De Anima (On the Soul)
29. De Anima III.1: Why Only Five Senses, and the Accidental Perception of Shape, Motion, and Number
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[0:01] It says in something else I was reading, and I went back to this text here in the First Epistle to the Corinthians in the second chapter, towards the end there. I don't know what words you're familiar with in English, huh? But he's talking about how we're saying spiritual things to those who are spiritual,

[0:29] and in the Latin translation, then says the animalis autem homo, right? The animalis homo Animalis homo. How would you translate that into English? The animalis homo. Homo means man, of course.

[1:01] How do you translate that? Animal man, or maybe natural man, or something. I think they translate natural man, yeah. But in other cases, you might be tend to translate the animalis, the animal man, right? Yeah. Okay. That's what he says, Saint Paul.

[1:25] The animalis homo, right? Yeah. Does not receive, right? The things of the Spirit of God, right? For it is foolishness to him, right? And he is not able to know it, right?

[1:44] Because these things are judged or examined spiritually, huh? Okay. Of course, the word spiritually is pneumatikos, psychikos okay, with a word for spirit. And then he goes on to say that the spiritual man judges all things, right? But he's judged by no one else, huh? Okay. Now,

[2:12] what do you think the Greek word is here that's translated by animalis? Psychikos psychikos, right? Yeah. In other words, you tend to forget in English sometimes that anima, right? Yeah. Anima is a Latin word for soul, right? Yeah. So these are called sometimes the the De Anima, these two books of Aristotle, giving it the Latin title that it's about the soul.

[2:43] Now the Greek word for animal, right, would be I suppose zoon or something like that, which is more derived from the word for life, huh? We get the word zoology, right, the study of animals, huh? Okay. Um.

[2:59] But the as I say the Greek word corresponding to this is psychikos, which is taken from the Greek word for the soul, right? Psychikos okay. So it's saying literally the souled man, right? Or the soulish, or the souly man. how do you want to make that into an adjective, right? Yeah. Okay. And you kind of lose sometimes the flavor when you translate that if you translate it in English as the animal man, right?

[3:29] Because you're thinking of him, although it might be not necessarily false to the meaning of it exactly, you know. You're thinking of animal without reference to soul at first, right? Yeah. But here it's soul, see? Okay. Now, this is one of several places or many places I think where Thomas has to what in his commentary distinguish between the what soul and spirit, right? Oh yeah. Okay. And how do you think he goes about that, right?

[4:03] Ah. Why does Saint Paul, in a sense, call this kind of man who doesn't understand spiritual things and for whom these things are foolish, right? Yeah. Why does he call him the the souled? Sure. Ah, S O U L E D, if I can make a word out of it, right? The why does he call him that? Yeah. But Thomas goes back to the fact that the that the soul is what the form of the body, right?

[4:34] Huh. And of course, if the soul had no powers that were of the body and in the body, ah, it would just be a what spirit, right? Like like an angel, right? Okay. So he's thinking of the fact that the

[5:00] this kind of man is concentrated both in his judgment and in his desire on his bodily powers, huh? Okay. Um, I just read you a little bit from Thomas's commentary. He's trying to explain the words. Where first he says it should be considered which what man is called animalis.

[5:28] It should therefore be considered that the soul is the form of the what body. It Goes back to the very definition of the soul. Whence those powers are property of the soul, which are the acts of bodily organs, namely the what sensitive powers. Yeah. Those men therefore are called animales, using the plural, who follow these powers, right? Huh. Among which he says is the vis apprehensiva, the knowing or grasping power, right?

[6:05] And the appetitiva, the desiring power, right? And therefore, a man can be said to be animalis in two ways. In one way, in reference to the knowing power, and the and this one is said to be animal, animalis, by his sense, who, as is said in the Glossa, um, judges about God,

[6:39] either according to the what images of bodies, huh, or the letter of the law, right? Or by philosophical reasons, right? Trying to, but by philosophy, by reason alone, right? Trying to judge these higher things, which are taken according to sensitive what powers, right? So they're judging by their senses of what they can imagine, right? Or

[7:13] even the case of philosophy, by knowledge that is derived from senses and is not adequate to judging these more spiritual things about God. In another way, he says, a man is called animalis, soul, in reference to his desiring power. A man who is attracted to or affected to only those things which are according to sense desires, and such a life is called animalis. So it's not actually false if you understand an animal life in a sense, a bestial life in a sense, but you you kinda lose the piquancy there of the understanding the word animal or soul, right?

[8:05] And such a life is called animal, animalis, who, as it said in the glass, follows a dissolute, lascivious, right, soul, okay? Because the spirit ruling does not contain these things within the the limits of their natural order. Okay,

[8:45] now just skip over some this. Now later on, you see, he says the spiritual man judges of all things, and he's going to have two meanings of that, corresponding to the two meanings of the animal one.

[9:06] So he says he says that the spiritual one judges all things and he is judged by no one. Where first it should be seen what man is called spiritualis,

[9:19] and it should be noted that we are accustomed to name or to call spirits the incorporeal substances, meaning the what angels, okay, God himself for that matter. Because therefore there is some part of the soul which we haven't studied yet, but we're approaching it here in book three. Because there is some part of the soul which is not the act of some what, bodily organ, right? Namely, the understanding part, right?

[9:55] Comprehending both the understanding and the what will, which is the rational desire. Desire this part of the soul is called the what? Spirit of man, right? Which nevertheless is illuminated or enlightened according to the understanding by the spirit of God, and inflamed by the spirit of God, according to its affection and its what will, right? Therefore, a man is said to be spiritual in two ways. In one way, on the side of the understanding, the reason, right?

[10:37] The spirit of God enlightening that understanding, and according to this, the gloss says that a man is spiritual, right, who is subject to the spirit of God, and who most certainly and faithfully knows spiritual things. Another way, on the side of the what? The will, the spirit of God inflaming that will,

[11:08] and in this way, is said in the gloss that the spiritual life is one in which the, um, one having the spirit of God has a rectified soul, and so on. That's kind of interesting there to see. You know, I meditate a lot upon those words of Mary there in the Magnificat, where she says, "My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God, my Savior."

[11:47] And I'm not altogether sure as to why they use the word soul there, and the word what, spirit, right, huh? But one way of understanding it, I'm not saying necessarily the only way or even the best way, but she's magnifying the Lord by giving birth to the word made flesh, and it's her soul in a sense that gives birth, right? Because obviously the the organs of reproduction, right, the organs of giving birth, are bodily things, huh?

[12:26] And those powers, huh? So my soul magnifies the Lord, giving birth to him, right, conceiving him in her womb and so on. But in her intellect and will, she's rejoicing in what? God, huh? With those powers that are not in her body, right? But are powers of her soul, insofar as it is not entirely immersed in the body, transcends the body, and my spirit rejoices in God, my Savior, right?

[12:59] That those powers that are in the body. As such, cannot rejoice in God, my Savior. Right? There can be an overflowing, right? You know, you know, from the higher powers to lower powers, and sometimes, you know, you know, the lower powers are stimulated by by good church music or something. You know, and it affects the higher powers. But as such, directly, only the intellect and the will can have God as a what object, right?

[13:32] And therefore, those virtues that that are called theological, that have God in Himself as their object, faith, hope, and charity, they're only in the what the spirit, right? In the understanding, as faith is, or in the will, as hope and and charity are. huh? It's kind of interesting. I just I read another text. I just went back and looked at this text again. I said to me, his explanation of you know psychikos the soul man, right?

[14:04] huh The animalis homo you know, he goes all the way back to definition of the soul as the form of the body, huh? I see. And in some sense, it's more proper to the soul to be what the form of the body, right? In the else, huh? And our soul is kind of you know as the Arab philosophy says, it's on the horizon between the material world and the what immaterial world, huh?

[14:35] And so we have some powers that transcend the body, huh? And other powers that are only in the body, but if we didn't have those powers that were in the body. We wouldn't be a soul at all. We'd be an angel. We're not simply an angel, you know, in a body, but we're the soul, the form of that body. Okay.

[15:03] Yeah. So let's turn now to Book Three, huh? And in this first chapter here, Aristotle is, with some probability, but not with any maybe complete certitude, is saying that there is perhaps no other sense, outward sense, besides the five that we studied: the sense of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. And he's going to give a kind of reasons for that, but not altogether necessary reasons, huh? And based somewhat upon the theory of the four what?

[15:48] Elements, right? Huh? Okay. And he's also going to clear up a possible confusion that there's not another outward sense that knows the what? Common sensibles. Okay. Common sensibles are known by the senses that we have already distinguished the five, huh? Okay.

[16:17] And it's in the second chapter he's going to begin to to look for what? Some kind of interior, inward sense powers, huh? And we'll see how he starts to approach that, huh? Okay. So at the beginning of Book Three, Chapter One, he says that therefore there is not a sense other than the five. I mean these sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. And we looked just at the part on sight, right?

[16:48] A little bit on touch, huh? But he's gone through all five of them. Someone might believe from the following, and perhaps using the word "believe" there to indicate that his argument here is not going to be altogether what? Necessary, right? Okay.

[17:05] And he starts with the sense of touch, as if the sense of touch knows every what? Touchable or tangible quality, huh? Okay. And he's kind of going to what? Argue from part to part. Well, if that's true, that the sense of touch knows everything touchable, then it's a reasonable guess that the the eye, the sight of the visible, knows everything what? Visible, right? Huh? And the ear, likewise, huh?

[17:42] It's an argument from part to part, right? Huh? Okay. And he's taking that the sense of touch knows all the touchable qualities because those are the qualities of the elements, huh? And he seemed to know those hot and cold, wet and dry, and so on, huh? Okay.

[18:05] For if we already have sense of all things which touches the sense, for all the passions of the tangibles or touchables, as tangible are sensible to us through touch. I say he takes that because he takes in that passage that our translator translate for us, right? That the sense of touch is about the basic what material qualities, huh? Okay.

[18:37] It is necessary if indeed some sense is missing for some sense organ also to be missing in us. And whatever of these we sense when touching are sensible by touch, which we happen to have.

[18:54] Now, how about the other senses, huh? Well, the other senses are the ones that know something through a what medium, right? And of the four elements, which ones can be mediums? Air and water. Yeah, and air is more for the ear, right?

[19:19] And water is what? Somewhat for the eye, because it's in the eye. Yeah. And one or the other for a smell. Nothing here. I think definitely about that, huh? So the senses that are through a medium we seem to have all of them if they work through those what groups, huh? Okay.

[19:44] Whatever things we sense through medium and not when touching, in fact, the simple elements I mean, such as by air by water, are such that if through one we sense many sensibles differ from each other in kind, is necessary for what has such a sense, or being to be sensitive of both. If the organ is from air and air is a medium of both sound and color. in color, If however, more than this, both air and water and media of color, for both they're transparent.

[20:12] What is either of these alone will sense through, through both? Okay, now he's trying to argue here that of the four basic elements, sight. I mean, air and water seem to be the organs, right? You don't have something that's purely fire or purely earth, okay? Although in a way they come in because the sense organs need some kind of warmth, right? So they all have fire, but fire doesn't distinguish one sense from the other.

[20:47] But this is the sense that's tied up with fire, right? That's made out of fire, huh? That seems to be made out of water or air, right? Earth doesn't seem to be characteristic of one, unless you say that it pertains to touch. In so far as touch involves all the four, sense organs are from two only of the simple elements, from air and from water. For the pupil in the eye, there is a water; the organ of hearing of air; the organ of smell from one or the other of these.

[21:18] But fire is either of none, right? There's no organ that seems to be made out of fire, or in some sense is common to all. In so far as there is some need for what warmth or energy in all these senses, for nothing without some kind of heat is sensitive. But earth is either of none, or most properly mixed in what Touch. huh? The kind of used to point to the end there of

[21:51] King Lear there, when King Lear is holding dead what? Cordelia. Cordelia. Yeah. She says, "She's dead. Dead is earth. " It's interesting, right? Now sometimes you know we compare the the soul to air, right? Sometimes we compare the soul to fire, like when Othello comes in, you know, put out the light and then put out the light in that comparison he makes there. We saw a connection, likeness of fire to the soul earlier in studying the plant soul, right?

[22:29] And water has something to do with life, you know, although it doesn't usually need to be the soul of water, right? But earth seems to be what? Yeah. Yeah. She's dead. Dead is what? Earth. Dust thou art, and to dust thou shalt be turned. Now they say you're fire, and to fire you shall return. Doesn't seem to be more, doesn't it? Your air, you know. Exhale, you know, give up the ghost, give up the air.

[22:58] huh? the air goes on, but dust. Earth, huh? Without water, no life there at all, and so they don't seem to characterize any sense organ as a whole, right? Although it might be involved in the most earthly of the senses, which is touch. Hence, it remains that no sense organ is outside of water and air. But some animals, like you and me, and the cat around here, now have these, right?

[23:35] Therefore, all the senses are had by the not imperfect; those who are not yet fully developed. If the dog doesn't see, I guess, for a few days, or they're mutilated, like the blind man, or something else, right?

[23:50] For it appears that even the mole has eyes under its skin. Hence, if there is no other body and no passion, which is now the body's here, not one sense would be missing. Okay, so this is only maybe a probable argument, right? That we have all the senses, all the senses. But

[24:12] let's say you wouldn't want to push this argument as being necessary, right? You know, like the dog is supposed to hear things or smell things that you and I don't hear or smell. Even human beings claim to smell things or hear things. I don't hear sometimes or smell, right?

[24:34] Okay. Now, right after that, he's going to exclude another possible mistake. Someone might say, "Well, couldn't there be another outward sense that knows not color or sound or smell or taste or flavor and so on, or tangible qualities, but knows the common sensibles, right? " But if there was a sense that had the common sensibles, those five or six things you mentioned six here, you know,

[25:12] like the eye knows color. Well, then those common sensibles would be accidental to the other senses. But that isn't true, as he goes on to point out. So I know, for example, the the shape of this table. I know the what, the the length of this table in a way through what, color, right? And I know the shape of it through hardness, right? And the length of it in a way through hardness, huh?

[25:43] So that the common sensibles are not accidental to the senses that we already know, and therefore you don't have another sense that would have the common sensibles as its own object, right? Then the common sensibles would be to the eye eye and the sense of touch and so on, like sweet is to the eye, huh? And I see some desserts and say, gee, that looks sweet. You know, we're all going to chop.

[26:10] And I was in Quebec. You know, we'd go by the bakery there. You know, and I don't know French must have a a sweet tooth or something. and you see these cakes in there. You know, and they look just you know almost you know disgustingly sweet. You know, we could eat that. You know, but but we hadn't tasted the thing, right? Just looking at it, you know.

[26:29] But the eye doesn't really know the sweetness of it, huh? So it's still accidental to it, huh? And you're kind of guessing, you know, how it's going to taste. But because you have remembrance of tasting things that look like that, huh? But this is not the way the eye or sense of touch knows what. The the shape of this table, right? I see the shape of this table in a way that I don't see the sweetness of the chocolate cake or whatever it is.

[27:01] Do you see that? Okay. That my eye doesn't, as such, know the sweetness, huh? And therefore, if the kid put you know salt in the sugar bowl, and I had added sugar to my coffee or something, which I don't, but I did, my eye would be completely deceived, right? And I wouldn't until I tasted. Oh my gosh, you did put salt in the sugar bowl, right? But the eye would be deceived because it doesn't know that,

[27:30] huh? For neither can there be some proper organ of the common sensibles, which we sense by each sense accidentally, like motion, standing, standing in the sense thereof, rest, shape or figure, magnitude, number. and notice he adds the word one here, right? huh? But that's kind of the first meaning of one for us is the continuous, huh? This is, I would say, one piece of chalk, right, huh?

[28:01] But if I broke this in half, I'd say it's what two pieces, right? You know, Socrates joke all the time when he asks somebody for definition, he's looking for one thing, a definition, and they give him many examples. And he he always jokes, you know. I guess there was a Greek joke, you know, when you pass somebody a plate and you drop it and it breaks. I asked for only one one thing, and you gave me many.

[28:28] But I mean, notice once the plate is broken and you got all these pieces there, you don't have one thing anymore. You've got many things, right? But so long as it's continuous, this is one glass. Sometimes, you know, Aristotle points out different ways that we think that the infinite exists in some way, right? But one way, and the most basic way for a number, is that it arises from the division of the what, continuous, huh?

[28:58] And therefore, you know, you get to study the Trinity, for example, later on. You'll see how careful Thomas is when you talk about three persons, huh? That that number three is not an ordinary number three, huh? Because number in the ordinary sense arises from the division of the continuous, and there's nothing continuous in God. He's not continuous. He's altogether simple, right? So what does three mean there?

[29:25] huh? We won't be studying the Trinity today, but it's not the three that we talked about when I was in grade school, right? Okay, probably religion class we did, but not the ordinary three we talked about in in mathematics, huh? But there's another kind of infinity, huh? That Aristotle says comes from the mind, huh? And it's the ability of the mind to say something is itself, right?

[29:54] And so I can say that Socrates is what Socrates, huh? And now that one man appears twice in the what statement, and I can say that the statement Socrates is Socrates is Socrates is Socrates, huh? And I can say that this whole thing is itself, right? You can always say something is itself, right? So how many Socrates can I get?

[30:27] Many as you want. Yeah, yeah, but that's a purely what mental infinity, huh? While the the Greeks, when they studied numbers, they were talking about a multitude that arises from a division of the continuous. This doesn't arise from the division of the what continuous, huh? Purely mental thing, huh? Doesn't have really a foundation things in that way. I can do that with God. I said God is God, and the statement God is God is the statement God is God, and the statement God is God is God is God is in fact the statement God is God is God is God, and I could have as many gods as the Hindus have or somebody else, right?

[31:13] Huh? But that's it's a purely what mental thing, huh? De Koninck was pointing that out, huh? Because you've heard Bertrand Russell's objection to the axiom that the whole was more than the part. What he did was was to take numbers, and he, for him, you know, one represents a number. He says you take all the the numbers, right? And you double each one of them, and so you got two, four, six, eight, ten.

[31:54] You can always have an even number for every what number. I can go on forever in the series of all the numbers, right? Yeah. And I can go on forever matching them with an even number. Therefore, the even numbers are equal to all the numbers, and therefore a a part of all the numbers, right? Even numbers are equal to all the numbers. Says that's pretty Russell's refutation of the of the axiom that the whole is more than the part, huh?

[32:33] Of course, but you don't really have the same what two here over here. We have a. He kind of said, "You know, I can do just two. "

[32:44] You can make two out of every one of these, right? Okay, but notice what you're doing is is is what going back to this mental multiplication, right? It's not the same two, right? Okay, you've got two twos, right? Or four twos, or eight twos, or you know, can go on forever, just twos, but it's not the same two. Okay.

[33:11] Your your head is kind of sterile. So if he has this two over here outside of the two over here, it's not the same two. But where is the multiplicity coming from? It's coming from the the mind's ability to what come back upon itself.

[33:34] It's like when when you say you know, I know what a triangle is, and I know that I know what a triangle is, and I know that I know what a triangle is. I know that too. And the mind can always come back upon itself. The mind never gives out, right? It's not particularly fruitful infinity, but it's a characteristic of the mind to be able to do that.

[34:01] I mean, the first thing that Anaxagoras said about the mind is that it's what infinite, huh? Okay. But there are some infinities that are more fruitful than other ones, huh? I mentioned how Faurbach, right, when he wrote the essence of Christianity, Faurbach is the thinker comes between Hegel and Marx and Engels, right? And Marx and Engels, as young men, read Faurbach with enthusiasm, huh? Well, Faurbach says the essence of Christianity is not that God became man, but that man himself is God.

[34:39] And of course, the the syllogism basically that he has is that the mind of man is what infinite, and the theologians, of course, theologians say the infinite is God, therefore man's mind is God. Well, I mean, there's all kinds of meanings of the word infinite, right? And he's got more than one kind of mistake there. He's got you know fallacy of equivocation there. He's also got the fallacy of simply in some way, because God is is simply in every way infinite, our mind in just some way.

[35:16] But um uh Bertie's doing something like that, see. But he's he's taking a different two, right? But just a mental multiplication of two so but it kind of inflated him when he said, I can do that with just two alone, right? Because I can multiply two as much as I want. Two is two, right? And two is two is the statement two is two, and that whole statement is itself, and so on forever, right?

[35:51] So I can multiply twos as much as I want to, but I'm multiplying twos, right, mentally, and therefore it's not the same two. Therefore, it's not the part; it adds up to the what whole, right? But anyway,

[36:19] you know, some people try to understand the infinity of number by this kind of mental thing, right? But then it's it's a different kind of number than we have arising from the division of the what continuous, huh?

[36:38] It's that number that arises from the division of the continuous that really was the subject of of what arithmetic in ancient times. Whence it is clear, he says, at the bottom of twenty six, that it is impossible for there to be a proper sense of any of these of these common sensibles. For if that were so, it would be thus, just as how we sense the sweet by sight, like I was mentioning earlier here, two seventy one.

[37:17] This is because we happen to have the senses both. Whenever they are come together, we know them. But if not, we would sense in no way except accidentally, as the son of Cleon, right? Which is altogether accidental to the senses, right? Not because he's a son of Cleon, but because he is white. What happens to the white to be the son of Kleon, huh? You notice what he's saying there?

[37:45] what he's reasoning there, right? If the common sensibles were the object as such of some other sense besides these five, then to these five it would be altogether what accidental, right? Just as sweet is accidental now to the sense of sight, but that's not our experience of sensing, right? It's through color that I know, you know, the shape of this book, right? Because the green goes this far and then stops, right?

[38:19] Okay, the green is spread out. Okay. He takes the famous example there of bile. Okay, but I prefer the example of sugar and salt.

[38:39] Okay. I think there's something interesting here about the fact that the common sensibles are known by more than one sense, because this seems to me to be the fundamental example

[39:08] and easiest to see of the fact that it is possible in our knowledge, right, for the same thing to be known in two different ways. So it's possible, for example, that

[39:28] shape could be known through color by the eye and through hardness by the what hand, right? The surface of the table could be known through color by the eye and by the sense of touch through hardness, huh?

[39:51] Okay. If you're taking steps, I could maybe count them, right, through my ears as your feet hit the ground. But if I was watching you, I could see your feet hitting the ground, huh? Okay.

[40:13] So that's an important fact of our knowledge that sometimes we know the same thing, right, in two different ways. Now, when Thomas Aquinas, for example, in my favorite book, the Summa Contra Gentiles, I don't know if you looked at the Summa Contra Gentiles, but it's divided a little bit differently than the Summa Theologiae, huh? And what's explicit in the Summa Contra Gentiles is that Thomas separates those things that can be known about God, etc.

[41:01] by reason as well as by faith, right? From those things that can be known about God only by what faith, right? faith, right? And so the first three books of the Summa Contra Gentiles are about what can be known about God in Himself, and God is the Maker, and God is the End, and the and His Providence by reason as well as by faith. So in all the chapters in those three books, Thomas will give reasons taken from philosophy.

[41:38] For what is being said, and then he'll what quote sacred scripture in confirmation of the same thing. But then he gets to the fourth book, right? He takes up the Trinity and incarnation and things of that sort. Then he he doesn't do that because here he's dealing with things that can be known only by faith, okay?

[42:06] So that's an important thing to realize. But I mean, that's a difficult thing to see—the thing about faith and reason, right? But you should begin with this example that we have here—the common sensibles, right? It's possible to know shape by the eye, and it's possible to know that same shape by the touch, huh? But they don't know the same thing in the same way, but they do know the same thing,

[42:34] okay? In in all the the crazy argument that I get nowadays, and you get into debates about abortion and things of the sort, huh? They say, well, that's the religious thing, right? Because the the magisterium of the church has condemned abortion and contraception and things of these sort. Therefore, this is you know, you're imposing religion upon me or something if you try to enact this in in law or something like that, right?

[43:12] But I mean, it's like they're assuming that if religion or if the the church has something to say about this, which is nothing to say, you know, about about what the water is H2O, right? They don't think the church is ever pronounced on that or ever will, do you think? You know, so that's a matter of science, eh, and reason. But whatever the church has pronounced on or pronounces on, that is ipso facto by a very fact, right?

[43:45] A matter of faith and not of philosophy or reason, right? Well, that's ridiculous, right? It is possible that the same thing, right, can be known in different ways, huh?

[44:01] And when you have two different ways of knowing, they probably will not overlap entirely. That wouldn't make any sense, would it? I mean, there's some things that the eye knows that the sense of touch doesn't know, like the color of the object, right? And it's something that the eye, the sense of touch knows, like the hardness of the table, right? That the eye doesn't know, right? But what it knows primarily, it knows something else, huh?

[44:33] Do you see that? Okay. I'm going to see an example of this later on here in the study of living things because Aristotle, from inward experience,

[44:49] in this next chapter we'll see, he's going to be reasoning from inward experience that the five outward senses come back to a common what? Center. Okay.

[45:05] He's going to reason from things that we experience within ourselves, right? That they must come back to a common center. Let's see the way he reasons there. Now, when somebody takes apart, right? You know, that's anatomy in a human being, right? He might find that the eyes and the ears and maybe the senses and nerves in some way go back to the brain or something, right? Okay.

[45:35] And you'd be knowing the same thing, but in a what? Different way, right? Okay. And but it's not at the same time surprising also that there'd be some things known by inward experience that are not known at all by what? Outward experience. And vice versa, that there are some things known by anatomy and outward experience that are not known at all by what? Inward experience, huh?

[46:11] Maybe some things they they we try to cooperate the two, you know. And if they stimulate this part of the brain and say, "Well, what are you? Oh, I'm experiencing sweetness, or I'm experiencing red, or something," you know, you see me, you know, or you know, if there's an injury, you know, to one part of the brain and someone can't talk anymore or something, you know, then they start to tie up, right?

[46:33] Huh? Certain things, huh? Um. So when Aristotle, you know, reasons too, you know, that the earth example is a sphere, right? Well he reasoned partly because of the nature of Earth, right, to seek the center. But he also reasons for the fact that the Earth, when it comes between the Sun and the Moon, it casts a circular what? Shadow upon the Moon, right? So it's kind of a more mathematical way of of showing it, huh?

[47:08] So it's possible in even in you know the study of natural things that the same thing like the sphericity of the Earth, right, might be known, right, by a more natural middle term and by a more mathematical term, right? Right. So there's going to be many important examples starting from what? This example of the common sensibles, right? That the same thing can be known sometimes.

[47:42] Are two different kinds of knowledge, right? Okay, that's that's the first example, right? The last one is faith and reason, right? See, but the other ones in between, right? And we'll see one here now. Things are very striking, you know, that from inward experience we can deduce, right, that the outward senses come back to a common center.

[48:09] There's some kind of knowing in us, which he's going to point out in the next chapter, which reveals to us, and which we couldn't have unless the senses came back to a common center. But that might possibly be known by anatomy to some extent also, right? Okay,

[48:40] and sometimes. And sometimes too, you know, you wonder. It's possible to give sometimes more than one reason for the same statement. That's kind of interesting, right? But there's more than one reason for that statement.

[49:10] More than one reason why we should come into philosophy from its natural beginnings, if you recall. The reasons for that, right? One reason is going to be that we what understand the thing best if we follow it from its beginning, right? Another thing may be is that we acquire what is not natural through what is natural.

[49:38] It's kind of interesting, right? That a reason, right, might see the truth of some statement by from different reasons, huh? You can see that if you read, you know, you know Euclid, you know, or look at Heath's notes and so on, right? Sometimes he'll give you a what? Alternate proof. Yeah, yeah. And you know the the theorem that interior angles of a triangle are two right angles.

[50:11] Well, after you know the parallel theorem, you can do that. But when I first learned it, maybe not through Euclid, I would draw a straight line through the vertex here, parallel to the what opposite side, and then by the parallel theorem, you know these two angles are equal.