Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
88. The Self-Moving First Mover, the Eternity of the World, and the Meanings of Spirit
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[0:00] So he says, go back to paragraph where I took off from. Because therefore, being had that there is a first mover that is not moved by another thing outside of it, it does not follow that be altogether immobile. Therefore, further Aristotle proceeds by saying that this could be in two ways: in one way that that first thing is wholly immobile, which, being laid down, the thing that we want to reason to has been had, the proposed, namely that there be some first mover that's immobile.

[0:35] In another way, that that first thing be moved by itself, right? And this seems to be what, probably right, because what is through itself? What is per se, Always is before that which is right through another, right? Whence in things moved, the first moved is reasonably said to be. It's reasonable to say that it is moved to itself, right, and not by another.

[1:11] But this being given, again the same thing will follow, for it cannot be said that the thing moving itself, the whole, is moved by the whole, because thus there would follow the fore said what? Things that don't fit together, don't go. Yeah. They named it. Some would be. Someone would be at the same time what? Teach and be taught, and likewise the other motions, and again that something would be at once in ability and in act, right?

[1:45] Okay, looking back to what was used in the first argument. For the mover as such is an act, and the moved is in what? Yeah. You can say the the giver as such is an act, right? And the receiver as such is in what? Ability, right? What's they always say? It's more divine to give than to receive, right? It's

[2:15] almost an understatement. It's more divine, right? Because if God is pure act, he can only give. He can't receive, right? Okay. And that's why.

[2:30] was it Avicenna? the Arab philosopher, the Arab philosophers said, you know, God alone is truly liberal, right? You know, because he gives, not expecting anything to be given him in return. He not only does that, but he can't receive anything in return, right? That's an amazing thing, huh?

[3:00] You see, when when you or I are liberal and we give something freely, expecting nothing in return, we get that good act out of that, don't we? Right. That's something added to us, right? But God doesn't what? Get another good act out of this, right? No, it's altogether simple, and there's no distinction between God and his his act, right? He's pure act. So he gives without receiving anything, right?

[3:30] So wonder what it is for us to thank him, right? Yeah. You know, sometimes I compare it. You know, to a child who who's paid an allowance by his his mother or his daddy, right? And then he saves some of his allowance or takes some of his allowance and he buys a gift for his mommy or daddy, right? His mommy and daddy appreciate that, right? You see, in a sense, he's what?

[4:00] Giving back what he got. Got from them, yeah. But but you know, the parents still rejoice in this. They don't expect him to be able to have his own funds at that age, anyway, right? You know. Um. But in a sense, we're giving God back what we have what received from Him, right?

[4:22] But in another sense, maybe he can't be given anything, right? So, Thanksgiving, you know, is very important, huh? Thomas's prayer there, his prayer after communion, you know, the famous prayer. Oh yeah. Yeah, but the very first line in that prayer is what? Gratias tibi ago you know. So, he's giving God thanks right? For for the for the gift of the Eucharist, right? You know, they bestowed this upon him, right?

[4:57] Who's wholly unworthy, right? And it's entirely the divine mercy that He's given him the Eucharist, huh? Um. In one sense, it's very strange, you know. Like you know, when we're young, sometimes they praise us for going to mass or you know, or daily mass or like that, you know. But but you know if if if I can tell the people if somebody's up in the drugstore there, you know, passing out a thousand dollar bills to anybody comes in there, right?

[5:32] Would you praise somebody for having gone up there, you know, and said what a wonderful person you were to go up there and get you a thousand dollar bill? Well, no, no, no. He'd be a fool not to go there, right? You know, but you're receiving something more, shall we say, than a thousand dollar bill when you receive the Eucharist, right? You know. So.

[5:57] Sometimes see people, you know, I go to mass because I can't do anything better to do. I need them to figure out the true significance of that, huh?

[6:16] Say something like that about philosophy too, right? Why do we think about these things? Well, can't we think anything better to do? So you know it's kind of a famous proposition that Aristotle has in one of the biological books. I think where Thomas quotes it from, but Thomas is always giving it out. Omne agens agit inquantum est in actu, right? Every agent, every maker acts or makes in so far as it is an act, right?

[6:53] Okay. But if you stop and think about what is given, is as act to what receives what is given, right? And what receives what is given is to what it receives as what ability is to act, right? Yeah. So something gives itself something. It would have to what have and not have, right? Okay. Somebody told me through the seminary there that the old priest, you know, when he asked a question in class and the student couldn't answer, he'd always say, "Nemo dat quod non habet."

[7:33] He always nothing gives what always nothing gives what it doesn't have, right? So he calls upon the student, the student can't answer the question, right? He always say, "Neil, Dr. Nohavut. So he's really kind of inculcating this principle into their, into their, their noggins right? But nothing gives what it doesn't have, right? The student can't answer the question. He doesn't have it. Doesn't know the answer. Doesn't have the answer.

[7:56] That's kind of a way of making use of the occasion of their ignorance, which you often have in class, right? To, to, to illustrate, right? And to, to repeat, right? But it's really a very basic principle, right?

[8:17] So there's got to be two parts then in the thing that is said to move itself, right? Okay. It remains, therefore, that one of its parts is moving only, and the other is what moved, right? Okay.

[8:37] And thus we have the same thing as we had before, namely that there is some immobile mover, right? For it's not able to be said that both parts are moved, thus one by the other, nor that one part moves itself and then moves the other part, nor that the whole moves the part, nor that the part moves the whole, because there would follow the foregoing contradictions, namely that something would be at the same time would move and be moved by the same or according to the same species of motion, and there would be at the same time in ability and in act, huh?

[9:19] And further, the whole would not be first moving itself, but reason the part. It remains, therefore, that of the thing moving itself, it is necessary that one part be immobile and moving the what other part, huh? But then Aristotle goes on a new step, right? But because in those things moving themselves which are among us, to wit, in animals, the moving part, to wit, the soul, although it is immobile as such, is moved nevertheless by happening or by accident,

[10:00] because if the soul is in the body and the body is moved in some sense, the soul is moved, right? Not as such, right? But through another. He further goes on to show that of the first mover, of the first moving itself, the part moving is neither moved per se nor per accidens, huh?

[10:27] Now, is Aristotle going to show this? Well, the things moving themselves which are among us, namely animals, since they are corruptible, the moving part in them is moved per accidens, huh? But it is necessary that things corruptible, moving themselves, be reduced to some first mover, something first moving that is eternal. Therefore, it is necessary that there be some mover of some moving itself, which neither per se nor per accidens is moved.

[11:09] Now Aristotle argues this way. huh That's the famous argument in the De Generatione et Corruptione. There are going to be necessary, according to his position, that something moving itself be eternal, is clear. For if motion is eternal, as he supposes, now right? He's going to come back to that. It is necessary that the generation of things moving themselves, which are generable and corruptible, be perpetual. But of this perpetuity is not able for there to be the cause

[11:49] one of those things moving itself, because it is not always, nor together always, nor nor together all of them. First, because they are infinite, and second, because they are not together. It remains, therefore, that it is necessary that there be something moving itself perpetual that causes the perpetuity of generation in these inferior things moving themselves. And thus, the mover,

[12:22] its mover, is not moved either neither per se nor per accidens. Let's come back and just look at that a little bit there. Suppose

[12:37] I move myself, you know, in a way. You see that, okay? But I have a beginning and end in time, right? In the same way for every animal, right? So if motion is going to continue, these things moving themselves that are corruptible, like me and the dog and the cat and so on, we've got to generate another like ourselves, right? Now, if this is going to

[13:06] continue, this generation is going to go on forever, right? Otherwise, you'd have no more living things around, right? And the only things to move themselves, so all motion would stop, right? So,

[13:22] what's the cause of this generation going on forever? Is it me, or my dad, or my grandfather, or my son? I can't be the cause of it because I'm not what. Forever. Yeah, I'm around forever, right? Okay,

[13:42] so I can't be the cause of why the human generation goes on forever, and an orange or whatever it is can't be the cause why generation of cats goes on forever because orange wasn't here when it was going on before, right? And it'll go on after orange, I assume, unless the world comes to an end, right? Okay. Now, if we say, well, then if I'm not the cause of it, is my, is me plus my father plus my grandfather plus my son plus my grandson plus my great grandson, all of us together are the cause of this going on forever?

[14:16] We don't all exist together, do we? Right? How can we be cause of anything? So he's saying that outside the perpetual generation, let's say of the cat or the dog or the man, there must be something, right, responsible for this, right? And in his thinking, it was the what heavenly bodies, right, huh, that were always what moving, always incorruptible, right? Incorruptible, but they were causing motion down here, right?

[14:54] Okay. That has some probability to it, huh? We want to, we want to rethink that a bit, right? But has some probability because everything is blossoming here, but why? Because of the position of the sun and so on, right, in the sky, right? Okay. And without the sun, there wouldn't be the plants going on and on, right? So there's some truth to what he's saying, even in our way of thinking today, right?

[15:21] Without the sun, there would not be this what continuous generation of plants and this earth or animals, that matter. Okay. Okay. Further, he says, in things moving themselves, huh, we see that some begin to move newly on account of some motion by which the animal does not move by itself, huh, as the food digested, right, or the air being altered, huh, by which motion the mover moving himself is moved what?

[16:12] per accidens, huh? Okay. So I'm sleeping at night and all of a sudden, bang, you know, and I wake up and all of a sudden, right, huh? Okay. Well, I'm not responsible for that sound that woke me up, right?

[16:29] So I'm not going to always be in motion if I have this sort of thing, right? From which one can take that nothing moving itself is moved always, whose mover is moved either per se per accidens. But the first thing moving itself is is moved always. Otherwise, there could not be what motion always, right? He's assuming that, right? Okay, come back to that. Because every other motion is caused by the motion of the first thing moving itself.

[17:13] It remains, therefore, that the first thing moving itself is moved by a mover who is not moved either per se per accidens. So the animals that we know, right? They sleep and then they wake up, right? And then they start to move again, right? And they stop, right? Okay. So how can they be the cause of motion being eternal when they are not themselves, right? Always in motion, right?

[17:41] So we need a kind of incorruptible eternal thing, right? Okay. If you still, if you want to see that there's another body, right? You haven't come right to this altogether immobile thing, right? Okay. But you're coming just according to this probable proposition, right? You're coming to the idea that there's something moving itself, right? Well, if it's moving itself, it's got to be a body, right? But if it's moving itself and is responsible for motion always being, it's got to be what?

[18:14] Always in motion. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Nor is this against the reason that the movers of the inferior orbs move a eternal motion or bi eternal motion, and nevertheless they are said to be moved per se, because they are said to be moved per se, not by reason of themselves, but by reason of their mobiles, which follow the motion superior. We don't worry about that too much yet.

[18:50] But because God is not a part of something moving itself, Aristotle further in his metaphysics investigates from this mover, which is a part of the thing moving itself, another mover entirely separate, which is God.

[19:10] For since everything moving itself is moved by what? Appetite. Appetite or by desire, right? Is necessary that the mover, who is a part of the moving itself, that it moves on account of the desire of something desirable, and that would be superior to it in moving, right? The end is the cause of all the other causes. For the thing desiring is in a way a what?

[19:45] A move mover, right? I mean. A moved mover, right? Okay. This this is brought out more fully in the what? The thing is going to hear now is that they can understand better once you have the De Anima right? Okay. With the De Anima, you see how desire, in a way, is a what? Moved mover, right? Okay. So the food, I I see the food, and that moves me to what?

[20:16] Want the food, right? And then because of my wanting the food, then my body is moved as a consequence of that, right? Okay. So my desire for the food is a moved what? Mover, right?

[20:36] It's because I've been moved to hunger, as my hunger is moving me to go to the restaurant or going to the dining room or wherever the food is, right? Okay.

[20:54] But the desirable is a mover wholly not moved, right? It's the unmoved mover. It's necessary, therefore, that the first separate mover be entirely immobile, and. This is God, right?

[21:14] Now, the four said processes seem to be what two things seem to make infirm or weak, right? Infermare, huh? Okay. Of which the first is that they proceed from the supposition of the eternity of motion, right? Which, among Catholics, is supposed to be false, right? The universe didn't have the universe had a beginning, right? Therefore, motion had a beginning; it wasn't always right. Now, why does Thomas go on to say, and to this it should be said, that the via efficacissima, the most efficacious way to proving God to be, is from the supposition of the eternity of the world.

[22:03] Okay. Why does why does he say that? I guess because if you if you're not going to suppose the beginning of the world, obviously there is going to have to be a creator or a god or something for to start it all off. Yeah, yeah. If you said that the world didn't even exist, right? Yeah. You know, you see, if you said the world didn't always exist, then you're going to have to have it has something to bring it into existence, right?

[22:31] You know, what doesn't exist at all can't bring itself into existence, right? See, whereas in that case it's very clear, right? Okay. So, so he says. Now, why does he say efficacissima, right? Most efficacious. Yeah, but I mean, in a sense, I don't think he means that it would be easier to show that there's a God if the world always was. Stronger. You know, it would be harder to show it, right?

[23:01] But if you could show that even if the world was eternal, there had to be a God, right? Then, if for eternity, if if the world had a beginning, there had to be a God, right? You see, you see. For every reason you have for its eternity, for the eternity of the world, that would hold, or the even if it were finite, but nevertheless you have more reasons because you have a creator, something to start it.

[23:31] Yeah, yeah. I mean, it could be more manifest that there is a God if we knew by reason, right, rather than by faith. We're talking here by reasoning, you know, by reason alone. If we knew by reason that the world had a beginning, right? Okay, so that

[23:56] the world existed after not existing, right? Okay. Then it'd be clear that there had to be someone to bring the world into existence, right? Okay. But if you take the alternative and say the world always was, right,

[24:17] then it's less clear that there's going to be a what a God, yeah. So if you can show it with that supposition, then most assuredly you'll show that there's a God, huh? Okay. Now, I don't want you to misunderstand this comparison, but make a make a a little comparison here. Now, sometimes in Aristotle, when Thomas, especially in the early Thomas, like in the sentences, when he first Aristotle's position here that he seems to reason from in in the

[24:50] eighth books, say of the of the physics and so on, that the universe always was, right, and the motions eternal. Suddenly, speak of this as a mistake of Aristotle, right? Okay. Okay. Other times, Thomas will say, "Well, maybe it's not a mistake of Aristotle. He's what taking the more difficult case and showing that even given that, right, you can show that there's a God, right? Okay. Now, why he doesn't bother to show it for the the easier case, right?

[25:36] See, now you could argue this way: either the universe, the material universe, always was, right, or it had a beginning, okay? Now, if it had a beginning, it should be fairly easy to see that there had to be a maker, creator, right? See, okay. So he leaves that to you to see, right? He says, "But if it always was,

[26:05] for these reasons, there would still have to be a unmover, right? Okay. Do we do we know which which were what was written first of the the physics or the Topics Do we know?

[26:26] I don't know if he knows exactly, but see in the topics he gives the question of whether the universe is eternal or not as an example of a dialectical question that we would want to know the answer to, but as if it's something we can only reason about the probability, right? And when Thomas, you know, as a work by itself, he discusses it in some of his major works too, like in the Sumas he discusses it.

[26:56] He has a separate work too on the eternity of the world, right? But in that work on the eternity of the world, Thomas considers the reasons that have been given by Aristotle or by other philosophers or thinkers for saying the universe is eternal or the universe is not eternal, right? And he argues that none of the arguments, either for or against, are demonstrations. He only has some probability, right?

[27:25] Okay. And therefore he concludes that we know only by what faith, right? That the universe was not what eternal, eternal, always existing, right? Okay. Okay.

[27:44] Now Aristotle may or may not, huh? You know, he may have been the opinion that the universe always was, but it's an opinion, right? You see. But from what he says during the topics, it seems he's aware of the fact that he doesn't really have a demonstration, right? That the universe was eternal, right? He doesn't even know that, right? Okay. But in in a way, he's doing something a little bit like Euclid does, right?

[28:11] Where if you read, you know, the Heath notes, sometimes, in some of the theorems, it's necessary really to distinguish a number of cases. And as Heath points out, the later the commentators like Proclus and later ones, they distinguish these cases and show it for each case, right? But Euclid takes the most difficult case and shows it, right? And leaves to his reader or his commentator, right, to to present the other cases, right?

[28:49] And Heath often makes that point if you look at the notes there, right? That that Euclid has taken the most difficult case, right? Well, you might say something like that, perhaps, is here, right? Huh? That Aristotle is taking the more difficult case to show that there's a God, right? The universe is eternal. Of course, eternal doesn't mean eternal. in the way God's eternal. The universe always was, right?

[29:17] Or the universe had a beginning, right? If they had a beginning, it's easier to see that there had to be a God. There must be a God, right? If it always was, you know, then it's harder to see that there's a God, right? But here are the reasons for even in that case for thinking that there must be a God, right? Must be an unmoved mover and so on.

[29:38] Okay. Let's see what he's doing there, huh? Okay. They talk about something being moved. per accident So if an angel's moving something, is it moved per accident? Well,

[30:15] not in the way that the soul is moved per accident huh? Because the soul is a form in a body, right? Okay. But the angel is not in that way.

[30:31] But there is a kind of. Have to be very careful there. There is a kind of time in the angels, right? Which Augustine. you know, calls it more like a discrete time, right? Not a continuous time, right? But let's leave that till the time when we study the angels, huh? Okay. Because this might be confusing, you know, to speak of time or even motion in the angels, huh?

[30:56] Okay. So, has do these arguments just conclude to some separate immaterial mover that doesn't move in the strict sense? Well, you're first seeing that probably in the physics, you know. But the metaphysics, you're probably going beyond that, right? Okay. So some people make a distinction between, in a sense of the physics, once you arrive at the idea of a of a unmoved mover in the sense of a immaterial mover, right?

[31:35] You know, a mover that is not a body, right? Okay. Well, if you're taking motion in the strict sense, you know, involves a body, right? That was shown in the sixth book. And so once you arrive at a mover that is not a body, that's not material, right? That's the end of natural philosophy at the the border, right? Huh? Okay. But when you get to the

[32:05] the twelfth book of wisdom, there, the twelfth book of the metaphysics, and you're aware that there's more than one immaterial substance, right? Then you have to see reasons why they go back to one, huh? Okay. This is touching a bit upon that reason, right, in terms of the desirable for which, you know, what is moving the heavenly bodies, right? The the ancient science there. Why is it moving the bodies always, right?

[32:37] Huh? Okay. Well, in a sense, it's to what has something of the eternity of God, right? Huh? Reflected in the material world, right? Okay. But Plato and Aristotle, Plato in the Symposium and Aristotle in the second book on the soul, there, they talk about how reproduction in the animals and in the plants is trying trying to be what like God so far as possible, right?

[33:09] That the animals and plants as individuals can't go on forever like God does, but by reproducing themselves, their kind can go on forever, right? So when when you know Shakespeare starts the sonnets there, and he's writing, you know, the first twenty sonnets almost, and trying to urge somebody to marry, right? Huh? But the very first sonnet, you know, it says the very first lines of sonnets: "From fairest creatures we desire increase, huh?

[33:41] " That thereby beauty's rose might never die, right? So he's talking about the desire to reproduce. In a sense, is a desire for what immortality, so far as possible in these mortal things, huh? So the mortal is striving to be like the immortal, so far as possible, right?

[34:07] And something like that in teaching, right? Because you're trying to what keep alive this knowledge of the science, right? You know, when the German physicists, especially those of Jewish blood, were leaving Germany because of this madman Hitler, there. And Heisenberg said to Max Planck, "Should I leave too? " You know, and Max Planck said, "Well if we all, leave! " You know, what's going to happen to to science here?

[34:30] You know, you know. And so that it's kind of desire there that this be immortalized, right? Huh? The same in the art of music, right? I mean, you know, if you play the violin and it's been your life to play the violin in the Boston Symphony Orchestra or some other orchestra, right? You you certainly want someone to play the violin when you're gone, right? And continue this, right?

[34:57] You see. So you you teach somebody else, and so it's kind of a desire for what to immortalize something, right? And that it'll go on after you, huh? So in that sense, you can see they're being moved, right, by something that is eternal. They're trying to be like it, huh? So far as possible, right? And so you know, if you're thinking of of the motions of the of the of the sun and the moon and the stars and so on as being ordered to the generation of things down here, right, huh?

[35:30] Or they're they're aiming at that. They're being moved, right? The movers of these things are being moved in the way in which desire is moved by the desirable.

[35:41] But they're trying to be like God, who is the cause of all things, right? In so far as they themselves are, in some sense, a what a cause, right?

[35:53] Okay. So Dionysius says, right? You know, the ultimate thing there in being like God is to be like God, even so far as he's a what cause, right?

[36:10] That's true, even you know, in the animals and the plants, you know, that when they're perfect, then they're able to reproduce themselves, right? You know, be perfect, even as your heavenly father is, perfect, right? As God says there in the ancient scriptures, there in the Old Testament, there, you know, am I who give generation to others? Am I going to be without? the ability to generate, right?

[36:34] But you know, the church fathers understand as referring to the, you know, to the generation of the sun, right? Okay, do you think the first argument here in chapter thirteen

[36:52] does that just really conclude to a material being that's not moving strictly? Well, it depends, you see, upon how universally you understand an act and ability, right?

[37:07] And you know, when you look at the at the Summa Contra Gentiles, when he goes on from here, right? He will pull out, you know, act and ability there and make a separate argument in a couple of forms there. And

[37:23] so, if you're looking at act and ability just as they're found in motion, right? Then you're not being as what complete as when you s pull out act and ability and understand it in a more. Universal way, right? But you're getting up into the ninth book of wisdom, right? In the ninth book of wisdom, when Aristotle begins, he talks about ability in the first part of the book, right?

[37:53] And and act, but only in reference to motion. And he talks about ability only for motion, active or passive ability. And he says this is not what our main interest in here, right? But this is where we have to start. And but when you get to the second part, we'll see act more universally than just motion, right? And then we'll see other senses of ability, right? And that sets the stage for the third part of the book where he talks about the before and after of act and ability, right?

[38:29] And and it's there that you see the basis for why the first being, the first cause, has to be pure act, right? The basis of reasoning to that.

[38:41] So in that broader sense, even in the angels, there's some kind of ability and act, huh? Their substance is not their what? Existence, right? And if your substance is not your existence, then your substance is to existence, is ability is to act. See, that's quite different. Thomas in the in the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, there when he's showing that you know even the angels there must be this composition of ability and act because their substance or what they are is not their existence, right?

[39:22] But then he has a whole you know chapter or so there where he's showing that this distinction between the substance of a thing and its what? Existence is not the same as matter and form, right? You know, a lot of people confuse those two, you know. And that's not the same thing as the mobile and its motion, right? You see, but there's a certain what? Proportion there, right?

[39:45] You see, so you have to we have to understand you know that form is not the same thing as motion. You know that that when you say you know that or it's not the same thing as operation, right? And existence not the same thing as form, right? Okay.

[40:10] So eventually you understand act and ability in a much more universal way than it is found in motion, right? And that enables you to come to a better

[40:21] knowledge of the first cause, huh? That's really more proper to the wise man to do that, as he does the ninth book of wisdom. You're getting ahead of the game here, sir.

[40:36] Okay. That's one of the questions in the third book, right, of the wisdom, huh? You know, if there are immaterial causes, right? There's something immaterial. Is there one of these? Anaxagoras spoke of one, or is there many? Like Plato spoke of many, right? Okay, but that's the question that has to be investigated, right?

[41:02] Natural philosophy wouldn't know anything about that. Given that question, right? Because once you realize that there's something immaterial, then you're at the end of natural philosophy. But the end of one is the beginning of another, right?

[41:21] So there's two or three places in natural philosophy where you come to the border, right? And one is you get to the unmoved mover, right? And you realize the unmoved mover is not a body, right? Well, that's one place where you're, you're looking over the border there into into wisdom, right? In the second place is in the third book on the soul. We have the argument for the the what immortality of human soul, right?

[41:48] That it can exist in separation from the body. And that kind of opens the door, right? That's kind of the opening in the knowledge of the soul there to the knowledge of the immaterial substances. That's the second place, really, you know. And the third place is maybe where, you know, Anaxagoras has led right the idea of a greater mind through the border in the natural world, and he has reasons to think that the greater mind couldn't order things if it was mixed up with them, right?

[42:17] You know, so there's at least three three places then, right? Where you see that natural philosophy you come to the border, right? But just at the border, you know, the end of the United States is the beginning of Canada, right? So the end of natural philosophy is the beginning of another science, right? Yeah. So then we'll be thinking more along the way. Plato thinks of motion in a broader sense.

[42:50] Well, well, yeah, but it might be better to say that we come to understand acting ability more broadly than just motion, right? Okay. But motion is the act which is most known to us. As Shakespeare says, "Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what that stirs." You see, and

[43:16] and that's why even you know metaphorically, you know, we speak sometimes, you know, God is you know guiding through the world, right? You know, it's with thoughts, as Heraclitus says, right? But that's kind of speaking more metaphorically, right? Kind of a metaphorical extension of the word motion, right?

[43:38] Okay. So to this it ought to be said that the most efficacious way to proving God to be is from the supposition of the eternal to the world, which, being posited, minus fide data, right? It seems less, it less seems to manifest that God is, right? Okay. For if the world in motion began de novo, de novo, right? It is clear, it is necessary to lay down some cause which de novo, newly, produces the world in motion, right?

[44:21] Because whatever de novo, newly comes to be from some innovator, right? Necessarily takes its origin, since nothing brings itself from potency to act, and if what sorry from non-being to what being, right? Okay.

[44:45] So something that is not could not be the cause of its being, could it? So if before it was the world was not, right? It could not be responsible for its own being, could it? You got to posit this other. Okay. So Aristotle is taking the more difficult case, like

[45:11] our friend, right? Right. Okay. Secondly, that he supposes in the fourth demonstrations that the first motion or the first moved rather, namely the celestial body, can be moved from itself, from which it follows that it is what animated, right? Okay. Which has not been conceded by many, right? Okay.

[45:47] And to this it ought to be said that if the first mover is not laid down to be moved from itself, it is necessary that it be moved immediately by something entirely immobile. Whence also he says Aristotle, under a disjunction, right, brings in this conclusion that to it is necessary either to what arrive at a first immobile mover that separated, or to one moving itself. And again he takes the less.

[46:23] That's it. That's the evident case, right? From which again one comes to, by the argument we saw, to a first immobile mover that is what separated, huh? Okay.

[46:45] Then he goes on to talk about the argument from the maker, right? Okay. Now I'm not trying to to fully understand either these first two motions, arguments from motion, but merely to go through them a bit to see that they do in fact what depend upon a knowledge of what we learned in the physics, right? Like the definition of motion, which is learned in book three, but also what we learned in book six, right?

[47:17] Okay. And you might suspect also what some of these things they went to, especially the second argument, necessity of knowing the De Anima, right? Which is the next thing we're going to study, right? Okay. I think I still have some of those ones that you used on TAC. You know, maybe we can use that. You don't have my own. Translation of it, huh? So I'll sit down and find some of those and bring them up next time, okay?

[47:45] How many copies do we need, though? I mean, is this uh for six I know I won? I won't be here. I'm- I'm going to be uh, bowing out till the Metaphysics now. so get to it quickly. What do you mean? We're just telling you you need it I know You can't convince us, No, I. think I'm I'm feeling we're. I'm from a small community, so I feel I'm feeling guilty, and I've never done the metaphysics, but I certainly could get a lot more out of the De Anima.

[48:18] Okay. Well, anyway, so we need five copies of Easter letter, six or what? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Six. Six. Okay, six, and oh God, I think we got probably got six left, yeah. Yeah.

[48:33] Okay. we'll start. We'll go slowly, say don't we? I don't have to get a lot of words, eh? We'll bring it next time, okay? Yeah.

[48:52] Could I ask you this? And since they just had Pentecost, do you know on the top of your head the various meanings of spirit and the order meanings? Well, the first meaning of spirit is wind or breath, and then it's carried over to the material substances because air, I notice, is a substance that is what almost sort of spiritual. Yeah, and and kind of what not sensible, right?

[49:24] Can't be sensed, right? So they carried that word over and applied to something entirely outside the sensible world, right? Can't be sensed at all. But perhaps also because of the what thinness of it, right?

[49:39] What does Shakespeare say in the Tempest? There, huh? And the vision there, that, he conjures up, you know. And these are actors, as I foretold you, were all spirits, and they're melted into air, into thin air. Oh yeah. Remember that? See. So the idea of thinness there, right? Huh? No.

[50:01] It's almost metaphorical and applied to an angel, right? But there is some continuity there, I think, at least metaphorical, right? So, uh, Anaxagoras, although he's thinking of the greater mind as immaterial, he speaks of it as the thinnest of all things, huh? And scripture often speaks of, you know, the word of God is, you know, you know, being sharper than the sword and penetrating things. So sharpness comes from thinness, right?

[50:30] Usually. So. But it's used more, you know, to name a name an immaterial thing, to name more like the angels and God Himself, than to name, say, the soul, right?

[50:52] Say. But the soul is sometimes said, the human soul, only really, in Scripture. Sometimes said to be a spirit because it is immortal, right? And it has understanding and will, like the angels have, right? And so the soul, in so far as it is above matter, right, and has these powers that are above matter, is sometimes called a spirit, right? So in the Magnificat, when she says, "My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God, my Saviour," she apparently using the words there in their strict sense, right?

[51:34] Now, why does she say, "said My soul magnifies the Lord," right? Say. You know, maybe it's partly not only because she's vocally praising our Lord, right, which involves the body, and therefore this the soul is the form of the body, right? But also because she what gave birth to our Lord, right?

[51:59] Say. And she has to that in her womb, right? Fruit of thy womb, we say in the prayer, right? What's the fruit of thy womb? Kind of interesting how

[52:14] we say Hail Mary. Okay. We say, "Full of grace, the Lord is with thee." And then we say, "What? Blessed art thou amongst women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb." Right. I I don't say that distinction between those two parts is exactly the same as distinction between spirit and soul, right? But it's something like that, huh? Okay.

[52:47] What is that the distinction between? Between you say she's full of grace, right? Okay. Because grace is is you have to be very careful about that, huh? But grace is more in the soul than the body, right? But you know, get kind of careful at because you know, obviously the the, the body of hers is immaculately conceived and so on, right? You know. But but

[53:13] sanctifying grace, I think, is more in the soul than the body. That's the subject of it. Say. And when Thomas distinguishes there between, say, grace and sanctifying grace, and and the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, the theological virtues are really in the reason and in the will, right? So faith is in the reason. But depends upon the will and hope and charity in the will, right?

[53:47] But sanctifying grace is in the what, the soul? Yeah, yeah. And just as from the nature of the soul there follows upon it reason and will, right? So from grace in the soul there follows into the reason the will, faith, hope, and what, charity, right? So so I mean our our soul in so far as it's the form of the body, right, is most properly called the soul, right?

[54:32] But in so far as our soul is not entirely immersed in matter and has some powers like the understanding and the will that are not in the body, which we'll learn when we get to the third book about the soul, then it's called a what, spirit, right? Okay. We wouldn't properly speaking call the the soul of a dog or or a the soul of a plant a a spirit, yeah.

[55:03] You can call it a soul, though, right. The word animal comes from the word soul, right? Sure. My wife and I were looking at looking at plants there and there were places there, and I said, Rosalie, I said, each one of these plants has its own soul. And so I was really, you know, you know, really feeling an affinity for all those plants there, each having its own soul, you know?

[55:28] Um, there's one, one plant there, you know, um, called, uh, Desdemona, that's its name, you know, the character. He called Desdemona, and of course, uh, I said, I'm going to buy this, Rosie, I said, you know. And, uh, but yeah. I was kind of reading, you know, the description there of it, you know, and it's it's like, uh, the other plant called Othella.

[55:57] So there's there's some plants that are called, you know, uh, I forget what the other part of the name was, Plantagullia, I forget what it was, you know, but but apparently there's there's two connected plants. One is called Desdemona now, and the other is called Atello, so I don't know. I guess when you go over to to to Stratford on Avon there, um, they have a garden there, you know, where they have, um, the plants, not that those names, but I mean the plants that are named in Shakespeare's play, so you can, you know, you know, all the plants that they, that he names, that they have them there, you see, and then you can, and I guess, you know, you got the quote from

[56:38] the play and the plant there, you know. So, so I kind of, you know, you got to go there, you know, see all these little plant souls there. in honor of Shakespeare, you see, but you wouldn't call him a spirit, right? See, so she says, you know, why did she say my soul magnifies the Lord, right? Well, she magnifies the Lord not only in her what spirit, right, but also in her body, right.

[57:05] In fact, in her body she gives birth to to our Lord, right? Okay, this is the fruit of thy womb, right? That's not a that's a body. And and so you can praise the person, you know, also with your body, with your tongue, right? Um.

[57:29] So, insofar as then her her her soul through her body gives birth to the Christ, and insofar as her soul through her body is praising God, right? She can say my soul magnifies the Lord, right?

[57:49] But then, and my spirit right rejoices in God, my Savior. That's that's the higher part of the soul, right? You know, which is more properly the body can't really rejoice in God the way the soul can, because the body, the senses don't know God, right? And the emotions can't really have God as their object, but there can be kind of what overflow, right, from the soul into the body, right?

[58:20] But but basically, you know, the love that is charity is in the will. It's not it's not a love that is an emotion. It can move emotions in some ways. I will, but but it's primarily the love which is in the will,

[58:39] and the rejoicing there, right, is primarily in the will, right? So there's a little difference in what she's saying there. My soul magnifies the Lord, right? And my spirit rejoices in God, my Savior. Yeah.

[58:59] I know. Yeah. I have to look at the text again. I just think you know about. Which is says Lord for the first part, right? My soul magnifies the Lord. What she say? Yeah. Use the word Lord. Rejoices in God, my Savior. Yeah, and the second part she uses the word God, right? See, see, but even that's kind of appropriate to that distinction, now, because he's called Lord of his creation, right?

[59:27] See, and that's in part of his material, his creation, right? See.