The Argument from Motion in the Summa Contra Gentiles: Everything Moved Is Moved by Another
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[0:00] Okay, so let's look here at chapter thirteen. Now, reasons to proving God to be having shown that is not vain, right? To make the attempt to demonstrate that God is now in both Sumas, before he takes up or attempts to demonstrate that God exists, he takes up the question whether the existence of God is what? Yeah, and before that, whether the existence of God is what obvious, right?

[0:40] Okay, and we're not going to go into that now, but he'll argue against the idea that the existence of God is obvious, right? Even though, as we were saying before, right, there is some evident signs of him, right, even to the average person who's never studied philosophy, okay,

[1:00] and then to take up the question: if it's not obvious, can it be demonstrated, right? And the people who deny that can be demonstrated, right? Okay, and so he argues against that, right? Okay, it's kind of interesting, huh? That those two positions that Thomas rejects, they are what extremes, huh?

[1:28] Because one is saying that the existence of God is altogether obvious, huh? Okay. Now you may remember when we talked about nature, Aristotle investigated what nature is—that cause. When he got through investigating what nature is, he said, "We haven't considered whether nature exists, right? " And he says it would be laughable. It'd be laughable to try to demonstrate that nature exists. Why?

[2:19] Yeah, it's obvious, right? And then a man who tried to demonstrate that nature exists would be a man who couldn't distinguish between that which is known to itself or by itself and that which is known by another, right? He'd be a man who thinks he knows, doesn't know, but in fact he does know. And Aristotle stops and says, "This is a strange position to be in, right?

[2:50] " You know. Now Socrates had had manifested that men were often in the reverse situation of thinking they know what they in fact do not know.

[3:06] And so that such a condition exists, people are quite aware through the work of Socrates. And Heraclitus had said this before, right? Men do not understand the things they meet every day, although they think they do. Okay, but what about the reverse? Could you know something and not know that you know it? That seems kind of strange, doesn't it? And so Aristotle uses the reverse case, whose possibility is well known or better known to us, to show that this is possible, right?

[3:50] Because if a man can make the mistake of thinking the unknown is known, right? Because he can sometimes not distinguish between the two, right? Well, if you can not distinguish sometimes between the two, then you can make the mistake going in the reverse direction, right? Example I always use in class is if you can make the mistake of thinking a man is a woman. I take Michael Jackson.

[4:18] see, See, I'm all aware. of it. If you can. Make the mistake of thinking Michael Jackson is a woman, right? Okay, when he's apparently a man, can benefit the doubt. Then couldn't someone make the reverse mistake and think sometimes some woman? He'll say, "Well, yeah, yeah. " See, if someone could think that an orange is an apple, if someone ever made the mistake because they couldn't tell apart an orange and apple, right?

[4:45] Well, couldn't they make the reverse mistake? Or if they can think Budweiser is Miller. Couldn't someone make the reverse mistake and think Miller's is Budweiser? You see? Okay.

[4:59] Gave someone a peach flavored wine the other day. He says, "This is Earl Grey." See? So he could think that the peach flavored wine is Earl Grey. Couldn't someone make the mistake and think Earl Grey is a peach flavored wine? Yeah. I'm going to give him some Earl Grey. the next time he comes, and I'll say, "Want some more of that peach wine? Do you like it?"

[5:19] Yeah, this is good. This peach wine. I got all fooled when I went around. He knew I had Earl Grey. He knew I had peach wine.

[5:30] You see what I mean? Okay. So, but these people are making the mistake of thinking that what what they don't know or what is not obvious is obvious, right? Those are trying to prove the existence of nature, making a reverse mistake of thinking that what is obvious is what not obvious, right? Okay. Aristotle says that's laughable because if you try to prove the obvious, you're going to prove it by the what is not obvious.

[6:06] That's obviously proving the less known, the unknown before the known. Okay. Ah, so that's one extreme you might say, right? Okay. Now the other, this is saying it's so well known, in other words, you don't have to prove it at all. Now the other error is to say it's so unknown that you can't even what prove it, right? It's not what demonstrable.

[6:42] Okay. You see how those two are two kind of extreme mistakes, right? And the truth lies in the middle between those two. It's neither obvious nor what unknowable, right? Yeah. But it's knowable by what demonstration, right? But by the demonstration that we call what the lack of demonstration quia, as opposed to demonstration propter quid, not the demonstration that goes from cause to effect, right? But does the reverse from effect to cause?

[7:22] And this is taught in the postanalytics, both kinds of demonstration. So Thomas would refer back to logic, right? So he says both syllogisms then he rejects these two mistakes and

[7:45] then he proceeds to demonstrate that God is, right? Okay. Now the Catholic Church there in the First Vatican Council, right? You know, said that it can be demonstrated, right? This is God, right? And they quote Saint Paul to that effect, right? Okay. But also authoritatively defined the text of Paul, right? From Romans chapter one, verse twenty, the invisible things of God, right? He's talking about the philosophers, right?

[8:21] Were made known through the visible things and so on. So that's a key text, you know, the chapter one, verse twenty, there, Saint Paul. So I mention that because you have some people running around now, even Catholic colleges, who will deny that you can demonstrate that God is, right? So they're always making the old mistakes, right? Okay. Goethe you know the. German poet I quoted to before, you know, he compared the wise man, you know, to a man swimming up the river or lake, you know, separating what the truth from the false.

[8:58] You know, true from the false, separating the two. And as he goes on, they what come back together? Come back together. Beautiful. See the whole description of history, right? So Thomas goes up, you know, separating the true from the false, right? You know, and so on, and this is the truth, and separate from these falsehoods. But then, you know, everybody comes back, back, together again, Same mistakes.

[9:34] How would you distinguish the that first view from what you were saying before about everyone, you know, the fool can? What? How would you distinguish that first position about the existence of God as obvious from what you are saying that in some ways naturally known? Yeah, well, that's a hard thing to do.

[10:02] That's why I use the word "think" there, you know, because it's not altogether clear what you mean by God, right? Okay, that's when I say the Greek philosophers, you know, thought there was a God, right? Who had providence, you know, they may have had some some very hazy notions about what God is, right? So it's a kind of imperfect knowledge of God that they have, you know.

[10:31] Except my mother having just a little girl, God can hold the whole universe with his little finger. Oh, he just got you, you know, you know, even my mom goes a big word faith, right? You only have kind of hazy notion of of God, huh? Okay, so okay, let me see.

[11:05] I just mentioned that a little bit because it comes up before this, huh? But it's interesting the way men will go to these opposite what extremes, huh? And you know, if the whole truth was here, why would anybody think this, huh? If it was obvious, why would somebody think it's unknowable, right? If that was really true, and vice versa, if something was really unknowable.

[11:42] Why would someone think it's obvious? Yeah, it doesn't make any sense, does it? You know, you know, a lot of times we're talking about the the two central mysteries of the Catholic faith, huh? This is very clear. The truth is in between two extremes, huh? And the the first central mystery is that the Trinity, right? And the Trinity, the truth about the Trinity, is that there is one nature with three persons, right?

[12:17] And there are two heresies, right? One that says there's as there's one nature, there's one person. That was what. Sabellius Sabellius, yeah. The other heresy would be to say that as there are three persons, there are three natures, like Arius would say, huh? Now, if the truth is that there's one person and one nature, why should anybody think there's three persons and three natures? There be no basis of truth in the truth.

[12:57] There be no no part of truth in the thinking at all. On the other hand, if it's true that there are three natures and three persons, right, there's no unity either. Why should anybody think there's just one nature and one person? You know, you can't explain why they should have thought that, right? But if the truth is as it is that there's one nature but three persons, then this has an element of truth.

[13:29] There is one nature. This is an element of truth. There are three persons, right? And you can see how they can be misled, right? The one because they realize there's one nature and they want to hold on to that, but that makes them think there must be just one person. And then the other thinking there's three persons, but there must be three natures now.

[13:54] You see, so you can explain, in a sense, the two errors by the truth, because men err because they see some part of the truth, but not the whole truth, huh? They boast of having seen the whole, as the great philosopher Empedocles says, right, huh? Now it's the same thing with with the incarnation, except that they're just reversed, right? In incarnation, you have unity of person now, but a multiplicity of nature, but two natures.

[14:30] Okay, so you have you know the monophysites, you say there's what there's one person, so there's one what nature right? Nature. and then you have Nestorius, right? He shouldn't be called the Mother of God," he said. Right? Okay.

[14:51] And so there's two persons and two what natures, right? Well, neither of those positions explains how the other one could arise. But if the truth is, as it is, that there's one person with two natures, right? Then there's an element of truth here, and there's an element of truth here. There are two natures. There is one person, right? Okay. But the two false positions each have a part of the truth, right?

[15:26] Okay. So in a way, these two positions: one is saying it's so knowable it doesn't have to be demonstrated. Yeah. The other is not knowable anyway, right? Just a matter of belief, right? It's not a matter of being. Known at all. The truth is, it can be known by a demonstration, right?

[15:52] So some element of truth here that it's known in some way, right? Some element of truth here that it's not what obvious, right? It's not

[16:05] fully or perfectly known, right? Huh? Okay. So truth often lies in the middle, right? Huh? It seems sometimes it's said that St. Thomas is not presenting demonstrations, but like converging probabilities, or even the way the the Catechism put it was kind of. I had the text with me, but it sounded kind of curious how it was put, sort of like I don't know if anybody remembers.

[16:43] I don't know if you're familiar with that one. I took the text again to see what you're referring to. Because the fundamental text is the one in the First Vatican Council, right? Sure. yeah. That's the same expression. of that Because that's referred back to again in the Catechism, I'm sure. Oh yeah. I just remember they made a reference to the yeah these proofs, and then it it said something like.

[17:13] I don't know how they expressed it. Anyhow, there does seem to be. I've heard in other places it was sort of a misunderstanding or a I don't know lack of clarity of exactly demonstration. Well, it's just like we were saying when we were showing that nature acts for an end. Remember that, you know? And take Aristotle's first two arguments, which I sometimes take together, right? But the one says, you know, that nature produces the good in the parts of animals and plants and the order of parts that's good almost all the time, right?

[17:48] And if it were producing that good in order by chance, it would happen very what? Rarely, right? Okay. So that's an argument all by itself; it can stand by itself, right? Okay. Then you have the second argument that says nature produces the good in animals and plants starting with a definite beginning, a seed or a fertilized egg, something like that, and going through an ordered number of steps such as to result in that good plant or animal, right?

[18:18] And that again is contrary to its producing the good by chance. When you go through a definite series of steps such as to lead to that, because that's by chance, right? Aristotle compares it to what you do in art, there, where you know if I follow the recipe for the meringue pie, guess what I got? The meringue pie. It wasn't a chocolate cream pie. It was a meringue pie.

[18:41] What do you expect? You're following the recipe, right? But no, it's the two of them together are even what stronger, right? Huh? You know.

[18:59] So I mean, those aren't opposed to say that they're separate arguments, but get together, right? It's even more convincing, right? Okay. So he says, having shown that it is not vain to attempt to demonstrate God to be, let us proceed now to laying down the reasons by which both the philosophers, right, as well as the Catholic teachers, prove God to be, right. Okay. And first, let us lay down the reasons by which Aristotle proceeds to proving God to be, right?

[19:42] Who intends to prove this from the part of on the part of motion in two ways, huh? Duobus viis, right? Okay. So they call these the five ways, the five what? Five roads, right? All roads lead to Rome, huh? All these roads lead to God, right? Huh? Okay.

[20:09] I've always thought the number five was my number, and I don't know why I've been attached to that number all my life. Number five. I don't know whether Duane has five letters, and that's how I got as a kid. I don't know why, but we just you know that's my Pythagorean number. Okay.

[20:28] Now he's going to give the first of these two ways, right? Of which the first is such: everything that is moved or is in motion is moved by what? Another, right? But it is clear by the senses, right, that something is moved, as for example the what? Sun, huh? Or something moves, namely the sun. Therefore, it is moved by what? Another moving it, right? Okay.

[21:04] Now either that mover itself is moved, or not, right? Okay. And you got to understand this in a very precise way. He means either it moves the sun

[21:20] by being moved itself, right, or insofar as it's being moved itself by something else, or not, right? Okay. It can't be one or the other. Could you also read that as saying either the moving thing, the mover, is moving, or it's not? Well, it's it's involved, yeah, yeah. But he's but he's he's understanding the fact that he's not talking about. My father generated me, right? I generated my son, right?

[21:54] My son generates his son, right? And this goes down. He's not talking about that kind of a order of movers and makers, right? Right? Because I didn't generate my son being generated at the same time by my father, right? See? Okay. He's thinking of you know like now, say, where I'm using this glass to push that paper, right? So this glass is what moving the paper insofar as it's being moved itself.

[22:27] Is that kind of a thing he's talking about, right? Okay. Or you're moving another insofar as you're being moved your what yourself by another, right? Okay. Do you see that? A lot of people misunderstand that. He's not attempting to exclude the idea of what of a series where I had a father and he had a father and that goes back forever. He's not rejecting that, huh? Okay.

[22:59] Now, if you say that the mover here is not moved by another, then you're saying there's an unmoved mover, right? And this is what we call God. If, however, it is moved, therefore, by another moving, it is moved, huh? Either this goes on forever, he says, or else one comes to some what unmoved mover. But one cannot go on forever, he says.

[23:31] Now, sometimes you know people take that out of context, right? And say you know Thomas or Aristotle or somebody like that is rejecting the idea of an infinite series, they're not, because they say that a what? We just saw that the line is divisible what?

[23:50] Yeah, yeah. See, that's supposed to single on forever. If you take that, you know, in the what out of context here, right? Okay. Particular particular series, he's saying that doesn't go on forever, right? Okay. Okay? I would say you know when you divide the continuous, you get a larger number, don't you? So if it continues to be divisible forever. The numbers can what go on forever, right?

[24:24] So you start with one, which is we initiated, knows a number, and you divide the line, and now you get the first number, two, right? Okay. Now you divide the half, and you get the number three, right? Well, since this is divisible forever, mathematical line at least, then the number of lines can increase forever, right? Okay. So is he denying that proceeding forever? No. So some people, you know, quote Thomas out of context.

[25:00] there, Uh-huh. You know, what kind of infant, right? series? Yeah. But he and Aristotle both talked about this infinity and the limit, right? That potential infinity, right? Okay.

[25:17] But it's this series now, right? Where you're saying that what every mover is a move mover. So before every move mover, there's another mover, right? And so on forever, right? All at the same time, right? Okay. Quite a violation of the principle of simplicity, right? You need? Infinity of movers to move anything. Tell that to the the movers, right? You make a living, you know, moving. They're called movers, right?

[25:55] You know, transporting furniture, right? But to move anything, going to have to have infinity of movers, right? He's going to deny that, right? Okay. No, it says movens immobile,

[26:12] which I would have translated as unmoved mover, but unmoving mover. Yeah, but a mover that moves without being moved itself is what you mean at first, right? Okay. But as he was saying, in a sense, that's going to be developed more fully later on. That you have a mover that's completely what free of any kind of what motion or change, right? Not only in exercising this one particular thing, right?

[26:44] In that sense, it's made more explicit as you go on later on, right? So unable in this immobile. Yeah. unable to be moved Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But you see that more fully later on, right? See, what you see at first is that there's a mover that is what moving other things, not through being moved itself, right? Okay.

[27:12] But as you say later on, he takes up as part of the substance of God. It's more explicit, as I say in the Summa, there that the first that mover is completely what immobile, right? Yeah. Okay. But your first coming to it is the idea that that he's moving other things, not through being moved himself, right? Okay.

[27:37] No. Just that word and then movator could mean moved. Yeah. Or moving in Latin. Did they? Right? They don't have. Yeah. Yeah. Different word. Yeah. I say, I'm trying to say, you don't. I don't think you have to come to a full understanding of the immobility of the first mover, right? At this point yet, right? Okay. Okay.

[28:15] Okay. Therefore, it's necessary to lay down, to posit that there is some first mover that is itself what immobile, right? Huh? Maybe hinting more, right, about it than explicit. Okay. Now, notice that's the main argument, right? Huh? If you accept that there are things in motion, right, which is clear to our senses, huh? Contrary to Parmenides right Okay. And. uh so you don't have to prove that, right?

[28:46] That's obvious to our senses, but you accept the premise that whatever is in motion is being moved by another, right? And that other either is what not being moved itself, right? Or if it is, eventually it depends upon something that moves without being moved itself, right? That can't go on forever. Then you are forced to conclusion, right? That t here is an unmoved mover, right? Which would be the first mover, okay?

[29:20] But now he says there are two premises there that need to be what backed up, right? Okay. The argument I was trying to figure out the

[29:33] the form of the syllogism, and I found it a little bit hard because sometimes this is basically an either or. Well, that the one part there is, yeah, yeah. But the main one

[29:51] would be the main. Well, if you take that part, t here is probably more than one syllogism there, right? I think either the mover is unmoved, right, or it's moved, right. And if you admit the first possibility, you've already admitted as unmoved mover, right? If you make the second one, either it what goes on forever, or you come to an unmoved mover, right? Yeah, yeah. And he excludes that possibility that goes on forever, right?

[30:18] Therefore, you must come to an unmoved mover eventually, okay? But since that that second part is set up from the first part, that's probably the order, right? You have to first of all see that what is in motion is moved by something, right? Okay. Now you got a mover, right? Is that mover an unmoved mover or is it moved mover? I guess say one or the other exhaust the possibilities.

[30:51] If you take one, make life easy for me, it's a move unmoved mover, we arrive, right? Okay. And take the more difficult case, right? That itself is is what be moved, right? In order to move you, then you say, well, okay, can that go on forever, right? No. Therefore, in either case, you are going to come eventually to a what? Unmoved mover. Yeah, sooner or later.

[31:24] What is in motion is in motion because of a what unmoved mover? Okay. Okay. Now, notice, son. You know, formal logic, as we call it, sometimes is not the chief difficulty in reasoning, right? I mean, some people don't. Understand the form of an argument, right? And like we were saying in the in the either or argument, right? I mean, excuse me, the if then argument. Some people don't realize that you can reason from a if then statement by affirming the antecedent, right?

[32:05] And therefore affirming the consequent, or by denying the consequent and therefore denying the antecedent. But you can't reason formally from denying the antecedent to denying the consequent, or from affirming the consequent to affirming. Okay, okay. But that can be learned, you know, without too much difficulty, right? The chief difficulty is in the matter, right? You know, whether the statements are true or false, or necessary, probable, and so on, right?

[32:34] Huh? Okay. And again, you set up an argument, right? Where is the the chief glory, right? Huh? You know, you may not be in what we call the chief syllogism, right? You know, you take this this theorem six here, which I like because in logic you take this theorem, you know, number six here in book one.

[33:10] Where he's arguing kind of reverse of five, he's saying if these two angles are equal, then these two what? Lines are equal. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Now, what's the main syllogism to prove that they must be equal? What's

[33:31] not where the main difficulty is, right? Or or the main discovery you might say is right, or the great subtlety is right, right? The main argument is a what? Either or. Yeah. Yeah. He says either they are equal, those two lines when these two angles are equal, right? Or they are unequal. Yeah. Okay. Or they are unequal.

[34:08] And then he's going to show, but they can't be unequal. Just going back to five then. But they cannot be unequal. Now, formally, this is very simple, right? There's really only two possibilities: they're either equal, these two lines, or they're unequal. The other possibility, and you got to see the truth of that, right? Okay. Now, if you can show that they cannot be unequal, then obviously they are what?

[34:40] Equal. Yeah. Therefore, they're equal. All that is very simple, right? But the real heart of it, you might say, the proof. Is how do you show that they can't be what unequal, right? Okay. And there the thing is that involves the construction and all other things, right? That if one of these lines is longer than the other, to have to be if they're unequal, you could by the the earlier theorem and say this makes a difference if one is longer.

[35:17] Let's say this left one is longer. You can always cut off the longer one a line equal to the what shorter. And so now I've done it, right? And then you draw a line from there to there. Okay. Then you could argue what you've got that that whole angle that that's cut is equal. To the other side, and also the smaller angle is equal to the other side.

[35:47] Yeah. First, because of your premises in six, second because of five. Well, what you've got here is the idea that if you have two triangles with equal angles, right, and equal sides. See, this side, this side right here, is equal to that side by construction, and this side is common. So, this triangle here, this triangle, excuse me, this triangle here, they have equal angles, right, contained by equal sides, right?

[36:22] Therefore, by number four, they are equal triangles, right? Okay. Now there you have a regular syllogism, right? What Aristotle's called a syllogism period, right? Yeah. These two triangles are triangles having an equal angle contained by equal sides. Triangles having an equal angle contained by equal sides are equal. Therefore, these two triangles equal. Okay. But

[36:53] notice, huh? That's absurd, isn't it? Okay. But that follows from saying what? The two sides could be unequal. Yeah, yeah. So if they aren't equal, then it follows ultimately that the part is equal to the whole, the lesser to the greater, as Euclid says, right? Okay. But that can't be.

[37:19] But the syllogism just gives, in a sense, to back up the if-then statement, right? If they aren't equal, then it's going to follow that the part is equal to the whole. You can make it, make them a couple of steps if you wanted to, right? You know, if they aren't equal, we could cut off the longer one, et cetera, right? Therefore, you're going to get two triangles, therefore you're going to get equal triangles.

[37:38] Therefore, you're going to get the part being equal to the whole, obviously greater, right? So it uses all three ones, right? But this is not the great. This first main syllogism is not where the great difficulty is, right? Okay.

[37:53] But still, formally speaking, that's more fundamental or closer to your your ultimate conclusion, right? Then, then the if-then syllogism, right? Right. Okay. So here, in a sense, you're saying what? Either the mover is unmoved or the mover is moved, right?

[38:18] And if you take the first one, then you're. You're granting the conclusion, right? See, so only if you want to avoid the conclusion, you have to take the other one, right? But then the question is, does this go on forever, or do you come eventually to an unmoved mover, right? And he's going to argue, well, if you eventually come to unmoved mover, then that's what I wanted to prove, right?

[38:42] If it doesn't, it goes on forever. But can that be so? No, right? Okay. So we have to back up a couple of premises here, right? And so in the third or next, I get them broken down my text here. He says, in this proof, there are two propositions to be proved. One is that everything moved, or everything in motion is moved by another, right? Okay, and that was towards the beginning of the argument, and that in movers and moved, one cannot go on forever, right?

[39:18] Okay. Now he gets the same proof in the Summa Theologiae he's going to give in the Summa Theologiae a reason for both of them, right? But here he's going to give what three ways of proving what both of them, right? Okay. So he says, of which the first, the philosopher proves in what three ways? Huh? Now, who's the philosopher?

[39:54] Aristotle's star student. No. Plato's star student. Yeah. Yeah. I know. So he called Aristotle up above, and he's going through that Aristotle's proof, right? But rather than say Aristotle again, he calls him the what philosopher, right? And I suppose in English, because we have the article, we can make it more explicit, right? Call him the philosopher, but they capitalize it because this is an example of what figure of speech then?

[40:25] What? Antonomasia. Yeah. Antonomasia means you're giving the what? The whole to the part. Yeah, the universal, the name of the universal to the particular, or vice versa, right? They call them both antonomasia. So if I say he's a Romeo or he's a Don Juan, oh, ah, then I'm what? That's considered antonomasia too, okay? But I usually contrast because they're very close together antonomasia and synecdoche right? And antonomasia is based upon the universal whole in its part, and synecdoche is based on what the composed whole in its part, right?

[41:18] So so in Saint John says, and the Word was made flesh, right? Flesh, there is a synecdoche for man, human, okay? But our very word incarnation, is taken almost like from the very words of Saint John, right? But some people misunderstood that synecdoche, right? And so, Arius, I guess it was, said that the word was in place of the soul. He didn't take out a human soul, but he had, you know, flesh, and in place of the soul, he had this logos right?

[41:56] You know Okay But that's the synecdoche But now, that's dealing with a a what composed whole, right? So, sometimes scripture will refer to us as, as, you know, souls sometimes as what bodies to you all flesh must come, right? Speaking to God, right?

[42:20] And for some reason, you want to emphasize that part, you know. He's a brain, right? Well, no, he's a human being, not a brain. We want to emphasize that part, right? See? Or he's all heart, and she's all heart, right? You know, want to emphasize the heart, you know? For some reason, that part stands out, right? Okay.

[42:45] My brother Mark, is going to get married, he says he's turning to me he said going in the way of all flesh. So, you know, emphasize the flesh, right, In this matter. As I was driving up here, there was a case there where somebody shot the priest. You know, who'd been abused by the priest. That was on the radio on the way up, so I suppose that'll be over the splash of the paper tomorrow.

[43:13] You know, but it goes on. What I didn't forget. Far away. I know where it was, but but it was good news on the way up or the bad news. It goes on and on and on. Yeah. So, antonomasia you know, sometimes you want to indicate the excellence of that particular among those who have the what come under the general, right? So we speak of the the White House, right?

[43:50] That's being the house of the president. That's stands out among all White Houses in this country, right? Christ is named by antonomasia. The Bible is named by antonomasia, right? But sometimes somebody you know who hesitates to act, we call him a Hamlet, right? Say, or the lover we call what a Romeo or a Don Juan or a Casanova or some other famous one, right? Okay.

[44:32] Saint Thomas notes how how Saint Paul and Saint Peter are called. The apostle by antonomasia Any of the apostles don't call themselves so much an apostle there when they sign their epistles, but but Thomas would usually refer to Saint Paul, a lot of times by antonomasia as the apostle, as the apostle says. You'll see that a lot, Yeah. So then when we speak of the Bible we call the book by antonomasia When the Bible is also referred to as we're studying the sacred page.

[45:10] Would that then be by synecdoche? No, no, that would be. the whole Of a composed whole. No, often they call it sacra scriptura, right? Sacred scripture, right? And in a way, you know, the writings of the saints are sacred too, aren't they? In some way, but not. When they call it page, a sacred page is the study of the Bible. Yeah. Oh yeah. Okay. That would be synecdoche right Yeah, if you call it page of the book.

[45:37] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah Study of the sacred page. Yeah. So these figures of speech, we use them in daily life all the time. We don't, you know, know the name for them, you know, but that's, but it's fairly common thing to do this all the time.

[46:05] Yeah, you're always running into an example. You don't even have to talk and think about it, right? But Peter and Paul, you know, see that in Rome especially the importance of Peter and Paul. You know, sometimes some churches you come in like the Saint Paul's downtown, you know, Peter and Paul, right? You know, in Rome, Peter and Paul kind of emphasized there, right? Churches kind of what coupled them, right?

[46:42] I was married on the feast of Peter and Paul there, on June 29th. Okay, very very orthodox. No, it's, the Gospels are named by Antonomasia right? You mean, the good news, right?

[47:00] Oh yeah. Yeah, well, there's a lot of good news besides the Gospels, but this is the good news, right? This is really good news. You see? So it's very common. Very common. What's the apocalypse, huh? That really seems to be a revelation, right? The last things, huh? Things that are hidden from us, huh? Names that Christ has given by, Isaiah's wonderful, is that one of the names.

[47:55] Oh yeah. Miracle might be part of antonomasia too. a miracle. It's filled with wonder, right? Of which the first of these propositions, the philosopher now, proves in three ways, huh?

[48:24] Now, the first is thus. Now this one is going to be based on the what? Sixth book, right? If something moves itself, right? It is necessary that it have in itself the beginning. Or source of its own what motion right? Otherwise, manifestly, is moved by another right? Okay, that's very obvious. The second part is a more difficult thing to understand. It is also necessary that it be the what first first moved right?

[49:11] Now, why is that necessary? Huh? See, something is is the cause for itself of something right? Is something is responsible for something belonging to it right? Why must that belong to it? What

[49:41] first? If it wasn't first, it would be because of a part of it. Yeah, or because of something else, right? Right. Does it belong to the emotions to be reasonable first?

[50:11] No, No. To it he says that it be moved by reason of itself, and not by reason of its part. Just as the animal is moved by the motion of the foot, right?

[50:34] For thus he says, the whole would not be moved by itself, but its part, right? In one part by another. Okay. Now the third thing, huh? It is necessary also that the thing in motion be what divisible, right? And have parts, because everything that is moved is what divisible, right? As is proved in the sixth book of the physics, huh? Sixth book of natural here. Okay, So here he's explicitly basing himself in the sixth book of the physics, huh?

[51:23] And since the beginning of book seven that Aristotle starts to develop this argument, right? But based directly upon the book six has come before, and later on he goes back to book three and argues in the definition of motion, right? Okay.

[51:40] So it's not it's motion and. Strict sense, sometimes we say, "Let it not change, like the mind to change." Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So these things being supposed, he argues thus: what is posited or laid down to be moved by itself, right, is what is first moved.

[52:06] But to the quiet of one of its part, there follows what the quiet or the rest of the whole. Okay, so he's saying now, if the part is at rest, right, of this divisible thing, which it must be divisible, right, if the part is at rest, he says,

[52:30] then the whole is what, yeah, the whole is not in motion, right? For if one part being at rest, another part of it is moved, then the whole itself would not be what is first what in motion, but the part which is moved, the other one what being at rest, huh?

[53:00] But nothing that is at rest, when something else is at rest, is moved by itself, right? For that whose rest follows upon the rest of another, it is necessary that its motion what follows upon the motion of another, huh? And thus it is not moved by itself.

[53:33] Therefore, what is laid down to be moved by itself is then not being moved by itself, huh? It is necessary, therefore, that everything that is moved be moved by another.

[53:48] He's going to give an objection that comes in here from Avicenna, but before we look at that, huh? If I remember right, the seventh book, huh? When Thomas is taking this up, right?

[54:04] He's pointing out in a way that in many ways motion can never be the sort of thing that belongs first to the thing in motion. Not only because the thing in motion is divisible, right, and therefore the motion of the whole depends upon the motion of the part, okay? So depends upon something other than the whole, right? But also, motion is a sort of thing that can never what first belong to you.

[54:36] Why? When are you first in motion? Is this when when you're becoming when you're changing? So you'd be both agent and patient. Well, no, see, that's going to come up later on. Yeah. But but when you when something when this motion first belongs to a thing, right? See, well, we saw that before some motion is, you have moved some distance already. Remember that? Oh. And before you have moved, right?

[55:13] Okay. So when is something first in motion? See, like like taking the most obvious kind of motion, motion of place. When is it first in motion? There isn't. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So motion is not the sort of thing that can belong first to a thing, is it?

[55:39] I don't know whether that's something you know. In addition to this, right? But he'll he'll he'll point that out, right? Okay. It's not the first time something's in motion, right? It's not the first distance it goes, right? There's nothing first, right? Right. See. And is uh, but but here the emphasis is upon the fact that the the the the body that's in motion is itself divisible, right? And therefore the motion of the whole depends upon the motion of the part.

[56:12] And if the part was not in motion, then the whole would not be in motion, right? So how can motion belong first to the whole when the motion of the whole depends upon something other than the whole, namely the motion of the part, right? Okay. But but it kind of adds something to it when you see that in the context there of the beginning of the seventh book, where he first back to the fact that in many other ways there's nothing what there are many other ways in which motion cannot belong first to anything because when is it first in motion, huh?

[56:48] Right. What is the first distance it goes, right? What is the first time it's in motion, right? Huh? There's no first. Okay. Those are different senses of first. Yeah, but I mean it kind of seems to add something to this, right? You know the way Thomas speaks. No, this is kind of like a summary of the whole of the eight books of natural hearing, right? But if you go back to the context in the seventh book after he's finished the sixth book, right, where he starts to argue and develop this first argument, right, you know, there Thomas points out that not only in this way is there nothing first, but in other ways there's nothing first, right?

[57:35] You see. So if you understand in some way that if something is responsible for itself having something, right, that's got to belong first of all to that thing, but motion is not the sort of thing that can belong first of all to anything, right? Okay. Although here he seems to be signaling out the fact it can't belong first to the whole because if it did, it wouldn't depend upon anything else, right?

[58:05] But the motion of the whole does depend upon the motion of the part. So if I can't have motion, if motion can't belong to me first, how can I be responsible for my own motion, right?

[58:26] If something has to belong to me first to be what an effect of me or for me to be responsible for it, right? Okay. If I move myself, right? Then motion has belonged to me first. Motion can't belong to anything first. At least, of all the thing in motion, because it's composed. So it seems that the places