De Anima (On the Soul)
56. The Soul as Gateway, Naming God's Simplicity, and Student Questions
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/056-the-soul-as-gateway-naming-gods-simplicity-and-student-questions/

[0:00] Now these last chapters here, the chapter twelve here and thirteen, which I don't know if we can do them next time or not, but twelve and thirteen, Aristotle's kind of through going through each of the powers, right? And in twelve and thirteen, or seventeen and eighteen, in Thomas' Lectio, he's going to talk about the order among the powers now, right? Okay. And so in a way, he's distinguished and defined the different powers, and that naturally comes before seeing the order among them, just as in general distinction comes before order, right?

[0:48] Okay. Are those the last chapters for the soul? Yeah, that's the end. Yeah, it's right here at the end of the book Gamma here, book three. Yeah. Okay. You may not get through both of them next time, but okay. Okay. Then what is then? Where do we go from there? Well, I was going to talk to you about that. There's two things we could do, right? Uh huh.

[1:10] We could go on to another part of philosophy, right? Huh. Mm-hmm. Okay. Or we could study the soul some more. Using Thomas's treatise on the soul there in the prima pars, right? It might be good to see the soul more, good, more, you know. So, but yeah, do people have a have a you know do they have a Latin one, at least an English one, you know, or the you know, yeah, yeah.

[1:41] So you might want to go and do the treatise on on the soul, really, in the Summa, you know. Okay. And you'll meet, you know, things you learn here, but also other things you'll you'll bring out not explicitly, right? Sure. Some some questions you'll go into, you know, and it might be good to do that, you know, because the study of the soul is so central, and the study of the soul is really kind of a

[2:08] necessary gateway for talking about the angels and ultimately talking about God, right? And if you don't talk about the soul, you kind of almost you almost end up being a materialist, right? Soulless. The Arab philosophers, you know, who came after and learned from Plato and Aristotle, used to say that the human soul is on the horizon between the material world and the immaterial world, huh? And so it's kind of the gateway to understanding the immaterial world, huh?

[2:39] You know, it's it's kind of funny you you think about our thing, you know, that after we die, right, huh? Our soul is separated from our body, right? Yeah. And so we're going to be living in this immaterial world. Yeah. Way up to that point, we're living kind of this material world, right? Really. And because

[3:02] I wonder, you know, in the next world too, whether we'll recall much about this life, you know, you wonder, you know. Remember what we did? Remember those classes we had up in there? you know, and you say, you know, but none of these buildings will be around. I don't think, you know, my house won't be here. These buildings will disappear. Assumption College will be, you know. You know, in the resurrection, you know.

[3:25] It will be a new and glorious Assumption College. You wonder whether people will sit around and talk about, you know, the old times, you know, the time when we had this mortal body and so on, you know, and the time when we got sick and had sniffles, and ulcers and whatever else we had, you know, wrong with us, you know. You know, I I can't, you know, that you know how we remember things, you know, in our past, you know, and and our sins and our boo-boos and embarrassing moments and unpleasant moments and stuff, you know.

[4:05] And but whether it will, I think we'll recall the past too much, you know. Hmm. Remember that, Mike? Yeah. We'll stay soft. I think even St. Thomas said that since the object of our knowledge here on earth is generic all the innocent species will know everything in heaven about that. Yeah, well, in seeing God face to face, we'll know everything we naturally desire to know about the natural world.

[4:41] Yeah. Yeah. That's cool. So, otherwise, we're not completely, you know, be satisfied, right? Huh? We're not completely reached to the end. So that's very interesting, you know. But we won't know the thoughts. But but the the you know the singular contingent matter is not really important, right? Huh? To know who married whom and you know how many wives this Hollywood actor had and so on. There's no reason why we will see those things, you know, or you know.

[5:09] Yeah. So we won't know those secret thoughts of everyone. No, no, no. That that part of our natural, you know. Yeah. You know. St. Thomas goes so far as to say, you know, I mean, it's kind of strange as a teacher, but saying, you know, it doesn't pertain to perfection of my mind, right? To know what you understand or don't understand, right? Oh. As a teacher, I mean, you're obviously trying to help people to understand, and you want to know whether they understand anything what you said.

[5:35] You want to know what they do, you know. I mean, it's not a really perfection of my mind to know what you do or do not understand, right? Huh? You know, it is a concern for me as a teacher, right? But it's not,

[5:50] you see, or to know, you know, whether you're diligent or lazy or what. You know, as far as action is concerned, you know, in action, the singular this gets us something about that, right? But it's not really a perfection of my mind to know that one way or another.

[6:18] To know whether you're wiser or not as wise as me, or you know, even that's a part, you know. But you know, in a practical way, you may want to know who's wiser, Aristotle or somebody, you know, so you can learn from them. But but

[6:32] the singular, as such, is not a perfection of our mind. Can I ask you to go over something that you've touched on before, Sure. the distinction of why it's important that we know God as truth and also as true. For instance, why we use the adjective and then also the abstract noun. Others, if you just use one, you're yeah. This was back what we were saying there that the the proper object of our mind is that what it is is something sensible to imagine, right?

[7:11] So especially what it is of a natural or mathematical thing. Well, these things are all composed of matter and form or something like matter and form, right?

[7:22] So that's the things we naturally understand, and that's why we have the so-called concrete and abstract word, right? See, so we have, you know, the word health and the word healthy, right? And healthy health signifies something like a form, right? It's in some kind of matter or subject, right? Mhm. But that matter or subject, when it has that form, is said not to be health, right? But to be what healthy, right?

[8:04] Okay. And that's that's the and it's like the matter. Well, that that's the matter of the subject, yeah. I see. In which the health is right.

[8:15] So you can't say that my body, when it's healthy, you can't say my body is health, can you? No. No. You can say my body has health, right? Right. But there's a real distinction there between the have and the had. Yeah. Okay.

[8:35] And so when we say my body is healthy, we don't mean my body is health. We mean my body has health, right? Okay. Mhm. Now when we turn to God, right? God is in no way composed. He's altogether what simple, right? That's what Teresa of Avila says, right? God is altogether simple. And the closer you get to God, right, the simpler you become, right? But you never become altogether simple like He is, son.

[9:13] Mhm. So our words and way of of understanding doesn't really fit God, right? Huh? Because whatever God has is God. Yeah. Say, God is whatever He has. Right. So

[9:42] what are we going to say? Say. Yeah. Um, if we say God, um, is wise, we seem to be saying that God has wisdom, right? Mhm. And therefore, we seem to be what making some kind of distinction between God and the wisdom that He has. Yeah. Okay. Right. But there is no distinction between God and the wisdom that He has; otherwise, He would be composed, right?

[10:20] Well, if to avoid that we say, "Well, then God is wisdom," right? You know, to signify there's no distinction there between the two, right?

[10:31] Then it seems that God is not wise, but is that by which something is wise? Is is health healthy, or is health that by which something is healthy? Oh, yes.

[10:48] So either way we we speak, we fall short of God, right? When we say God is wisdom, we don't seem to be saying that He is wise, right? But is that by which something is wise, right? Yeah. If we say He's wise, as He is, then we seem to be saying that He has wisdom, and therefore He's not His wisdom, right? So Thomas says that all these words are inadequate to express God,

[11:27] and we can both affirm and deny them of God, right? We can say God is wise because He really is wise, but we can deny that God is wise if that means that He has wisdom and He's distinct from His wisdom.

[11:48] We can say God is wisdom itself because there is no real distinction between God and His wisdom, right? We can deny that God is wisdom if you understand by that He's that by which something is wise rather than being wise Himself, right?

[12:13] The same way we say God is is good, right? You know, God is good, right? Okay, but good signifies its way of signifying is different from that of goodness, right? To be good means to have goodness, right? Okay. Well, God has goodness, right? He is good, so but yet to say that He has goodness

[12:43] seems to what imply a distinction there between the have and the had, right? So we say God is goodness itself to bring out His what simplicity and that there's no real distinction between Him and His goodness, right? But we say that God is good to bring out that He really is good, right? He's not just that by which something is good.

[13:18] So we're kind of tied to our way of understanding in this life, yeah. And so we have no way of understanding or speaking of God that is perfect, right? Is it because we're just participating of His being and we only see that? Well, it's because what Aristotle said here, what he learned here, that our reason is the reason of a soul, is the form of a body, right?

[13:45] So it's naturally turned towards the body, and so the proper object of our reason is what it is of something sensed or imagined, right? And so we,

[14:02] the way we form our thoughts, right, is a reflection of the fact that that's the proper object of our reason, okay? And these things are all composed, and they have what this composition of matter and form, right? Or Could be a subject in accidental form, huh?

[14:27] Proper object of reason is something of matter and form. Yeah, what it is is something sensed or imagined. Okay, it's either sensible matter, at least, or at least this imaginable matter is extension, right? So we have, but our mind is apt to what to distinguish between the matter and the form, right? See, you know, remember how we spoke long ago with the definition of reason. Reason is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, right?

[15:00] And I mentioned how that when reason, if reason is able to look before and after, it's also able to look for distinction or differences of things. That's included in the in the ability to look before and after. Remember, we had the axiom of before and after. Nothing is before or after itself. So there always has to be some distinction. Before you can have before and after, right?

[15:27] So if you go through all the senses before, you can see this more clearly. Today is before tomorrow, and after yesterday. But can today be before today? Or can today come after today? No, nothing is before or after itself, right? Okay. Now

[15:52] that means, therefore, that before you see it, before and after, you have to see two things at least, right? And therefore, you have to see some distinction or some difference. Before you can, right? Okay. If I didn't see any difference between today and tomorrow, I couldn't say that today is before tomorrow, right? If I saw no difference between today and yesterday, I couldn't say that today is after yesterday.

[16:21] Okay. If I didn't see any difference between wine and beer, could I say that wine is better than beer? No. Okay. So reason is the ability, not only to see order, but to see distinction, right? Okay. Remember how how we said when Shakespeare defines reason by the ability for large discourse. I raise a question, you know, but reason is is even more capable of small discourse. So why does he define reason by large discourse rather than small discourse?

[17:06] Yeah, it shows its ability, its its extent, the greater. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, the very basic principle there. We define an ability by the utmost of what it can do. See. So if you ask, you know, how fast can my car go? Yeah, you know that'd be the the greatest speed it could go, right? Huh? If you ask, you know, what's my weight lifting ability? Well, what's the what's the largest weight I can lift, right?

[17:35] So if I can lift two hundred pounds, yeah, that includes the ability to lift a hundred pounds, and he needs to lift a hundred pounds and two hundred, right? Sure. But if you you wouldn't give the full ability of my weight lifting power if you said a hundred pounds when I could actually lift two hundred, but not two hundred and one. Yeah. See, you define ability by the what?

[17:57] The the it's at most, right? So he defines it by looking before and after, rather than by looking for distinctions, right? He includes, right, the ability to see distinction, huh? Like like

[18:19] I was giving an example there, John Dryden, right? He said when he was a young man there, there would be you know two or three plays of Fletcher performed every one of Shakespeare, and it's only gradually he realized that Shakespeare was better than Fletcher, huh? See, so he must have seen some distinction or difference between the plays of what Shakespeare and Fletcher before he saw that Shakespeare's plays are better.

[18:49] Sure. Yes. Okay. The same way I might have two students in my class, right? And I can distinguish between them at least outwardly without knowing yet which one is a better student, right? See, and sometimes it might take a long time before you know which one of two students is a better student, right? Yeah. But I couldn't possibly know which one is better if I didn't see any difference in the two.

[19:17] Sure. Yes. Mm. Hmm. But sometimes you know when someone asks you know which of these two students is better, and you're kind of you know you're kind of weighing, you're not exactly sure, right? You know, sometimes it's obvious, but sometimes it's not obvious, and you're kind of weighing in your mind which is better, right? So

[19:36] you can see a distinction between two things without seeing before and after, but not vice versa. See, you know these two students in front of me, one of them is older than the other. Mm. Hm. You know their their birthdays are probably at the same day, right? But he's older. You know.

[19:56] But I don't know which one is older. Mm. Hmm. You know. You know. I look younger than my age, right? Some people might think I'm younger than I am, right? Huh? And they might realize I'm older than this person, but I don't look older. See, so he knows the difference in the two of us, but he doesn't know that I'm before this other guy in time, right?

[20:18] Is that right? Hmm. Hmm. So in the ability, so you can see a distinction without seeing it before and after, but you can't see before and after without seeing the distinction.

[20:32] So I always mention that thing about the wine tasting, right? You know that they will. If you don't know, you know that this is Cabernet Sauvignon and this is Zinfandel, you can't tell them apart. Then even more so, can you not say that Cabernet Sauvignon is better tasting than Zinfandel? Right? Makes any sense, would it? It's just all wine. Yeah, yeah. I mean, if I say you know that Cabernet Sauvignon tastes better than Zinfandel, and you say, okay, now we're going to give you a glass of each without it being labeled, right?

[21:12] You tell me which one is a Cabernet, and which one is a Zinfandel. I can't tell. Which is the one You know, but you know they do this all the time with beer, right? You know, somebody say, well, Budweiser tastes better than Miller's, right? So they give him a glass of Budweiser's and Miller's, you know, and he doesn't know which one is which. So how, you know, it's kind of a Socratic test there, you know, huh?

[21:33] You see, but if I can't tell them apart, how can I say that one is better than the other, right? But the reverse is not necessarily true, right? If I can tell apart these two beers, right, I may not yet be able to judge which is better, right? But I certainly can't judge that one is better without knowing the difference between them. You see? So,

[22:00] so anyway, going back to what I was saying, reason is apt to distinguish between the matter and the form of something, right? So if you take a piece of clay and you mold it into a sphere and then you mold it into a cylinder and change its shape, right? Reason begins to see the distinction between the matter and the form, right?

[22:24] Okay. Or if my body is sometimes healthy and sometimes sick, right? Then I distinguish between my body and its health, right? And the same man is sometimes good and sometimes bad, right? And sometimes virtuous and sometimes vicious, right? Well, then can the man be the same as his virtue?

[22:58] So we distinguish between the form and what has the form, right? Okay. Now you see, we we name things as we know them, right? So

[23:17] we have a different way then of expressing the form and what has the form, right? So we have health and healthy, or virtue and virtuous, right?

[23:34] So Socrates is not virtue, but he might be what virtuous, right? That's why they puzzle over the Blessed Virgin there, right? What did she say to the young lady? I am the immaculate conception. And of course, the the the priest or the rector was, you know, you know, what did she say? See, she didn't say I am immaculately conceived, right? He said, "I am the immaculate conception, right?

[24:19] " There's some special reason why she said that, right? And I'm not sure that we fully understand yet why she said that, you know. You see, but then, but it puzzled, you know, obviously the man, right? Because it seemed incorrect, right, way of speaking, right? You see, okay. So,

[24:52] so we have these two words, right? These two kinds of words, right? When we do all these things, right? Healthy and health. Since they call healthy abstract word, right? And health the concrete, right? But it's a difference between the word that names the form itself and the word that names what has the form, right? Okay.

[25:16] That's why you can say that my body is healthy, but you can't say my body is health, because the form what has the form are not the same thing, right?

[25:34] Well, see now, do we have other names that come to talk about God? See, we have the words good and goodness now, right? Which word are going to use for God?

[25:54] Well, if we say is good and is good, right? I mean, Christ says that in the gospel there, right? Why call me good? God alone is good, right? God most of all is good, right? Okay. But that word seems to what signify as what has goodness, right? And therefore seems to indicate a distinction between the haver and the had, right? And in God there is no distinction, right?

[26:28] But in creatures where our knowledge begins, right, and where our knowledge is adapted to knowing, right, what has the goodness is not the goodness, huh? Now you see, you know, if man had wisdom but he was not wise, for, the wisdom that he has, he wouldn't have any perfection, really, by that, would he? Right? Right? What good would it be to have wisdom and not be wise?

[27:09] What good would it would it be to your body to have health and not be healthy? Right? See, it's like it's in your pocket or something. So,

[27:23] if God is not wise and good and just, what perfection would He have, right? But in using those words, we seem to what admit composition to God, right? Okay.

[27:47] So then we turn around and say, well, but there's really no distinction between God and His goodness, right? Or God and His wisdom, or God and His justice, right? So in order to bring out that there's no distinction, we say God is wisdom itself. God is ipsa bonitas, goodness itself. God is justice itself. God is love, as Saint John says, right? See, can't say that you and I are love, right?

[28:21] Can't say that my my will is love. You can say my will loves, right? But we say God loves us, right? He has love for us. But now we seem to be introducing a composition, right? So no way of speaking can be adequate to talking about God. So I mean, Thomas often quotes Danisius there, saying you know we can affirm and deny, right? And I say, you say, well, is that a contradiction?

[29:02] Well, no, because you don't affirm it and deny it for the same reason, right? Okay. So you say God is goodness itself, or God is justice itself, or God is love. God is wisdom, right? Ego sapientia, I am wisdom.

[29:42] To bring out that God is altogether simple, right, in the way that He has these things, right. But we say that God is just and God is good and God is wise, then to keep that He's what truly perfect through His goodness and through His wisdom and so on, right? And not just that and by which, huh? That's why there's always some negation there in our knowledge, right?

[30:31] You guys have to negate the imperfection in the way we know God in this life. Now, when we become separated from our body, our separated soul will see like the angels, kind of, is that right? Yeah, yeah.

[30:55] No, in a different way, right? We won't turn to images, right? Because we'll be free from our body, right? Yeah. So that's how our will is fixed in good or evil, because we see everything. Yeah, we won't be in time anymore either. See, that's where our will will be. We're frozen, so to speak, right? Oh, We won't be subject to this. Change anymore.

[31:28] So long as man is in time, right? He can change from good to bad, or from bad to good, right? Yeah. So we never despair of a man so long as he's still alive, right? Even though we be doubtful about his salvation, right? huh but see the angels their their mind was fully formed when they were created, right? So when they chose, their choice was forever. Yeah, kind of a frightening thing to think about, right?

[32:00] Yeah, right. You know, see. We kind of dilly dally, you know, kind of you know wishy washy back and forth, yeah. But but yet there'll be some types of change won't there? Because we'll be able to acquire knowledge in the next life, right? We'll learn new things and go to higher angels communicate knowledge. Yeah, but we won't we won't be you know learning essential things. You know, our mind will be satisfied as far as what it naturally desires to know.

[32:38] Ah, accidental. Yeah, but to be kind of secondary in that way, you know, not really pertaining perfection of the mind, right? Ah. Speaking of accidental secondary, wonder if I could just I I have I have a much more mundane question than yours, brother. but this is something that purpose i wanted about oh for about a twenty years or so, and that is um something like twenty years ago, and I'll understand if you laugh or smile or whatever when I say this, but you know this this book by Robert Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.

[33:17] Mm. That um, my question for you is um, um, can you can you in any you know kind of fairly simple way you know gain traction on what's wrong with it? Because the

[33:38] I found it very compelling and interesting. Again, something like twenty years ago, and it's been quite a few years since I've looked at it at all. Yeah. But um, it it nevertheless remains. For example, I had a long conversation with a professor probably the so-called professor at Sacred Heart University. I was taking a philosophy class there, and this book is his life. He's a professor at Catholic University.

[34:05] Yeah. Yeah. And I knew that there's something deeply, entirely wrong that that could be the case, but I. Didn't have at hand, you know, an argument. Yeah. And I and I, in brief, talking to him about it, he said, "Well, part of the thing about the book is that, you know, it's unassailable by any argument or something like." Oh, the guy with the in my opinion, the man, just totally lost his reason.

[34:33] It was kind of spooky, but in any case, can you can you give me even like a cocktail party, you know, catchy sentence to say about it because, or I don't know, I mean, maybe it's nothing you had occasion to look at, but. I don't really know the book. I never read the book, you know, so I can't really. I just I've seen it in people talking about it.

[34:57] Yeah, yeah. But it's not around. It happened to be what got me sort of interested in philosophy, and then I quickly found that what was being taught was. Incoherent and didn't mesh with what I read in the book, and I kind of threw up my hands about the whole thing. Yeah. So that's like you know when you read somebody like Heidegger or somebody, you know, that basically doesn't make sense, right?

[35:30] It's hard. And getting traction on criticizing. Yeah, yeah. I mean, I mean, if you can't understand what the man is saying, you know, you can't. uh, Mm. uh, judge, make a judgment. Nothing, yeah, yeah, nothing to judge, right?

[35:47] I think that's what turns a lot of people off from philosophy. They take these intro courses, and none of these none of these guys make any science.

[35:57] The revulsion is actually a healthy reaction in a lot of ways. The incoherence of what's being taught. Yeah. Yeah. I just remember that even from twenty years ago. I talk, but that's such a stupid way of thinking.

[36:14] Yeah. Well, there's a lot of that. Thinking themselves wise, they they become quite foolish. So. Right. How about this, Doctor Brooks? I have a different question that I've been dying to ask. And close the answer. In all seriousness, I'll understand if you smile, but I've been thinking about this for over twenty-five years. But it has to do with food. It has to do with modern processing of food.

[36:43] It has to do with at what point do we process and abuse our food to the point where it becomes a non-food? I suppose we could particularize it by asking, addressing. Is a Hostess Twinkie food? Or is it? I mean, it's it's funny how they they they don't have these cheeses. They. They don't even say it's a food; they say it's a food product. You ever noticed that?

[37:07] And it gets even funny because then they say it's a non-dairy food product. So, cheese. Right. So in all seriousness, I I wonder, you know, sometimes about.

[37:23] Of course, has real practical implications as far as what one eats. Okay, you know, it it seems to go to, and I, maybe this is closer to the you know standard philosophy playbook or something, but I never quite understood the real answer to the the riddle. You know, which philosopher was it? He's got the wooden boat. It takes the one plank, he puts it over here, and it's still a wooden boat.

[37:49] It's just missing a plank. He takes another plank, and at some point, t here is like half a boat here, half a boat there. What? Where is the boat? And then, who was that? Maybe it's not a standard philosophy illustration. I thought it was from someone, but it seems similar with the Twinkie, where you start with. I don't know what the raw material is. I think there

[38:19] is some cornmeal. You know, at what point is the cornmeal no longer cornmeal because it's been so denatured? That's the part where I think about how much of our food is denatured. It's no longer no longer has its proper nature. It's been. It's sort of like. Help me out here at any point. Yeah. Well, no, I mean, there is. That's very involved. Those things about the food, you know.

[38:45] The thing I notice, you know, that that in some of the supermarkets now, you know, they have a better bread now than used to have years ago. Sure. And one thing I notice about certain kinds of bread, I know, going back to my my toaster, you know, yeah, um, my wife brought home this. It's called Italian boule, boule, and and just you slice a long thing and piece of it, put in this this long toaster, and.

[39:18] When I first had it, I had put up a nine. You see, see, well, if you had some of this, you know, cheap white American bread, you know, which you don't use at the house, Wonder bread, Yeah, yeah, You'd probably put on 3 or 4, right? Yeah, yeah, I like there's no substance there, right? Or others just be, we burned up, you know. You see, but I know people, you know, who make their own bread too.

[39:41] You know, and and but this, you know, there is two remarkable America. You get all these other things, but the basic things like bread, you can't get good bread here, right? And probably even these stick loaves you get over in France or Italy are better than what our stick loaves are. But but they're imitating some of these things and getting better at them, you know. But usually, charge much more for them than the breads.

[40:08] That's true, you know, but but but the taste of the bread is much better, you know, and. My father-in-law has been dead now many years, you know. But one part of his life, he was a baker, right? And he used to court his wife that way. He'd, he'd, he'd come, you know, bakers have already hours and so on. He'd come by and he'd drop some little goodies off at the house, though, you know.

[40:29] And they'd be involved with the whole family, obviously, as well as the house. You know, but he used to make, you know, especially you know maybe Sunday morning when he's home, you know, the working man really. But he'd make some bread, right? You know, and and we after mass we'd stop by and get a loaf of his bread, you know. And we start consuming that. My wife and I and the kids, you know, we always thought it was the whole loaf on the way home.

[40:51] You know, it's so good. You know, yeah, just that fresh, that fresh bread. You know, and so,