De Anima (On the Soul)
64. Replies to Article Two: Hoc Aliquid, and Is the Brain the Organ of Thought?
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[0:00] Okay. Let's see now the replies that Thomas says to the objections. Then take a little break maybe before our second article. We we didn't do the last couple of sentences. Okay. Um from Proptor quote. Yeah. In the body. Okay. And a kind

[0:18] of which right? You explained that sentence there. huh? Yes. On account of which we do not say that heat heats, but the hot heats, right? Because heat doesn't exist by itself, right? Huh. Okay. But exists only in in the hot, right? Oh yeah. So he's so it's not the heat is doing this, but the hot is doing that, huh?

[0:44] It remains, therefore, that the human soul, which is called intellect or mind, is something incorporeal and what subsisting, right? Okay. That's interesting, you know. Going back to this, people who think of the soul, as you said last time, as being kind of an air-like substance, right, in the shape of a man. But in taking the word air, right, they're they're trying to understand the incorporeality of the of the soul.

[1:14] As they take something like air, that seems almost what immaterial, right? Huh? Yeah. And because the air is a substance that you can hardly sense, right? We've carried over the word air and applied it to those substances like even the angels or even to God. You say God is a spirit, huh? Christ says that, right? God is a spirit; must be worshipped in the spirit, and so on.

[1:41] And the angels are spirit, right? And sometimes even say the soul, its higher aspect, is a spirit, right? But we borrowed the word what for air, because air is a material substance, right? That's barely what sensible. Hardly sensible, right? Kind of invisible almost, right? In the sense it is invisible, although we can be aware of it somehow by wind and so on. And so when you want to give a name to a substance that is in no way sensible, an immaterial substance.

[2:18] We borrowed that word, right? And has a new meaning now, but nevertheless, there's some reason why we took that word, right? Why we took the word from air rather than the word from what? Earth or fire or something else that is not invisible, right? And you

[2:39] notice how Scripture speaks even there, right? You know, God when He creates the soul of Adam, there, right? He breathed into the what? That way of speaking, right? But you can see, in a sense, in thinking of the soul as being an air-like substance, they're on the way, but can't quite transcend their imagination, huh? Okay.

[3:06] Now the first objection, as I say, is based simply upon the somewhat equivocation of the phrase hoc aliquid, right? To the first, it should be said that hoc aliquid can can be taken in two ways. In one way, for anything that is subsisting, right? Okay, this something, In that sense a soul would be a hoc aliquid, right? In another way, for something subsisting that's complete in the nature of some what?

[3:38] Species, huh? And in the first way, it excludes the inherence of accident, right? Which exists only what? In substance, right? And of a material form, that's a form that has existence only in matter, even if it be a substantial form, right? Okay. In the second way, it excludes even the what? Imperfection of being a part, huh? Whence the hand is able to be called a hoc aliquid in the first way, but not in the second way, huh?

[4:10] Thus, therefore, since the human soul is a part of the human race or species, it can be called a hoc aliquid in the first way because it subsists or has subsisting, but not in the second way as something what? Complete, right? And in the sense of complete individual, then it's the composite from the soul and the body that is called a what? Hoc aliquid right? We have to worry too much about that objection because, as I said, involves how is that phrase to be understood, right?

[4:46] And Thomas is simply saying there are two ways you can understand it, right? Okay. What when it talked about the second way excludes even the imperfection of being a part? Yeah, because in some way you could say that the human soul, as he gets in Article Four, which we will be seeing next time, Whether the soul is man, right? Okay. Okay. Oh yeah. Is man just a soul?

[5:12] I see. Yeah. Or just a body, or is he something composed of soul and body, right? Okay. Well, the complete man is something composed of soul and body. I see. Yeah. Okay. So the second way that excludes it because it's subsistent it's perfect, not. it. Can never be just a part. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Good. Now the second one is also based upon what does Aristotle mean when the first book, he's proceeding dialectically, right, through the opinions of his predecessors, huh?

[5:44] And so Thomas solves it at first in that way, saying, "To the second, ought to be said, that those words of Aristotle, that Aristotle says those words, not according to his own what, opinion, but according to the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be what, moved, right? As is clear from the things that are sent forth there, right?

[6:12] That they said before he got to that point. Now, Aristotle, sometimes you'll notice in the examples he gives, he gives examples that he thinks are what, false, right? But they're according to the opinions of his contemporaries or his predecessors, right? Before he's determining the truth about that, right? Okay. Now Thomas points this out in his commentaries. A very subtle thing, right? Yeah. But I remember the first place where I saw it was in the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, huh?

[6:58] And in the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is talking about how different arts aim at different what, goods, right? Okay. And so he gives a number of examples, right, from the arts, huh? And he also mentions a household art, right? And he says the end of the household art is wealth. Mm-hmm. The end of the military art is victory, right? The end of the art of cooking is a good meal, and so on, right?

[7:27] Because people thought of the end of the household art as being what wealth in those days, right? And all he's trying to do is what give examples that are familiar to them, right? But then later on, when he gets to talk about the family, that's not the end of the family wealth. That's not the end, really, that he's aiming at, huh? And then he he corrects that opinion, right?

[7:52] Okay. So I see Aristotle do this in a number of places, huh? And sometimes he'll speak according to. The opinions of his predecessors, right? Before he's determined the truth about the matter. So it's a kind of a subtle thing that he does there, okay?

[8:11] And you know, I'll sometimes, you know, I'm talking about the senses of before, right? And I'll say now, if water is H2O, right? Which I know they all think, right? Well, then hydrogen can be without water, but water cannot be without hydrogen. Yeah, okay, they accept that, right? Now I don't know if water is H2O. Maybe it is. Maybe it isn't, right? But if water is H2O, you know.

[8:40] So I'm just taking an example that to illustrate this thing, not to prove it, right? But an example that they would what have in mind, right? Huh? Do you see the idea? Okay. Aristotle does that, right?

[8:59] Huh? Say. Okay. Or he gives the second one here now, huh? Another way of perhaps replying to the same objection, huh? Or it ought to be said that to what act or do something by oneself, right? Belongs to something existing by itself, right?

[9:24] But to exist by oneself is sometimes said something if it does not exist in something as an accident, right? Or as a material form, even if it be a what part, right? But properly and subsisting by itself is said what neither in the foresaid way is inhering, nor is a what part, right? According to which way the eye or the hand cannot be said to be per se, subsisting, right?

[9:59] And consequently not to be operating by itself. So you shouldn't say so much that the you could say the eye sees in a way, right? But it'd be better to say that a man sees through his eyes, okay? Or a man hears through his ears, right? Okay. So when the soul is in the body and is therefore a part of the whole man, right? It makes sense to say that the man understands through his soul, right?

[10:26] Okay, and through his mind, right? Huh? Rather than to say the the soul by itself, because the body at this point is sharing in the existence of the soul, right?

[10:40] But the existence of the soul is not fully what grasped by the body, huh? And that's why the soul is an operation above the body.

[10:51] So Thomas often uses that phrase there, immersed, right? I think it's kind of interesting to use the word there. You've seen something immersed in the water, right? Was entirely under the water. And you see something maybe floating, so it's partly submerged and partly above the water. So that way of speaking is borrowed there, right? That the soul's existence is not immersed in the body, right? That the body doesn't what contain the whole existence of the soul, right?

[11:24] But it partakes of it, right? Okay. Just as that body floating on top of the water is only partly immersed in the water, so it has some part above the water, right? So the soul has some ability or some power above the body, and therefore it's said not to be immersed, right? Whence, he says the operations of the parts attribute to the whole through the parts. For we say that a man sees through the eye, and he touches through the hand, right? In Another way than the hot heats through what heat, right?

[12:10] Because heat, in no way, heats properly speaking, right? It's that by which you heat something, huh? It can be said, therefore, that the soul understands just as the eye sees, but more properly it is said that man understands, right, through his soul, right? Okay.

[12:37] Now the third objection, I think, is is the most important one, because it's not so much set up with the understanding the use of certain words in Aristotle, right, like hoc aliquid this something or this particular sentence, but it's based upon the fact that there seems to be some dependence, obviously, of reason upon the what brain, upon the body in our thinking. And I mentioned how, and I remember having a guy who was so materialist in my class years ago, and he was

[13:19] making known his opinion that the brain is the organ of thought, huh? And so I said, well, then I suppose a good sign of that I said would be that that blowing the brain interferes with thinking. Yeah, that proves my point. Or alcohol going into the brain interferes with thinking. Yeah, that proves my point, and so on. Okay. And I think I showed you how I did before, but I repeat it here.

[13:48] I said, okay, now suppose you and I are in the same room with no windows, and there's a single light bulb in the center there with the light on, and you and I can see each other because of that, right? And all of a sudden I take a hammer and I wank the bulb, and that interferes with you seeing me, doesn't it? Therefore, the light bulb is the what?

[14:11] Organ of your sight. Yeah. I didn't admit that, right? But notice, huh? You can interfere with my seeing you by hitting the light bulb, or you can interfere with my seeing by hitting me in the eye here, right? Now if you hit me in the eye, you'd be interfering with my seeing on the side of the organ, right? But when you interfere with the when you knock the light bulb off, you're interfering with my seeing on the side of the what?

[14:43] Object, right? Okay. Okay. Now take an even simpler example, right? I can see you over there now, huh? See? Now somebody hit my eye here; that would interfere with my seeing you, right? Because my eyes, after all, the organ of my sight, right? But if you left the room, that interferes my seeing too. You seeing you, right? But is that interference my organ? No, it's interfering on the side of the object, right?

[15:14] Do you see the difference? Yeah. Okay. So a blow on the brain interferes with thinking. Alcohol going to the brain interferes with thinking. Drugs going to the brain, etc. Clot in the brain interferes with thinking, and so on, right? Therefore, there's a connection between the brain and thinking, right? But that doesn't show you yet whether the connection is. That on the side of the of an organ, or on the side of the what object, right?

[15:44] You can't syllogize from that, can you? No, sir. We're down here in in logic, right? We argue in one of two ways here, right? Say

[16:09] if a blow on the brain interferes with thinking, then the brain is the organ of thought. I shouldn't draw the line yet. But a blow on the brain

[16:51] interferes with thinking. If you lay down those two statements, what statement follows necessarily from those two? If a blow on the brain interferes with thinking, then the brain is the organ of thought. But a blow on the brain does interfere with thinking. Okay. Therefore, the brain is the organ of thought. Yeah. Therefore, the brain is the organ of thought.

[17:38] Now, second way of syllogizing here: if the brain is the organ of thought, then a blow on the brain. Will interfere with thought, but a blow on the brain

[18:21] does interfere with thought. Therefore, the brain is the organ of thought. Okay. If the brain is organ of thought, then a blow in the brain will interfere with thought. But a blow in the brain does interfere with thought. Therefore, the brain is organ of thought. Now,

[19:00] both of these arguments have a defect. In one of them, the conclusion doesn't follow, although the premises are true. In the other one, the conclusion does follow, but one of the premises isn't true. Now, in order to have a demonstration of something, right, your conclusion must follow necessarily the premises, right? And the premises must be true. Yeah. But if the conclusion doesn't follow the premises, or if one of the premises is false, then you fail to demonstrate it, right?

[19:41] Yeah. And down here, if the brain is the organ of thought, then a blow in the brain will interfere with thinking. That's true. And it is true that a blow in the brain interferes with what thought. Does it follow? Therefore, the brain is organ of thought.

[20:00] No. You can't syllogize from the what affirmation of the consequent. Remember that? Yeah. I always give in class that I say, "If Burke was dropped dead last night, then he'll be absent from class today. " But he is absent from class today. Therefore, he dropped dead last night.

[20:28] Well, if the only way, if the only possible reason I could have been absent from class was that, you could argue that way, right? Hmm.

[20:36] But there could be some other reason why I'm absent from class, right? So I tell them that's wishful thinking, but it's not logical thinking, right? You see? Okay.

[20:50] So, like I was showing with the example there of the light bulb, right? Huh? You see? The fact that a blow on something interferes with an operation, that's enough to see there's a connection between the two, right? But that doesn't tell you what the connection is—that of organ or that of what on the side of the object, okay? A blow on my eye, interferes with my seeing you, right?

[21:22] If they pulverize you there with a sledgehammer, it's going to interfere with my seeing you too, but it's on the side of the what object, not the side of the organ, right? So,

[21:36] although this would follow from that, right, could follow from other things too, and therefore the fact that it is so doesn't make this antecedent so. So you remember when we studied logic, right? This is in the form: if A is so,

[21:57] then B is so, and B. is so. Does it follow then that A is so. Aristotle in the Poetics says this is the way Homer taught all the other poets to tell a good lie. See? So,

[22:17] no, as you say, if A is so then B is so. You're not saying that A is the only possible explanation of B, right? You're just saying that if A is so then B is so, right? If I am a dog, right, then I am an animal. Ah, but I am an animal. Therefore, I'm a dog, right? See? If I am a woman, then I am a human being.

[22:44] That's true, right? But I am a human being. That's true. Therefore, I'm a woman. Huh? If I'm a little boy, then I'm a human being, right? But I'm a human being. Therefore, I'm a little boy. If I'm a young man in his prime, then I'm a human being, right? But I am a human being. Therefore, I must be a young man in his prime. I don't think that's.

[23:12] That's wishful thinking. Yeah, yeah. But it's not logical thinking. You see the point? Yeah. So down here, the argument, the form is what? Bad. It doesn't follow. If A is so, then B is so. B is so. It doesn't follow that A is so, right? And I teach you some logic. You know, I get some students up at the board, and I'll put these forms on the board, and I'll say something follows necessarily, and you always get somebody up there who says A is so, right?

[23:42] So people are very often deceived by that, huh? Yeah. It's a reference to Homer. In that one. That's a reference to Homer. In that. Did you know? Well, Homer would tell us something, you know, that if a man is this, then he would do such and such, right? So he does such and such. Therefore, he must be such a man, right? And everything has the characters talking like this.

[24:11] Well, yeah, we'll reason that way. Now, the way the poet would do it, right? Um, it's the way you make you kind of persuasive that way, right? Huh?

[24:27] No, I had a student one time and had the kind of long hair, you know. So one day comes up certain classes, hair's all nicely cut, you know, right up at the, you know. And so I made some remark about his hair, you know, and he said, "Well, let me tell you what happened to me, see. " Um, he got into some kind of traffic accident, see.

[24:49] Mm. And this is back before no-fault insurance and so on. He was going to, you know, manly defend his case in court, right? Yeah. So he went down to the courthouse for some preliminary, you know, paper. Signing, you know, and the cop when he saw the guy looking for the place, he says one of these guys in a drug charge, right? So you know, you know, that's where the people are, you know, in the drug charge.

[25:11] right He said, well, he said I'm going to show up in court with this hair and give that impression, right? See, so that's what the guy is saying. If you were in in a drug charge, then you had this long hair, right? No, apparently all these guys in a drug charge have this long stringy hair. This guy's not long stringy hair, therefore he's in in a judge.

[25:33] He's in a drug charge. Doesn't happen all the time, see? Or you know, if you're drunk, then you don't walk too steady, right? Right. He's not walking too steady, therefore he's what drunk. Well, like my my wife works with the you know the brain injured people, right? And they have certain speech impediments, right? You know, and and sometimes have a little difficulty walking, right? And sometimes it's embarrassing because a cop or somebody will take this guy to be what drunk, drunk, right?

[26:14] So this guy could come out of of a bar, right? And and you know his words are kind of slurred and he's kind of walking like that and you would jump to conclusion that he's what Drunk, yeah. Drunk, yeah. And it might be true in many cases, most cases he was coming out, right? But not necessarily, right? Some other cause of his

[26:41] not being able to walk a straight line, or he's not being able to speak his words too clearly sometimes, huh? Okay, now up here, here the form is good, huh? Here is saying if A is so, then B will be so. But A is so, therefore what B is so, right? The form of the argument is good, right? The conclusion follows necessarily from those premises, right? But are the premises both true?

[27:16] See, and now let's I reverse the thing here. I say if a blow on the brain interferes with thinking, then the brain is organ of thought. Now it's become false, right? Because that doesn't follow necessarily, because the that's not the only way to interfere with what an operation is to interfere with the organ, it interferes with the what object, right? Huh? Do you see that? Okay.

[27:45] So the proper object of our reason is the what it is of something sensed or imagined, right? So when the soul was in the body, when it's thinking of what a triangle is, right? It imagines a triangle, right? And what's understanding is the what it is, of what is imagined, right? See, Aristotle, if you remember in the De Anima, he compares that to the outward senses, right?

[28:14] I see the color of you. I see the color of the fireplace, right? So the object of the eye is the color of something outside of me. Okay, so you take that something outside of me away, and I can't see the color of you when you get out of the room. You see? In the same way, the object of the reason there is the what it is of something sensed or imagined, huh?

[28:41] So you naturally form an image, right, of what you're thinking about, huh? But you're understanding the what it is of that, huh? And you understand the what it is of that is not in the body, right? Okay, but the same way, my seeing you is not in you either, right? See, but I can't see the color of you without you being there, right? And so the soul doesn't understand the what it is of a triangle without imagining a triangle there in imagination.

[29:14] And that's why a blow in the brain interferes with thinking, or why alcohol going to the brain, right? It interferes with the what? Images, huh? Okay, but that's on the side of the object, huh? The object is the what it is of something sensed or imagined, just as the object of the eye is the color of some exterior thing. So interfere with that exterior thing interferes my seeing the color of that exterior thing.

[29:43] Interfere with the image, right? Yeah. Interfere with my thinking about the what it is of something imagined. But my thinking or understanding the what it is of something imagined is not in imagination, any more than my seeing the color of you is in you, right? Yeah. Because then you'd be the organ of my sight, right? But you're not. Blow in the brain interferes with the image, then.

[30:09] Yeah, yeah, yeah. And that's what what the alcohol does and the drugs, huh? Interfere with the images, yes. Not with the organ huh? No, I mean, it interferes with the organ of the imagination, yeah. But notice, huh? By a separate argument, like the argument we saw in the body of the article, right? Or by the argument I was giving here in terms of the continuous. By a separate argument, we can show that understanding the reason is not a body, right?

[30:40] And therefore, we say then, if a blow in the brain interferes with thinking, and the brain is a body, it can't be interfering with the organ because it doesn't have an organ. Therefore, it must be interfering with the what? On the side of the object. And therefore, right? But you go back to what Aristotle says, you can see the reason for that, right? That when the soul is in the body, its proper object is the what it is.

[31:06] Of something sensed or imagined, of a natural thing or a mathematical thing, okay? He makes a beautiful comparison there, right? Just as the object of the senses is the color or the sound or the flavor of something, right? Some exterior thing. Do you see that? Now you interfere with that exterior thing. You interfere with my seeing your color or your, you know.

[31:39] But that doesn't mean that that the exterior thing is the organ of my sight or my sense of smell, right? No, the the sensing is inside the the sense organs, huh?

[31:53] Okay. And the understanding of reason is inside of reason, right? Only examining the character of understanding. That you're understanding a continuous thing in an uncontinuous way, right? Or like he argued there from Aristotle, that you're understanding all what bodies, right? Huh? Then you realize that the understanding is not taking place in the body. And then you realize that, you know, you really have an either-or statement here, right?

[32:22] Either, right? If a blow on the brain interferes with thinking, then either the brain is the organ of thought, right? Or it's on the side of the object of thought. For which it is, it doesn't tell you. See? If a blow on something interferes with my seeing, then that something is the organ of my sight? No, as I showed in that example, right? Huh? You could interfere with my seeing by blowing on the light bulb as well as by blowing on my eye.

[32:53] And one is on the side of the organ, the other's on the side of the what? Object, huh? See? So you see, if the if a blow on something interferes with my seeing, that something is the organ of sight. That's obviously a mistake, isn't it? See? All you can say on the basis of that is that if a blow on something interferes with my seeing, then that something is either the organ of sight or it's on the side of the what?

[33:25] Object of sight, right? See? You see that? See? I'm listening to Mozart, right? That's that's that's my this thing, okay? Now, what could interfere with my hearing the beautiful music of Mozart?

[33:43] My wife could say that's too loud, and turn it down and turn it down so far that I couldn't even hear it anymore, right? That would interfere with my hearing Mozart, right? The other way would be like poor Beethoven. I guess his father used to box him on the ears, right? That's how he eventually went deaf in one ear. You know, he had kind of a rough father, I guess, and you know, you know, you know, used to do that sometimes.

[34:07] They would, you know, whack like that. It really, oh yeah, you know, and sometimes you had these kind of tough teachers in high school that would would do this. You know, it really gives you a shock, wakes up the kid, right? Yeah. But apparently his father did this a little too much, and this is what led to his subsequent deafness. I don't know if there was something congenital too, but I think it was that's they attributed to it.

[34:36] But but anyway, that's beside the point. You could interfere with my hearing Mozart by whacking me on the head, right? Whacking me on the ears, puncturing my eardrum or something, right? Or you could do interfere with it by turning the volume down so I couldn't hear anymore. Interfering with the object, right? Or kick my my my speakers in or something or endear yourself to me, you see?

[35:01] So there's two ways of interfering with my my hearing, huh? So if a blow on something interferes with my hearing Mozart, that something must be the organ of my hearing.

[35:17] No, it might be on the side of the object, right? Huh? I got this new computer at home. I had to get a new computer because the other one was just it wasn't functioning anymore, right? Well, of course, it has all these things I don't really need, right? But my son comes in who's a little more computer wise, and he says, "you pull this thing up, right?

[35:38] There's these little things down at the bottom, he pulled it up, And it says iTunes, right? And you can go and get all this music, you know. And most of it I wouldn't want to hear, of course, but they have a section called classical. So I open it up, you know, and you got all these things. Always Mozart, always Mozart. Another one is Go for Baroque, you know.

[35:58] It's always Baroque. There's a Beethoven one, and there's you know some general ones that say classical, right? And so I said, Gee, that's something, you see. So I put down the Mozart, you know, and all this Mozart music is coming out. It's continuous Mozart, one piece after another being played. It's kind of nice. It'll distract you in your computer, and you can actually you know do stuff in the computer, you know, type something out or something, or read something on it with this music playing, right?

[36:22] So it's going fine, and all of a sudden the Mozart's gone. And what happened to it? So that happens sometimes. They say you know it just it goes out or something happens, you know. And I find out today it's not came back the Mozart. So I don't know whether it's going to do that, but somebody has taught me who has one of these, you know, that you know sometimes somehow on the internet on this kind of a you know station, I don't know.

[36:48] There's some question, a legal question about it too, but it's kind of nice. Well, at last, anyway, but there nobody hit my ear, but something in these computers they got a mind of their own. Just all of a sudden it's gone, doesn't even appear on the screen anymore, right? Couldn't get it, right? Well, that was a a blow somewhere out there on the internet or something, or a blow in my machine, right, or something, right?

[37:11] But that was on the side of the object, right? Interferes my hearing Mozart. Do you see the point? So a drunk per se is he can reason correctly if he could pull up the image or see. Yeah, That's the only thing. that's... But you interfere with the images, you interfere with the thinking, but it's on the side of the object, right? Yeah. So you turn down the volume, as I can't hear it, or you you know bring in all this what static, you know, the old radio sometimes.

[37:44] You know, you can hear one station, and there are other stations coming in all the time, and that happens even on the car radios, you know, from time to time, you know, you're listening to something, all the static comes in, or you get some other voice, or you get the police talking, or something. All these things interfere with you hearing something, but it's all on the side of the object, right?

[38:03] Yeah. So notice the way Thomas solves it here. In the third one here. To the third, it should be said that a body is required for the action of understanding, right, or the understanding, not as an organ by which such an action is exercised, right, but by reason of the object, huh? You see, he's taking the distinction that I'm making here. For the phantasm, he uses the Greek word.

[38:30] The phantasm or the image is compared to the understanding as color to what sight, and that's the proportion that the great Aristotle used, huh?

[38:43] Thus, to need a body does not take away the understanding being subsistent. Otherwise, the animal would not be something subsisting, because it needs exterior sensibles to sense, right?

[38:59] You see, so showing the the defect in that argument of that student years ago. But this is what leads most people to what think that the brain is the organ of thought.

[39:14] They don't see there's two possible connections, right? Sure. Yeah. There could be, and they don't know the arguments to show that the understanding is not a body, right? I mean, you got an either or syllogism here, huh? You can say if a blow on the brain or alcohol going the brain, etc., interferes with thinking, then either either the brain is the organ of thought or it's on the side of the object, huh?

[39:44] But which of those two it is, you've got to have some reason to eliminate one. See, but by these arguments that we saw in the in the body of the article, or by the arguments I was developing on the board again, we show that the brain or the understanding doesn't understand in a body, right? It Doesn't have a body organ. Therefore, it must be interfering on the side of the object, right?

[40:08] But if someone hasn't seen the arguments for the understanding being immaterial, and not seeing this either or, right? They're going to jump to that conclusion, right? And most of them do, huh? And Aristotle gives you know the you know the materialistic understanding of the understanding in the Greeks. There, Homer describes how he gets hit on the head there, right, huh? In battle, right, and he he lay there thinking other thoughts.

[40:36] Yeah. And it's kind of a funny line in a sense, but kind of illustrates their their thinking, right? And my brother Mark and always jokes about that because he and brother Edmund there, the Christian brother, taught philosophy at St. Mary's. They used to go, you know, mountain climbing sometimes, and they're up in the mountains and. The rocks gave way, and my brother fell right, and he was temporarily knocked unconscious, you know.

[41:11] And Brother Edmund is trying to get down to my brother, right? And he he almost fell too because it's you know dangerous thing. And by the time he get down to my brother Mark, he guess my brother Mark had come too, you know. But they had to fly him off eventually, the helicopter. You know, which led to all kinds of problems with the insurance. You know, the insurance pay for helicopters or not because that's expensive thing.

[41:36] Yes, but but anyway, my brother Mark's joke well afterwards, but when this incident was recuperated from it, if I had been quick enough thinking, he says I would have pretended that my whole philosophy had changed, you know, from this blow that had received, you know. And Marcus Berquist lay there thinking, you know, like a Hegelian or a Kantian or a Marxist or some Cartesian or some other guy.

[41:59] Uh He didn't. he. could You know, he wasn't quick enough to think of it, you know, Mm hmm because he he lost his watch when he fell with the rock, you know. So his joke was always, "For the editor stole his watch," you know. Yeah, yeah. You're the best of friends, these two guys. Yeah. But that was kind of a thing, huh? So we take a little break here before we look at this article, maybe.

[42:19] Yeah. I'm here. Yeah. The guy could come out the hall. He had a little break, you know, when these sunrises. Okay, children, he'd say, "Come on back." Yeah. He could do that though, you know, against the white solidarity. Yeah. No, he seemed to mind. Yeah.