De Anima (On the Soul)
9. De Anima, Book Two: Defining the Soul by Division as Substantial Form and First Act
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[0:00] Let's start to look here a little bit at the second book now. Let what was handed down about the soul by our predecessors have been said. That's what he spends the rest of Book One in doing.

[0:24] Let us begin again, as if from the beginning, trying to determine what the soul is and what would be the most common account or definition of it.

[0:36] Now, how is Aristotle going to go about investigating the definition of the soul here? Well, in the book called the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle speaks of two ways of investigating a definition,

[0:59] and one way is to take many examples of the same thing, right, and compare those examples, right, and separate out what they have in common, right,

[1:15] and leave aside the differences. That's one way of doing it. So, if we thought that the fireman that ran in the building with the building collapsing and rescued the little baby there in the building, right, we honor him for being courageous, right,

[1:39] and then when the man was attacked down the water by a shark and the girl swam out and dragged him in, baptized him on the shore, was courageous, right, and then the soldier advancing across the field with the machine gun shooting at him, right, is courageous, right. See, what do these three have in common? The fireman running into the burning building and rescuing the baby in there, the girl swimming out into the shark-infested water and dragging this man in.

[2:12] This actually happened one time, and the soldier advancing across the machine gun fire, right? They all have sharks, you know? No. They all have bullets. No. They all have building on fire and collapsing, right? What does the fire and the bullet and the shark have in common? Yeah, they're all life-threatening, right? Huh? They're fearful things, right? Things that could end your bodily life.

[2:49] What did these three persons do? Did they foolishly approach fire and shark and bullet for no good reason for the fun of it, huh? Or did they have very good reason, right? Well, the one advanced to save the man's life, or to save his soul, right? And the fireman went there to save the baby, right? And the soldier went forward to defend his country, right? So they all reasonably, right, and for good reason, right, went to something that what is fearful, huh?

[3:28] Because it can threaten death to your body. So I'm separating out what they have in common, right? Leaving aside their what differences, right? Now, what's the other way to investigate what something is?

[3:47] Yeah, yeah. And so, if I'm going to define, let's say, the square, I might say, well, what is the square, right? Well, say figure of some sort, right? Is it a plane figure or is it a solid figure? It's on a flat surface or is it a three-dimensional figure? Plane figure, right? Is it one contained by a circular line or by straight lines? Straight lines and by three or by four or by you know.

[4:25] And so, by a number of divisions, I might eventually arrive at what the square is, right? And maybe I'd have to, when I got down to let's say quadrilateral, I might have to divide in a couple ways to arrive at square, right?

[4:43] Because are the four sides equal or unequal, right? But if they're equal, that still wouldn't give you what the square is, is it? Because else the square is an equilateral quadrilateral. Well, yes, every square is an equilateral quadrilateral, but is the reverse true?

[5:06] There's something called the what? Rhombus. Okay. So the rhombus is an equilateral quadrilateral. The five ones that Euclid has, right? They're all four-sided. They're all quadrilaterals. But some are what equilateral, and some are what not right.

[5:50] That division would not be enough to arrive at the definition of square, would it? I've got to take into account the angles, huh? Some are right-angled, and some are what not right. If I put those two together, I say the square is a what equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. Now I have what speech that is convertible with square equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, right? Okay. So those are the two ways that Aristotle talks about explicitity in the second book of the Posterior Analytics.

[6:32] Because definition is the beginning of demonstration. This is the book about demonstration. So he has to talk about how we arrive at a definition, right? And he contrasts these two ways.

[6:46] Now, which of these two ways do you think he's going to investigate the soul by? Division. Because unlike the square, you know, I mean, if I could investigate the square by by this two, I mean, you might, you know, a little kid might recognize that to be a square and this to be a square, and this is not a square, and so on, right? So what do these two have in common, right?

[7:14] You can start to single out well, they both have four sides, and you can recognize if they have, you know, this kind of an angle, and maybe the equality, and so on. You can eventually separate out all that these two have in common, right? Okay. Leaving aside the differences that one is white and one is green or something, right? Okay. But can you take a bunch of souls like that and kind of lay them out there?

[7:40] No, the soul is not that accessible, right? So you need more to investigate it by what? Division. Yeah. You know. Think in theology, we we proceed more by induction or by syllogism. What do you think in theology?

[8:04] Syllogism. Yeah. Articles. There's only one God, right? What's induction going to be? But now he's going to do something different than what we did up here, though, right? Because

[8:27] is the soul going to be defined? You think as something by itself, or as something of another? Something other than that. Yeah. And if the soul is something of another,

[9:02] we might want to divide to distinguish that other from other things, right? And we might want to divide in order to know what this something is, right? Okay.

[9:18] Just like you might say in regard to the definition of what time, right? Time is something of another, right? So Aristotle is going to give. Actually, you could enumerate six divisions here, right? But he's going to give three divisions to separate that of which it is something, right, from other things, right? He's going to give three divisions to get at what it is of this other, right?

[9:55] Okay. And we didn't go through the whole book one there in the the dialectic, but what makes us think at first that the soul is something of another is going to be defined as something of another rather than as something by itself.

[10:55] We can see the operation of the soul first through the body. Okay. Okay. Now, is the soul and the body the same thing? No. Okay.

[11:13] Now, why we think the soul is something of the body, because of the operations, right? That most of the operations, right, of the soul seem to be in and through the body, right? Most of the operations of a living thing.

[11:34] And the other reason to think that the soul is something of the body. Now, obviously, those who think the soul is the the harmony of the body, right? The organization of the body, the order of the body, right? They think it's something of the body, right? Okay. Okay. Um.

[11:59] But now, is there some element of the truth in that thinking? That the soul is the harmony of the body. That the soul is the order of the body, the organization of the body. Instead, at death, the body falls apart. Yeah. Yeah. In other words, the body doesn't remain alive if the order, organization is lost, right? The soul goes right when the body is disorganized, huh? Okay.

[12:32] Now, let's go back to something more known to us. huh? Remember when Aristotle was. Investigating the definition of time, right? And how do you investigate the definition of time? What was the starting point for investigating the definition of time? I'm recalling this now because time, like the soul, is defined as something of another, right? What led Aristotle to think of the soul as being something of another, right?

[13:07] Little comparison here. Because we don't do not notice time without motion. Yeah. Okay. Now let's go back a little step before that, right? You say that in in the investigation of time,

[13:28] the beginning, right, was that there's a connection between time and motion. Okay. And some people speak of time as if it were a motion, right? Okay.

[13:58] So they speak of the flow of time, right? The passage of time, right? They speak of the time going fast, the time going slow, right? Okay.

[14:13] But Aristotle argued that time is not motion. If time went fast or slow, what does it mean to say that motion is fast or slow? We're going to have to have a time that doesn't go fast or slow to measure it, right? Okay. The faster the slowness. So he starts with the idea there's some connection between the two, but then Aristotle reasons that time is not motion, right?

[14:46] Okay. But it's not perceived without some motion. Time is not motion. Okay. But it's not perceived without time. Without motion. That kind of reaches the conclusion that time is something of motion without being motion itself.

[15:29] And then he starts to investigate. Well, what is time of motion, right? And then he actually got more precise as to it's being something of the before and after in motion, right? And then eventually he found out that it's the number of that before and after in motion.

[15:54] So three days or three hours is a number of the before and after in some motion. And eventually he he saw it as being the most regular motion that you can find, and so, okay. So I'm not trying to teach time here again, but make a little comparison there, right? That we are led gradually to see that time is tied up in some way with motion, but it's not motion, but it's something of motion, huh?

[16:25] Okay. Now the doctor talks about health, right? And does a doctor ever find health without examining some body? How's he ever find sickness without examining some body, huh? What do you think? No, no, no. So there's a connection between health and bodies, right? Or some bodies, anyway. Okay. Not stones. Or tables, right? But living bodies, right? Okay. But now is health a body? You think? Well,

[17:28] it's not perceived without examining the body, right? So it seems that health is something of a body, right? Now, if we wanted to define health, we'd have to say, well,

[17:43] it's something of a body, but but what kind of body? A living body or a non-living body? So you'd say maybe a living body, right? Huh? Maybe an animal more than a plant body. Maybe a plant body can be sick too. Okay, that used to be an animal, okay? But then you'd be dividing inside of that of which it is something, right? But now

[18:11] something, huh? Of the body, right? Okay. What would be the first division you might make? It's something of a body, something of a living body. You know, division derived that which it is something.

[18:32] Was it the size of a body or the quality of a body? Is it the shape of the body or the condition or disposition of the body?

[18:46] Yeah. Is it a good decision or a bad decision of the body? Right. You see. Well, see, I make a number of divisions there, right? You know, is it quantity or quality? Is it quality? Is it disposition or shape? Or what is it, right? Disposition? Is it a good one or a bad one? You might make three or four divisions there on the side of of health itself, right?

[19:10] And maybe one or two divisions on the side of that which it is. You say it's a natural body or an artificial body? Something of a natural body, not an artificial body. Of a living natural body or a non-living natural body, right? Okay. So you might have a number of divisions on the side of that of which it is something, right? And what it is, and a number of other divisions on the side of what it is of that something.

[19:44] Is that clear as mud or what? It's even clearer. Is it blank? So, if it's true that the soul is something of another, right? You might have to make a number of divisions to grasp what that other is, right? In fact, Aristotle is going to give three divisions, and then you might give a number of divisions on the side of what the soul itself is, right? Okay.

[20:21] So that's where he's going to begin. He's going to be he's going to actually three divisions on the side of the something, right? That it is, and three divisions on that of which it is something. Okay.

[20:49] Right. Just like if I was defining the point, the point is the limit of something, right? What's the limit of? Line. It's the limit of an argument. Limit of your patience. What's the limit of? Line. Or something continuous. The limit of, right?

[21:19] Is it the limit of something continuous in one or two or three dimensions? It's the limit of a of a line, right? Okay. It's something of a line, right? Is it a part of a line? No, it's a limit of a line, right? End of a line, right?

[21:47] So see how this is related to the question Aristotle raises. All things are all things defined in the same way. Well, some things can be defined by themselves, as if they were a complete substance, right? Other things are defined as something of another, right? Okay, but let's come back now to the question presupposed to this, right?

[22:13] What will do Aristotle to see if the soul is something of another? It's something in the way of the body, in fact. Also, some kind of experience. Okay. First of all, the Greeks heard the word soul, and we didn't go and read the rest of Book One there, but. All the Greeks were convinced that we have a soul, right? There was any doubt in their mind that we have a soul.

[22:49] What they're in doubt about was what the soul is, and we said that puzzled people now because the way the word "soul" is used, right? That's really a difficulty in the use of the word. What did the Greeks understand by the word "psuche We translate by the word "soul."

[23:11] Why was it so familiar to them, right? Why to us the word "soul" is so unfamiliar it seems, right? What it refers to, right? That men nowadays wonder whether they have a soul. And I mentioned this bad custom of eliminating the word "soul" from the Bible, right? You know, in the parishes, there you see that.

[23:43] What did the Greeks understand by the word "soul"? We mentioned this before, but come back to the principle of the body that has life. Yeah, by the word "soul," they meant the cause of life

[24:02] within living bodies. Okay. So the word "soul" was broader meaning than just the human soul, right? We use the word "soul" or use it all today. We think only of the what human soul, right? Okay.

[24:25] Now we mentioned how Latin, there, the word anima, our very word "animal," comes from a Latin word for soul, right? Now that there is a cause of life within living bodies, is that obvious in our experience? Yeah, it's it's obvious in our experience that some bodies are alive and some bodies not alive. That orange or that cat is alive, right? At least last time I saw her, or he, or her, right?

[25:04] What? Her. Okay. Um, but the stone is not alive, right? Okay. And what do we mean when we say that a body is alive? What does anybody say that a body is alive?

[25:20] Can move itself. Yeah, yeah, and that means that it has within itself, right, a cause of its own motion, right? So it's kind of obvious that there's a cause of life within living bodies. What is that cause, right?

[25:38] Is it the order, organization of the body, right? Or is it like Plato seems to think, you know, that it's some other substance in the body temporarily, like a man in his boat or a man in his car? We'd say today, right?

[26:00] But even that common notion, you might say, what is meant by the word soul, right? As a sort of connection with the body, right?

[26:12] Cause of life within living bodies, right? Okay. Right here, this connection with something other than the soul, right? The body, right? Huh? Okay. But if you think of the soul as being the harmony or the order of the body, which is one of the main opinions about what the soul is, then obviously it's something of another, right?

[26:40] Just like if you think that the soul, the word "cat" is the order of the letters, right? Well, the order of the letters can't exist without the what? The letters. It's something of the letters, isn't it? Okay.

[26:59] So if the soul is the order of the body or the harmony of the body, the organization of the body, then the soul is clearly something of the body, right? Okay.

[27:13] But suppose the soul is not the harmony of the body, right? Okay. But when the harmony of the body is lost, when the organization of the body is lost, right? When your head is chopped off, parts are separated, and so on, then the body no longer has a soul, right? So the soul seems to be,

[27:52] if not the order of the body, the organization of the body, the harmony of the body, it's only in a body. So what? Organized, right? So it has a connection there with that order, right? Even if it's not the order, right? Okay.

[28:12] Now, there is a problem in saying that the soul is a complete substance distinct from the body. You know, the some of the modern philosophers know they make fun of the position about the soul that's a ghost in the machine, right? That's kind of their expression, right? But if the soul was a ghost. In the body, right, A ghost in the machine, right. Then the soul could presumably what?

[28:47] Leave a body Leave a body come back in. This doesn't make much sense, right? Or the soul could be in just what? Anybody, right? Okay.

[29:01] But also, it doesn't make sense in terms of the what? Our inward experience of the unity of the human being, right? That when my body is in pain, or my body is injured, right. Or if I have a a limb amputated, right, or something, right. But this is not like having, you know, part of my car removed or something, right? This is me, you know. Instead, there was a movie there where Ronald Reagan he's injured in the movie, and and his leg is has to be removed, right?

[29:43] I don't know what they do here. I'm touched if this happens or something, you know. And that's horrible shock, you know. The actor, where's the rest of me? You know, thinking it's a very serious tragic scene, and you know it's a horrible thing to wake up and realize the lady's mother there, right? You know, and but no, that's where's the rest of me, right? Now what happened to my car?

[30:09] Where's my leg? Where's the rest of me? So the soul seems to be then not a complete substance distinct from the body, because then you can't understand the unity of man. Okay, the body is part of man.

[30:31] Now there's also though the arguments that Socrates gives in the Phaedo against the soul being the harmony of the body, and we mentioned that one of the arguments is that the

[30:46] soul resists the inclination of the body sometimes. And therefore, it seems to be something like that, something substantial, right? And not just the order of the body, because how the order of the body moves the body, right? Okay. Or he argues that the soul is sometimes disordered, and the philosophers are trying to order the soul, right? Well, you don't have an order of order.

[31:19] And again, the order of the body doesn't seem to be the same thing as order of the soul. Doesn't seem to be simply the order of the body. So those are some things that would lead you to think that the soul is something of the body, into the body in some way. Exactly what is it of the body? So he's going to investigate then the soul by dividing both

[31:49] in ways that lead us to see what the soul is something of, and divide in other ways to see what that something is that it is of another. Okay.

[32:06] Now he's very brief here, and that's why you need Thomas in his commentary. If you had a chance to, come. In 112, he gives three divisions in order to arrive at what the soul is,

[32:23] and then in one thirteen, right, he gives three more divisions to arrive at that of which the soul is something. Let's go to 113 first, because that's going to be. a little bit. easier, okay

[32:54] he's going to begin by saying that the body seems to be something in the genus of substance. He's going to begin one twelve for that matter was substance.

[33:07] Now, that's interesting. division, to go back to right? Remember the point I made about the distinction of the four kinds of cause. That that is both a distinction of four kinds of cause, but also a distinction of four meanings of the word. Cause right. While the distinction of the kinds of quadrilateral that I just gave from Euclid again, right, is a distinction of four or five kinds, right, of quadrilateral.

[33:58] But is it a distinction of four or five senses of the word quadrilateral? No, no, no. Now I'm going to ask you to do something like that, except instead of with cause, with things.

[34:22] How many kinds of things are there in the world? Well, chiefly you can say there are four kinds of things in the world. So I want to understand this distinction of the four kinds of things.

[34:41] You could have maybe more kinds of things if you use the word extremely loosely, but distinction of four kinds of things. which is also going to be a distinction of four meanings of the word thing.

[35:22] I think it's kind of interesting to note that, huh? That these most universal divisions of kinds of things or kinds of causes are also divisions of what senses of a word.

[36:03] So suppose you have a man in here. You have a man in here, right? And suppose we had orange in here, cat, right? Okay.

[36:14] And you could ask, "What is this?" Socrates in here, huh? What is Socrates? Or what is orange? And we say, "Socrates. What is Socrates? Well, Socrates is a man. What is orange? A cat. Okay.

[36:46] Okay. Now, what about the size of orange? How big or how tall is orange? How big or how tall? What's the size? Okay. Now, is the size of a man the same thing as what a man is?

[37:27] Is the size of the cat the same thing as what a cat is? It's another kind of thing, what a thing is, and the size of that thing, right?

[37:46] Now, how is Socrates? He's healthy, right? He's just, right? Orange, he's what healthy? Orange, cruel? Maybe. I don't know. What is Socrates towards his sons? What is he? Father. Father. What is Socrates towards Plato? Teacher. Yeah. What is Socrates towards Xanthippe Husband. Yeah. These are four distinct kinds of things, aren't they? One you might call substance.

[39:25] These are most fundamental. What a thing is, right? One you might call quantity. The size of a thing, how big it is, how tall it is. One you might call quality, how it is.

[39:42] And when you might call what relation, right? Or something such stuff causes. So, chiefly, there are four kinds of things in the world: substances, quantities, qualities, relations, right?

[40:09] Now, isn't that also a distinction of four senses of the word "thing"? Because you might not think of relations being a thing at first, would you? No. You'd think of a substance first of all as being a thing, right? Right. Okay.

[40:31] But then, isn't the size of a thing something too? It's not what it is, but it's pretty close to what it is, right? And isn't the health of a man or the health of a dog

[40:53] isn't that something? Relation seems even less a thing, right? So it's not equally a thing, right? As opposed to say quadrilateral, right? A square is not more quadrilateral than an oblong. Or if you said animal, let's say the dog and cat and horse, right? Is the dog more an animal than a cat?

[41:33] It's an equality, right? But is is things said equally to these four? No. If you ask a man even this question, you know, in the bar, right? Is your nose and your ear the same thing? What would he say, the common man there in the bar, there with his beard? No. Okay. Two different things, your nose and your ear, right? Now, how about your nose and the shape of your nose?

[42:09] Are these two things too? Like your nose and your ear are two things? Do you hesitate a bit to think? Because the nose can be independently of the ear and vice versa, right? But the nose, the shape of the nose, you can't separate them in that way, can you? The shape of the nose is something of the nose, right? It's a quality of the nose, right? And some men have, you know, a Roman nose and some have a little Irish nose.

[42:44] I guess I don't know what I have. heritage of, my mother's nose, I guess. So I get a Roman nose in there, right? Romans are known for having big noses, aren't they? I guess.

[43:02] But you want to see if the shape of your nose is nothing, would you? If I flatten your nose, right, is that nothing? Same. You see the way you might hesitate first to call something a thing, right, and then later on, something, right? So these are the four kinds of things, but it's also a distinction of four senses of the word "thing."

[43:33] In Latin, Thomas speaks of quantity and quality as saying something absolute, as opposed to relative, right? To be, let's say, to give a simple example, the father to be double, right? To be double is nothing in itself. It's only something towards another, right? To be a father is nothing in itself. It's something towards another, right? It hardly seems to be a thing at all, right? And if you study, you know, the history of human thought, there are some people who thought that that all relations are just something of reason, right?

[44:12] As I say, you know, having had a number of cats in my life, you know, I'm convinced that my being taller and bigger than the cat is extremely important. You know, there's a movie they made, The Incredible Shrinking Man. You know, he takes the wrong medicine and starts to shrink. You know, he's almost eaten by the family cat, right, as he gets down to that. Why, if I was as small as a toy soldier, tin soldier, little toy soldier, I would be scared stiff of my cat.

[44:42] In fact, my cat be playing with me like you play with the mouse, right? This would be terrible. So I'm very much convinced that being bigger and taller is something very real, you know. But it's not as real as my being as my size, right? See? My being taller than them is something not actually in me, right. That is something in myself. something in me towards her, or towards you.

[45:23] Do you see that? Yeah. So the word "thing" here is really different in these cases. So Aristotle, of course, is being very brief. Gets has a whole book on these things here, right? Plus the lesser things, right? And he's, you know, jumping right away to the one it is, right? Okay. So the soul is something

[45:57] in the genus of substance, or quantity, or quality, or relation. And he's saying it's what in substance, right? Okay. Now, obviously, if you think with Plato that the soul can exist apart from the body, it's going to be something substantial, right? But even if the soul resists the body, right? That shows not just an accident of the body. Okay. So that's the first division on the side of the soul, right?

[46:34] So he says we see that the substance is one genus of being. What genus, of course, is the Latin word for kind, right? What's the Latin for one of a kind? Sui generis. Yeah, you see it sometimes. Yeah, sui generis, one of a kind, unique, right? So you say substance is one genus of being, one kind of being, one kind of thing, right? He's not making explicit the whole division.

[47:08] Quantity is another kind of thing, right? Quantity and kind, okay. Now, the second division he gives here in one twelve is a division of substance into matter, form, right, and the what? Composite of the two. Okay. Now, just as this first division here, our first distinction, if you wish, that we gave here, this is first taught in logic, right? In the book called the Categories, right? Okay.

[47:52] So the second division, which is a division of substance now into matter and form and the composite of the two, where does that division come from? Natural philosophy. Yeah.

[48:21] From the first book of natural hearing, the first book of the physics, right? Okay. And from the fact of what substantial change. Okay. So what we saw back in book one there of the natural philosophy. That in everything that changes, there's something as matter and something as form. So if there's substantial change, like when a man comes into existence or a man dies, or a cat comes into existence or a cat dies, right?

[48:57] Okay. Then there's got to be something as matter and something as form in the genus of substance. So he's distinguishing then between the matter and the form and the complete substance that's composed of the two. Kind

[49:16] of confused. This is the second division you said. In one twelve, yeah. But what's the first one now? Well, he's very. He's as Thomas would say, studens brevitate, right? Seeking brevity, right? He's touching upon the distinction of the various kinds of things, the various genera of being, right? The various genera of things, of which the fundamental ones—not the only ones, but fundamental ones—are substance, quantity, quality, relation, right?

[49:47] Okay. He just mentioned explicitly the one in which the soul is going to be found, right? Substance. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. And because the living body, like a man, say, or a cat or a dog, is a substance, this makes sense to say the soul is going to be in the genus of substance. Okay. Yes. Okay. They say that division is a distinction is made fully in the categories, huh?

[50:16] Okay. Then he subdivides, right? Substance, right? Into matter and form, the genus of substance and the composite of the two. Yep. And that goes back to the natural philosophy, huh? Right. So you have to understand the categories to understand this first division, and then the subdivision of substance, right? The first book of natural history. Okay.

[50:51] Now, what's the third division? is? A little bit different here now, because when he distinguished between matter and form, if you did a natural philosophy, we saw that the matter was in potency or in ability, right? For many forms, right? And the form is as a what? Act, huh? Okay. Now is the soul going to be in the genus of substance as matter or as form?

[51:27] Form. Yeah. So it's going to be as an act, right? Not as a what? Ability for act or ability for form, right? It's going to be as the act, right? Okay. But then he gives a third division, okay, which is division of act, okay. Since form is an act, he wants to make clear, and he divides act into first act, which is almost the same thing as form, and second

[52:07] act. There's a substance there. Yeah, good substance there. Yeah. Wasn't the Sphinx down there in Egypt right? Is you know kind of a symbol of the pharaoh, I guess. Uh, but you kind of combine the lion with the U. S. King, right? It's like in the end, of the, you know, the king there in England, where you had the lion, right? Down. Symbolism. So that the the lion is what the king. Right, the forest, huh?

[52:43] You know, when my son Paul graduated at West Point, right? And at first summer, you know, at West Point, you're in what they call beast camp, right? You're not considered a human being until you get through beast camp, right? And there's a officer in charge, right? And they call him the king of the beasts. So, but it's a lion, he's the king of the beasts, right? So the pharaoh is ready to go.

[53:14] Okay. Now, he manifests the distinction between first act and second act, huh? Which is really distinction between form and some kind of what activity, right? Some kind of of acting the more common system, where some kind of operation, of doing, going. He manifests it as something more known.

[53:40] The one is science, the other is consideration. Okay. Well, notice, son. Take an example there of a science, like geometry. I have acquired something of the science of geometry. So you could say that my reason is formed, huh? Okay. But now, if you want to talk about geometry, I'll talk a bit about it, right? Okay. I'm going to prove the Pythagorean theorem now. I know.

[54:14] I can I'll put the board now do the Pythagorean theorem. See? So notice, my reason was in ability or was in potency before it acquired geometry, right?

[54:28] But after I've acquired geometry, I'm not always actually thinking about geometrical things, right? So the science of geometry, whereby my mind is formed in a certain way, is the first act, right? And then my actually thinking about the geometrical things is a further act, right? So we call that a second act, right? Okay. Well, the soul is going to be a what? First act, right? Rather than a what?

[55:04] Second act, right? It's going to be a first act in the genus of what? Substance as a form. Now, I'm mentioning, you know, just to make an aside here now, theological aside, huh? It was in the Council of the Ephesus. You see, the Church, you know, officially adopting Aristotle's understanding of the soul. And that's when they talk about the soul being the form of the body, right?

[55:34] But they're understanding it in form, in the substantial sense of. We can look at that text sometimes if you want to, you know. But it's kind of you know, late in history, the church that's officially adopted right? But most people don't understand what the soul is, so they, you know, want to escape the word, right? If you don't use the word, you don't have to what? You can ask what the soul is.

[56:00] So like, was it was it nineteen eighty four? Is that the one where they, you know, you became an unperson sometimes, you know? But it's like what the Russians used to do with the communists when they were in power in Russia, you know, and they would study these photographs, you know, how you have the the brass up there on May Day, huh? Stalin and all the other brass and so on, and get official picture of everybody there, you know, and kind of know where they who's in power.

[56:27] And then when the picture appears again, maybe somebody's been purged, you know, and he's been removed from the picture too, right? He never was.

[56:39] That's kind of a frightening thing, right? But you know, they're always rewriting the history books, right? So somebody who who was there is no longer there, and somebody who wasn't there, now suddenly appears there, right? Like he was associated with Lenin or wherever he was at the early period, huh? It's kind of funny in a sense, huh? Because the communists had their own kind of mean sense of humor, you know.

[57:14] You know, when when they had the fight after Stalin's death, right? And Malenkov, you know, was trying to grab the power, and they kind of, you know, self protection, they ganged up on Malenkov, right? But instead of killing Malenkov, right, they sent him out west and made him the head of a power station out there, electric power station. That's kind of a funny sense of humor, right?

[57:42] Because he's the guy saying, "Oh, tarring his hands," and now he's the head of an electric power station. And then Molotov, who was the great diplomat, right, for the for the communists, you know, he's the Molotov Ribbentrop, you know, started the Second World War, right, the compact, but he was he was a big diplomat, right? So they rather than kill him when when he fell from power, they made him the ambassador to Outer Mongolia.

[58:12] So kind of the kind of kind of the cruel side that's he brings too, but it's kind of funny though. So, but in a with an intended humorous, it's humorous though to see the fact, you know, that in history books, you know, a guy who gained power, you know, suddenly. Appears in the history books. It hasn't been very close to Lenin or Stalin or somebody in the earlier days, right?

[58:38] And someone who was has been purged is eliminated from photographs. And they actually have known some of the earlier photographs, you know, in the West, and they have the later photographs and their new editions.

[58:57] In the old days, you could go to the communist bookstore there in New York, you know, and could buy the, you know, the official foreign language editions from Moscow, right? And they were very inexpensive. I remember one time being there and going in there. I said, "I want to get the guys taking my picture, " but, but I could buy, you know, six or seven books of Marx or Engels or Lenin, you know, for the price of one or two paperback[ s] in Barnes and Noble in New York.

[59:23] And go and buy a couple of paperback[ s] . You pay as much. And of course, most of the books in the communist bookstore are in Russian, right? But they have the foreign editions, which are the official translations of the texts. They're kind of nice to have. But you have these pictures usually in the front, maybe of Marx and Lenin, You know, they look such vigorous, healthy people.

[59:43] You don't really feel alive necessarily. But the pictures all like dripping with material prosperity. Kind of doctored things, you know. Like Chairman Mao in old age, they're swimming in the Yangtis River over there, you know. Whether We did or not? We don't really know. As long as in the water, but you know, this seventy-year-old man, you know, swimming down the Ice river.

[1:00:17] So there are three divisions he gives. Then, right, the first division is a distinction, right, of the kinds of things, right, which is also distinction of means of the word "thing" or "being," right. Substance, quantity, quality, and so on. But he just notes the one that he's concerned with, right? Okay, he's kind of applying that division, right? This is one kind of thing, right? And that's the kind of thing which substance is, in which the soul is found, right?

[1:00:51] Then he gives the second division, right, which is the one for natural philosophy. Now, nobody today hardly knows the categories, right, in the philosophical world. Nor do they know the first book of the physics. So,

[1:01:11] and because form is act, he uses other distinction of first and second act, right? So the soul is going to later on be defined as the first act of something, right? Okay, substantial form of something you call too, right? Okay. What does he mean by science in consideration? Well, he's using as an example of something more known, where you have this distinction between first and second act.

[1:01:41] Yeah. And the science itself is like a form of the mind, right? Oh yeah. Okay. So when I acquire the science of geometry, my mind has been actualized in a certain way, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Because before my mind was able to have the science, but didn't actually have the science, right? Now that I learned geometry, I actually have the science, right? But even after I've actually acquired the science of geometry, I'm not always thinking actually about geometrical things, right?

[1:02:15] So there's a further act, right? Which is to be actually thinking about these things. Okay. Okay. That's what he means by consideration, actually thinking. Yeah. Yeah. Okay.

[1:02:32] So I was pointing out there at the house that night. There, I said in Book Two, five, nine, fourteen. Okay, you guys are supposed to be all teaching Euclid so 5 9 and 14 fourteen. What's the order there?

[1:02:50] Well, five and nine. In both cases, you're talking about what dividing a line into equal and equal segments, right? And then talking about the figures on these. But number five is a theorem of what equality. Number nine is a theorem of inequality. Okay, so the theorem of equality comes before the theorem of inequality, right? Okay.

[1:03:20] Now fourteen is proven by means of what five. So I was using that to illustrate something, right? That the equal is before the unequal in geometry, right?

[1:03:36] Well, the same way with with six and ten, eleven, right? Six is the theorem of equality when you you know bisect a line in half and add line to it, right? And you do that in both six and ten, but in six you have a theorem of equality, and ten you have a theorem of inequality. In eleven, you have this beautiful theorem: how to divide a straight line such that the rectangle contained by the whole and one segment is equal to the square of the remaining segment.

[1:04:08] But it's proven through the theorem six, not through theorem what ten. So the theorem of equality is before the theorem of inequality, and the theorem that's proven by one of those is proven by the theorem of equality.

[1:04:25] Okay. What's more striking, which you first notice in Book Two, is that in twelve and thirteen you have the theorems about the obtuse angle triangle and the acute angle triangle, which correspond to the one at the end of Book One on the right angle triangle. On the right angle triangle, the square of the side opposite the right angle is equal to the squares of its sides contained.

[1:04:50] In the obtuse angle triangle, the square opposite the obtuse angle is greater than, and in the acute angle one, it's less than them two. So the theorem of equality is before the theorems of what inequality. And then when you examine the proof of twelve and thirteen, they're proven to forty-seven of Book One. You prove the inequality theorems, the equality theorem. So I was using that to make the point that in geometry we consider the equal before the unequal.

[1:05:27] So now I was actually thinking about these segments in geometry again, right? Suddenly I forgot the science. Sometimes I go back and and rethink that, right? See. And now I'm suddenly, for some reason or another, talking about this again, right? To impress you or something, right?

[1:05:46] But so there's a further act there, right? I'm actually thinking about those things. As Aristotle would point out, in this case here, I can go to the second act whenever I want to, really. If I have the first act, right? If I don't have the first act, I can't automatically acquire it if I want to, right?

[1:06:13] So he's contrasting the first act and second act because the soul will be as a first act, right? But that first act that makes possible will be what? the what? Second act, which is the operations of life.

[1:06:32] So maybe we should stop on it being five o'clock. Okay. But now in one thirteen, he's going to give three divisions on the side of the body, right? On the side of that of which it is the first act, and then he's going to bring out finally the definition of the soul. He's going to manifest it, and he's going to demonstrate it later on again. So the division or the definition he arrives at by these divisions will be manifested by beautiful analogies, proportions, help us to understand it better, and then he's going to give a demonstration from effect to cause.

[1:07:14] Okay. Now next week I won't be here. Okay. I think I mentioned I'm going to go out to California.