De Anima (On the Soul)
8. Concupiscible and Irascible Emotions, Human Pleasures, and Natural Philosophy's Definition of Anger
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/008-concupiscible-and-irascible-emotions-human-pleasures-and/

[0:00] any other way of saying in English the two groups, concupiscible and irascible what do you say the desiring and the angering, or? Well, sometimes I use the term sense desire for that first one. You know, see, when they name it in Greek, epithumia and they name it in Latin, the concupiscentia right So concupiscentia really means sense desire, right? And

[0:28] we're more aware of that, right? You're very much aware of your hunger and your thirst, right? And that's why it's named for what stands out. And desire is more like emotion than joy, that's, right? Remember how I was explaining the other day there and was talking about the metaphor sweet.

[0:57] Well, part of the metaphor there was that the sweet is what pleasant, right? But also the idea it's being restful. So when you enjoy something, you're kind of your soul is at rest. But desire, your soul is in kind of what pursuit of something, right? So emotion is what's most known to us. And so desire is more known to us, huh?

[1:24] But also the fact that that you don't have what you want, right, makes it kind of vivid to us. So sometimes I call this sense desire, right? But again, you're naming in a sense the whole from the part, right? Because this is not desire, desire, right? But but it's tied up with what's agreeable or disagreeable to the senses, huh? So you see in Latin, you see the word appetitus, right?

[1:54] You know, to use, you know, for the will and for you know the senses and so on. I mean for the emotions, but appetitus we use for the word appetite. It's really from desire, right? You still naming it from that, huh?

[2:13] I was talking about Shakespeare's definition of reason. I made that comparison. Then the way to define reason by discourse, by the act of reason that is like emotion, is like you know naming the what, desiring power by desire. See

[2:38] the ability or the power to feel these emotions. Any of them. They speak of them in Latin as the appetitive powers, right? The desiring powers, huh? Even though desire is just speaking the name of one of them, right? Okay, but it's because that stands out in some way, right? And so, likewise, as Shakespeare says, things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs, huh? And so that's true in a way.

[3:09] Even reason itself, right? Reason in motion is more known to us. It stands out more than reason at, what Rest, reason, understanding. Watch your attention? now move around, right? Okay, and so the acts here that are more like motion grab our attention, huh? Anger, right? Very volatile thing.

[3:40] That means your motion, right? Stands out, huh? Is it is it possible thinking of the soul separated from the body? Is it possible in this life then

[3:56] for us even to have any concept of what a what the soul would experience these formal aspects of what we sense of joy and fear and all kinds of things? The soul has these too, but in a different aspect. You're saying the will, yeah. What's the will? In a non-bodily way, yeah. But we can't. It seems to me then, from what you're saying, we we can't even conceive of how what the what that would be like.

[4:30] We can only conceive of what what we are now. We we can't even imagine what the soul would would feel like. We see. We can we can understand the the formal aspect of the emotions, right? I know it is a word. I can understand it, but I'm not sure that I. Yeah, but we can understand you know something about what fear, anger is in a formal way, huh?

[4:54] I I don't know how. See, you know, when they define anger, say as as the desire for revenge, right? Yes. Okay, that doesn't First of all, I'll call that dialectical definition, right? Because it's not in terms of the bodily change going on, right? And he says, really, to be a natural philosophy, a natural science, you got to bring in the body, huh? The matter, right? But we understand something of the bodily changes going on the emotions, and you can study the anatomy Okay.

[5:30] He doesn't have the dynamic because he's considering the soul kind of in a somewhat separation there. But as he goes on, you can talk about the bodily changes, and those who study emotions bodily, right? They can talk about the actions in the body going on. Um, but we also understand the formal aspect, this desire for revenge, and so when he carried the word over to the acts of the will, we drop out one part, right?

[6:01] The bodily part, and just keep the formal aspect. But we understand that even the emotions, huh? When I when I think of what sadness is or joy, even as an emotion, I'm not thinking just of the bodily change that I undergo, right? When I'm joyful or sad,

[6:21] but it's in the possession of something good, right? Or in the something bad has been forced upon you, right? They can't avoid. I still think of it in the in a book. But it's only l it's only less known, yeah. I remember as a child sitting in church, you know, and the priest is talking about the love of God, and of course, I heard the word love.

[6:44] I'm thinking of girls or something, right? And the love of God is not really an emotion, see. And I think, what does that really mean? I mean, that's kind of a proto-philosopher, philosopher there, right? See, because somehow I knew that that the love of God was not exactly this thing I felt for girls, right? And it's funny when I was in college there. Used to drive this one philosophy professor kind of crazy, you know, a little Polish Polish philosopher, and

[7:22] he was into symbolic logic and so on, and I was always using the syllogism, right? One day in class, he was frustrated with me. He says, "Berquist, " he says, "Do you have an emotional attachment to the syllogism? " I just laughed and said, "I I can have an emotional attachment for a girl, but I certainly couldn't have an emotional attachment to a syllogism. " But no, it's my will was attached to the what syllogism, right?

[7:48] Because I understand that in the syllogism, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, right? So my reason is impressed with the goodness of an argument where the conclusion, in fact, does follow necessarily from the premises, and so I love that kind of an argument in terms of the criterion Aristotle gave in the first part there. In terms of its certitude, right? Yes. You see, but that's a love that's in my will, so I don't have an emotional attachment to the syllogism, right?

[8:19] But I have a a rational. You see, this man must must have had an emotional affinity to the syllogism. Does Does that mean that when we love God in the will, or if when when the soul leaves the body and and we're in the presence of God, that our sense of the love of God is different completely than the sense that we have today in the body?

[8:44] Do you think that it's totally different then? Well, you're getting much more aware of what it is, yeah. Yeah. But even in this life, we see, huh? I know that my love of wisdom, my my love of the syllogism, as a tool, right, is much different from my my love of candy or something like that, huh? Ah. You see. But you see, when you get to what we call the the fine arts, the fine arts are kind of in between.

[9:20] Yes. I think Osterly, you know, spoke it very well in his essay there towards an evaluation of music. He's talking about how the the pleasures and so on of the fine arts are not the highest thing for man. It's not as high as, say, philosophy or theology or something like that. But he says that the works of the fine arts are what are most pleasingly proportioned to man.

[9:50] So when I talk sometimes about John Stuart Mill, right? John Stuart Mill has got a kind of defective understanding of ethics. He's an utilitarian, right? And pleasure is kind of the criterion, right? Greatest pleasure or the greater number or something like that. And but Mill's kind of a a more reasonable defender of this position. And he says sometimes we utilitarians, he says, we're attacked because our philosophy is fit for the beasts.

[10:27] You know, and of course he tries to turn the table on those who attack them, saying that you are the beasts, right? We're making this objection if you think that man has no pleasures other than what the beast has. Okay. So there are some pleasures that the beast has that we share with the beast, like the pleasures of eating and drinking and sleeping and so on, right?

[10:53] Other pleasures that man has that the beast doesn't have, right? And he says that the man who's tasted both pleasures, right? Really. The man who's tasted the higher pleasures, the pleasures that man alone has, prefers those, right? It's only the man who who's never tasted the higher pleasures, right, that thinks the pleasures of eating and drinking and sex and so on are the greatest pleasures, huh? Okay.

[11:23] But I think that distinction you can improve upon it, right? And say that there are three pleasures. There are the pleasures that man shares with the other animals.

[11:39] Pleasures of eating and drinking, sleeping and so on, sexual pleasure. There are the pleasures that man shares with the angels, and with God. which is the pleasures of what understanding. And then there are the pleasures that are human,

[11:59] in the sense that man alone really has them, right? And those are the pleasures of of listening to Mozart, are looking at Titian or Raphael or Da Vinci or somebody, right? Or reading, you know, Shakespeare's plays and working your imagination, so on. Now, Austenly's way of speaking, though, was very interesting. I think he said the pleasures of the fine arts are too high for the animals and too low for the angels.

[12:30] See. So sometimes I call them the animal pleasures, the angelic pleasures, and then the human pleasures in the more narrow sense of human, right? The only man has, right? And the human pleasures are better than the animal pleasures, and the angelic pleasures are greater than the human pleasures. But if you compare those, you can say man has the pleasures that the pleasures that man shares with the animals.

[13:03] Man has those in a higher way. So with haute cuisine, you know, and wine and all this sort of stuff, we have the pleasures of eating that the animals have, but in a more refined way, in a more interesting way, right? Okay. But at the other end, the pleasures of understanding, we have them imperfectly, because we very imperfectly understand compared to the angels or God. See, but the pleasures in the middle are, as Austenly says, the ones most pleasingly proportioned to man, because we're not just an animal; we're not just reason; we're an animal with reason, and therefore these are most proportioned to us.

[13:45] And what's interesting about that, and kind of a sign of that too, is that one can pursue those intermediary pleasures longer than either the other ones. So when you eat or drink, there's what I say a diminishing return there, right? My brother Mark says, you know, the first glass of beer tastes much better than the second glass. In fact, he says the first sip tastes better than the rest.

[14:11] You know, so you're drinking more but enjoying less, right? See. While in the case of understanding, you know, it's such so difficult for us to understand we get kind of tired after a while, and so we, you know, while we can sit down maybe and read a novel for two or three hours, longer, see an opera, you know, hear a Mozart opera for two or three hours, right?

[14:33] Or spend two or three hours looking at the paintings in the museum, right? You see, and it's kind of more proportioned to us, right? So really, proper education is to lead people away from this excess of the animal pleasures

[14:54] through the human pleasures, right? You know, to the the higher pleasures, right? I used to joke, you know, about having a room set up, right? And you come into the first room, and they serve dinner there, right? And but you have, you know. Manners you have to have at the dinner table, right? And there's wine served, but you've got to drink in moderation and appreciate the wine and so on, right?

[15:22] And there's a door at the other side of the room there, but it's closed. And after people have learned to eat and enjoy the table the way they should, all of a sudden after dinner that room is open. You walk in there and there's some beautiful paintings and some Mozart music playing and so on, right? You know. Another door beyond that, right? Closed. And there, there's got nice editions of Shakespeare, right?

[15:52] And Homer and Sophocles and so on, right? And then there's another door beyond that that's closed, right? And inside there, there's what Euclid and so on, huh? Then after philosophy, eventually, right, and wisdom, and finally what theology, right? You know, see. But I mean, you have to kind of be led, you know, up through the intermediary ones, huh? So it's hard for you know a human being to go from animal pleasures to the pleasures of understanding, right?

[16:24] Without going through the intermediary ones. One could stop at the intermediary ones, right? As if they were the highest thing. So I know people who have some appreciation of good music and appreciation of good literature that don't philosophize or pursue theology, right? But I've never met a good philosopher or good theologian who didn't have a good appreciation of good music. It wouldn't make any sense to listen to rock and roll and be a theologist.

[16:54] It wouldn't make any sense at all. Have to be crazy, you know. You know. Yeah. Could you offer any comments or maybe you want to digress or anything? Just regarding, it seems that the past few centuries, anyway, this order you've just been discussing in education is either disregarded or simply lacking. Yeah. Do you think it seems to be wreaking havoc? Can something like this be restored without a miracle from God?

[17:30] Or do you think just your thoughts on this whole modern educational system that we're discussing? Well, as I said, there's some schools like like the Trivium school you take out for high school, you know. You see. But seems to be a loss.

[17:48] I mean, that's the that's why it's so important this this homeschooling now, you know, because there you can they read good literature these kids, you know, and then they hear good music and they maybe go to the museum and so on, right?

[18:15] Father Boulay, you know, made a nice collection from the ancients on the importance of music, and Thomas there in his commentary Matthew, I think I pointed that out, you know,

[18:33] I propose that part of the scripture there where you know we played this and you didn't do this, and so on, and Thomas says nothing so changes the soul of man than music.

[18:50] This is quite a commentary too, one on perhaps on some of the problems of the church. She seems not to be aware in the modern age of leading people through beauty and these things we're talking about to the higher thoughts of God. She expects. She kind of stopped a dead end, and we we're introduced to ugly churches and ugly liturgy and so forth, and therefore we lose the sense of God.

[19:20] Sure, sure. Now, I mean, some of the music they play in church, you know, is just mediocre, and some of it is plainly scandalous, you know. A. Friend of mine was in church, and during communion time, they're playing Blue Moon. You know, it's something to dance to in the dance hall. So that was, you know. And he turns to me and says, "Would like to dance?" He says.

[19:41] She got offended. She says, "It's church, you know. It's so ridiculous." And it was very hard. I mean, you know, people trying to educate people, guide through Gregorian chant, you know, and

[19:59] it's an uphill battle, you know. Things are so corrupt. Have you read the closing of the American mind? I imagine you have. Yeah. Do you think that's true. Well, yeah, I mean, it's something you want to, you know, modify a bit, but there's no question about the fact that education is in bad state, you know. You talk about angelic pleasures. You mentioned understanding. Is there something too with the will?

[20:33] Well, that too, yeah. Yeah. Socrates, in the Symposium, he talks about this kind of a ascent, you know, from you know the love of beautiful bodies, right, to the love of the beautiful souls, and all the way up, you know, to the beautiful itself, right. But you know, Augustine kind of begins that, doesn't he? The Confessions, huh? Too late have, I come to know the the ancient beauty, huh?

[21:07] The father, I mean, the popes, and they talk sometimes about the beautiful and the liturgy and so on, right? And how it's leading up to God, right?

[21:18] One priest he was talking about. I think it was one of the saints who wouldn't ever look at anything beautiful, sunset or something. And he said that that's not necessarily very good for everyone to do that because you need that. So he said, you know, that some of the saints can do that because they're maybe already up in the other ones, but that might be bad for you.

[21:50] He said, you know, you might need to see these beautiful things. Yep. So the the Greek word thumos, how would you put that more in English besides irascible, as far as covering all? Well, thumos, you know, like it means anger or or boldness, right? No, it's not really correct when they translate now a lot of times in the Greek text they're spirited, you know, but there's some aspect of that.

[22:39] See, in a way, the irascible is more closer to reason in a way than thumos and and there's kind of a quid pro quo there, right? And it's kind of interesting here if you compare, say, anger with, let's say, lust. You know, anger in an excessive sense of lust. Anger is said to hear reason, but what? Imperfectly. I'm going to punish you because you did this, right?

[23:11] Now, if I'm angry, I may punish you more than I should or hurt you more than I should, right? But in sense, I'm doing this because of that, right? So there's some aspect of reason there, right? And in general, the irascible ones, right, are for the sake of something else, right? So when one fights, one is not going to be doing something that's maybe pleasant. when the animal fights right?

[23:35] But it's for the sake of something else, right? It's almost like thinking, and that's why Plato, when he has the three parts of the soul, there he has one corresponding to reason, that's the highest, and then thumos, second, and then epithymia, the last, right? Then the Republic he compares it to three parts of the city, right? You have the ruling class, which is reason, and then the soldiers, right?

[24:01] Which are thumos, and then the common people, which are down in epithymia. So the irascible, in some senses, closer to reason it seems, huh?

[24:18] So it's interesting that anger can be applied to God metaphorically, right? Yes. See, well, you wouldn't speak of hunger or thirst metaphorically of God, huh?

[24:32] Though you speak metaphorically of our soul, you know. Oh God, you are my God, whom I seek, you my flesh pines and my soul thirsts, right? It says in the psalm, right? So

[24:45] they're using the word thirst metaphorically, right? But it's appropriate because there's a desire for God, right? Which can be called metaphorically thirst. huh? I was thinking of that psalm the other day after I came back talking to you people last time, because we talked about the deception there, right? And our Lord is saying that the Sadducees are what? planomenoi, right? You err, you wander, right? He gives us the reason why.

[25:21] Deity says here in the Greek, because you are ignorant, right, of the power of God and the Scriptures, right? Well, it's interesting that emphasis upon the power of God, right? Because when the first Vatican Council talks about the motives of credibility they are proportioned, to, everybody it speaks of two, and one is the miracles, right, and the other is the fulfillment of prophecies. But the miracles in a sense, point to the what?

[26:01] Power of God. Power of God, right? Now, of the miracles that say that our Lord worked on this earth, which are the greatest miracles? Is it curing the blind men, giving sight to the blind men, or is it raising Lazarus and those other ones he raised from the dead?

[26:24] The raising, raising. Yeah. You know, when you read about Lazarus being raised from the dead, there, this was leading to many conversions, right? And in fact, the gospel says too that they were thinking of putting Lazarus to death, poor guy, because he was an occasion for people, you know, being converted, right? Now, come back to that psalm. Now I got to think about the psalm again. It says, "O God, you are my God, whom I seek.

[27:01] For you, my flesh pines, and my soul thirsts, like the earth parched; life is not water. " Let's have a gaze towards you in the sanctuary to see your power and your what? Glory, right? Now, usually when I say we see those two words, "to see your power and your glory, " you are thinking, you know, of the kingdom of God, right? So, what do we say in the mass sometimes for thine is the

[27:32] what? They say. Yeah, so you think you know? Were you looking to the kingdom of God, right? But maybe you could also understand it in this way. My flesh pines, the Lord. One is seeking what? Resurrection. Resurrection eventually, right? And my soul thirsts, right? And you just come back to it, it's power and glory.

[28:02] Power has in connection with the resurrection, right? And that's pointed out in Christ's criticism of the Sadducees. They deny the resurrection, right? Because he says you're ignorant of the power of God, right? Yeah. So I'm looking for the power of God in the resurrection of my body, huh? You know, by glory, I'm looking for what? The vision of God, huh? It's like Thomas at the end of the Adoro te devote he says, "Jesus."

[28:39] He says, "Visu," right? To a glory, right? He may become blessed in the sight of God's glory. So you can kind of adapt power and glory there. One to the to the body, and the other two what? The soul, seeking the vision of God, huh? Kind of interesting, huh? This kind of struck me that I never hadn't thought about that before so much because I've been thinking about that text, you know, we looked at in Gospel about the Sadducees, huh?

[29:08] Interesting. You know the thing we another kind of aside here but application that thing about the order of these things, huh? That we saw before, where you have to know the object before the act, huh? And the act before the power. Well, you have a similar principle in ethics, and also when you study the theological virtues. Since which is more known to us, the theological virtues, or the acts of the theological virtues?

[29:47] In other words, don't you have to understand to love or to believe, the act before you can understand the what? What the virtues are, right? But maybe in order to understand the acts, you have to understand their what? Object, right? Now, when Thomas begins the the treatment of the faith there in the Secunda Secundae, he talks about its object being what? The prima veritas, the first truth, huh?

[30:24] You kind of see that in the in the Adoro te devote too. Credo quidquid dixit Dei filius? I believe whatever the Son of God says. Then he gives the reason. Nil hoc verbo veritatis verius, huh? Nothing is more true than this word of truth itself, huh? In the three theological virtues, the object in each case is God, but in a somewhat different way, right? So God is the object of faith in a way as he is the first truth.

[30:58] But God is the object of of love of of charity, in so far as he's what? Good. Yeah, yeah, he's the good itself, goodness itself. When you come to to hope, what is that?

[31:17] What way is God the object of hope? Our help. Yeah, I mean sometimes we we think of the power of God, right? We we think of his loving us, right? But also it seems to me more very prominently is the idea of what? His mercy. Right. Which kind of presupposes that he has what? He loves us, right? And and he has the power to what? Remove our wretchedness and so on, right?

[31:48] Okay. So the mercy of God, in some ways, is very much the object of of hope, huh? I've seen that little thing that the Capuchins there sent sent in the mail there. I guess they're going to canonize Padre Pio this this weekend, yeah. Thursday. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And of course, the Capuchin, the Franciscan Capuchins, are there. They're saying that there's more people visiting Padre Pio's tomb now than go to Lourdes and and Fatima.

[32:27] I don't know, but anyway, anyway, it's kind of thing, huh? But anyway, they had a little, you know, passage from him. You know, I think it was very good. He's talking about prayer, right? And you know, he says worry is useless. You know, don't worry, just pray, okay? But

[32:51] those three words are kind of key if you read the text: hope and pray. Of course, Augustine and Thomas always tap hope and praying, right? And then the mercy of God, right? You know, you're saying like prayer is the key to God's heart. You know, but there you see the connection: hope and praying, and what the mercy of God, huh?

[33:16] You know, what's the old saying in Scripture there? Bis orat qui cantat. You heard that? He prays twice. Sings right. Well, now which which two prayers in the Mass are sung? I've

[33:39] talked to you about the symmetry of the Mass. The five things are set to music. You know, A B C B A. Yeah. And the Kyrie and the Agnus Dei, right? See? the Gloria and the Sanctus are more what praise, right? And the Credo is not a prayer read at all, but it's a confession of faith, right? But the two prayers are what the Kyrie, Eleison and Agnus Dei, right?

[34:13] But the both are using what mercy, right? To make it perfectly clear, one uses the Greek word Eleison, and, the other uses what Latin word, miserere. But they're both asking for the divine mercy, right? So bis orat

[34:32] qui cantat, qui cantat. These are the two principal things that we sing. You know, and they both have the same thing that Padipio has now. The thing that the caption sent me: the idea of mercy, right? You know.

[34:49] So notice the theological virtues have God as an object, right? But this three different theological virtues, God has to be an object in a somewhat different way. Otherwise, there'd be no distinction, right?

[35:04] So God is the first truth, is in a way the object of faith, and God is goodness itself, is the object of love, and God, um, is mercy especially, not only, but

[35:28] it's it's curious in the Summa there when Thomas takes up the theological virtues at one time, and and the object of them, he puts faith and hope together, in contrast to charity, huh? A lot of times we we put hope and charity together because they're both in the will, right? Faith is in the reason, right? But he's just touching the object there. He puts faith and hope together, in contrast to charity.

[36:10] Well, in a sense, he's saying that in the case of charity, you're adhering to God as such, right? In the case of hope and faith, you're adhering to God as what the teacher of truth, right? As the truth you're going to get from him, so to speak, and as what is going to what bestow these goods upon you, like eternal life and so on, right?

[36:44] So in both cases, adhering to God is the one to whom we're going to get something. In charity, you're adhering to God, not as one to whom we can get something, but just as God, because of the perfection of charity there, right? It's kind of interesting that that he puts faith and hope together, and the distinction against charity in that particular text, you know. He does like St.

[37:10] Paul in a sense. Paul does the same thing, doesn't he? When he talks about faith, hope, and charity, he says faith and hope will end. Yeah. Yeah. Forever. Yeah. Yeah.

[37:25] Yeah. Does St. Thomas make that consideration in one particular place, or is it spread out in more particular? Well, he talks about the object there a number of places, but in

[37:41] each article, he talks about each of the virtues in particular. He also talks about them in general, you know. So you find him saying many times talking about this, but I just had to look at one text right there this morning, and he was making that contrast kind of interesting. Yeah.

[38:02] But you do that in philosophy a lot. If you have three things, right? You see, the family is divided into what? Parents, children. Yeah, because you can say the father, the mother, and the children, right? Okay. That's into three. If you divide into two, where'd you put them? Father and mother. You put the father and mother together against the children, right? The parents and the children, right?

[38:30] But if you think of the father as head of the family, and you put the mother and the children together, he's the head and they're the ruled, right? Okay. You don't rule the children, mother, the same way as you rule the children, but you know. So I mean, it's possible to to do it in both ways, right? Or just like when you divide word, right? Set of many things.

[38:53] Thomas Thomas divides divides it right away into three. Word set of many things with exactly the same meaning in the mind in each case, with entirely different meanings, and then partly the same and partly different. Okay. But now, if you want to divide These into two versus one. One most common way is to say, names said equivocally of many things, and names said univocally of many things.

[39:22] And then you subdivide names said equivocally of many things into the purely equivocal or equivocal by chance, and the analogous, right? But couldn't you put the analogous word together with the univocal word and say, names said of many things by reason, and then the names said of many things by chance, right? You could divide that way, right? You don't see it very often, but you could, right?

[39:49] It would bring out something, right, that these two are said, right? You know, words said of many things, and you have a reason to say of these many things. Why am I running into somebody in life who's got the name Duane and Why the two of us had the same name? You know, he's not a philosopher, I'm not whatever he is, right? We're not related, right? Just happen to have the same name, right?

[40:22] You know. Okay. Now, in the eleventh paragraph, after he's pointed out in the tenth paragraph that these emotions seem clearly to involve something bodily, right? Give me a couple of signs of that. And because of these things, he says, right away the consideration of the soul, either of all or of those of this sort, pertains to the student of nature, because natural philosophy is about things that involve what matter, right?

[41:08] Okay, and defined with matter, right? So now he goes on to explain it more fully. The student of nature, the dialectician, would define each of these, for example, what anger is, differently. For the one, like the dialectician, would define it as an appetite or desire for vexing in return, right? Desire to punish, huh, or something like this. While the other would define it as a seeding of the blood and heat around the heart, in terms of the bodily aspect of it, right?

[41:45] Of these, the one, the second one there, gives the matter, right? The other, the species, and the what it is, huh? Logos. For the account is the species of the thing, but if it will be, it is necessary that it be in this sort of matter, just as the account of a house is of this sort, that it is a shelter preventing destruction by wind and rain and heat.

[42:12] While the one will say it as stones and bricks and lumber, right? Two different definitions, right? The other will say it as a species and these for the sake of this. Which of these belongs to the student of nature? Is it the one about the matter but again? ignoring the logos that is probably their account, or the one about the logos alone, or rather the one made from both?

[42:38] But then, who is each of the others? Well, the one that gives just the form he considered what, the dialectician does that, dialectician right, defines without matter. The one that gives just the matter would belong to the natural philosopher, right? Because it uses matter. The one that uses both would also belong to the natural philosopher and be more perfect.

[43:07] Is it the one about the matter but ignoring the logos, or the one about the logos alone, or rather the one made from both?

[43:19] Or is there not someone who considers the inseparable passions of matter not inseparable? That's the natural philosopher, right? Considered material things and he brings matter into the definition. But the student of nature considers every body of this sort and the works and passions of the sort. But another treats whatever is not such and about some, the artist if it should chance or the carpenter, the doctor, he would deal with what, the matter only in so far as it pertains to the art to do so.

[43:53] But the mathematician treats the things that are not separated from matter, but he doesn't consider them as passions of the body, and by abstraction he considers them. But the first philosopher treats these things, in so far as they are separate.

[44:14] But one must return once the argument was derived. He said then that the passions of the soul are in some way inseparable from the natural matter of animals, just as courage and fear exist as such things, and not as line and surface, right? Which the mathematician considers in separation.

[44:34] So, notice, it's going to belong to the natural philosophy to consider the soul in so far as the soul is what, in matter, right? And if the soul was an immaterial substance, that had to do with matter, it would in no way pertain to natural philosophy.

[44:54] And so, in the third book, when you arrive at the proof of the immortality of human soul, then you are at the what? That's the border, right? Just like if you go north there, you come to the border of Canada, and that border, that line there that divides Canada and that states. Is the end of the United States and the beginning of what Canada, right? So just like when you arrive at the immateriality, of the immovable, right?

[45:26] You're at the what Mexican frontier, right, of the United States. So when you arrive at the immortality of the soul, you're at the Canadian border of the United States, right? So you know there's a science metaphysica after the consideration of what natural things are concerned, huh? So

[45:51] the way the soul understands the separation from the body, that really belongs to metaphysica right? Okay. When the De Anima we're concerned with how the soul understands when it's in the body, huh?

[46:11] Okay. But therefore it's the area, when you talk about the motions of the senses that involve an activity in the body, right? This pertains to what natural philosophy. Okay.

[46:30] So.