De Anima (On the Soul)
66. Summa I, Q.75 a.4: Is the Soul the Man? Body and Soul, and Truth as the Mean Between Extremes
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/066-summa-i-q-75-a-4-is-the-soul-the-man-body-and-soul-and-truth/

[0:00] justice, I read something that really struck me as strange in St. Thomas in a sense. and he says that we can never repay our parents because they gave us their body, gave us life, yeah, yeah, more than. Okay. Name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment. Guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly.

[0:33] Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, Great honor for us and help us to understand all that you've written. Name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. So we're up to Article Four here, and Question Seventy-Five. And the question is whether the soul is man, right?

[1:01] And because the soul is something subsistent, one might guess that the soul is man, because something substantial can exist by itself, right? But Thomas is going to reason against that.

[1:18] Okay. It seems, to the fourth he proceeds that one proceeds thus. It seems that the soul is man, huh? For it is said in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, Chapter Four, Verse Sixteen. Although the outward right man is corrupted, right? Nevertheless, the inward man is renewed from day to day, right?

[1:50] So he doesn't fit the outward man that's renewed from day to day, does it? And you're over the hill, you're going downhill. But that which is within the man is the soul. Therefore, the soul is the what? Inside man, the interior man, huh?

[2:16] Second objection. Moreover, the human soul is a certain what? Substance. It's something in the genus of substance, right? But it's not a universal substance like a species or a genus, right? Therefore, it is a particular substance. Therefore, it is a hypostasis or persona. Now, persona is a Latin word. Hypostasis in Greek, as far as etymology is concerned, was more naming an individual substance, huh? In general, but they became accustomed to be calling an individual substance of a reasonable nature or intellectual nature and hypostasis, huh?

[3:02] But in Latin, persona means exactly that, right? So if you study the treatise on God here, which maybe we'll do someday, but he talks about a person, right? He always takes the definition of Boethius, huh? An individual substance of a what? Rational nature, yeah. So, so

[3:27] the human soul seems to be an individual substance, and therefore to be a a person, right? But Thomas always denied that he's a person, huh? Because he doesn't have a complete what? Nature, huh?

[3:42] So he pray, you know, Saint Peter pray for us. Thomas says that's a what? Figure of speech. Synecdoche huh Saint Peter's not in heaven, but the soul of Saint Peter's in heaven, right? Yeah. But Christ and Mary are in heaven.

[4:00] Yeah. I think I was mentioning how De Koninck, in his audience with Pius XII, there made use of those things, you know, talking about the mystery of the Assumption, right? Because it was fitting that Mary herself should be the person in heaven, huh? Not just her soul, given her importance and causality and so on. But against this is what Augustine says in the 19th book about the City of God, where he commends Varro, huh?

[4:36] Latin thinker, who what? Thought man to be neither just a soul nor just a body, but at the same time a soul and a what? Body, huh? Now that

[4:56] three possibilities there reminds me of this dialogue of Plato. It's a very early dialogue, and I think it's the Alcibiades, huh? Alcibiades one. Sometimes they don't regard all those very early dialogues as authentic Plato, but I think they are. I know Strauss, Leo Strauss thinks they're authentic, and other people. But anyway, in the Alcibiades, Socrates raises the question in terms of those three possibilities: Am I a soul, or am I a body, or am I something composed of both?

[5:27] And Socrates, well, what reason there that he's just a soul? And in way in the Phaedo, he seems to speak as if he were just the what? Soul.

[5:43] But most people think of themselves as just a body. Yeah. But maybe the truth is, or in the middle, in between these two, yeah, yeah.

[5:57] Let's see how Thomas here goes about showing this, huh? I answer. It should be said that for the soul to be man can be understood in two ways.

[6:19] In one way, that man be the soul, but this man is not a soul, but something composed from soul and body, as for example Socrates.

[6:35] Now this sounds kind of strange at first, but you've got to kind of realize where the Platonists are coming from, right? Which I say because some laid down that only the form was of the what definition of the species, and that matter was only a part of the individual, but not of the what species.

[7:06] Now if you want to just stop and think about that a bit, in logic when we talked about definition, we talked about genus as the first part of the definition, if you recall this.

[7:41] Now genus, if you recall from logic, if you take genus to mean the name, it's the name, right, said of many things, right, other in kind, right, signifying what each is. Under that, okay. Would you please say that again? Yeah, it's the name said of many things, said with one meaning first of all, said with one meaning of many things, other in kind,

[8:20] signifying what each is. So for example, animal is a name said with one meaning of dog and cat and horse, which are other in kind, right, different in kind, right, and signifies what each of these is. What is a dog? An animal. What is a cat? An animal, right? Okay. But of course it can only signify in a general way what each is because it has only one meaning, but it's being said of many things, other in what kind, okay?

[9:00] So to say completely what any one of those particular kinds of things are, you have to add what they call the difference, and it should be more than one difference, huh? And the difference is separate these particular kinds of things one from another, and they also are what the particular kinds of things have in addition, right? Okay. So quadrilateral, for example, is the genus of square, but equilateral and right angle are the differences that separate square from other quadrilaterals.

[9:44] An equilateral and right angle are what the square had in addition to the genus. Okay. Now we define the difference, of course, as a name said with one meaning of many things other than kind, but signifying how they are what they are, right? Signifying how they are what they are. But now, what's the name of those particular kinds? What's the name given to those? particular kinds? of things under the same genus.

[10:23] Well, in Greek, the common term was eidos huh? Okay. In Latin, the common word was species, huh? Okay. Now in English, sometimes we take the word species, huh? And use that. But sometimes, instead of using eidos or species or species in particular English, we use the word form, okay? Now that's rather close to eidos and species. Eidos and species. If you know the words a little bit, of the Greek, and, Latin, they indicate more the form that you see, right?

[11:10] So eidos is related to the Greek word for seeing, eidenai, and species, you know, to speculare, to look at, and so on, right? So it's the form that I see in something.

[11:24] So we could say, for example, that democracy is a particular kind of government, right? But we might call it a species of government, right? Or we might call it a what? One form of government, right? So that which is defined is called a what? Form, huh?

[11:53] And it's kind of interesting this use of the word form, because if you compare the form to the genus, huh? It's a little bit like form is to matter, right? You could say the difference maybe is the genus too, as form is to matter. So when I say quadrilateral, for example, the genus, I have a four-sided figure, and those four sides can be equal or unequal, right?

[12:31] They can meet at right angles or obtuse angles or acute angles, right? But the differences determine one or the other, right? So the genus is like matter in some ways, huh? And the differences in the species more like what? In various ways, the matter can be formed, huh? It's not the same thing as matter form, but there's a likeness there, huh? So it's not by chance that we use the word what?

[12:59] Form there, huh? Genus is related to generation, right? You have many offspring and so on. But now when you turn around and compare. What the philosopher calls the lowest species or the lowest form huh When, you compare that to individuals.

[13:27] It's a bit like what form to matter too, because the same kind of thing can be realized in this flesh and blood, or in that flesh and blood, right, huh? Or what it shares can be realized in this metal and in this metal and in that metal, right? So in a way, you think of that which is defined as being form, as opposed to what matter, right, huh?

[13:57] So that even our way of speaking there could kind of make you think that the definition is of the form only, and the matter pertains to the individuals in whom that form is what realized, huh? Okay.

[14:16] Of course, this could be strengthened if you're thinking of form in mathematics, right? Or you might say, well, sphere is a form, but you can realize sphere in in wood or in glass or in steel or in some other material, right, huh? But the form is the same, right,

[14:41] huh? Yeah. And um, oh, and the word for for nature, huh? If you ever study the word for nature, there's the fifth book of wisdom. The sense of nature that's relevant here, what a thing is, huh? Is the one derived from nature, the sense of what form, okay? So if you see the Platonists as coming into natural philosophy in a way through the study of logic and so on, they tend to think of what can be defined as being just what form, huh?

[15:20] okay? And that's why this comes into this particular text. here. I'm saying I see it out of the blue here, but if you realize the Platonic background of these things, huh?

[15:33] But Thomas is saying now, like we saw in natural philosophy, that if you're going to define a natural thing as opposed to a mathematical thing, yeah, you have to bring in at least in a general way some kind of what. The matter. Some kind of material, yeah, yeah. So you're not going to put my flesh and blood and bones in the definition of man, right? Right. Or your flesh and blood and bones, right?

[15:59] Right. But you're going to understand in general that a man has what flesh and blood and bones, right? Okay. The same thing for their natural things, huh?

[16:15] So if you're talking about a geometrical sphere, there's no matter there. If you're talking about the Earth, which is more or less a sphere, or the Sun, it's not just a sphere. There's some kind of what matter there, huh?

[16:31] So he says, which is not able to be true. For to the nature of the species pertains that which the definition signifies. But the definition in natural things, now, as opposed to mathematical things, does not signify the form only, but the form and the what matter. Whence matter is a part of the species in natural things, right? Not individual matter, which is what they mean by signata materia, which is the what source of individuation, but matter in this common way, right?

[17:14] For just as it pertains to what this man is, that he be from this soul in these these this flesh and these bones, so it also pertains to the ratio, the notion of man, that he be from a soul and from flesh and bones, huh?

[17:39] For it's necessary to pertain to the substance of the species, right? Whatever is is commonly right, or whatever is common about the substance of all the individuals contained under that species, huh? So you're trying to say what is a dog in general, right? You've got to say what all these individual dogs are in general. What is common to all of them, right, huh? And it's common to all of them to be flesh and blood as well as soul, right, huh?

[18:15] Okay. What is materia signata again. What did you say that was? Yeah. it's another way of referring to this matter, right, huh? Man is pointed out. huh? Oh, okay. okay.

[18:39] Now, in another way, one can understand this saying. That someone might say, not just that man in general is just soul, but this man is what soul plus individual matter. But the other way of understanding it is to say that this soul, my soul, is me, huh? That this soul is this man, right, huh? Okay.

[19:06] Now Thomas has a kind of interesting point to make here, huh? Going back to the third article, right? And this could be sustained, this opinion, he says, if one. Laid down that the operation of the sensing soul was its own without the body. See,

[19:28] man is a what? An animal with reason, right? Huh? He has reason because he has this understanding soul, right? But he also has what the animal has—the sensing abilities. Huh? So if he's an animal because he senses, and his sensing was something the soul did without the body, right? And not in the body, then you'd have reason to say that the soul alone is what me, right?

[19:57] He's going to go on to give the the reason for that, huh? Because then all the operations which are attributed to a man would belong to the soul alone, right? Sensing as well as what understanding and what willing, right? And now notice the reason he gives there. For that is each thing which does all the operations of that thing. That's kind of obvious. if You stop and think about it, huh?

[20:31] For that is each thing which does the operations of that thing. Yeah. Okay. Makes sense. Yeah. Okay. So if the soul by itself sensed as well as understood, right? So that all these operations that we have, like sensing as well as understanding and willing, operations just of the soul, then the soul is what would be me, right? Why would you need a body at all? Yeah. Yeah.

[21:01] Yeah. Whence that would be? Whence that is man that does the operations of a man, right? But it has been shown, however, that to sense is not an operation of the soul alone, huh? So clearly, touching involves the body, right? Huh? And tasting involves the body, right? Huh? And even what sensing involves the eye being acted upon in some way by color, right? And hearing the ear being acted upon by sound, right?

[21:36] And that's why we said that the intensity of sound, you know, excessive sound can actually hurt the what? Ear, right? Huh? That was hearing on the Every Christmas time, there's some group, you know, that puts out warnings about Christmas toys. Oh yeah. You've probably heard about them, right? So, toys that they consider to be dangerous. Yeah. Yeah. And I guess they just put out their this Christmas list.

[22:07] There's 25 toys in there. I don't know. Wow. But some of the toys, of course, are dangerous, you know, because you know they come apart, and little pieces can be swallowed by little baby and so on, or child, right? But other toys were were considered dangerous because they're too noisy. They're too loud for the baby's child's ear.

[22:27] That's what he's talking about, right? A good example of what they're talking about here, huh? Yeah. But they're not. They, you know, they notice those doctors, you know, with the young people going to these horrible rock concerts, you know, that they're apart from their morals being corrupted, which is a minor thing, of course. Their ears are being corrupted, right? They're going going and deaf in their ears.

[22:53] And especially that ear that's that's turned to it, huh? You see. It's not just like my my old friend there, Jim, the the boxer, you know. Mm-hmm. He was a little hard hearing one ear because he got hit under here. So, but just sound itself alone can can produce what hardness of hearing, right? So clearly, this involves the body, huh?

[23:21] When sense to sense is a certain operation of man, right? That's a matter of inward experience, right? That I hear the music of Mozart, right? I see the road, I see the plants, I see the trees, right? I taste the food, right? So it's a part of my experience that the one who sees and hears and smells and tastes is the one who thinks about what he sees and hears and smells and tastes, right?

[23:52] So the one thinking, right, is also the one sensing and digesting, for that matter. without going even that far. And therefore, I'm both what soul and body, huh? And not just one.

[24:09] Since, therefore, the sense is a certain operation of man, although not one that is what private to him, right? Propria can be taken there as private, huh? I think a lot of times, you know, we have a problem there in translating propria into English. You know, people want to translate proper, and proper in English sometimes just as opposed to what improper or something, right? But a lot of times, proper in Latin has a sense of what private,

[24:38] yeah, yeah. Okay. Mean belonging to one alone, right? Okay. So he's saying to sense is an operation of man. It's not one that's private to man. It's something that he shares with the other animals, right? It's not like understanding, which is private to man compared to the other animals, anyway, right?

[25:02] It's manifest that man is not only a soul, but he's something composed from soul and what body, right? Plato, however, laying down that the sense was private to the soul, right? Meaning private to the soul as opposed to the body, right? Was was able to posit that man was a soul using a what a body. I know. Here's another example here of where the truth is in between two what extremes, huh?

[25:38] Sure. And when you ask yourself, you know, why should people have thought either one of the extreme positions or the false positions, right? If the truth is that middle position, there's a basis in in what is for those who think man is just a soul, sure, and there's a basis in what man is for thinking he's just a body. At least they have some part of the truth.

[26:14] But if the whole truth is that he's just a soul, if man was just a soul, why should anybody have thought? Most men seem to think that you're a body, right? Huh? And why would we say, you know, anybody home? Anybody home? Any soul home? Yeah. See. But vice versa, if the truth was that man was just a body, huh? Like most people seem to think, you know, why would anybody ever think, right, that any brains?

[26:47] there's just a soul. You see. Well, the truth is what? that he's both body and soul. So there's a part of truth in both of these positions, right? See. Like when Aristotle's in in in ethics, there, right? Then he's dealing with the probable opinions, opinions of all men or most men or other philosophers and so on about what happiness is and so on. And many men act as if sense pleasure, right, was happiness, huh?

[27:26] That's the greatest thing, huh? And Aristotle says, well, they wouldn't think this if there wasn't some element of truth in it, right? That the human happiness, the best thing in life, is not sense pleasure, but the best thing in life will be something pleasant to have. You see? So there's some element of truth in this, huh? Okay. Why

[27:53] somebody, you know, thought that the best thing in life is pain? I don't see any any basis for that in in the truth at all, do you? Any element of truth in that, huh? You see? See. But if someone thinks the best thing in life is is sense pleasure, he sees something of the truth, right? You see? Because even Scripture speaks you know of the torrent of pleasure in God's house, right?

[28:22] See? But it's a spiritual pleasure and and much different from the sense pleasure, but it is a kind of pleasure, right? And there's an element of truth there, for right? Okay. Do you see that? Yeah.

[28:41] Um. I mentioned that again when we're talking about the the definition of the soul, right? Huh? And those who think of the soul as an accidental form of the body, right? And those who think of the soul as a complete what substance, huh? Independent of the body. They both have a part of the truth, right? The soul, the whole truth, which Aristotle was the first to see, is that the soul is a substantial form of a body composed of tools, right?

[29:16] So the accidental form people. Saw part of the truth that the soul was a form, but they are mistaken as to its being an accidental form. Those who saw the soul as a complete substance saw part of the truth that it's something substantial, right? But they're mistaken in thinking this was the the whole man, right? Okay, but they're mistaken in thinking this was a complete substance, right?

[29:45] Now I mentioned before how, how when you get to the two chief mysteries of the Catholic faith, which are the mystery of the Trinity and the mystery of the Incarnation, two chief ones. When Thomas is is defending those against all the heresies, right, he knows that the heresies are extremes, right, and have nothing in common, right, with the truth, huh? So you have who is Sabellius who says that there's what one person, and we call him Father and Son Holy Spirit because he does different things.

[30:27] Um, so they're saying that there's what, as there's one nature, there's one person, right? Then you have Arius and people like that who saying whereas there are three persons, there's three natures, and only the Father is really God, and the Son is something less, and the Holy Spirit even even less, right? Um,

[30:50] ah, well, if the truth is that there's one nature and one person, why should anybody think there are three natures and three persons? There'd be no basis in the truth at all for that. Anybody going astray in that way, huh? Because there'd be no foundation in the truth, huh? But vice versa, if the truth is that there's three natures and three persons, why should anybody think that there's one person, one nature, right?

[31:16] There'd be no basis in the truth, in reality, in what is, for that opinion, right? But if the truth is something more difficult to see and to understand that there's one nature but three persons, then you can see how either heresy could what arise, huh? In the same way that that Heraclitus said, right, huh? You know, having seen a part of life, they boast of having seen the whole, right?

[31:46] You see, But they they they see one part of the truth, huh? Now with the with the great mystery of the incarnation, in a way it's just the reverse. There you have one person, but what two natures, huh? But you have likewise two extreme errors, right? One like Nestorius, right, who gets up and says you shouldn't be called the Mother of God, Call the mother Jesus, right?

[32:15] And Nestorius and started a riot, I guess, in the church there because they knew there's something wrong with this guy was was saying. But as there are two natures, there must be what two persons, he thought, huh? And then you have the Monophysites and so on, right? Eutyches I guess and so on, who says that as there's one person there, there's really what one nature, right? Okay, and again the truth is more difficult, right?

[32:45] Because you have to understand that there's one person subsisting in two natures there, right? But then there's a part of the truth in both of the what currents of heresy, right? But if one of those was the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and the other would have no basis at all for it at all. There'd be no reason to think that at all.

[33:11] And vice versa. The other one was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, huh? There'd be no reason why anybody would think that, huh? So, in that sense, the the true being in between the two extremes is

[33:31] explains them, right? But they can't explain it, and that's another sign that you have the truth, huh? That you can not only, you know, defend it in it by itself, but you can also show why people should have thought other things, right? Say. But if one of these positions is trying to defend itself, it can't explain why somebody thought the contrary extreme.

[34:02] The sign of truth being that you you can explain the opposing, yeah. So in a way, moral intellectual virtue, in that sense, resembles a bit moral virtue, which is in between two extremes, huh? Like courage is in between

[34:20] cowardice and foolhardiness, right? And liberality or generosity is in between stinginess and extravagance, huh? You see, and but that's what Shakespeare and Thomas sometimes do. But Shakespeare will say, if he says more or less than the truth, he's a villain and the son of darkness, huh? Falstaff says. But notice, huh? What it means to say more than the truth is to say what is not is, and to say less than the truth is to say what is not is not, huh?

[35:02] So, in Mister Incarnation, the man who says that as there's one person, there's one nature, he's saying that what is is not, and the man who says that as there are two natures, there are two persons, he's saying that what is not that second person is, right? So, to say what is not is is to exceed the truth, right? And the other is to fall short, huh?

[35:36] And I think I mentioned that before when we were in logic. There, you don't often see people understand that phrase we use in the courtroom, right? I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. When you say the whole truth and nothing but the truth, you're not just repeating again your promise to tell the truth, but you're excluding the two ways you could depart from the truth, huh?

[36:04] Say. So, I always give as a simple example in class. If I'm called upon to testify who was present at the bar. At nine o'clock, and let's say John and Thomas were there, and only John and Thomas were there. That would be the truth, right? But if I left out John or Thomas, I would be what? Not telling the whole truth, would I? I'd say John was there, but leave out that Thomas was there too.

[36:32] Then I'm not telling the whole truth. I'm cutting the truth, is where I, clipping it as Shakespeare says in another phrase, huh? Okay. I'm saying that what is or what was in this case was not. Okay, but if I say that John and Thomas and Paul were there, when I know that only John and Thomas were there, then I'm adding to the truth, right? I'm saying that what was not was right.

[37:02] In the case, what was not, what was was not. You see, two ways to go. So, sometimes we can say that intellectual virtue is a bit like moral virtue, right? It's in between two what extremes, huh? And we see it again and again in the history of human thought, huh? That men go to extremes when they're mistaken, huh?

[37:38] So let's go back now to the reply to the first objection, which was taken from the text of Saint Paul there, who speaks of an inner man and outer man, huh? There were people, you know, used to kind of make a joke, you know, with those words, you know, when they're hungry, you know, they've got to go and satisfy the inner man. Yeah, that's not the way.

[37:59] He's using the term inner man, but they used to, you got to satisfy the inner man. Remember that. To the first, therefore, it should be said that according to the philosopher in the ninth book of the Ethics, that most of all seems to be each thing, right? That is principle or chief in it, huh? Just as what the ruler of the city does, the city is said to do, right, huh?

[38:33] So if George Bush declares war on Iraq, you know, tomorrow, the papers will say U. S. declares what? War, right? Or if the Congress, you know, declared war in Japan, right? U. S. declares war in Japan. Well, it's really the Congress that did so, but they're kind of the the the head there, right? Of the country, huh? Okay.

[38:58] Um. So what did what did the French king say? L'état, c'est moi. Yeah. Because he said the principle one, right? Huh? So what the Pope does, you know, the Pope declares someone a saint, right? We'd say what the Church has declared so and so a saint, right? Huh? That's that's a common way of what speaking, right? Huh? And in this way, sometimes, right, what is principal or chief in man is said to be the man, right?

[39:45] Yeah. Sometimes the intellectual part, according to the truth of the thing, right, is called the interior man. But sometimes the sensitive part with the body, according to the estimate of some, are detained only in sensible things. Huh? They can't rise above sensible things, right? So they think of themselves simply as being a body, right? And this is called the what outside. Man, the exterior man, huh?

[40:20] So Aristotle says in the Ethics there, at the end, there when he's dealing with happiness and how it involves the highest operations of reason and so on. And he say, for reason more than anything else is man, right? That's reason that really separates man from the beast, right? So reason most of all seems to be what man, right? Right. That's even you know stronger than saying the soul is man, huh?

[40:57] Okay. So he's explaining then how the words there of Saint Paul should be understood. Just like when you read Saint John, he says, "And the Word was made flesh," right?

[41:17] Well, one heresy is that the Word was changed into flesh. That's very gross, right? Another one is that the what? That in Christ there's human flesh, but no human soul, and the Word is in place of the soul. That's another heresy. Okay, because he has that in Arius and so on, huh? But when he says the Word was made flesh, as Thomas explains in the commentary, that's a figure of speech, synecdoche right?

[41:47] Where the name of the what part is given to the what whole, right? And you find it in Scripture, though. To you, all flesh must come, right? Okay. But sometimes in Scripture we're called souls too. See, give the name of the part to the whole, synecdoche, huh? But we do that in daily life and in speeches and so on, huh? So we say he's a brain, huh?

[42:18] Well, he's not a brain. That's only part of him. But because that part stands out, we say he's a brain, right? Huh? See? Or this what's his name, Vinatieri, the guy who kicks for the Patriots, right? He seems to always get his kick, you know, and he he won the the thing for them, you know, the final games, you know, last year, you know, in the playoffs, right?

[42:39] He kicked his field goals, you know, and so on. So I saw him the other day. He's kicking the ball right through there, you know. Doesn't seem to miss that. Maybe misses some day. I don't never see him miss, you know. But they call him, you know Vinatieri, the toe, you know. They call him the toe. Because he's got a, you know? but you get these nicknames these people because of some part of their what body, you know, you know.

[43:01] Somebody call somebody muscles, you know, or somebody like that. That he's he's bulging, you know, as he goes around this the fist. Um. My poor Cyrano de Bergerac might be named from his nose because that stands out. Some part of it stands out, huh? Okay. Have your bigger eyes. You know, people's eyes just stand out. Bigger eyes.

[43:30] Okay. That's a fairly common figure, figure of speech. Now, to the second, he says it ought to be said that not every particular substance is an hypostasis or person, but only one that has the complete nature of the what species, huh? Whence is the hand or the foot cannot be called an hypostasis or person, and likewise neither the soul, since it be a part of the human species, huh?

[44:19] What's that text that Thomas often quotes from the Book of Job? You know, he's talking about the resurrection, and in my flesh I shall see God. Right? It doesn't mean you're going to see God through your eyes, right? But it means your soul will see God face to face, being in your what body, the soul, right, huh? Okay. You're not going to see the God through the body eyes, no.

[44:47] But you're going to be seeing him with your soul again joined to your what body, right, huh? Yeah, we take a little break here because we'll try to divide evenly between these two articles, right? We went to Article Five, huh?