De Anima (On the Soul)
18. The desiring powers: sense desire, the emotions, love, and Mill on pleasure
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/018-the-desiring-powers-sense-desire-the-emotions-love-and-mill/

[0:00] As he goes on in this chapter, he's going to talk about the order a bit, right? Look at 140 here. The nutritive alone. Now again, here's the English the feeding, growing powers and so on. These alone are present in the plants. That's all they have.

[0:25] But in others, meaning in the animals, you have both the nutritive powers, the feeding powers, and the sensing powers, right? But if the sensing, right, also the desiring, right.

[0:46] Now, he gives a division here, right? And I'm going to give you the Greek here now, right? Orexis is the Greek word for desire. And the three words in Greek are epithumia, which the translator here translates as desire, but that's maybe not as precise as it could be, because the appetitive is more what desire, right?

[1:14] Epithumia. Let me just write the Greek words on the board. If I have these words in Plato as well as in Aristotle, I don't know if you've ever read. Did you ever read the Republic? So on the Greek here. orexis huh? And you divide it into three there. The first one is I think it's kind of English. epithumia. Then you have thumos And then he has boulesis huh?

[2:40] Now, epithumia and thumos in Latin, the way they translate those, they'll call epithumia the concupiscible appetite, and they'll call thumas the irascible. how would you translate that in English? Epithumia or concupiscence? These are words sometimes, they're English. concupiscence, right? But sometimes I translate simply as what sense desire, right? Okay. Well, they could perhaps use sense desire for both of these. I call it sense desire.

[3:40] Well, over here you have reasonable desire, what we could call the will in English, boulesis huh? Now, if you read the Republic of Plato, he's making a comparison in there, Socrates, between the parts of the city and the parts of the soul. And he's comparing what reason, thumos I'll emphasize this, and epithumia,

[4:14] the three parts of the what. City. The rulers, right, who direct others, like reason directs the rest of us, right. The soldiers, and then the what, the laborers, the common people, right. Okay.

[4:43] Well, under the concupiscible appetite, as we call it, or epithumia, you would put such things as what, the desire for what is pleasing to the senses, right. And the opposite of that, the aversion for what is painful to the senses. So hunger and thirst and the desire to reproduce, right? These would all be under the concupiscible appetite. We talked a little bit about these before, right? These are what we call the emotions or the passions, right?

[5:21] Feelings sometimes, but the concupiscible appetite is concerned with those emotions or feelings that are directly related to what is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses. And so, if something is agreeable to my senses, I have a feeling of what, liking it or loving it, right? Basically, the same thing—liking or loving. but loving is a stronger word, obviously. And if I don't have what I like or love, I but desire or want, like.

[5:56] I'm hungry or thirsty, and so on. But then, if I get what is agreeable to my senses, I get that candy bar, piece of candy, then I have joy or pleasure, right? Okay. And then you have three emotions like that with the painful. If something is disagreeable to my senses, like I dislike salmon,

[6:21] I dislike the liver. I hate these things. And so, if I can avoid them, I turn away from them, right? I eat crackers and eat salmon. But if I'm forced to eat salmon, I say, then I have pain and sadness.

[6:48] I can't avoid. Now, why do you why aren't those enough? You see, for the animal. Well, sometimes there is a difficulty, right, in getting what you want. Sometimes there's a difficulty in avoiding, right, what you have aversion for, right.

[7:18] And sometimes something that you hate is forced upon you, right? Causing you pain, right? It might be difficult, right? So that's what the irascible appetite is for.

[7:40] So if I desire something that is pleasing to my senses, but there's a difficulty in getting it, right? Like two men want the same thing in the department store, right? And it's the last one, right? Also there, okay. Now, if you think you can

[8:03] overcome the difficulties, right? Then there arises the feeling of hope, right? If you think you can't overcome the difficulties. there arises despair. Right? If my bowl of candy or popcorn is right there, and I just reach over, help myself. Right? I don't need irascible to reach out and do that. So,

[8:32] if two men want the same woman, right, can't both have her, right? Well, then they might have a what? Fight, right? So Aristotle says the animals fight over what? Food and sex, right? Now, you have two emotions like that, in regard to that. If something is threatening me, and I'm not too sure I can overcome it, then I have a feeling of what? Fear, right? Huh? Okay.

[8:59] I remember having one of my cats on my shoulder, and the big dog went around, and the cat you know, you feel them shivering, on you, you know. You see? We're out at the lake there, and and the cat ran up the tree. You know, she was afraid of this dog. He's a big dog. He's a friendly dog. harm to the cat, but you know, We finally got the cat down from the tree, and but she ran in the house under the bed.

[9:23] We had these beds on the porch in the summer in the lake, and she ran out of the beds, and wouldn't come out for about a day or two, you know. And the first day she came out, she took off from the bed. She came to the door, he took off, saw the dog, she ran back. That's fear, right? Is it? But but no, fear does give you a little what ability to what?

[9:45] Resist, huh? Even if it's only resisting by running away, right? There's an Aesop fable there, where the one animal is chasing the other animal. Eat it, and the other animal gets away, and they're kind of laughing at the at the hunter, right? He says, "Well, it's one thing to be running for your dinner; another thing you're running for your life."

[10:05] It's amazing how fast people can run. Sometimes, you know, you have these chases by the police and so on, right? They're running to your car, right? So running does give you something, right? It does give you a some strength, right? But then you have the other side, which would be boldness, so you think you can overcome it, right? If I'm you know think I can beat the heck out of you, you know, I'm gonna be bold, you know, huh?

[10:30] Thinking you're fighting for me, you see? Now there's a fifth irascible emotion which we mentioned before, which is anger, right? And you see, if I think I can get rid of the thing that's causing me pain, then anger arises. So if you're stepping on my foot, and I say, "Hey, you're on my foot," and you say, "So what?"

[10:53] That might arouse anger, you know, and this anger gives you the strength maybe to what? Shove you off, right? Huh? One guy had a a very bratty kid living next door, right? Huh? And the kid comes over to his backyard there, and there's kind of a little. Porch or whatever it is, and there's a plant there in a pot, right? The kid's looking at the guy, and he knocks the plant over and breaks it.

[11:16] It's like I'm going to have to kill him. He's like, what? you know. So the mother was indignant, but the father applauded it. So, anger is a certain strength, right? Huh? You know, if you looked out the window and your neighbor was using your kids for target practice, you know, he'd be out there, you know, very angry, right? You see,

[11:39] one guy I know he had a gun and he looked out the window, somebody's trying to steal his car. So he started shooting. Oh, they ran away, but they'd be in big trouble. I suppose but anyway So that's why why the thumos or the irascible was seen there as being kind of characteristic of a soldier, right? Because the soldier has to be bold and courageous, and that sort of thing, right?

[12:04] The common people are more down there in the pursuit of beer and peanuts, and so on. So those are the names in Greek, and these are the names in Latin. We've kind of taken a breath from one to the other. But you're kind of naming the irascible appetite from ira, anger, right? Just like thumos in Greek is named. Thumos in Greek can mean anger, it can mean boldness, right?

[12:35] But it includes all those emotions that I mentioned: hope, despair, right, boldness, fear, anger, those five. Epithumia, the ones concerned directly with what is pleasant or painful. to the senses So in Greek, thumos would be the same word for the all of the names for one in particular. Yeah, yeah. You know, you're naming the whole from the more known, right? But notice, son, when you name this whole thing like you do in Greek, the orektikon or orexis, as he says, right?

[13:13] Or you name in Latin, appetitus, right? Or I name it desiring powers, son. But desire really is used to name one particular emotion, right? Or even one particular act of the will.

[13:28] Desire is for a good that you like or love, but don't have. So desire is not the same thing as liking or loving. It's not the same thing as joy or pleasure. But the whole thing is being named from desire because that's the one that is what most known to us. And I think this irascible is named in a way that you can see in Latin from anger, right?

[13:58] Because that's the emotion that is most manifest. When somebody's anger, that's very quickly noticeable, isn't it? Even the tone of voice changes, huh? People notice it right away, that you're angry, right? The very tone of your voice. An animal knows that too. You yell at an animal, right? An animal's doing something. A child knows that, too. Even if they don't understand your words though. Among the irascible emotions, hope arises from the desire for something that's difficult to attain.

[14:43] Wait a minute! Just a minute. The irascible arises when there is a difficulty in getting what you desire, right? Or a difficulty in avoiding what you want to avoid, or in getting rid of something that's been forced upon you, right? Okay. Now the irascible is considered in the Republic and in general to be higher than the concupiscible because it's not so much tied to the immediate, what, outward senses, huh?

[15:19] So through the irascible, you may pursue something that's actually painful to the senses, like a fight, right? A fight can actually be painful to the senses.

[15:31] So it seems to hear reason more, right? And Aristotle kind of contrasts even anger with sensual desire, let's say, right? Anger hears reason, but imperfectly. Because

[15:48] I have a reason for getting angry with you, and somehow you've done something, right? I may exaggerate it, or you know, not be too much aware of what you've done, but I seem to be hearing to some extent the reason to be angry with you.

[16:02] So through the irascible, you may pursue, right, something even that's painful to the senses, right? So the kind of it's more close to reason, right? Looking before and after, right? Okay.

[16:24] Questions about that? Well, I was just wondering among the irascible emotions, hope would arise from the desire for that which is difficult to attain, despair would come from its awareness of the inability to attain it, and fear would arise from the aversion of something that's difficult to avoid, prospective evil. Yeah. And boldness. How does boldness relate? to fear? Now, if I think, you see, if you and I want the same piece of meat, right?

[17:07] Or the same woman or something of this sort, right? Now I look at you, and I see you're kind of a weak thing, and I'm, you know, bulging with muscles and so on, you know. Then I, you know, come right over, right? The way kind of Rip Van Winkle started, not Rip Van Winkle, but the legend of Sleepy Hollow there, right? Yeah. You know, or Brom Bones is real.

[17:27] You know, he's a top athlete in the whole country, right? So anybody who challenges him, he just beat that guy, right? You see? Okay. So he's bold, right? With any competition for Katrina, is her name. You know, eventually he drives Ichabod Crane out of town, right?

[17:51] Scares the wits out of the guy right? So I mean, Ichabod Crane can maybe you know, talk or outsing him, but it's a physical contest, right? Brom Bones is going to beat the heck out of him. Yeah. So he's going to be bold, you know, with respect to him, and and. uh uh. Ichabod Crane is gonna be somewhat fearful, right?

[18:17] But notice they're bold in regards to difficulty, right? For some difficulty Katrina, because many people want her because she's lovely and she's the daughter of a rich, well-to-do farmer, there, right? huh? That's farmer, right? huh?

[18:36] There is a conflict in some which arises from. I mean, there's if if if one of these men wanted her and she wanted them, wanted to marry them, right? There'd Be no difficulty, right? But if you have two men or more than two men who are pursuing the same woman, right? Then there's a little difficulty in getting her, right? You've got competition, okay?

[19:03] And maybe you have to fight, you see? The same way animals will fight over that matter, but also they'll fight over a piece of meat or something like that. You

[19:19] put the food out there outdoors now for Moppet there in the back, you know, and sometimes another cat neighborhood comes over there, right? And of course, you know Moppet's not as aggressive, but the cat we had before, Tabitha, she was known as the queen of the Bumblebee Circle, right? And I'd seen you know a cat come in there in the backyard, you know, and Tabitha goes around the thing, and she charges like a mad woman, you know.

[19:47] Another cat just turns around, zoom get out of the yard You see Moppet doesn't do that. She's not that, she's not that bold, right? " Tabitha was afraid of nothing and nobody, right?

[20:01] When I first got, first got Tabitha, my daughter, I got her through the piano teacher, and I brought Tabitha home and had her down in the basement there, and I was kind of watching her, so I was a little bit afraid of Tabitha, the way she, you know, kind of wild, you know, you know, but I mean, you know, if you would, we tend to put the cat down the basement, you know, where the cat box is at nighttime and close the door, but Tabitha didn't want to go down there, Moppet doesn't want to go down there.

[20:31] Moppet would go, she'd go downstairs, put her downstairs. Tabitha would pick up and, you know, as soon as you started down the stairs, you know she's going downstairs. She turns out to try to bite

[20:51] you you know I'd say to my son Marcus, put Tabitha downstairs. " Thank you, though. Yeah I have to watch her. " Good job, I would say But anyways so notice, you know, another cat coming on the territory, and especially wanting to go to the same dish, right? that you're eating out of. Well, that's a little difficulty in getting what you want, right? Someone else might eat what you want.

[21:12] So you have to rise up. But if the other animal was much bigger, and you thought, "oh my Gosh, I can't do anything with it, " then you probably what? Run away, being scared. So fear or boldness, either one could arise. And you can see that you know in soldiers in battle too. I mean, sometimes the same army, the same soldiers, in some circumstances they're more bold because they're more confident in victory and so on, right?

[21:42] Other times they're more what? Fearful, right? Sometimes in a way the army panics. Sometimes. The way you used to know a lot of these things, you read about them. You know they would

[21:57] take make use of this as strategy because sometimes the men in front, you know, they panic and they run back, and then they go behind them and get panicky and they takes off, right? He has some examples of that, but sometimes they do this as a what strategy? So the guys in front would shoot, and then they give way like they were panicked, and they fall back between the lines of the guys behind them, and then they would attack forward bravely, and then the second line would pull them down.

[22:25] See, it was all part of the strategy, right? So that's why, as you see, Plato has the thumos there as characterizing the soldiers. He's putting the soldiers above the common people there, right? Of course, the Greeks would admire the virtue of courage, you know, most of all. see. But the very, the very life of the city depends upon that. So the the the irascible appetite, thumos, in a way, is the defender, right, and the fighter for what the epithumia wants.

[23:05] That's why there is no emotion arising from pleasure like there is from pain. From pain, you cause me pain, you are stepping on me, or something like that. I can get angry, right? And I am trying to repel what is causing me pain, right? But if I got what I want and I am enjoying it, no emotion and irascible arises from that There's no difficulty in enjoying the candy that you wanted or the steak that you wanted or the dish you wanted, right?

[23:36] Once you have it, right? Unless something suddenly takes it away, right? Then that'd be something bad. So these are the words in Greek then, in Plato, and Aristotle, and then the way they were translated into what Latin. Now, I think I mentioned before how music, classical music, is used as representation of these emotions in part, right? Okay. So we have Mozart, you know, letter to his father, how he's representing anger in the um, abduction from the Seraglio, Very interesting letter.

[24:22] But in general, they discovered that the major keys, right, and the minor keys, are suitable for representing different emotions. So they found out that the major keys is better representing, let's say, joy, right, and the minor key representing what? Sadness, right? Okay. So you have, let's say, what they call the heavenly twins there, Köchel 515 and 516 of Mozart, and one is sad in G minor, and the other is joyful in C major.

[25:01] But then again, the irascible appetite see, emotions like hope and boldness uh, are more represented by the major key, and anger and fear by the what? Minor key. And if you study, you know, some of Mozart's piano concertos, where you very much have a plot, and there's a turning around, you know, you actually bring back the melody in a different key, you know, drop from the major key to the minor key, right, as it goes from what hope or faint hope to despair, right?

[25:42] Okay. So if you take Mozart's two minor concertos, minor key, the C major or C minor, twenty fourth and the D minor, representations of anger there, right? Okay. Remember my old teacher, Kasurik, didn't like certain things in Mozart, He said, hey, they're all in D minor, didn't like, you know, and so

[26:12] now there's even a tendency Mozart to to identify certain major keys like D major and to some extent C major would be more used to represent boldness or hope, right? And B flat or G major Mozart used more to represent concupiscible joy, right? A major and E flat is more in between, goes either way Can't be too precise about those, right? But the greatest distinction is between the major and the minor.

[26:45] Of course, rhythm, of course, you know, is going to be involved as well as that. Other things be equal, the major key is used more to represent joy, hope, boldness. The minor key is represent sadness, right? Fear. The Don Giovanni going down to hell, right?

[27:07] It's fearful. It's in the minor key, right? Of course, the minor, the minor key, of course, too, is more, of a, um, more serious, you might say, too, right? So sometimes Mozart uses the minor key in some of the masses, right? You know, the great mass is, C minor, I think.

[27:35] Does epithumia also name one of the concupiscible appetites Yeah, yeah, Orexis. Yeah, see, you can see that even more clearly. It's another from Latin. right? Concupiscence, what does that mean? Concupiscence means a desire for what is pleasing to the senses, right? Especially in the sense of touch, right? Okay. Epithumia has that same sense in Greek.

[28:02] So how is orexis different? Doesn't orexis also name? Yeah, it would be a more broader word for desire, right? Okay, but they would use both of them? Yeah. But this this year is a little more precise, right? So in English we don't always have the more precise names for these things, right? So we borrow the Latin names. right So boulesis in Greek is the one used for the act of the will,

[28:34] And wule in Greek means what? Counsel, right? Whether it be the act of taking counsel or the counsel that liberates, right? So it names more a what? Desire that grows out of counsel, the use of reason. So it's well named in that sense. Now, if we ever have a chance to look at Thomas's treatise on love, there, right? In Latin you have the word let's say amor, right?

[29:05] And then you have the word dilectio. Well dilectio names more? The love that is in the will, and it's related to the word for what choice, dilectio. So sometimes I translate that in English by saying it's a chosen love. While amor is more like in Greek, it corresponds more to eros, right?

[29:35] And for this higher love, in Greek you have a number of words: philia, you have agape for charity and so on, various. But in English we don't have as many distinct words for love. So if you look at that famous work by C. S. Lewis, there called the Four Loves, right? Well, he's talking about. In the Greek there, he's using the Greek words there, referring to them in the text, right?

[30:04] There's four different words, right? Eros and storge and philia, and then agape, right? And eros is a very sensual love, right? That's where that word erotic, you know, that sort of thing. Amor right? The Latin amor, huh, and then you have storge, which is more the love that the parents have for the children, kind of a natural love, but not a sensual love. And then you have philia, which is what more like friendship, right?

[30:34] And then agape, which is what we call charity. So we don't have quite the distinction of words there to name the same thing, right? Name the different things. In English, not as rich as the Greek is there, maybe in Latin. So,

[31:04] so we use the word love now sometimes, you know, to mean eros. Sometimes use the word love to mean charity, right? So yeah, that's kind of.

[31:16] Equivocal to some extent, English. So sometimes you know I will call you know if you want to say the love that is in the sense appetite and the love which is in the will, how would you name those in English? You just use the word love.

[31:36] I mean the love of the will, but but sometimes I call this sense love, okay? And I call this indicating that a chosen what love, right? Okay. But in a sense, the Greek word is the sense of what? I will say deliberate love, right? Meaning a love that is the result of some deliberation of reason. I say if you look at the Greek, you know, look at the Greek word that Aristotle has there, it's boulesis right?

[32:05] And I say goes back to the word boule, right, which means counsel, right? The act of reason deliberating about something. Those two things are related, you know. In English, we have the word from the Latin council with a c i l then we have consul in the sense of s e l right, but a council, a council. I mean, the word council in this sense, you know, they have a council that maybe advises the governor or somebody, you know, or okay, but the council here is what council, really, basically the same word, right?

[32:45] But they they think about the thing they deliberate about, right? So boule is that sense in Greek, so boulesis, right? The word itself would indicate a what?

[33:00] A desire, right? That follows upon what the use of reason, right? And electio maxime is the Greek word for choice, but choice in the strict sense involves what? Some deliberation of reason. So strictly speaking, a newborn baby doesn't have choice He can't even think. huh? You know, I always refer to those words in Hamlet where Shakespeare says he's talking about why he chose really Horatio as a friend, right?

[33:36] In a particular scene there, where he's going to ask Horatio to watch the king, right? And he puts on this play within the play. You know, the play. Sorry.

[33:49] You see, the ghost of Hamlet's father has told Hamlet that he's been what killed by his uncle, right? Okay. By his father's brother, right? And what he did was to pour poison in his ear, he said. And nobody knows that except Hamlet. Been told by the ghost, but you believe a ghost? Is this the baby's father speaking to him? So he decides to have the actors reenact the scene of a murder, right?

[34:19] And then he wants to watch how the king reacts to that. So if I committed a murder, right, and nobody knew how I had done it, but I knew how I had done it, and all of a sudden the very way I had done it is being, you know, I might, you know, and of course what happens in the in the scene, the king gets up and asks to leave, right?

[34:36] Disturbed by the scene, and so Hamlet's now sure that he's guilty of this, but he wants his best friend Horatio to watch the king and see how he reacts to the scene.

[34:52] But then he says something there about why he had chosen Horatio as a friend. He says, "Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice,

[35:05] and could have been distinguished, her election has sealed before herself. " But thou hast been as one in suffering, all and the other suffers nothing. He goes on to give all these reasons why he chose it, right? Give me that man that is not passion's slave. Now, wherein my heart, in my heart of hearts, is I and thee, right? But notice what he's saying at the beginning there.

[35:27] Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, when was the soul mistress of her choice? For reason. Yeah, when it could distinguish among men, and see the order by one man is better than another man, right? You see that this man is a slave of some passion, and this man is not a slave of passion, right? And you can see that this man, who's not a slave of passion, is a better man than this man who's a slave of some passion, right?

[35:57] So until you could distinguish and you know see order, right, you couldn't really choose, right? It would just be emotional feeling you have with somebody, right? But friendship in the strict sense and involves a choice, right? So the very precise Shakespeare's words: "Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, and could have been distinguished, right, by his reason, right. "

[36:30] So if you say a chosen love, right, is one that involves some deliberation of reason. So if this word "dilectio" is taken from the word for choice "electio that's where we get our word "election", right? And Shakespeare uses that word too, right? Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice and could have been distinguished, her election, you know? In other words, for choice, has sealed before herself.

[36:58] So sometimes I call this love a chosen love, and I call the love here a sense love, right? So I can remember as a child being in church there, and the priest is talking about love, and I'm thinking of this kind of love, the love of a girl or something. And what does it mean to love God? Well, it's not a love in emotion, but it's a love that's in the will,

[37:32] right? Okay. Now the Greeks they had a separate word for the love of God, agape, right? Which is found in St. Paul and so on. In Latin they translate it as caritas, right? Caritas now has been kind of used for the exterior works of charity. You know, it's kind of lost that sense. So a lot of times they speak of you know love. They translate agape, love, and you know in the

[37:59] Greek, so this is love, they say, right? You know, because they say there is a distinct word for that kind of love in Greek or in Latin, but not apparent in English, right? So as I say, I use a phrase instead. It's called a chosen life. Aristotle is in the metaphysics. He's just comparing the philosopher at the sophist, right? And he says they differ by their choice of life, right?

[38:34] And you know the famous way of saying it is that the philosopher would rather what be wise than appear wise. He had to choose between the two, right? Why the sophist would rather appear wise than be wise. So they differ by their choice, right? Okay. So I think what Aristotle is is touching upon there is that the love of wisdom is a what? diolexia, right? It's a chosen love, right?

[39:08] So the love of wisdom is not down here. Can't be. Until your reason could distinguish between wisdom and other kinds of knowledge, right? Not until your reason could see then the excellence of wisdom, right? Could you really love it and be a lover of what? Of wisdom, right? But in Greek, you see the word philosophia. It comes from the Greek word, the word for love there is philia, right?

[39:42] It's not the word eros, okay, which would mean more a sense love, right? But since that love is more sensible, it's more known to us, right? And so you know, in contemporary life, when they use the word love, they they're thinking of eros usually, right? But it kind of stands out that kind of love, right? So if we say somebody's a lover, we're not thinking of a philosopher usually.

[40:15] We're thinking a romantic love, right? But nevertheless, you could speak of the love of wisdom, right? So you got to beware that. So before Saint Paul, the Greeks used agape. Yeah. And what would they use it for?

[40:42] Well, again, we're more familiar with the use of it in Scripture, you know. Aristotle does he use that for. me. Not particularly, I don't think. No.

[40:55] But he'll distinguish between eros and philia, right? So when he says for appetite is desire and anger and will. Well, let's say the Greek is epithumia. Which I would, if I want to make more precise, I would translate appetite as desire, and then this is sense desire, right?

[41:22] And then anger was it? It's not anger. What? See, anger seems to be a desire for what? Revenge, yeah, desire to get even, right? Okay. Was I say it doesn't include just that emotion you're talking about? thumos right. Now he's going on to give the reason why, if they have the sensing powers, they also have the desiring powers. All animals, however, have at least one of the senses, namely what?

[42:00] Touch, huh? But in whatever sensation is present, whatever has touch will also have what? Pleasure and pain, right? And we have pleasure or pain, then you have desire for the pleasure, aversion for the what? Pain.

[42:22] But whatever these things are, desire is also right. But this is appetite for the pleasant. I see there. There, the word is epithumia, okay? Which is translated desire, and he seems to consistent his translation there, right? And then when it goes on, for this is appetite for the pleasant, see, then it goes back to the word orexis right? So epithumia is the desire for what is pleasant to the senses.

[43:03] So, so in a way, the senses—that's the way the senses know good and bad by what is agreeable or disagreeable to their what senses. So they have a more limited way of knowing good and bad than reason does, huh?

[43:31] I think I mentioned how you know you get to in ethics there you get to say John Stuart Mill and the Epicureans and and the Utilitarians. For them, the whole criterion of good or bad is what? Pleasure and pain, right? Maybe they'll add to that thing, you know, the greater pleasure, the greater number, or something, right? Of course. So, um.

[43:56] But some people then attack them, saying what? That their philosophy is what? Bestial, right? And I think I mentioned how. Mill tries to reply to that. Tries to turn the

[44:15] objection against those who object, right, and say you are the beasts, right, because you are assuming that man has no pleasures that the beast doesn't have, right? Okay. Now, and there is something good in that reply, but there is still some insufficiency about it, right? See. And you know, I kind of you know improve upon Mill's. I mentioned I think before, you know, he distinguishes two kinds of pleasures, right?

[44:43] Pleasures that we share with the beast, and then the ones that only human beings seem to pursue, right? And of course, he maintains that those who have tasted both pleasures prefer the human pleasures. But just a matter of experience, you know. There is any reason for it, right? Um. Well, I say that there is really, what, following Aristotle there is three kinds of pleasures, right? There is the animal pleasures, and there is the angelic pleasures, and in between there is the human pleasures.

[45:14] And I suggested by Aristotle's remark there that the pleasures of of Mozart and the pleasures of Shakespeare and so on, these pleasures are too high for the animals and too low for the angels. See, but they're most pleasingly proportioned to man because he's body and soul, right? Okay? So the animal pleasures we share with the other beasts, although we have our pleasures of eating in a more refined way, you know, haute cuisine and so on, but cook our food and season and so on.

[45:50] But basically, we have these pleasures in common with the other animals, and then the pleasures of understanding. Pleasures of understanding God, understanding the soul, we have those pleasures in common with the angels and with God, but in an inferior way. because. We don't understand very well.

[46:11] We'll have those pleasures more perfectly once we see God, right? You know, Scripture talks about that, right? Um, but then there is these pleasures that are what human pleasures. That kind of involve the union of body and soul, union of the senses and the reason, right? So, as Mozart said, right, music can never be displeasing to the ear, if it were it would cease to be music.

[46:42] See, but I played Mozart for years for my cats. There, I don't say for them, but but they're being present there, and they seem to what completely ignore Mozart. Right. Can't get through them, right?

[46:58] Once in a while, I pretend that they, you know, that I Mozart, but I don't. Don't really seriously maintain that they do. Um. But you go out to the kitchen, right, and try to get a little sandwich meat or something out, and try to be as quiet as you know. And you look down; there's Talitha right there, looking up at you. And you're playing this music, you know, blah blah.

[47:24] I mean, loud sound, and I see right through it, you know. The tingle of wax pig or a lizard, right there. And so, oh, but so he has something to say, right? That there are pleasures that that man enjoys, right? Animals don't, right? That's a kind of a partial answer to the objection that his his philosophy is bestial, right? And you know, Plato and Aristotle talk about how the common man doesn't taste these higher pleasures, right?

[48:05] So he tends to go to some excess in the lower pleasures, and therefore it's you know. More excusable, you might say, in the in the common man than would be in the man who can taste these higher pleasures, right? But nevertheless, if pleasure is your whole criterion for judging, right, which is to be pursued, then your way of judging is still the way of judging of a what beast, right?

[48:36] See, so he's not really entirely overcoming the objection that his philosophy is a philosophy for beasts, right? See, although there is something to be said in what he's saying and worth saying, too I think,

[48:53] but reason can see other reasons, right, for loving something besides the fact that it is what pleasant or agreeable in some way to us.

[49:11] In fact, reason can see reasons why truth or justice are desirable, nothing to do with pleasure, right?