De Anima (On the Soul)
35. Reason Is Most Man; What Imagination Is Not (Aristotle's De Anima, Reading 5)
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[0:04] Okay, we're on page 33 there at 304, which is the beginning of the fifth reading of Thomas. So this is the the fifth and the sixth readings here, which take up the rest of this chapter,

[0:26] will bring us right to the door of reason. As Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics, reason more than anything else is man. I sometimes ask the students, you know, which is more you, your reason or your emotions? Of course, their first tendency is to say their emotions. And then I try to recall the experience you know of getting angry or something like this and saying something they wish they had not said, and they cool off and they come back and they apologize.

[1:05] You know, the next day, I'm sorry about what I said yesterday. You know, I wasn't myself yesterday, and I lost control of myself. But something was in control of you yesterday, namely anger, right? So when the emotions are in control, supreme control of you, then you've lost control of yourself. And that's not something just the philosophers say; everybody says that. But when reason is in control, my other example is that you're in the bar there, and Joe's about to get in a fight with a guy, and you see trouble and say, Joe, get control of yourself. Right, and you're kind of holding Joe back from starting the fight.

[1:44] But something is in control of Joe, right? Anger or some other emotion, and he's about to get into a fight and so on. But then Joe is not in control of himself, and that's a sign that what we think that reason is more than anything else. You, right? When reason is in control, you are in control. When anger is in control, you are have lost control of yourself.

[2:10] That shows that reason is more you than what emotion, huh? The other example I give is other things being equal, where you, as a member of the jury or the judge or whatever it is, consider a crime of passion, right? If someone, you know, anger is aroused, man comes home and finds a man with his wife or something, and kills the man, or a premeditated murder, huh?

[2:42] Which do you judge more severely? I mean, both obviously severe, right? But other things being equal, the premeditated murder, everybody would judge as a member of the judge or jury more severely, as if you are more responsible for a premeditated murder because you had time to what think it out. Think about it, right? And you really have been planning to murder so and so and using your reason and really choosing to do so, right?

[3:11] And when you do something suddenly out of emotion, you seem to have reason less involved, right? Okay. So reason more than anything else is man, but you know, students want to say, "it, "First of all, my emotions identify with their emotions, but it's not really them, most of all."

[3:39] Or sometimes I ask them, you know, if you're in want to start a fight, you're more apt to start a fight by saying to somebody you're wicked, or by saying you're stupid.

[3:52] And for some reason, it seems that although it's worse to be wicked than to be stupid, they're more annoyed by being called stupid than be by being called wicked, huh? They sometimes rejoice in their wickedness, right? Their evilness, huh? Okay. As if they somehow identify themselves more with their reason than even their what heart where their wickedness is, huh?

[4:25] But we won't get to reason until next time. right? We've got to do five and six today, and here our staff is going to stop now and talk about what imagining is, huh? Or what imagination is. In Greek, you have the word what phantasia okay? Phantasia Okay. And in the first of these two readings, uh number five, is starting in three oh four, He's going to argue what imagining is not.

[5:05] And then at the beginning of the sixth reading, which begins in your text there at number three eighteen, he's going to be saying what imagining is.

[5:24] So 304, he says, but concerning understanding, since it is different from sensing, as we saw in the previous reading. While of this, one seems to be imagination, following upon sensing, and the other belief. Now, determining about imagination, then later on we'll speak about the other, right? Okay.

[5:53] If therefore he says, imagination is that according to which we say some image comes to be in us. And if we do not mean something metaphorically.

[6:07] Perhaps an English you could say we say what, it appears to me right. It seems to me right, huh? You seem to be making some kind of what, discernment, right, between the truth and the false, right, true or the false, some kind of judgment, huh? If that's true, he says, it is some one power habit, and he leaves that kind of open the open, whether he's talking about a power or a what, habit, a disposition of some power.

[6:42] Of those according to which we discern and speak truly, huh? And speak falsely. And the next sentence there in the Greek, there you don't have the word powers, right? He just says, and these are. So these the refers back to power or habit, right, huh? Okay. And the translator there stuck in the word powers, but it's not in the Greek, right? Okay. So he's saying the powers or habits, huh?

[7:18] By which we discern between things, distinguish between them, and speak either true or false. These powers seem to be, or not these powers, but quoting the translator now, these are sense, opinion, science, and what understanding, huh? Now,

[7:42] he's mentioning these because they were clearly identified before, at least by what. Plato, right? And you know how Plato was kind of a follower to some extent of the Pythagoras, huh? He learned from many people, but Pythagoreans were always using numbers, right? And everything, according to Pythagoreans, was numbers. And Plato saw some truth in this, huh? Even Aristotle sees some truth in this when he talks about in the ninth,

[8:21] Not the ninth book, the eighth book of wisdom, right? And sometimes these four were identified by Plato or were tied up with one, two, three, and four. Okay. Now it's not too clear exactly why the Pythagoreans and others wanted to go to one, two, three, and four.

[8:57] But they do add up to what ten, right? No one knows exactly why we count to ten and start over again. Ready? One, two, three, and four. And in the first book, which we didn't read much of, in the first book, these four, Plato connects with the one, two, three, and four, and understanding

[9:29] with one, right? episteme, if you want to translate that by, uh science, you could, right? Okay, A, reasoned out knowledge, right? Science, or science in the sense of a reasoned out knowledge, that's two.

[9:54] Three is what opinion, and four is what sense. Sense, okay. Now what the Pythagoreans were doing, huh, was trying to reduce everything to numbers, and so they're trying to explain everything by numbers. And perhaps this expression you still have, I got your number, is Pythagorean in origin, right? And you and I would be a lot more understandable if there was some number to explain. So sometimes I joke about that.

[10:39] Always felt an affinity the number five. Maybe that's the number that explains me. I don't know why I got this attraction to five, but likeness is the cause of. love, right? So, and so they would have even. You have an opinion of Pythagoreans that the soul is a self-moving number,

[11:02] and they would try to find a number for the different virtues. And so I say to the students, "Do you think the virtue of justice is an odd number or even number? What do you think?" Even. Yeah. Of course, we see that, you know. If you go to the store and you buy something for me, we're going to settle, you know. And I say, "Are we even now, right?

[11:22] Okay. " Are people going to, you know, get even with somebody, right? In the name of justice or supposed justice, I'm going to get even with you, right? Okay. Um.

[11:35] So they try to see a likeness between numbers and things, right? And uh by ingenuity in this. Now, in what ways are likeness between these four numbers and these four

[11:58] habits or powers whereby we judge? Understanding here is referring to something that we know without having to think it out or reason it out. Something that we kind of naturally know. Like everybody knows that a whole is more than what a part, right? then? Okay, so that's like one, right? You see, odd one. Science, the reasoned out knowledge, is something that you have in a demonstration in geometry, where you reason from what the premises to the conclusion.

[12:32] So you have two here, right? Opinion, you're not too sure, right? So in the case of opinion, maybe you have a reason to think it is so, and a reason to think it is not so, right? So your basis could lead to two things, yes or no. So that's represented by what? Three.

[12:59] Okay. Right here in geometry, say when you have science, you reason from your premises to the conclusion. In an isosceles triangle, the angles opposite equal sides are equal, right? You don't at all reason to the opposite, do you? But in opinion, where you're not sure, you might say, "Well, I see some reason to think it is so, and reason to think it is not so." So in the dialogue called the Meno, right?

[13:31] Socrates reasons that virtue can be taught, and then he reasons that virtue cannot be taught, right? You don't do that in epistēmē you're in science. Euclid doesn't reason. For the

[13:47] reason why those angles should be equal in the isosceles triangle, right, and the reason why they may not be equal, right, he just comes down on one side, right? Okay. So it's one to one. Here it's one to what? Two. Okay. Now, why is four represent the senses? Yeah. Then premises and two possible conclusions.

[14:15] Yeah. Opposing. Yeah, yeah. Here you reason from your premises to only one of contradictory statements, right? Yeah. But in the Meno, when he doesn't know for sure, he reasons from his premises to virtue can be taught, and he reasons to it cannot be taught. So you have three, right? Premises and the two opposite conclusions.

[14:44] Now, why does four represent the senses? That's kind of subtle. What is the likeness there? It's a little different. The basis there for four here. The body. Yeah, yeah. If you stop and think about it, right? Two points

[15:07] determine a what? A line, say a straight line, right? Now, if you have a third point that's not on that line, you connect them. Maybe you have a what? See, surface, right? If you get a fourth point that's not on this surface, and you connect them, you now have a what? A body, right? Okay. And the senses are what? Bodies, right?

[15:37] So four represents what? Body, are you done? A certain connection. You need four points to specify a body, right? Two points, all you do is specify a line, right? Three points, a what? Surface, huh? If they're not on the same line, but not a body yet, right? Need a fourth point

[16:05] to connect with them. It's off that surface, and then you have a what? Body, are you done? Could you also say because they're bodily and bodily and material? That same thing, you know, in a way. Sure. I didn't actually hear all that you said about number one. Okay, but here you see you're not reasoning from one thing to another, right? So it's represented by something obvious right away.

[16:34] A whole is more than a part. Here you have to reason from something to something, right? So you have two, right? What you reason from, what you reason to. Here you have not only a reasoning from something, but you reason from something to two different things. It is so and is not so, right? Here you're not reasoning at all, but you have a body, right? And four is the number of points you need to what?

[17:03] Specify a body, right? Okay. Would the number one then be what we've been considering as equal to say natural understanding? Yeah, natural understanding. Yeah,

[17:19] natural understanding. We are still just called understanding because it's understanding without anything else, so to speak. Okay. And so in Greek they sometimes call it nous, understanding. Latin Thomas would call it habit intellectus, right? Okay.

[17:41] So some of these things are not really. This is not really, as Thomas points out, the power of reason, the power of understanding, because then you wouldn't divide it against these things that I didn't. But these are different dispositions or different

[18:01] habits or conditions of reason, right? Of the power. Yeah, but this here might name a power, right? Yeah. So that's why he's kind of says

[18:16] it is some one power habit of those according to which we discern to speak true to speak falsely, and as I mentioned, the translator stuck in the word power is, but Aristotle in the Greek there just says these are right. He uses the preposition, right? I mean the pronoun, right? And so these refers back to what? These powers are habits, right? Yeah. Okay, because sense seems to name more a power, and opinion and science, very definitely name more a habit or disposition, and natural understanding could be used sometimes to name power, but maybe here it's used more to name the natural understanding that disposition or habit.

[19:01] Okay. So in three o six now he's going to start first of all and argue against it being what sense or sensing. That therefore it is not sense is clear from the following, and he's going to eliminate it's being what science or understanding. He's going to give a common reason for that, and then finally he's going to come down to opinion, which it seems most of all to be like, right?

[19:37] And he's going to kind of somewhat repeat what he'd said in the earlier reading we saw last time. That therefore it is not sense is clear from the following, for sense is either a power or an act like sight or seeing, but something appears even though neither of these two is present. The things in sleep, the ones not usually at least as power, right? A little confusing there, but he's certainly not sensing right when he sees us.

[20:07] Okay. Had a dream the other night. I must have seen a little bit of John Paul the Second thing, you know, the Weigel thing, you know, the you know piece in his book, right, his biography. Then I had a dream about John Paul the Second, and you know how you dream, I just like before you wake up, and we were in the library there, see, and John Paul is apparently trying to get out of the the crowd, so to speak, right, and he's kind of gone back into the stacks like you have in the library, and he had a tabernacle in there.

[20:40] Oh man. Yeah. And. I don't know if you saw me. I was kind of observing him, you know, on the corner. And the tabernacle was there, and he was singing to the tabernacle, "Pange Lingua."

[20:55] And then all of a sudden, he started talking about the the games on the football or baseball games, right? My wife had turned on the little radio next to the thing there, and I was just waking up with that thing. And the voice on the radio seemed like it was John Paul II. All of a sudden, he stopped talking, about, you know, singing "Pange Lingua" and he was giving me these things.

[21:21] but there originally I was not sensing, right? I was just what imagining. So imagining seems to be something different from what sensing. Again, he says, sense is always present on the animals, but not imagination. Now there he's talking about the power of sense, right? That's always present, but not imagination. So we're not always dreaming and so on. But if it is the same as a sense and act, it would happen that imagination is in all beasts, but it seems not to be as in ants and bees and worms.

[22:06] I'm not sure if that's true or not. But Aristotle is thinking of the fact that some animals seem to act in regard only to what is actually what present to them, right? And other animals seem to what act on the basis of some kind of what memory, right? So they seem to have a more developed what imagining, huh? Because they act on these images, right? Which I'll talk about later on again, as if they were sensing, them.

[22:42] So you know, when an animal sets off for the place where the it goes hunting, right? Yeah. It's not sensing that area right now, right? But it's remembering it, right? And so it has images, more developed images, whereby it lives. Okay.

[23:01] I say perhaps the main argument is from dreams, because there it's very clear, right? That the man is not sensing, right? But he's what imagining, so they don't seem to be the same thing, right? Okay.

[23:23] Again, he says the senses are always true, while imaginings are more often false. And so we speak of false imagination as being the chief cause of what deception, right?

[23:39] That's interesting. When there's an accident, there's four or five witnesses to the car collision or something like that, right? Yeah. Policemen and other people know from experience that you've got to get these people to write down what they saw as soon as possible. And if they write down right after it happened what they saw, there'll be much more agreement among the witnesses. But if you ask them the next day what they saw, you start to get this what divergence, right?

[24:18] And that's a sign that they're kind of what following the images, right? That are left over in them, right? But they're somewhat what distorted, huh? And not as what accurate, huh? Okay.

[24:45] And indeed, he says, and I'm talking about this idea, the senses being true. And indeed, we do not say when we are working with certitude in regard to sensible that this appears to us to be a man, but rather when we sense not clearly, then it is either what true or false.

[25:07] Notice how we use in English the word what it seems right. It appears to me right. But I wouldn't say now, you know, it appears to me that you are sitting there right. I mean, it's clear, right? That you're sitting there, right? I'm not really in doubt of that, huh?

[25:33] So he's talking about this incertitude or lack of certitude that there seems to be in what imagining, right? Okay. But sometimes you use that for the senses too. if you see something at a distance, right? There seems to be a man up there, right? There seems to be a dog up there or something else up there in the hill, right? It's not very clear, right? Okay. So it seems to be a difference then between the senses in their certitude when you sense something, and when you what imagine something, right?

[26:09] And it seems or appears to you to be so, right? So he's that's another way he's distinguishing the two. And what we said earlier, then something appears even when the eyes are what closed, huh?

[26:31] Okay, so he's first of all eliminating that imagining is simply what the sense or sensing. And now, very briefly, he's going to eliminate both of these together. And what's the reason he gives for saying it's neither natural understanding nor is it demonstrated knowledge, reasoned out knowledge. If you have a geometry. if you have a real demonstration, it's true. It's necessarily true, right? And so for natural understanding for natural understanding, but the images are often what false.

[27:11] You see things, huh? As he said. So in three twelve, then he's eliminating those two. But indeed, neither will imagination be one of the powers which are always true, like science or understanding. Again, question there, the translation there, powers. For imagination is also false, huh? It remains, therefore, to see if it is opinion, because that's the one that it would seem to resemble the most. For opinion comes to be both true and what, false, right?

[27:54] Now, this is perhaps not a bad translation. The Greek word there for conviction is pistis, the same word you have for faith, right? But it's not obviously supernatural faith he's talking about here, right?

[28:09] He's talking about the mind being what, believing something, right? Being convinced of it, right? For one cannot be opining things of which one does not seem to have conviction. So does the other animals seem to have opinions about things which they are convinced?

[28:44] However, conviction is present in that one of the beasts, while imagination is in what, many of the animals, right? All the higher animals. Now the second reason he gives, Thomas says in the next paragraph, is kind of backing this up.

[29:05] He says moreover conviction goes with every opinion, by having been persuaded goes the conviction, and reason goes with persuasion. So he's saying if you have an opinion and you're convinced of it, right, it's because you've been persuaded that opinion, and you've been persuaded that opinion by reason, right? You don't really have conviction without reason, but the other animals don't have reason. Therefore, but they do have imagining, right?

[29:35] Therefore, imagining cannot be what, opinion, right, which is tied up with belief and persuasion, and therefore reason. Okay. Now at that point he's eliminated all four of these, right? And now he comes to an opinion that you, another estimate, that Plato has in the in the Sophist, the dialogue upon the Sophist, right? And it's kind of interesting here because Plato is talking there about imagining, but maybe has only these four kinds of knowing, right?

[30:19] So what is this imagining? And so Plato says it's kind of a what, combination of opinion and sense. It's a kind of what, opinion tied or based upon some kind of sensation.

[30:39] Well, that's getting fairly close to what imagining is, because Aristotle will say in the next reading, imagining originally is a motion produced by the senses, where the senses are moving something more within us. But Plato's thinking of imagining as being kind of an opinion you have when you're sensing. Now Aristotle's going to reject that idea.

[31:11] Is apparent, he says, 3: 15, announcing his intention. It is apparent through the following things. Therefore, that imagination would be neither opinion with sense, nor opinion to sense, nor an entwining of opinion and sense.

[31:32] Now, why does he reject that? Well, first of all, he sets down, "Oh, does it have to mean? huh It Would have to mean that your."Opinion was about what you sense, right? And he's going to show the difficulty in that. And it is clear that the opinion, huh, is not of another thing in this case, but of that. If it is of which there is sensation, I mean that imagining in this opinion of Plato, right, is the entwining of the opinion of white and the sensation of white.

[32:08] For surely it, it surely is not from the opinion of the good and the sensation of the white. Therefore, imagining is opining just what is sense, not what accidentally, huh?

[32:25] That's got to be supposed. His argument's going to get interesting. He's saying that if imagining is an opinion based on sense or from sense, it's going to be an opinion about the very thing you what sense, huh? Okay.

[32:46] But now in the next paragraph, he's taking a common example, where something that you sense seems to be right, such and such, but you think your opinion is that it's not such and such. Okay, that's his example here. Maybe we can get another example of it. But indeed, the false appears about that of which, at the same time, one has a true belief, huh?

[33:21] For example, the sun appears to be a foot in diameter, but one is convinced that it is greater than the what inhabited part of the earth, huh? If we just look at the sun sky, it seems to be, you know, I can block it out with my hand, right? Doesn't seem to be very big, right? But I think that the sun is what larger than the earth, huh?

[33:45] That's my opinion, right? So, what would be my, if you say my imagining or it seeming to me to be smaller than it is, is that another opinion tied

[34:04] with my sensing of it? Well, then I'd have at the same time I'd be have the opinion that it is no bigger than my hand or smaller than my hand, and that it's what bigger than the earth, right? How could I have these two opinions at the same time?

[34:22] Okay, I couldn't really. Could I? Seems that you could. You could. Not sure about either. Yeah, I know, but I mean, if I'm if I believe one of these things, right? See, if I believe that the sun, I don't really know. I, you know, how do I know? If I've been told this and so on, I believe that the sun is larger than the earth, right? But it seems to me, I look at it; it's smaller than the earth, right?

[34:46] Okay. So that seeming is that another opinion. Seems, it seems so, right? There seems to be an opposition now between my opinion and what seems to be so, right? Okay. So he's going on to explain that. Therefore, the thing remaining, if he actually started to think right that it is no bigger than the earth, right, or smaller than the earth, it happens either that the true opinion which he had is left behind him, right.

[35:22] Though he neither forgets his opinion, right, nor is he persuaded otherwise, or else if he still has it, it is necessary that the same thing be both true and false. But it would become false when it escapes notice that the thing is changing. Imagination, therefore, is not some one of these, nor is it false. from these. He's saying a man changes his opinion, or sometimes gives it up when he forgets his opinion, right, or when he what has a reason to give it up, right, or when the thing itself has changed, right.

[35:54] But in this case, how would he give his true opinion that the sun is larger than the earth, right, when it appears to him to right to be smaller than the earth, right, if he hasn't forgotten his true opinion and he hasn't thought that the moon has suddenly, earth, the sun has suddenly shrunk or something, right? Nor does he think he has some reason to think that it's false, right?

[36:22] Okay. Now take the simpler example here with the optical illusion. Take the simplest one that we all know. Apparently, there's a whole art of optical illusions. One time years ago, the psychology department put on an exhibit in the library of all these ways of making lines appear to be longer or shorter than they are, or to be bent when they're straight and so on, right? Okay. But suppose, just take a simple example of this.

[36:58] Suppose you draw two straight lines exactly what equal, right? Okay. Then you do something like this. No, the one on top now seems to me what longer than the one below, right? Do I think? Is it my opinion that this is longer than that? No. No. So if it's seeming the one on top longer than the one below, if that was an opinion, right? Yeah. Connected with my sensation of this, and what happens to my true opinion that these two lines are in fact what equal, right?

[37:57] Why would I be giving up that opinion now, think that they're unequal? If I didn't forget that you know the opinion I had and had reason for for thinking they're equal, right? When I first do that, and when I don't think that what this line has been shrinking, I'm using the thing is shrinking, right? And

[38:24] so I have now a true opinion that these two lines equal, even though they seem not to be equal, and one seems to be longer, right? That kind of a sign that my seeing is not really what my thinking, my opinion.

[38:46] Now in English, as they say, we often use the word thinking for what not being sure that something is so, right? Or maybe declined that way, right? Or we have that. So someone says to me now, will George Bush, let's say, have a second term, right? I might say, I think he will have a second term, right? I think he will be reelected. Do you know he'll be reelected?

[39:21] And I say, no, I don't know he's going to be reelected, right? I'm not sure, right? But I think he's going to be reelected, right? Well, in a sense, when I say I don't know, but I think he'll be reelected, I'm making clear that this is an opinion of Duane Berquist, right? This is not part of his what knowledge in the strict sense.

[39:44] But in English, we'll often say what I imagine he will be. We might say instead of he's thinking, right? So the two of them seem what fairly what close, right? Okay.

[40:04] It seems to me, right? Does that mean? I think those lines are equal, though. It's my opinion they're equal. It seems to me now that the one on top is longer. Doesn't it seem that to you?

[40:24] I wish I'd remembered all the different ways they had. Yeah. The thing is kind of fascinating to see. Yeah. I used to, when I taught logic, you know, I kind of referred to the fact that it's actually an art, you know, of making lines appear other than they are. Yeah. And in syllogical part of logic, right? There's an art of making what the falls appear true, right?

[40:47] You might not think there could be an art, right? But there're definite ways of doing this. It shows you how the eye of the soul, right, and the eye of the body are in some way alike, right? There are definite ways that I can deceive the students, and I know how to do it. See? You know, Aristotle taught me 13 ways to deceive the students.

[41:18] And but but as they say, the psychologists and so on, they have discovered ways of what, in a sense, deceiving the what eye, right?

[41:30] What's that? What they call trompe l'oeil, you know? You see sometimes in the in the wallpaper, right, where it seems to be like a wooden thing coming up and so on. It's kind of amazing to see that. huh And. even it seemed to be carved. when It's actually what, just flat, huh?

[41:51] Interesting. There's a scene down in the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum. There, it's a scene of Annunciation painting, I should say. And it's got a, you know, between the Mary and the angel, there is kind of a pavement right in the painting. And if you get over the right side, you're looking straight down the pavement. Get over the left side, you're looking straight down the pavement. How they do this thing, right?

[42:25] I I have a I know it's by Canaletto or after Canaletto, but it's a canal scene from Venice, right? And if you get on the right side, way over here, and you look at the painting, looking straight down the what canal. You follow around the room, and you're still looking straight down the pavement. You get all the way over here, and you're still looking straight down the pavement.

[42:49] It's kind of a first time you notice that it's kind of amazing to see that. And I guess some painters too, they they can paint the eyes so that the eyes of the person in the painting there are looking directly towards you. If you're over there and you follow them around, and they still seem to be looking at you directly, following right around the room. Washington Irving, you know, alludes to this in one of those stories of the old mansions in England, you know, and how the servants are kind of superstitious about painting of so and so the portrait, a lot of old portraits of the former members of the family, because those eyes do seem to follow you right around the room.

[43:31] But how do they do that? I don't really know. Do you? So there are certain arts of what deceiving the eye, huh? There was a story told of of a of a

[43:52] yeah a painter where I guess he paints something, I guess to eat or something like that. He invited the painter or he said, "well, have one, " you know. The guy reached for it. It's a painting. So he wanted to get even with the other painter. So in those days, sometimes you have a painting you wanted to keep, you know, hidden until you were able to display, right?

[44:10] You have a big curtain over, there, and you pull the curtain and then reveal the painting, right? So he painted the curtain with the tassel, everything, right? So once it's his painting now, right? Okay, the guy was able to pull the thing and to do, and that's a painting, right? That's kind of marvelous to to deceive a person, huh?

[44:34] Of course, in Shakespeare, you you seen the Winter's Tale, haven't you? That play, or the the the king, right? He accuses his wife of infidelity, right? And this is false, right? And then she feigns away. It is, and the false rumor is given that she has died, right? Naturally, she goes into hiding, right? Give her husband a long period to repent, huh? Well, then the reconciliation scene, right?

[45:03] You know, Paulina tells the king, you know, that she had this famous artist do a statue of the wife, huh? And it's really remarkable this painting, this statue, right? So the king and everybody comes in to see the statue, right? Of course, it's it's

[45:22] and of course he almost wants to kiss the statue, right? Don't don't the paint is not yet dry, you know. The statue's, uh, you know, gradually comes alive, right? But, uh, It's kind of a kind of a marvelous ending of that.

[45:42] Yeah, you have to read the scripture, you know, the wonder people are filled with this amazing, amazing play in that sense. So up to this point, Aristotle has been showing what

[46:02] imagination is not, right? It's not sensing. It's not opinion. It's not natural understanding or demonstrative knowledge, reasoned out knowledge, nor is it a combination of opinion with what sensing? Okay.

[46:24] Now he's going to try to go on and say what it is. I want to take a little break now because that's a appropriate time to take between the fifth and the sixth.