De Anima (On the Soul)
10. Know Thyself; Aristotle's Divisions Toward Defining the Soul (De Anima II.1)
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[0:09] Very famous words, "Know thyself." Know thyself, right? The seven wise men of Greece said they put up at the Oracle of Delphi. I always begin by saying, you know, that's an exhortation, right? Know thyself. I say, to whom is that addressed? Is it addressed to the gods? No.

[0:35] Is it addressed to the animals that wander around the oracle? Say. Well, it's got to be addressed to someone who is able to know himself, right? But who more or less doesn't know himself? Well, the gods know themselves, right? And God and even the angels, what they primarily know is themselves. So it's not addressed to them because they know themselves. It's not addressed to the beasts because they're not able to know themselves, right?

[1:16] So it's addressed to man because man is the only thing that is able to know itself but doesn't know itself. Say. But then you can say,

[1:33] but it's addressed more to the soul than to the body because the body can't know what a body is, but the soul can know not only what the body is. We're talking about that in the philosophy of the continuous, right? The soul can know what a soul is, as we're about to find out. So you can say it's addressed to man, right? But even more so to the soul, right?

[2:07] That's number two, right? Then three, you can say it's addressed to reason. Because reason can know what an eye is, or an ear is, or hand is, but reason is the only part of man that can know itself, but has a hard time with itself, right? So it's addressed to reason even more, especially, right?

[2:36] And so the definition of reason that the great Shakespeare gave us—that's the knowledge of reason in both senses. See, reason's knowledge of the triangle is a knowledge of reason in one sense. It's a knowledge had by reason, right? But the knowledge that we have, that reason has through the definition of reason, is a knowledge that has of itself.

[3:24] So the definition of reason is a knowledge of reason in both senses. Okay. Now, of course that's an outrageous explanation of in the commentators know they're investigating this. Know thyself, And they understand it to mean a knowledge of knowledge. Eventually, right? You know, I mean, they understand, it, right? So, in that sense, you could say what, you know, the definition of definition, right?

[4:14] That seems to be a knowledge of knowledge, right? In a way, right? A knowledge of what knowledge is. Getting close to that, right? The definition of definition.

[4:28] Statement about statements. That seems a little bit kind of forced in a way. But I think it makes some sense to say that the great words "know thyself," right, are addressed to man,

[4:46] and not to the beast or to the angel, for the reason he gave, right? But more so, it's addressed to the soul, right? And when the soul seeks to know what a soul is, it's what we're doing in this course right now, right? Then we're obeying the seven wise men of Greece. We're responding to the exhortation of the seven wise men of Greece. So what the hell is going on What the hell is going on?

[5:18] What the hell is going on? What the hell is going on? Use the word "soul," right? You know, how are they obeying the Oracle of Delphi, right? Now, of course, Socrates takes it. Okay, okay, but then I go on and I say, you know, you know, people are interested in the definition of reason. Are they obeying the dictum "Know thyself," right?

[5:48] Because you could say that just as man is the only thing that can know itself, but does know itself, so even more so in a way, you can say reason is the only part of man that can know itself.

[6:06] So, if you're interested in the definition of reason, what are you? Are you interested in finding what the oracle of Delphi says, right? Now, Socrates

[6:23] understands it to to be kind of a command, right? To find out whether we know or whether we think we know, right? You know,

[6:39] so so you might say, you know, that reason knows itself when it knows what it knows and what it doesn't know, right? But when it thinks it it knows what it doesn't know, or even if it thinks it doesn't know what it does know, then I suppose you could say it doesn't know itself in some way, right? But more basically, when it doesn't know what reason is, it doesn't know itself, right?

[7:09] Because that's itself most of all, right? What it is, you know. See, St. Paul takes it in another sense there too, where he speaks of the man who what looks in the mirror and then walks away and forgets what he looks like, right? But he's talking about moral law, right? You know,

[8:10] I read the Nicomachean Ethics, and I go through the virtues and say, "That one, I don't think so." Do I have that one? No, I guess I don't have that either. Do I have that. No Pretty sad. State of affairs. I guess I'll give him a couple days. Yeah. I guess I'm mild enough. So, so

[8:52] we're talking about the shooting down there at the monastery there, and or the the seminary I guess the monastery and seminary down there in Kansas. you read about that? and uh you don't read the news here. No. No, there are two. So let's go back here to the beginning of Book Two here, Chapter One. Now, Aristotle has said we've considered now what our predecessors have said about the soul, and now he's going to make a fresh beginning, investigating what the soul is.

[9:25] Now, is the soul defined as something by itself, or something of another? Something of another. Yeah. And because of that, he has to investigate by divisions, and he's going to give about three divisions on both sides. A division about the soul itself, right? And then a division of that of which the soul is something, right? Okay.

[10:00] So, three divisions to find out the something, and three more divisions the something which it is something. Okay, is that clear as mud? Okay. Okay. We met that kind of a definition before when he had the definition of what? Time. Yeah. In a way that's true, the definition of motion too, huh? Is something of what? Another, right? I guess that's true about the definition of place too.

[10:30] I wouldn't take that up, right? Yeah. Okay. So the first three divisions then will be on the side of the soul itself, and the second three on the side of the which might call the subject in which the soul is, right? Okay. Now, in one twelve, you you meet three divisions there. In case you didn't get that, the brevity of wisdom here. And the first division he's giving, and he's just touching upon it there very briefly, is division of what being or thing, right?

[11:14] According to the ten figures of predication, substance, quantity, quality, relation, and so on, and he's saying that the soul is in one of those genera, and in fact, it's in the genus of what? Substance, right? Okay. So what's implicit there is that is the soul something in the genus of substance, or in the genus of quantity, or quality, or something else, right? And

[11:55] why would you think that the soul is in the genus of substance rather than in the genus of what would be most likely second choice after substance?

[12:06] Quality. Yeah, yeah. So going back again to the Phaedo there, Socrates seems to speak of the soul as if it were a substance distinct from the body, right, and a complete substance in itself, huh?

[12:21] And then what's his name, Simmias, proposes the Pythagorean opinion that the soul is the harmony of the body, right? And that would be like a what? Quality, huh? A disposition, right, of the body, huh?

[12:41] So why think that the soul is in the genus of substance rather than the genus of let's say quality? Why? Because it can't exist by itself. Okay, that's true. Although we haven't seen that really until the third book, right? Okay. But if the soul can exist obviously independently of the body, which will be shown at least about the human soul in the third book, then clearly it's something substantial, right?

[13:17] Because the accident wouldn't exist apart. The harmony of the body wouldn't exist by itself. Okay. And the other reason to think that the soul is in the genus of substance.

[13:30] Because the soul itself has qualities and dispositions. Yeah. And that's going to lead into the immortality of the soul. If the soul has some activity, right, that the body doesn't share in, if it has an activity that's not in the body, right, that would show the soul to be something what? Substantial, right? If the soul were merely an accident of the body, right, it would have no activity except in the body, in the body, right.

[14:09] And of course, you can recall Socrates' argument. There, one of his arguments against the soul being the harmony of the body is that sometimes the soul what resists the body in its inclinations, and doesn't seem to make too much sense that the harmony of the body would resist the body. Okay.

[14:33] Now, the second division is more particular, and it's in a way dividing substance, right? But it's distinguishing substance in three senses, and one, of course, is substance in the sense of matter,

[14:53] and the other is substance in the sense of form or species, and the third is the composite of the two. Okay. Now, apropos that division, what makes us think that there is

[15:15] matter and form in the genus of substance? Huh. Because when we first think of matter and form, we're usually thinking of matter as some actual substance, right, like clay or stone or something of this sort. We're thinking of matter as a material substance, right, as a body, and we're thinking of form as something that happens to the body, like its shape or its disposition or its sense quality or something of this sort.

[15:54] What makes us think that in the genus of substance, within substance itself, there's something proportional to that? But there's matter in the genus of substance, and there's form in the genus of substance, and consequently the composite of the two, too. What makes us think that is so?

[16:19] Because substances change into other substances. Yeah, because there is substantial what change, right? Okay. Now, what is the best example, or the more certain example, of a change of substance?

[16:46] What let's say before that, what is the best example of a substance? Is it a stone or a tree or a dog or a man? Which is the best example of a substance? A man. Yeah, yeah. If you look at the categories, Aristotle talks about substance and other places like that. He will give as a first example of a substance a man, and then as a second example a dog, right?

[17:18] Or it could have been a cat or a horse, but one of the higher animals, huh? He doesn't give a tree or a plant as an example of a what substance, although maybe that is an example of a substance, right? And even more so, he doesn't give a stone as an example of substance.

[17:41] Now you know how sometimes metals run together and they seem to get fused together, right? And is a stone really one substance, or in some sense a a glued together of many substances? That's not clear, really, right? Maybe it's really what. Maybe it's not really one thing, the stone, right? Maybe it's a combination of what substances. And even the plant, huh? There are some plants that you can propagate not by seed, but by what?

[18:17] Dividing them, right? And both parts will what grow, right? And I know is that true about the starfish? They say that the starfish used to cut them up, and they were actually multiplying them rather than destroying them, huh?

[18:37] What is it that a man, and that matter even a dog has, that makes us think more of them as being one thing rather than a combination of many things? And why even man more than the than the dog, right? What does the man, the dog have that the plant doesn't have, and even more so the stone doesn't have? Well, one thing that man has a personal experience of unity.

[19:07] Okay. So nobody really thinks of himself as what as we, huh? You know, we came up here today to give a talk. We sometimes use the editorial we write, but in our more sober moments, right, we never think of ourselves as as we, huh? You know, that's kind of lending more authority to me when I say we think, you know,

[19:37] as if I was many persons, right, And not just one one fool by himself, okay. Um. But another thing here that man and the dog have in common is that they have sensation, right? And I think we may have spoken about this before, but let's call it a bit, huh? Um.

[20:06] Is sensing the kind of activity, or operation, or doing that many distinct substances, right, can share. Now, it's possible, let's say, if together, several of us might be able to lift this table. It's kind of a heavy table, right? But maybe one of us would have a hard time lifting this old table and transporting it someplace, right? But perhaps many of us together can lift the table, right?

[20:41] So we all share one lifting of the table. Or in the tug of war, you got a rope there, and you got six or seven guys on one side pulling six or seven other guys into the mud or wherever it is they have there between the two of them, right? Um, this pulling of the rope, right, is the work of six or seven men, right? They share it, huh?

[21:05] Now, could six or seven men share in in seeing that crucifix over there, seeing that clock or something like that, right? Or is there some reason to say that seeing is not like lifting or pulling, right? That's not the kind of activity. That can be shared one sensing by many different what substances, huh? What is there about sensing that might indicate the difficulty of saying that? You need one sense, right what is the difference in the kind of activity that sensing is as opposed to pushing or pulling or lifting or something of that sort, huh?

[22:09] Yeah, that's the Latin word they use, right? It remains within the one doing it, right? While lifting or pushing or pulling is acting upon something outside of you. It's a transitive activity, right?

[22:29] So many men together can lift or push or pull something sometimes that one of them alone could not do, right? Okay. But could the crucifix be seen there if I saw this

[22:47] the the vertical and you saw the horizontal? Could the crucifix be seen by the two of us together? No, each would see its part personally.

[23:03] Yeah. Or if I saw, you know, one half of that painting over there, right? And you saw another half, right? Could you say together; the whole painting was seen.

[23:21] Was the whole painting seen only when one person or more than one person by themselves, right? See that painting, huh? Sometimes I compare it to what defining or or syllogizing, right? Suppose you know what a quadrilateral is, huh? You know what an equilateral what it is to be equilateral, but you don't know what it is to be quadrilateral. He knows what is to be quadrilateral. He doesn't know what is to be equilateral.

[23:54] And I know what is to be right-angled, but I don't know what it is to be quadrilateral or to be right-angled. I mean, to be equilateral. And vice versa, you don't know what is to be right-angled, right? So between the three of us, we can understand what a what a a square is.

[24:13] Or does one of us have to see the whole thing? As an equilateral right-angled quadrilateral, and then what a square is is is known definitively. Right? Yeah. And someone else is going to share in knowing that, right? He's got to see the whole thing, right? That's why it's a common good in every every instance. In the same way, in the syllogism,

[24:42] if I know that every mother is a woman, right, but I don't know that no man is a woman, and you know that no man is a woman, but you don't know that every mother is a woman, can we syllogize that no man is a what?

[25:02] Mother? No. One of us would have to get both premises into his head, right, before you could see the conclusion of that, right? So this is kind of a way of elaborating upon that inward experience we. have Of sensing and understanding and so on and reasoning and defining and so on, this is not the kind of activity that goes into something outside of itself. It's not a transitive activity.

[25:33] It remains within the doer, right? And one seeing or one understanding or one defining or one syllogizing cannot be shared partially by two different men, right? Do you see that? Okay.

[25:56] If I see the major premise but not the minor premise, and you see the minor premise but not the major premise, together we can't syllogize. See?

[26:09] Well, If you help to get into my head the premise you have that I don't have, then I can syllogize, and if I do the reverse favor, then you can syllogize, right? Okay.

[26:24] So if man is a substance and and a dog is a substance, right? And men and dogs come into existence, right? And men and dogs go out of existence. There's clearly substantial change.

[26:42] And then we saw back in book one of of the physics, book one of the natural hearing, that when a thing changes, there's something that what remains throughout the change, right? The underlying matter or the underlying subject, huh? And there's something that is what acquired, right? And that is called the form, huh? The act, huh? That's acquired.

[27:12] So if you put those two things together, right? Then everything that changes inwardly, right? There's matter and form, and then that there is substantial change, then there must be in substance matter and what form.

[27:34] Okay. Do you see that? Okay. Remember the problem. Just recall that from natural philosophy. Remember the problem that you had in the apparent contradiction. Suppose the the hard becomes soft, right? Or the healthy becomes sick, right? Well, there's an apparent contradiction when you say the hard becomes soft, right? Because what does the word becomes mean? Comes to be. Yeah. So if the hard comes to be soft.

[28:23] Then the hard would be soft, right? Which is impossible, because if it was both hard and soft, it would both be and not be hard. Because it's hard, it would be hard, and because it's soft, it would not be hard. The same way here, if the healthy become sick, or for that matter, the sick become healthy, there's an apparent contradiction because you're saying that one opposite comes to be the other.

[28:57] So if the healthy came to be sick, then the healthy would be sick, and therefore the same thing would be healthy and sick, and therefore healthy and not healthy, and sick and not sick, right? Now on the other hand, you say, well, like Parmenides says, change involves a contradiction, as you can see. The healthy cannot be sick, and the sick cannot be healthy. So if you're healthy, you're going to what?

[29:24] Always be healthy, right? Be thankful. And if you're sick, you're going to always be sick. Too bad, right? And if the butter is hard, if the thing is hard, it's going to always be hard. If it's soft, it's going to be always soft, huh? Okay. Well, how did we untie that apparent contradiction?

[29:49] It's not, yeah, the hard. It's not the hard as such that becomes soft. Yeah. The one way we solved that is by saying that there's a third thing besides the two contraries, right? So in the case of hard and soft, there might be something like butter, right?

[30:12] And the butter is the subject of hardness and softness, but not both at the same time. But it's able to be both, right? It's in potency to both, huh? But it's not able to be both at the same time. And so when it's actually hard, the butter is able to be soft, and it becomes actually soft. It's no longer hard, right? The same way down here, there's something like the body, let's say, which is able to be healthy and able to be sick, but not at the same time, huh?

[30:50] Now another way of looking at this is to say, well, this word "healthy," as we learned in the beginning of the physics, like a name, it's signifies in a confused way, right? And when I say healthy, I don't distinguish between the health and the subject in which the health is, namely the body.

[31:19] And it's not the health in the healthy that becomes sick. Health itself cannot be sick, could it? But it's the subject, the body that becomes what sick, right? And it's not the hardness that becomes soft, but that in which the hardness exists, like the butter. Remember that, no? So, in the same way over here, right? You have the sickness and the body which it is, And the softness and the butter, say, which is.

[32:01] So, the thing that changes must be what composed, huh? It's composed of two things, one of which is in what ability to be the other, in potency. You see, both words sometimes in English. Okay. And then the other is as what act or as what form. So, if there is such a thing as substantial change, like a man becomes a lion, huh? The Coliseum, right? Okay. Then there must be something as matter and something as form in the very genus of what substance, right?

[32:46] Okay. So he's saying now the soul is in the genus of substance, but in substance, because it's substantial change, we recognize as something as matter there, something as form, and then there's the what because the composition of the two, right?

[33:08] So is the soul right as matter in the genus of substance or as form, right? Whereas the composite of the two, huh? Okay. And he's going to conclude that it's as what form, right? Okay. And therefore, as act, huh?

[33:38] So that's the second division, still in one twelve. We say then that substance is some one genus of being. Of this one is as matter, which, according to itself, is not this something that's being an individual or complete substance, while another is the form in the species, according to which right away this something is said it's actually some individual substance, and a third is what is from these, huh?

[34:08] The composite of the two, right? And then, like we saw, going back to the first book of the physics, that matter is as what potency or ability, right? And the species as Actuality or act huh?

[34:29] Now, because you're going to conclude that the soul is as form or act, then he gives a third distinction, which is distinction between what they call sometimes first act and second act. Isn't these those words here? But later on, he's going to use the word first act in talking about the soul. Now,

[34:53] what is that distinction between first act and second act? It's a distinction between. He compares it to having knowledge and using the knowledge. See. So that's what he's doing. He's calling first act

[35:28] some thing the form, right? Huh? Okay. And he's calling second act. They use the word yet. Um, the operation of the doing, right? Okay.

[35:47] And he exemplifies it in something more known to us, right? Okay. He takes example of the geometry, right? Okay. Now, to some extent, my mind is what formed, huh? When I've learned geometry, huh? But after my mind has been formed by geometry, I can now think much better than I could before about angles and figures and so on. Okay. And that's a second act, right? Okay. So

[36:28] it's interesting. In what sense the first and second is he using the words first and second here Second. Before the one can be without the other, but the other can't be without. That's to some extent true. Also, in the first sense, though, right? In generation, right? Okay. I had to learn geometry before in time, right? Before I could think the way I now do about the geometrical things, huh?

[37:11] Okay. But in terms of the third sense of before and after, which would be first, which would be second? The second would be first, and the first would be second. The operation. It shall be last, and last shall be first, right? Okay. Aristotle points out in the ninth book of Wisdom there, when he talks about act and ability in general, right, that the word "act" seems to have come from operation, or, from motion, and then to be applied later on to what Form, right?

[38:00] And usually, when we use the word "act," let's say in English, we'll think of something like a doing or an operation or motion rather than a form, right? And we kind of carry over and apply it to the form, right? But here he's talking about kind of the order of what generation, maybe something as you said of the order of being, right? Huh? Okay. But the order of knowing would be the what reverse, huh?

[38:26] First act. I don't think it's right, but it sort of seems to me. It sort of seems like it's an ability to act. Yeah, yeah. Is that true? But it's an active ability.

[38:46] It's an ability to do something, right? Yeah. Okay. As opposed to ability of matter, the ability which is matter is an ability for what form, right? Oh, okay. But the ability of form is an ability what not for form, but an ability to do something, right? Okay.

[39:09] So the baby, I guess, you know, when the baby's in the womb, even to some extent, the baby comes out of the womb. They're not able to see very well, right? They acquire the ability to see, and then they start to see, right? Or they acquire the senses, huh? Or they acquire the ability to digest, and then they start digesting things, okay? So we can't give a newborn baby a steak, you know, apart from the problem of chewing it, right?

[39:40] The baby couldn't what? Digest it, right? Huh? Okay. So when a thing has its form, its nature in that sense, right? Then it's able to do what that kind of thing can do, right? And that's a further act, right? So they call that second act, huh? Okay.

[40:07] So that distinction between first and second act will come up again when he talks about the the abilities or powers and their what operations, huh? Okay. But it's relevant here now is the soul, right? If the soul is an act, is an act in the sense of an operation or a doing? Or is the soul an act in the sense of a what? Form, right? But form in this unusual sense of a substantial form, right?

[40:40] Okay. So notice how how these three divisions in a way are what ordered, right? Huh? And is the soul in the genus of substance, or quantity, or quality, or relation, right? Okay. And then, if it's in the genus of substance, is it as matter in the genus of substance, or as form the genus of substance, or as a combination of the two? And if it's as form or act, right, in the genus of substance, is it as a first act or a what second act, right?

[41:20] Okay. But no, that's not exactly a subdivision, is it? A form in the genus of substance, because operation would not be in the genus of substance, right? Okay. But it is, in a way, a subdivision of what? Act, right? A distinction about act, done. Okay.

[41:44] So he doesn't give here any reason for saying it's the form. Well, again, it's going to be clear that the animals sometimes are asleep and not doing things, right? But the animal is not dead when it's hibernating, is it?

[42:04] So that's a sign that the soul is as what? First act, right? Yeah. Rather than second act, huh? Yeah. In form as opposed to some kind of matter.

[42:20] Well, again, if you go back to the idea that the that the how does the living body differ from the nonliving body, right? Say. Remember my my simple comparison there, right? I said, is the living body different from the nonliving body? Like the word cat does the word dog, huh? That basically you have a different matter altogether in the living body from the nonliving body, or does it differ like the word cat and the word cat, huh?

[42:56] That's only a you know analogy, right? It's a different substance. If you say it differs as cat and dog, then you couldn't what take nonliving things like water and so on and minerals and so on and build them up into the living thing, and vice versa, you couldn't break down the living thing into something that you find in the what nonliving world, huh? So the difference seems to be like cat and act, right?

[43:29] So if the soul, as the word means, huh, is the cause of life with the living body, right? It's going to have to be not as the matter, but as the what form, right? Okay. So when the living body becomes dead or vice versa, the matter that seems to remain, right? But under different what form? So the soul is going to have to be his form, huh?

[43:58] Okay. So these three divisions are leading to the idea that the soul is a substantial form, huh? Or it's a first act, right? Of something. What is that something? Well, he approaches that now by three divisions in one thirteen.

[44:25] Of course, as we know from the meaning of the word soul, it's the cause of life within living bodies. One investigates somehow the body, right, of which the soul is a substantial form. The body of which the soul is the first act, right? And so, first of all, the bodies seem to be what substances, right? Most of all, okay. And when Aristotle gets into even metaphysics, right, he starts to talk about the questions of wisdom.

[44:56] One question is: Are bodies the only substances there are? Are there also immaterial substances, right? And it's clear to everybody that material substances exist, and bodies are what we mean by material substance, right? Okay. And of course, the question is whether there are these immaterial substances as well, right? Mhm Because this guy? Anaxagoras and this guy Plato and other people have some reason to think there are right okay so he says bodies seem to be substances most of all it means to us right to us in the beginning we kind of identify body with what substance and that's why in the fourth book when Aristotle takes a place

[45:41] he quotes the common opinion of the Greek philosophers whatever it is must be somewhere if it isn't somewhere it doesn't exist now to be somewhere to be in place is a property of a what body so they're identifying what is with what body okay and gotta be careful you know sometimes Thomas following Avicenna you know will say being is what our mind first understands right okay and some people misunderstand that as meaning being in the way the wise man talks about being as being where he sees being as something common to material and immaterial things and so on but Thomas in other places when he's being more precise he says being considered immaterial things right okay our Cajetan in his scholastic jargon says ens concretum

[46:43] quidditati sensibili right being concrete right in a what sensible what it is right okay but you know take some of the mystery out of those ways of saying it right just go back that common what thinking of men right whatever it is must be somewhere does everybody kind of think that at least at first part of their life right where is it right you know oh get asked where is heaven right or where is God right huh yes sir

[47:21] and God or an angel is not in some place huh in the sense of being contained in some place okay that's why I say in wisdom to some extent you have to rise right from the particular to the general you have to rise from seeing substance as the same thing as body really the substance as something more general than body body being one kind of substance material substance huh okay

[47:58] so he says bodies seem to be substances most of all right and then he's implicit here the distinction between the natural body and the what artificial body right

[48:18] and the natural ones are more seen to be substances than the artificial bodies. Okay. So the soul is going to be something of something substantial, but something of a what? Body, right? Huh? And something of a what? Natural body, not an artificial body. The living body is a natural body, right? And then the last division of natural bodies: some have life, while others what? Do not, right?

[48:54] Okay. And notice he's not defining life here, but he's kind of exemplifying the lowest grade, you might say, of life that's common to all living bodies—that they have some kind of what?

[49:08] Ability to nourish themselves, right? And ability to grow and to shrink, huh? Okay. See, I see her nature, she's like shrinking. Okay. Um. Okay.

[49:34] So the soul is something of what? A body of a natural body of a natural body that is what? It has life, right? Huh? Okay.

[49:54] Okay. Now he starts to gather from these two sets of divisions the definition of the soul. I'm sorry. His last thing when he talks about life. Yeah. When he says we call life self nutrition and growth. Yeah, that's not really a definition of life, right? But he's taking the lowest common denominator, you might say, right? The life that all living bodies share, right? They all take in some kind of nourishment, right?

[50:24] And nourish themselves, feed themselves, right? And they all what? Grow, huh? Okay. Later on, a topic of reproduction, but okay. But these are very from the very beginning, right? You see this nutrition and growth, right? And so, man, as well as the animals and even the plants, right, have at least this amount of life, right? Okay. I'm sorry. Why? Why diminution? Well, because that's what happens. I know.

[51:03] I always, you know, I've always put down my my height is five foot ten. I guess it was five foot ten, you know. But now suddenly my my driver's license is five foot eight, and I'm kind of annoyed at that, you know, because it makes me a little shorter than I want to be.

[51:17] Maybe I am actually getting shorter. I don't know. But the body does, you know, the animal body, right? Thus to crumble, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[51:33] Yeah. But yeah, self-nutrition and growth. Ah, but that's enough to see what he means. huh? Now, whence all natural bodies, sharing in life now, one fourteen there, will be substances. Substance, however, thus as composite, put together. Now, and it says not altogether clear there because sometimes we use the word body there

[52:13] for the what composite, right? So if you say that body is one kind of complete substance, then body is the composite, and then you have form and matter, right?

[52:35] But sometimes use the word body for the what the matter, right? Okay. And when he defines the soul, at least the way Thomas explains it here, he's using body more in the sense of what one part of the living body. Okay, it's a little confusing, right? But it's equivocation there in the word what body, right? Okay.

[53:05] Why I'm on it here? Take a little example of a equivocation comes up sometimes. Sometimes Thomas will say that the human soul is not a material form. Okay. Now say something like that. While

[53:45] the other substantial forms are material forms, even other souls, other substantial forms are material forms. Now, what does that mean? What does it mean to call form material? Depends on matter.

[54:18] Yeah, it exists only in matter, right? Okay. But now we speak of we divide substance. Let's say we divide into material substance and the immaterial substance. Now material means the same down there as it meant up here.