De Anima (On the Soul)
7. Are the Passions of the Soul Bodily? Emotions, the Will, and Immortality (De Anima I, Proemium)
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[0:06] So today, maybe we'll look at the second half here of the third part of the proemium, which is on the difficulties as far as the properties of the soul, and starting with number seven there. Okay.

[0:29] He says there is a difficulty also about the passions of the soul, whether they are all common as well as to what has soul, or is there something of the soul proper to it?

[0:47] What problem is going to consider mainly here? Well, are there different kinds of souls? Are there different kinds of souls and different kinds of passions? Yeah, well, it's not that's going to be involved, I suppose, but he's going to talk really about whether things like, what we would call in English the emotions, right?

[1:13] Whether there's something bodily or not, right? Okay. And you could ask the same thing about what sensing, right? You could ask the same thing about understanding eventually, right? Oh I see. Okay.

[1:32] But he's mainly talking here about the emotions. Okay. So he says to grasp this is necessary but not easy. in the eighth paragraph. But it seems that of most there is not one suffering or doing which is without the body. To be angry, to take courage, to desire, to sense in any way, huh? As if these are clearly involving the body, huh? Thinking seems most to be proper, meaning proper to the what?

[2:13] Soul. Yeah. But if even this is some imagination, okay? Or is not without imagination? Not even this could be without the body. I notice how we often use it to change the word to imagine

[2:44] and the word to think, huh? I imagine that's so. I think that's so. As if they were the same, right? And the third book Aristotle is going to distinguish between imagining and thinking, huh? Okay.

[3:07] But there's a likeness between imagining and what thinking. And when I imagine something, I form a what image of it. And when I think about something, I form a thought about it.

[3:32] And in English, you'll find that people will use the word idea in a confused way, sometimes meaning a what image, and sometimes meaning a what thought. Even those who who know the difference between image and thought or imagining and thinking sometimes, as we said before, use these words interchangeably.

[4:04] If you look at Shakespeare there, in Henry V there, and he has the chorus and so on, the kind of apologizing for trying to reproduce the Battle of Agincourt on this little wooden stage, right? And he's asking the audience, right, to help them with their what imagination, imagination, right? Before you see two or three guys on the stage, imagine you got you know two or three hundred people, you know, so.

[4:32] But you'll sometimes say, you know, help us with your what imagining, right? Other times with their what thinking, as if the two were the what same thing, right? And English philosophers, huh? They use the word idea. They're not too sure whether they're talking about an image or a what thought, huh? Yeah.

[5:00] So if the philosopher has an idea, it should be a thought, right? But if the girl says to the guy, "Don't get ideas," it's probably images that she's talking about, right? Because he's probably not doing too much thinking at this time, huh? Okay. So you find people using that word idea in English sometimes for an image, sometimes for a thought. I got an idea. What do you mean?

[5:28] You know, is the image or a thought, huh? And even if they are something different, there's a certain connection between the two that we'll see when you get to the third book, huh?

[5:49] And eventually, we learn that imagining is something in the body, but thinking and the sense of understanding is not in the body. But at this point, we don't know that yet. So just raising a difficulty question about it.

[6:09] Now, the ninth paragraph is showing the importance of this question in regard to something that man naturally wants to know. If you read the famous dialogue of Plato, the one called the Phaedo,

[6:34] Phaedo is the dialogue that takes place in the last day of Socrates' life. He's in prison. He's been going to die that day, right? And he gets involved in several conversations, but the longest conversation is a conversation about whether the human soul survives death, okay, or whether the human soul perishes with the body.

[7:04] And Socrates, in getting involved in that discussion, he he can't help but make a joke, huh? He says they're always accusing us philosophers of talking about irrelevant things, right? And notice the expression that we have in English now. We call the question academic, right? That it's not somehow relevant to our real life or something, huh? Of course, academic comes from Plato's school, the Academy. But Socrates makes a joke about this, right?

[7:39] Saying, "But they could hardly say that this question of whether our soul survives death is irrelevant to me because I'm going to die today. "

[7:50] But of course, it's relevant to us all our life, because we're not going to live the same way, not just in the day we die, but all our life we're not going to live the same way if we think that our soul survives death, right? Or we think that our soul perishes. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[8:12] Now, as Christians, we believe, of course, that the soul survives death. But if you didn't have the faith, right, and nothing but natural reason to go on, you can see how this would be a very serious what? Question. Okay. And Aristotle's pointing out in the ninth paragraph here the connection between the questions that we're asking here now and this question, right?

[8:44] He says, "If therefore there is something proper to the soul among the works or passions of the soul, it can happen that the soul be separated. If, on the other hand, nothing is proper to it, it would not be separable. " Notice what he's saying. He's saying if our soul

[9:09] does something, right, but not in the body, if our soul has some activity, right, some operation. Not in the body. Then the soul's existence is not tied to the body, okay?

[9:36] But if we find that the soul has no activity by itself, if we find that the soul has no activity except one that involves the what, body, right?

[9:53] If the soul has no activity except in the body and through the body, then there's no reason to think that the soul's existence is what

[10:06] independent of the body, huh? Okay. Now, everybody's heard the famous statement of Descartes, which was actually made by Augustine before him. I think, therefore, I am, right? Okay.

[10:30] But notice, son, you're going backwards there, as far as reality is concerned. As Sherlock Holmes says, right? We've got to reason backwards, he says. And Watson says, Sherlock Holmes, what do you mean, reason backwards? We've got to reason from the effect back to the what? Cause, huh? Okay. Now, something very similar to cause and effect, but maybe more tied up here with the second sense of before, and that is that you've got to be before you can do something, okay?

[11:13] So that being is before what doing, right? Okay. Perhaps something can be without doing something, right? But so they can't do something without being, right?

[11:43] But which is more known to us, the being of the thing or what it does, huh? What it does. Yeah, yeah. Notice when Descartes or Augustine says, "I think, therefore, I am," these what the order in our knowing there is the reverse of the order in being there. Okay.

[12:14] So notice, son, if the soul has being, if the soul has existence only in the body, right? Then the soul would not do anything except in the body and through the body, right? Okay.

[12:34] What we want to know, as he says there, is does the soul have being only in the body? If the soul had being or existence only in the body, then when the body crops right, when the body is destroyed, then the soul would cease to be too, because it has being only in the body.

[13:04] But if the soul has being or existence, not only in the body, right, but in itself, then it can be without the body even after the body perishes.

[13:18] But the being of the soul is hidden from us. What kind of being it has? Does it have being only in the body, or does it have being in itself? Is its being, as we sometimes say, immersed in the body, right? Or does the body maybe partake or share it as the soul, but the soul is in existence in itself? Well, we have to reason to that backwards, as Sherlock would say.

[13:50] If the soul has something that it does not in the body, and the most likely one for this, candidate for this, if there is such one, would be what thinking or understanding. If the soul understands the universal, not in the body, right,

[14:17] then its existence is not just what in the body. Do you see that? So Aristotle is talking about the importance of this question now, right?

[14:37] The very question of the immortality of the soul: Does the soul survive the death of the body? That depends upon the answer to this question, right? Does it do something not in the body?

[14:55] Okay. You see the enormous importance of that question, huh? Okay, number nine again. If therefore there is something proper to the soul among the works or passions of the soul, if the soul does something right by itself, right, and not in the body or through the body. It can happen that the soul be separated. If, on the other hand, nothing is proper to it, nothing is private to it, right?

[15:34] It would not be separable. But just as many things happen to what is straight, is straight, you can talk about it, right, in separation, but it can't exist in separation, huh?

[15:48] That would be the same way at the soul, right, huh? Okay. So I can talk about the shape of this glass in separation from the glass, can't I? But I can't really take the shape of this glass and put it over there and put the glass over here, can I? You see?

[16:08] So although we can talk about the soul maybe by itself, right? It wouldn't be able to exist by itself, right? But if it does something, right, by itself, not in the body, then it must. have existence not just in the body. That's based upon something kind of obvious that you must be before you can do something, right?

[16:37] And so, if you can be without something else, then you can do something without that, right? Or put it the other way around: if you can be not just in another, but you can be what?

[16:55] By yourself. Yeah. Then you can do something not just in that other, but in yourself, I can think not only in this room. If I could think only in this room, then I'd want to make sure this room doesn't get

[17:22] destroyed because then I couldn't think anymore, right? Okay. And there'd be no reason to think that I could exist separately from this room, right? If I can't do anything except in this room, huh?

[17:39] Okay. But most of the things that the living thing does clearly seem to involve the what? Body, right? Huh. And he goes into the question in particular, what they sometimes call the passions of the soul. Now, I think that phrase down through history, which you find carried over directly into Latin, you know, the passiones animae, right? Um.

[18:10] That's kind of misleading in some way because you might think you're talking about a passion that the soul has without the body, right? Okay. And the reason why they call it the passions of the soul is because it's passions that only bodies that have a soul have. Why the passions, Passion actually comes from the what? Latin word and the Greek word is similar. It's another word for what?

[18:43] Undergoing, right? So there's some things that non-living bodies undergo as well as living bodies, huh? So you can heat my body, you can cool my body, but you can heat the water, you can cool the water, right? Huh? Okay. That's the bodily undergoing, say, right? But only a living body can undergo something like anger or fear or desire or something like that. A non-living body cannot undergo that.

[19:23] Okay. So that's what they call passions of the soul, but it's kind of, I think, in some ways, misleading, but. occasionally, so if you can mislead what you're saying.

[19:36] Yeah. But it seems that all the passions of the soul are with the body: anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating. For the body suffers something with these, huh? He's going to start to manifest this a bit, huh?

[20:03] The following indicates this. Sometimes, when forceful and manifest sufferings occur, nothing is provoked or fear. But sometimes one is moved by small and faint occurrences. Whenever the body is excited, and is in a condition like that, it has when one is angered, huh?

[20:30] People remark about how sometimes people are set off by practically nothing, right? And this one one of those instances where someone was remarking, he's watching this clerk, you know, who is dealing with the public there, railroad tickets, however it is, and he's being very patient with people coming in, you know, and changing their tickets or asking stupid questions and so on, right? He kind of admires the guy being so patient and calm with these people all this time, and finally he gets up to the desk, you know, he he decides to compliment the man on, you know, how patient he's been.

[21:07] The man blows up. But you know, sometimes you know you come in, you say something to somebody, you know that all of a sudden they start off, you know, because their body has been what disposed, right, huh? To feel something, huh? And sometimes you feel, you know, sad or depressed or joyful or fearful, and you can't point to anything, right? That seems to be a sign that there is something what bodily there, right?

[21:37] Very much, huh? Moreover, this following case is more clear: for nothing fearful occurring, the passions of one being fearful come to be in those sufferings. If things are so, it is clear that passions are enmattered accounts. That's the attempt there to render to the Greek, right? Count would be logos, right? And it's it's a logos in matter, huh?

[22:06] Once the terms are such as if you're going to define anger, anger is some motion of this sort of body or of a part or a power from this for the sake of this, huh?

[22:20] Let's stop at the business a bit here, huh? What in Greek or in Latin they sometimes call the passions of the soul. In English, we have sometimes we use the word passion, but that maybe sometimes is. A little too passionate to name these, but you see, sometimes the word passion is used. But perhaps it's better in English to use the word emotion,

[22:48] which comes from the word for what motion, right? So I'm said to be moved to fear, or moved to anger, or moved to pity, right? Moved to sadness sometimes. Another word we use sometimes, but it's maybe not as precise because there's other meanings. The word feelings, right?

[23:13] You hurt my feelings, your boy. Or I'm feeling sad, or I'm feeling, you know, I feel angry or something like that, huh? Although this word feeling there indicates a kind of connection there between the sense of what touch, which feeling can name, right? And emotions, huh? Maybe because the emotions are in us, and the sense of touch is a sense of the what interior, right? Okay. Other senses seem to be kind of more turned outward, right?

[23:55] But touch and taste, to some extent too, but especially touch is a sense of the interior, right? And maybe that points out some connection between the emotions and the what Senses, huh? And? Aristotle will bring this out when we get to the third book about the soul. That the emotions or the feelings follow in some way upon the senses,

[24:30] and that will be in the sense the difference between the emotions and what we call the will, right? Where the will follows upon our having reason,

[24:48] understanding, huh? So the emotions are something that we share with the other what animals, huh? Now the emotions of man can be more elevated than the emotions of the animals, right? But the other animals have anger and fear and hunger and thirst and so on, okay? Or

[25:18] the will is something that we share with what the angels and God, right? Strictly speaking, God and the angels don't have emotions. But they have will. So man, being an animal with reason, right? Animals defined by senses. Man has these two groups of desire and powers that he'll talk about.

[25:52] But the emotions are more known to us than the acts of the will. And what you find is that we take the names of emotions sometimes and carry them over and place them upon acts of the will.

[26:24] So. The word love, for example, right, can name an emotion, or it can name a what? Act of the will, okay. And sometimes in Greek or in Latin, you might have a somewhat different what?

[26:49] Name, right, for that love, huh? Like in Latin, you see sometimes the word dilectio, which comes have the word for for choice, huh? It shows in love, right? And here they might use amor, okay. In Greek, you have different words, maybe.

[27:17] If you look at C. S. Lewis's book, there, the Four Loves, right, kind of study of the four different words in Greek, you know, like eros, which maybe names very much emotion, and agape, which is used to name the love and the the will and so on. But

[27:38] when you carry the names of the emotions over from to the act of the will, you're going to be keeping part of the meaning of the emotion, and you're going to be dropping part of the meaning of it.

[27:54] This is we're pointing out here: the emotions involve something bodily, okay. And so it's very clear, anger, you know, and fear, you know, that there's a bodily change, right? You ever hold little kids in there, you know, and their big dog comes around, you know, and you get to feel that thump thump thump thump, right? Okay. But the will, like the understanding, as we'll learn, because the will falls upon understanding, the will is also immaterial, okay.

[28:28] And so the act of the will that is given the name of an emotion, it keeps the what? Formal aspect of the emotion, like, for example, in the case of anger, there's a desire for revenge, there, right? It keeps that formal aspect, but it drops the what? Bodily meaning, huh? But notice it's very difficult for most people to distinguish between the love that is an emotion and the love that is an act of the will, huh?

[29:05] And the two may be present at the same time in us, right? Okay. It's very hard for people to to to see a distinction between that, huh? Okay.

[29:23] Let's say the love of wisdom, where the philosopher is named. Is that love an emotion? What else is that? That wisdom is not something really that the senses know.

[29:43] Of course, sometimes if the will is moved, right, it can overflow into the emotions, right, and that can people confuse too, right? Okay. And vice versa, the emotions can sometimes, you know, affect the will, right? So it's very hard for most people to separate these two, okay? But the essential difference is that when the name of the emotion is carried over to the will, you keep the formal aspect that drop the what bodily aspect.

[30:17] If you ever look at the towards the end there of the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, when Thomas is talking about God, right, he wants to talk about the love of God and things of this sort, right? And he'll make this distinction that we make here. He points out how certain names of certain emotions are carried over and placed upon the acts of the will,

[30:46] and he points out he dropped the bodily aspect, right? Okay. And then later on, some of these names are carried over and applied to God,

[30:57] but as he goes through the emotions, he sees that the names of some emotions can never be carried over to God, properly speaking. Metaphorically it can be said of Him. But say something like fear, right? Can there be any fear in God? Say. Well, fear. First of all, it can't be the bodily aspect of fear. Thump, thump, thump. This guy doesn't have a heart to go thump, thump, thump.

[31:23] The other bodily parts, huh? But even the object, the formal aspect of fear, right? Fear is concerned with the evil that is difficult to avoid. Was any evil that's difficult for God to avoid? Can God, in his divine nature, now undergo anything bad? No. So there is nothing to fear. So there can't even be fear in its formal aspect. huh? But. In the case of our will, there can be fear, right?

[32:01] So in Socrates, you see Socrates, the fear of being what mistaken, right? The fear there. As my friend Warren Murray said about Monsignor Dion, right? His principal passion is fear.

[32:21] And but he's thinking, you know, not so much bodily fear, but of this fear of being what. Mistaken, right? It's a joke, you know. I mean, if you propose something new, Monsignor Dionne's first reaction is to reject it, and you've got to really justify it, right?

[32:45] So that fear of being mistaken, huh, involves the universal question of philosophy, which you see in Socrates or Monsignor Dion, That fear is in the what? The will, right?

[33:07] One sabbatical, you know, semester sabbatical, you know, I spent studying the causes of error, right? Oh. And I kind of joked that after this semester, right, you know, I was like this this friend, my brother Richards, who everyone got a medical degree, and then he went got a you know psychology degree or something like that. And of course, you look around at you and I and all these average people, you know, and you see everybody just on the brink of going into one of these psychological disorders or sicknesses, right?

[33:42] And kind of funny to talk to them, you know, because they they studied all the different ones, and you know, used to be joking. I was in college, you know, that you should take the course in abnormal psychology because what you see in abnormal psychology is what we all have, only in somewhat exaggerated form, and so you can kind of what see what these little things that we have are with us.

[34:06] Our life, in a sense, huh? You see, I say how something like that, you get through with a semester like you, you realize how easily the human mind is what deceived, right? And how many are the causes of us being deceived, and how difficult it is to avoid being deceived. As Aristotle says later on, you know, this seems to be the usual condition to be more or less mistaken, to be in error, right?

[34:34] And as Thomas says, we live you know, longer in error, right, to do the truth, right? And so, and we see fear in the will. It's not a bodily thing, right? But you realize that error is something bad. Thomas says in the Summa Contra Gentiles when he's showing that perfect happiness is, of course, not found in this world, right? And he says that error is a magna pars miseriae That error is a great part of wretchedness, right?

[35:10] And of course, everybody is to some extent what mistaken, right? So they can't avoid wretchedness, huh? It's only when you see God face to face, huh, that your mind would be so strong; it's going to be no errors in your mind anymore. But in this life, there's always always mistaken about something. or other.

[35:35] So mistake is something bad. It's a great part of misery, and it's something what difficult to avoid, right? And that's the object of fear, an evil difficult to what avoid, huh? Okay. But in the emotion of fear, in addition to that, there's this bodily thing that you're doing. This motion, bodily change, huh? But you drop out that bodily change part of it, which is part of the definition of what fear really is, huh?

[36:12] As an emotion. When you carry the word fear over and apply it to the will, right? But when you get to God, fear cannot be carried over properly at all. to. God Because not only does he not have the bodily aspect of it, but he doesn't have the formal aspect, right? There's nothing bad, difficult for God to avoid. God cannot suffer anything bad. His divine nature, right? So he can't have fear at all, right?

[36:47] Now sometimes the names of some emotions that cannot be said properly in God because not only because of the bodily aspect, but because of the formal aspect, sometimes it can be said metaphorically And the common example is God is said to be what angry, angry, right? Okay. But that's by certain what metaphorical likeness there, because the angry man what punishes, right?

[37:28] And God in his just will, right, punishes, right? Okay. But he doesn't really have anger. Anger arises from what sadness, right? It arises from you're undergoing something bad, right? That you're trying to get rid of, right? And so God can't really be sad, and therefore he can't be angry. But metaphorically, anger is said of God. But fear could not even be said metaphorically of God.

[38:10] A pity could be said metaphorically of God, right? There's no sadness in God, right? But the man who pities somebody, he what tries to help that person or to relieve their misery, wretchedness, right? So God is said to what God's will to what relieve our misery, right? Is metaphorically called pity.

[38:37] So you have the same word for pity there in the Aristotle's work in the tragedy there, right? But you have the misericordia. So the difference between the ones that can be said metaphorically and those that cannot. Yeah, you say no. The name of no emotion can be said of God, or even our own will, as far as the bodily aspect of emotions concerned, right? As regards the formal aspect of the emotion,

[39:10] the names of all the emotions really can be carried over to the acts of our will. Okay. But only some of those names can be carried over finally to God's will.

[39:24] But those that have for their object something bad can never be carried over to God. See, and those that have like ones like desire and hope cannot be properly in God, because desire and hope, although they're for something good, they're for good not had, right? See, so God is good in itself, so it can't be desire or hope in God.

[39:52] Basically, when they distinguish the emotions, Aristotle doesn't give a complete consideration of emotion, but if you look at the prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, or you look at the question on the passions of the soul in the De Veritate Right, Thomas will subdivide them into basically what eleven different emotions,

[40:18] and just touch upon a bit. Plato and Aristotle already distinguished them into two groups, huh? In Greek one was epithumia, and the other was thumos. And in Latin, they would translate these two kinds of emotions into the concupiscible emotions

[40:57] and the irascible emotions, but both kinds of emotions are named here from one that stands out. huh? Inrascible from anger, and concupiscible from sense desire, right? Like hunger, thirst, and so on, right? Well,

[41:31] the concupiscible emotions arise in regard to what is pleasant or painful to the what senses, and so if something is pleasant to the senses, or something is painful or disagreeable, if it, arises liking or loving. word word, but basically the same thing. You like it, huh? I like licorice, huh? Or I like chocolate or something, right? Okay, liking or loving. If it's painful, disagreeable to the senses, right?

[42:18] These other words besides pleasant, painful, agreeable, disagreeable, right? I liver, I hate liver. I don't like the taste of liver. Okay, and salmon, I don't like to taste the salmon. It. Doesn't agree with my senses. Okay, so that involves what? Loathing, hating, disliking, right?

[42:50] So you have these two basic emotions, huh? Liking or disliking, loving or hating, huh? Okay, so I love licorice, I hate liver. Okay, but now if I don't have what I like, then I have what? I want some licorice. right? Okay, so there arises desire to use a liking word or wanting, right?

[43:15] So desire, wanting is for what I like but don't have. So hunger and thirst are examples of desire, wanting, right? Okay. Um, we don't have a common word for that one. Sometimes use the word aversion or turning away, right? But be the opposite of desire, wanting.

[43:42] So I go to somebody's house and they're serving salmon. I think aversion for this. I eat the stuff. Okay, but now desire diversion is before the good is bad or the bad is forced in you, right? Okay. But now that I eat the salmon, is going to be what sadness, right? Okay.

[44:16] If you give me the licorice, which I like, or whatever it is, right, and now you have sensible joy, right? It sounds you might say pleasure or pain too, but okay. So these are the six emotions that they call the concubiscible emotions, but they arise in regard to the what? What is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses, huh? And the basic, you know, agreement or disagreement of the concubiscible appetite, as they call it, is liking or loving or hating or disliking, right?

[44:57] But they arise from these two other emotions, each of them, right? One in the absence of the object, and the other in the what? Presence of the object, huh? Okay. Now,

[45:12] why is there this other group of emotions which they call the irascible? Well, they arise because. Sometimes there is a difficulty, right, in regard to getting what is pleasant, right, or holding on to what is pleasant, right, or there's a difficulty in what, avoiding what is disagreeable, right, or in getting rid of what is disagreeable, right.

[45:47] So, from desire, there can arise when a good thing is desired but is difficult to get, right. Either there can arise hope, which is a movement to overcome the difficulties, right, Therefore, you estimate that you can overcome the difficulties, or else there arises what, despair, if you think you cannot what,

[46:21] overcome the difficulties, huh. Now, in the case of aversion, if you aren't too sure you can overcome or avoid the evil that's threatening you, then you feel something called what? Fear. What's the name of that one? But? I think you know. You know, I can handle that guy. You know. Then you have a certain what? Boldness, right? Confidence.

[47:04] Okay. Sometimes confidence is equivocally used for hope too. Okay. So you have two emotions that can arise from desire when the good desired is what? Difficult, right? To obtain, but either hope or despair, upon whether you estimate you can overcome the difficulties or not, right? And two, they arise from aversion for something bad that's difficult, right? Now if the candy's there in front of me, right? Well, then I don't have difficulty reaching for and taking some, right?

[47:44] Okay. But the man is pursuing the young lady. He's not sure she's going to say yes. He's in hope, right? Or else maybe he's in what? Despair of getting that, right?

[47:58] Like the one with sour grapes, right? The fox desired the grapes, but they were high. He tried and he tried, he couldn't get them, right? So eventually he what? Despair, right? Okay.

[48:15] Now there's something like that, you see, in the act of the will, because the will loves something that reason presents to it as good, right? But if it doesn't have that good, then it desires it, right? Like you might learn what wisdom is, and you start to love what wisdom is, but you don't have wisdom, so you desire wisdom, right? But if that's something difficult to acquire, wisdom, then you need something in addition to the desire for wisdom.

[48:52] You need the hope of achieving it, right? But if you get discouraged, you might start to what? Discourages itself a kind of despair, right? And you grow into into despair, right? So in that great dialogue, the Phaedo, they want to know whether the human soul is immortal or not. But. At one point, they become what? Discouraged, huh? And Socrates has to lead them back to hope before they can continue the discussion, huh?

[49:24] Okay. And today I was seeing something the other day there. They're talking about English gardens, right? A lot of interesting gardens in England. One of these gardens has what they call mazes. Nice mazes, you know, like those little things you do with your pencil, you know. And but it said that the monastery started the idea of the mazes. Have you heard that before? No. Apparently, the the purpose of the maze in the monastery was to give the monks what?

[50:00] Two things: patience and perseverance, right? So you get down that that thing and you're trying to find your way through it. And you got to learn your patience, right? Because it takes a long time. Must have been very involved, huh? And then and persistence, right? Those qualities, huh? So you need that, right?

[50:29] But then after he gets them, you know, he starts their hope and so on, and then they start to have some initial successes and they get kind of bold. And then Socrates said, Whoa, whoa, whoa! That could be so easy to answer. See this? That was Simmias right? He knocks Simmias down, bang, bang, three strikes, he's out. Whoa. Okay. And so you got to just start having balance between hope and fear.

[50:58] Now, if you're sad, right, or in pain, right, but you think you can what? Overcome the thing that is causing you sadness or pain, right? Then there could arise another emotion. Anger, right? So you're stepping on my foot, right? I say, Hey, you're stepping on my foot. You say, So what? Well, then I get what? Anger, right? Huh? Okay. I think I can, you know, shut you off, right?

[51:38] Okay. So there are what? Basically, 11 emotions. Love and hate, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. These six emotions are called the concupiscible emotions. In Greek they put them under epithumia. And then you have five emotions called what? The irascible emotions, named from this one here, which is so manifest, huh? Okay. Two that arise or can arise from desire, right? When the good desired is difficult, right?

[52:15] Two that can arise from aversion when the evil or bad that you're trying to avoid is somewhat difficult to avoid, huh? And one that arises from sadness, when you think you can overcome possibly what's causing this, but there's no one corresponding anger with joy because joy or pleasure, there is no difficulty in that at all. So in a sense, the irascible emotions there are to help what get the concupiscible objects.

[52:50] Says Aristotle says that the animals they get what they fight over food and sex. He says right, okay, it means sometimes too, right? Okay, they fight over the girl, right? Okay, um, but you know they fear what's going to hurt their body, right? So, yeah. Now, when you study the the virtues and ethics, huh? You'll find out that there are certain virtues that are concerned with certain emotions, huh?

[53:30] So temperance, let's say, or moderation is concerned with these kind of emotions here, with hunger and thirst and sexual desire and so on. And mildness is concerned with this emotion here, and courage with these emotions down here, magnanimity with this here, okay? So different things. Now, as I say,

[54:05] each of these emotions has a formal aspect, a logos, as Aristotle would say, right? Um, but also if it's an emotion, there's a bodily aspect to it, huh? Okay, so hunger and thirst and sexual desire and anger and fear, there's something bodily going on that's involved in this emotion. But there's a formal aspect, what the object is, whether it's good or bad, whether you have it or don't have it, and so on, whether it's difficult or not.

[54:42] So the names of these can be carried over to the will as far as the what formal aspect is concerned, but not the what bodily aspect, huh? And finally, some of these names can be carried over. As we said, even to God, Thomas shows at the end of his first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, but he'll say you can't have um,

[55:13] uh, even bad in God, right? So none of these emotions here, none of these names can be carried over to God, even as far as their formal aspect is concerned.

[55:26] Because nothing can really what harm God, right? Okay, can't undergo anything bad. It's divine nature, all right. Okay, when God became man, then he could have emotions, right? Have fear and anger and so on. Okay, but as God, he couldn't have these. Now, as far as the good is concerned, right? Well,

[55:52] there can be love in God, enjoy in God, but no desire because desire is for a good you don't have. And so, likewise, it couldn't be really hope or despair of God that presupposes desire. But you can love something whether you have it or don't have it, and you love it more when you have it if it's good than you did before. So love and joy can be said properly in God, but as far as a formal aspect is concerned, not as far as the bodily aspect of them. But these ones that concern the bad cannot be said of God at all.

[56:32] So none of these. But sometimes metaphorically, one of these can be said of God, Like this is a metaphor for the divine justice, right? We're in Psalm ninety-four. These doings is at the beginning of the office of the day, right? I swore my anger, right? Meaning it's justice, right? They will not enter into my rest and so on. But things like despair and fear, nowhere is said of God, even metaphorically.

[57:02] It's not really like despair. Do you know