De Anima (On the Soul)
68. Q.75 a.5 Replies: Proportioned Abilities, Angels as Form and Being, and Pride as the Mother of Error
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/068-q-75-a-5-replies-proportioned-abilities-angels-as-form-and/

[0:00] So let's look at the reply now to the first objection, which was saying that God is what pure act, and everything that has any actuality gets it from partaking of God. Therefore, anything that has any what. Ability must what get it from what is pure ability? Yeah. And he phrased matter, right? Yeah. Okay. Now Thomas here is going to solve in a different way than he would solve the Manichean heresy, right?

[0:31] The Manichean heresy, right, says that there's a bad itself, right? And apparently he had this kind of in the Platonic dialogues a bit, right? Okay. We can see that Aristotle refutes that in the ninth book of wisdom, right? But Plato speaks as if in some places there might be a bad itself, right? So sometimes he kind of identifies the bad itself with matter, right? So it's kind of Manichaean tendency there, right?

[1:03] In the Platonists, you got to watch out for that. But Aristotle saw his way through that, huh? But here he's going to solve in a different way because there really is a first matter that is ability, pure ability, right?

[1:18] But he's going to show what's wrong with that what proportion there, huh? Okay. Because he's saying pure act is to everything that has act, or vice versa, pure ability is to everything that has some ability. As pure act is to whatever has some act, right? Now if all you see is that likeness, you can be deceived by that likeness, huh? Okay. Knows what Thomas is going to say here.

[1:47] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the first act, which is God, huh, is a universal principle, a universal cause of all acts, right? Because it is infinite, right? Because it is infinite, right? That's one of the attributes of God, containing virtually, right, in its power, all things, huh? And he's quoting the words of Dionysius. Praehabens having before, you might say in itself all things, huh?

[2:22] Okay. Now when you study God, sometimes you'll find out that God is universally perfect, right? His perfection of all things, but in a simple way, huh? And

[2:39] this infinity of God, right, is referring to his what? Not lacking any perfection, right? huh? Whence he is partaken of by all things, not as a part of them, right? But according to the what?

[3:06] Pouring out of his procession, right, huh? Now, notice that means you know how we use the word part sometimes. You say you say partake. You know that means literally to take a part of, right? Okay. But sometimes we use the word part in the sense of what partial, right? Meaning that you have something of something, but not what completely or perfectly, right? Okay. And so he's saying they all partake of God, not in the sense that they have what a part of God, or that the God is a part of them, right?

[3:55] But they have something like God, but in a very what deficient way. Okay. Okay. Now, thing I was going to think of their time at the University, of, perfect there. Thomas often when he quotes um. uh God, there talking to. I think, I think both uh but to Moses, one person, and he says, you know, follow me, and I will show you every good. And Thomas says, that is myself, you know, but that's the way of speaking, right?

[4:30] God is said to be every good, not in the sense that he's a composite thing, right? He's simple, but his every good in a completely what simple way, right? Okay, so all things partake of God in so far as they're perfect in some way, but they partake in a what imperfect way, right? In a partial way, right? Okay, but they don't have a part of God, nor has God a part of them, right?

[5:00] But he says, potency or ability, since it is receptive of act, is necessary that it be what proportion to act, huh? So that not just any act is received in what any potency.

[5:19] And that's why the perfection of the eye is not the same as perfection of the what ear and so on, huh? Because what's receiving the perfection is not the same. But he says the acts received, which proceed from the first infinite act, namely God, and are certain partakings of it, are what diverse.

[5:44] Whence there is not able to be one potency or one kind of ability, right, that receives all acts, right? As there is one act, namely God, pouring into, you might say, or pouring out, all what participating acts, huh?

[6:08] Now, why is it that there's no ability to receive that is capable of receiving every act as a partaking of God? Because in a sense, the objection is saying that, right? The objection is saying that every act other than God is partaking of the actuality of God in an imperfect way, right? Huh? And the objection is saying that everything that receives an act, partaking of God's perfection, right, is doing so because it partakes of this what pure ability, right?

[6:46] Huh? Okay. But Thomas says there's no one ability that is adequate to receiving every actuality that God could what give, huh? And therefore, you have different kinds of ability, right? And the ability of matter to receive something like the perfection of God is other than the ability of what the soul to receive a perfection of God, huh? It's interesting how Aristotle, in the first book of Natural Hearing, he speaks of form as something godlike, right?

[7:18] Because it's a certain act, right? But as we said, when matter receives one form, it excludes another form, right? But when the soul receives one form in the understanding, it's not prevented from receiving other forms. It can receive the forms of all these things in the material world, and therefore the soul is in some way all things, right? So it has a different kind of an ability, an ability to receive other forms, okay?

[7:48] Just as we could say the eye is able to receive what color, and the ear is able to receive sounds, right? But they're all limited, right? They can't receive everything that can be received from God. There's no ability to receive everything that can be received from God.

[8:08] And it's interesting, huh? That even in us, if we take our our reason and our will, right? Huh? My reason is able to receive, let's say, the perfection of faith, right? Huh? Or my reason is able to receive the perfection of some of these gifts, the Holy Spirit, understanding, maybe, or science, or something like that, right? But my reason can't receive the perfection of hope or charity, can it?

[8:45] My reason cannot be the subject of charity. My will can receive hope, right? My will can receive charity, right? The theological virtues of hope and charity are in my will. They're received in my will. My reason can't receive them. My reason can be directed by them, right? Can be formed in some way by them, but it can't receive them as what a subject receiving them, right? Why faith is received in the reason itself, huh?

[9:17] Why faith cannot be received in the will? See, so you see that that something of God's knowledge and something of God's love, and these are perfections, in God but the one thing in God, right? But they are received in us by different what abilities, right? One being my reason, the other being my heart or my will.

[9:43] And in matter to receive other things, right, another way, right? See, there's no one ability to receive everything that God can give. It's kind of interesting there in terms of men and woman, you know, when Paul Paul the Sixth there, when he made. Teresa of Avila, Doctor of the Church, right? And it's very interesting. If I don't have a chance to read his address in the time, it's very interesting address.

[10:22] And he quotes the Doctor Divine Love there, Saint Francis de Sales, right? With approval, since Francis de Sales say that the woman's soul is more capable of love than the man's soul. It's a very strong thing, right? And he contrasts, you know, the way in which Teresa of Avila is a Doctor of the Church and the way Saint Augustine is a Doctor of the Church, right? And Augustine's a Doctor of the Church much more in this scholastic sense, in this argumentative sense, right?

[10:52] And Teresa of Avila isn't right that way, right? But woman has certain perfection in love, right? That's kind of interesting, huh? Because that means that the man and the woman

[11:07] don't equally or exactly the same perfection perceive as much, right? You see. So, like in marriage and so on, you know, the the man's love of the children is kind of what confirmed by the woman's love the children, I think. But the woman's reason is confirmed by the man's reason. See, it's just an

[11:33] yeah, but it's the idea that you don't have the same what ability, you know. And interesting when when when Thomas Aristotle is reasoning there at the end of the treatise almost on friendship there he's reasoning about

[11:52] does friendship consist more in loving or being loved? Okay, because both must be found in friendship, right? Friendship involves mutual love, right? So if I love you and truly love you, but you don't love me in return, we're not friends. See, see. In order for there to be friendship between you and I, I have to love you, but you have to return my love, right? Okay, so love.

[12:20] So both things are necessarily involved in friendship: loving and being loved, right? Okay. And Aristotle raises the question now: which is more? You know, which is more? And he gives the sign taken from the woman, right? It's the case where the woman cannot feed her children, right? Maybe she doesn't have milk or whatever it is, right? So she has to give the child to another woman to nurse, right?

[12:54] Why? Because that's the only way for the child to to flourish, right? But you realize is in giving the baby to the other woman to nourish that baby is going to be attached to the other woman. So she's seeking more to what love. Love than be loved, see.

[13:18] Thomas Aristotle doesn't give the reason, you know, why friendship consists more on loving than being loved, and then he brings in the reason there. Thomas does because Aristotle says that's kind of obvious, but we'll go into that. But it's interesting. But why does he take the sign from the woman? Right, was because the woman has a certain what perfection of love, huh?

[13:42] And because very much there, you know, when you see when they talk about Mary, you know, Mary is called the mother of what? Yeah, she's called the mother of mercy, right? See, she's never called the mother of justice. See, but Christ is called the son of justice, right? And he says the apostles, you know, are sitting in the twelve tribes, judging, you know, twelve seats are judging the twelve tribes, right?

[14:08] Now that is more an act of what reason, right? To see what is just. You know, but the woman is by nature more merciful. That's why Shakespeare puts, you know, into Portia's mouth, right, the most beautiful words about mercy we have in fiction, right? You know, the ones from the scene there in Merchant of Venice, there, where she's pleading for with the with the for the Merchant of Venice's life, right?

[14:38] You know, falls the gentle rain from heaven, the mercy. You know, they don't know those words. Well, I got to read Merchant of Venice there. Um, but but also, you know, the last plays of Shakespeare, these forgiveness plays, you know, these mercy plays, mercy romances, and it's a woman forgiving. You see, it's done very beautifully. You know, but you know, when when Mary appears, you know, in some of these things, you know, she can no longer restrain my son.

[15:07] You know, like he's going to punish us for our wickedness. You know, huh? But you see, the mother is. But in some of the old medieval commentaries on the Hail Mary, you know, they'll speak of Mary as Mother Mercy. You know, Neil Hobbins and Raymond Justicia having nothing in the Kingdom of Justice. Made a little strong, but you see the merciful nature. That's the type of love, right?

[15:29] The merciful love of soul. But I mention that because it's kind of striking that that this diversity, even of man and woman, there is not just on the physical level, but in the soul itself, right? And it's kind of strong the way Paul the sixth, I mean, take him as my authority. he's making Teresa of Avila there and Saint Catherine of Siena, right? Those who made the first two doctors of the Church, but but he quotes with authority, I mean, with approval, apparently.

[16:02] Francis de Sales had said this before, right? Right, but if you go to Francis de Sales, you know, treatise on love, right? You know, he's he's the most complete treatise we have, perhaps in some ways. But you'll take his examples from Teresa of Avila and other of the female saints more than from the male saints, right? You know, more than from Augustine or Thomas and like that, right?

[16:24] But it's in excellence there, you know, in terms of the will. Um, but but you know, but apart from man and woman, right? In any of us, right? Um, some of the perfection of God I receive in my reason.

[16:44] And some of the perfection of God I receive in my will, but it's not the same perfection I receive in both, right? See that? No, just repeat that again. Some of the perfection of God I receive in my will, like the love of God, right? Okay. Okay. Some of the perfection of God, the knowledge of God, I receive in my what? Yeah, and I can't receive that knowledge in my will.

[17:13] Although my reason can influence my will, right? And I can't receive charity in my what? Reason. See. And and the way the way reason and the will are perfected is different. Like we mentioned before, you know, reason you got to take things, huh? You got to grasp them, right? See. By love we think of it more in terms of what? Giving. Giving. Giving. You see. Right. You know.

[17:49] You know. You know. They have a popular song: "Love isn't love until it's given away," right? Huh? See. But as they used to say in that, I gave a lecture one time there, at TEC there, and on this contrariety in quotes between love and knowledge, right? Huh? And I said, it's always bad to lose your mind.

[18:13] I said it's not always bad to lose your heart. It Depends upon whom you lose it to. You see. Hmm. But but why is that? Why is it always bad to lose your mind? But not always bad to lose your heart. See.

[18:29] Well, as Christ says, huh? Where your your treasure is, there your heart shall be, right? So love is in the thing loved, huh? Hmm. By knowing is more the reverse, putting the thing, but you want to know inside you, right? Um, Father Boulay used to point that out, you know how the the the will in some ways is more proportioned to God, right? Than reason, because reason is trying to put God into reason.

[19:03] But the will is going out to God, right? So it's like the difference between trying to put the ocean inside of you, which would be like trying to understand it, and then jumping into the ocean, which would be like loving it. You see. And so, even in in in faith, huh? As Augustine and Thomas teach us, Church teaches us, no one believes unless they want to, right?

[19:31] Huh? They're moved by the will, but God moves reason through the will because the will is more proportioned to God. Hmm. That's why we can we can truly love God in this world, right? More than we can truly know him. We know more what he's not, you know. We don't really see him as he is until we get the beatific vision, right? But we can love him as he is, even in this world, huh?

[19:57] We're not always sure that we're loving him that way, right? It's hard to know. We can have some probable signs that we're loving him in this way, but we can't really know him as he is in this life, huh? Hmm. He's more proportioned to our will in some sense.

[20:14] Yeah. Okay. So, so he says. Continue here. He replied the first objection. The received acts, right, which proceed from the first infinite act, namely God, and are certain partakings of Him, those acts are diverse, right? Like I was saying here, charity is a diverse thing from love, right? From knowledge, right? The love of God is quite different from the knowledge of God. Whence there cannot be one ability or power which receives what all acts, because they have to be proportioned to those particular acts.

[20:55] Okay. I know. Notice, huh? What does Augustine say in the Confessions? There, too late have I come to know thee. What was he called? Too late have I loved thee. The ancient beauty, yeah, yeah. Then he says, "That's one too. " Yeah. Too late have I loved thee. Okay. Now, beauty in some way is partaken of all the way down to the senses, the higher senses, right?

[21:21] But the sense of sight and the sense of what hearing, right? Huh? So I can see a beautiful sunset, right? Beautiful mountains or beautiful waterfalls and so on. And I can hear the beautiful music of Mozart, right? Huh? See. But the beauty of of nature or the beauty of the music there is a partaking, right, of the beauty of God, right? Imperfect, right? You know. So sometimes, in like Pius the Twelfth and the thing on sacred music, we talk about that, right?

[21:55] Huh? Sacred music should be what beautiful, huh? You know. It's like Shakespeare says that you know, sacred music sung out of tune is worse than priests that lie. Rather strong thing.

[22:12] But anyway, but notice, huh? The beauty of the painting cannot be known by the ear, and the beauty of Mozart's music cannot be known by the what? Eye, right now. See. So the eye is able to receive the beauty of the sunset, but it can't receive the beauty of Mozart's music. That's right. Or Palestrina. And and the ear can receive the beauty of Palestrina or Mozart, but it can't receive the beauty of the sunset, right?

[22:51] See. So the different abilities are proportioned, as Thomas says, to different acts, huh? But all those acts are, in some way, partaking of the divine act, huh? But there's no one ability; that could be an ability for all the acts that can partake of God's perfection. It's kind of really marvelous. is this first objection and what Thomas points out in reply to it. Whence there cannot be one potency, right, that receives all of these acts, all these participating acts, right?

[23:30] As there is one act flowing out, right, or all these participating acts, right? Otherwise, he says the potency, the receptive potency, would equal the what? Active power of the first act, huh? Okay.

[23:51] So there is another potency, receptive in the understanding soul, from the potency that's receptive of first matter, as is clear from the diversity of the things we see. For first matter receives individual forms, right? But the understanding receives forms. Absolute, eh universally. When such a a potency in the soul, understanding soul existing, does not show that the soul is composed from matter and form. I notice that kind of sets the the the stage for the reply to the second objection, right?

[24:31] The second objection was based upon the equivocation of the word we see, right? The equivocation of the word undergoing, huh? Okay. I told you about this this philosopher, my brother Richard, knew they were friends, and the guy was describing, you know, teaching, you know, in college. I think he went to the University of Colorado teaching, you know. He's describing the student kind of the looks on their face, you know, as you're teaching, you know, and the looks, so you know, why are you doing this to me, you know?

[25:04] But as if you're acting upon them in a way that was, you know, harming them or hurting them or something like that, rather than acting upon them in a way that's going to bring them to understand something, right? But then you're kind of confusing the first meaning, you know, of undergoing.

[25:20] Yeah, yeah, suffering. Yeah, yeah, to be suffering, you know, because they did look like they're suffering there, you know. It's kind of funny how the professor he sees. When I was first teaching in California, you know, I had a very good student in the sense that he would make good objections, right? And these objections that I had heard before, I mean, that you know, Aristotle or Thomas brings up and solves, you know.

[25:57] So I knew how to meet all these objections, right? But he'd think up the objections; they were new to him. And he thought, well, he won't be able to answer this tomorrow, right? And he'd come to class, I'd answered, right? But I used to notice, you know, he'd be like this, you know, he'd come up with this objection, and then as I tried to answer, he kind of, you know, settled back, you know, relaxed, you know, like that.

[26:16] So he knew when you were answering the objections. It was beautiful to see a student like that, huh? Because he had a good objection, but he knew when the objection had been answered, you know. But he'd tell me afterwards, you know, he used to think, you know, these things up at night time. He said, "I'll have them tomorrow, you know." I say, I seem to know everything, you see, but it's not, you know, that I discovered all these things, but I've read Thomas before, and these are I've heard these a million times, so to speak, you know, I've heard it many times, and I, you know, expect them to be making the same mistake over and over again, you know, or being, you know, seeing

[26:51] the same difficulties. Okay. Did he become a philosopher? I don't think so, but you never know. Yeah. I had another student who wanted to be a an accountant, and I said, "Why do you want to be an accountant?" He says, "Well, I heard you can make a lot of money fast." He says, "He wanted to buy a big, you know, boat." And take his friends out in the Pacific Ocean.

[27:16] So I don't know what he finally did, but now the second objection now is clear from something we saw in the first reply to the first objection, right? That there are different kinds of ability, right? Whose receiving is different in kind, right? To the second, it should be said that to be subject and to be transformed belong to matter according as it is in potency. But just as there is another ability of the understanding or potency of understanding, another of first matter, so there's another what definition you might say of being subject to and of being what transformed, right?

[28:02] Of course, Thomas will use that word what transforming when he's talking about love, too, right? That's another meaning of transforming, huh? Or Shakespeare will use the word what metamorphosis, talking about love.

[28:20] So in this way, the understanding is subject to knowledge and change from ignorance to knowledge, according as it is in potency to the understandable forms. But these are something universal as opposed to singular, right? huh? If we seize things universally and not singularly, huh? If we seize them,

[28:42] the understandable form of contraries are not contrary in the soul, are they? So the definition of what virtue doesn't kick out the definition of what vice, but the definition of virtue helps me to understand the definition of vice, huh?

[29:00] Virtue, moral virtue, is a habit in the middle, right? Towards us is determine the right reason, and vice is a habit, it's in the extreme, right? So I can understand one better to understand the other. Is that clear enough? The second reply to the second objection.

[29:21] Now the third one is taken from the text of the eighth book of the metaphysics, and there I say you have to understand this in the way Aristotle is proceeding there, right? He's he's dealing with material substances at that point. point, right? And as you start to go from material substance towards the immaterial substances, right? The material substances

[29:43] are produced from matter, right? Huh? And they have existence through the form that they receive, right? And through the agent that is transforming the matter, right? But when you turn to the immaterial substances, they're just form alone, right? So they don't proceed from matter, do they, right? Nor do they proceed from an agent transforming matter, huh?

[30:11] Now some people, you know, thought that Aristotle didn't know about creation, but Thomas is a pretty good case for Aristotle knowing about creation, right? But at this point, you don't see them. they would seem to be simply what forms, right? And form has existence as such. So,

[30:31] so he says, form is the cause of being for matter and the agent. Whence, the agent, insofar as it reduces matter to the act of form by transforming it, is a cause of being. If, however, something is a subsisting form, it doesn't have a a what? It doesn't have existence through some formal principle. Then you have a form of a form, right? You have to have a form of that form and that form, right?

[30:59] Okay. Nor does they have a cause. of. Transforming, changing over, I suppose you have to translate transmutans, changing over from potency to act, because you're not generated from potency. Hence, after the fore said words, the philosopher. What's the name of that figure of speech there? Where he calls Aristotle the philosopher. antonomasia, yeah. He often calls Saint Paul the what? The apostle, right? I guess if you look in the New Testament, you'll see that the other apostles don't call themselves apostles in the way that Paul and and Peter do, right?

[31:46] So they're the apostles by antonomasia. And also John Paul II will call Peter and Paul the what? The princes of the apostles. So the philosopher concludes that those things which are composed from matter and form, there is no other cause except what, what moves them from potency to act, right? Whatever things do not have matter, all these things are what simply, right? And they are truly beings, huh?

[32:28] So they are through themselves, right? Not through a form of their form. So they're they're they're really elegant beings, those angels, huh? You've heard my little paraphrase, you know. You know how there are forefathers gathered there in Independence Hall and so on, and our friend came out with some words. You know, we hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal. Did I tell you my little thing?

[32:59] No. The angels came together, right? And they said, "We hold these truths to be self-evident that all angels are created unequal. " Because they're all a different kind, right? There can't be two angels of the same kind because there's no matter there, right? So all the differences are formal; they're all different kind. And so, my old teacher Kasurik used to say, "You know, God hates equality." I see.

[33:25] We're much closer to being equal, you know, but still, you know, in heaven we'll be what? Unequal, right? Star differs from star, you know, like Paul the sixth says in his encyclical on Saint Francis de Sales, huh? Star differs from star.

[33:50] So I don't know. Democracy doesn't have much future. What did Plato say? Say comes after democracy. Tyranny. Tyranny, yes, right. Yeah. You know, I. You know, they're getting concerned about the invasion of privacy now. You know, and as far as I can see, it's necessary, right? to to? Check up on these people, you know. But but if you got somebody in there, you know, if this thing gets established, right, you know, and then you get somebody there who is really, you know, tyrannical in mind, you know, you know, you have the instruments there already, you know.

[34:28] Hillary Clinton and Hillary. Yeah. Hillary Clinton Yeah. That's scary. Yeah. No Gore's scary too. Yeah. Yeah, he's. He got a very low rating though. They had a, you know, one of these, you know, these like like Bushes got sixty five percent favor rating. Gore got eighteen percent favor rating and forty five negative or something. Oh, why? I don't know. He's got much chance to run again. That's a sign of hope

[34:55] I don't know. He's not openly running yet. Okay, now the fourth objection, right? Right. Now the fourth objection, saying that what does not have matter but is form only is pure act and infinite right? And but my old teacher Kasurik used to say, you know,

[35:16] as you go through the wisdom there, the metaphysics, you know, well, this is God or this is the best thing there is, you know. Well, it is compared to everything that's gone before, right? Then beyond that, there's something even better, right? Okay. And you know what I was saying? What are you saying about the first-year great angels say this is God? He said, no, no, no. But then you know he's up higher, so you go from the angels up to the archangels.

[35:39] Oh, okay, this is God now. I know you come, you know, because they'll be so much greater than the angels. Because the great angels are in the lowest, and then the archangels, and then you go up to the the princes, and all the way up to the archangels, you know, to the seraphim, you know, you know, and you say, Ah, this is God. No, no, no, no.

[35:57] This is God. And none of them are God, but they're marvelous, marvelous creatures, huh? Marvelous creatures. And he used to say, you know, if you run and roll all the the best minds together, you know, Einstein and Aristotle and Shakespeare and Plato and all the, you know, great medical doctors and so on, you still won't have a mind equal to the lowest angel. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Basirik used to say, you know, your great angel watching you trying to make a decision, you know, like you're watching, you know, a anchor or something down there, right?

[36:45] Decide what to do. He says to the fourth, it should be said that everything partaken, right, is to the one partaking, right, as its act, right. Now he says every created form.

[37:09] Subsisting by itself, right? Is necessary that it partake of what? Being to be, right? Because even life itself, or whatever is thus said, partakes of being itself, as Dionysius says in the fifth book of the Divine Names.

[37:33] But the being partaken is limited to the capacity of the one partaking. Whence only God, who is his own what? Being, who is being itself, is a pure act and infinite, huh? In understanding substances, there is a composition from act and potency, not from matter and form, right? But from form and the being, the existence partaken, right? Whence, by some, it is said that they are composed from what is and that by which it is.

[38:18] For the being is that by which something is. So only God is I am who am, right? I think I mentioned how who was it, Hilary? You know the Poitiers who wrote these famous works on the Trinity, defending the the divinity of Christ. You know the second person, the Son. And it's one I think Thomas quotes the most. You know after Augustine, Augustine is obviously the greatest there.

[38:49] But he quotes Hilary a lot. The Hilary was originally a Greek philosopher, right? And if you look at his work on the Trinity, he has a little autobiographical sketch of his life there, you know, or his conversion. And he somehow came into contact with scriptures, right? And he started looking at Exodus, and then he ran across these words, you know, "I am who am," right? And as a philosopher, right, that was a motive of credibility for him, right?

[39:16] To come into, you know, there must be something about these books and you know about this religion. We saw that, you know. And it's kind of striking when you read read the second book of Wisdom there, which maybe we'll read someday. But Aristotle is showing how being and truth go together, and how the cause is more true than the effect, and so on. But notice if he had gone from the Old Testament, "God is I am who am," to Christ in the New Testament, "I am truth itself," he would have made the connection right away as a philosopher, you know, and how true that was, you know.

[39:59] And so it would have been a motive of credibility for Aristotle if he had lived at the time of what Christianity, right? Yeah. But again, you never know. I mean, I mean, Augustine speculates there that Porphyry, you know, it's pride that keeps him out of the church, right? Because Porphyry was kind of out of the anti-Christian, you know. So even though he had quite a philosophical background, pride is can blind you.

[40:35] So my first time I met I met Charles De Koninck. You know, he came down on this lecture tour. You know, and so so Kasurik calls me up on the phone and invites me over. You know, and he makes me great DeConick. And I was supposed to ask DeConick. You know, I'd asked I'd written to some questions that Casiric couldn't answer. And so Casiric said, "Well, when DeConick comes down, you ask these questions of DeConick, you know."

[41:08] So DeConick came down and he answered all my questions. You know, very clearly. I thought, well, you know, I could see right away his superiority to to Casiric. You know, you know, and and then Casiric said, "You know, I've waited something to tell you," he says. So he had me explain to Casiric to DeConick my ideas about Mozart and music. You know, DeConick says, "Good," he says, "Write them up," he says, "and we'll publish them," he says.

[41:38] But I mean, this kind of humility, that's the kind of thing to me, you know. This this kid, you know, from from from the college, you know, huh? You know, but he really, really.

[41:53] I remember too now when I was writing, I was writing my doctoral thesis. I was writing it under Monsignor Deon, you know. Mm-hmm. And uh, of course, DeConnick, you know, really you know, respected much of Deon, you know, and would have Deon read his things before he published them, you know. So anyway, but there was this one particular difficult question, you know, and I decided to go and see what DeConick thought about, you know.

[42:17] So when I asked him what he thought about, and he says, "Like, why are you bothering to ask me? You know, you've got Dion." I said, "Well, I'd like to see what you think anyway." You know, he said, "Okay," so he told me what he thought. You know, but that's kind of humility, you know. And I guess what you know, what happened, you know, they were both parity, you know, for the Vatican too, you know, you know, for the you know attached there the Cardinal Quebec.

[42:42] So I guess over in in in Europe there, and they were discussing something, and something in the philosophy nature came up, and of course that's what DeConick was teaching, you know, for three years, and Dion apparently pointed out something that DeConick had never seen, you know. And DeConick just stopped. I guess he said, "How could I have missed that after all these years?" You know, you know, it involves that humility, you know.

[43:04] Have you seen that? You know, and. No, and I've heard other people, you know, who you know DeConic used to go on the lecture tours. People knew DeConic, you know, and they might have thought DeConic was a greater mind than Dion or something, you know. Sure. And and when you tell them these stories, no, they, you know, they, they,

[43:26] you know, think, well, that's just, you know, like false humility or something, you know. But I don't think it was at all. Yeah. I remember when

[43:37] when Mary Shane went to went to went to study in Quebec there, and she stayed with Mrs. DeConic, you know, after DeConic had died, you know. And if anybody admired her husband was Mrs. DeConic, you know, she had twelve children by him. But I mean, the first time I met Mrs. DeConic, you know, it was her first sense was she met my husband, you know. I was like just absorbed, you know, kind of in her husband's greatness and so on.

[43:59] But when when Mary Shane stayed there, Mrs. DeConnick said that Charles DeConnick had made absolutely clear to her that Dion is the greatest mind up here, you know, you know, you know. So when when the wife, you know. There's no question about that Did De Koninck recognize the excellence of Dionne You know,

[44:19] I know sometimes I come back from the university there, and I lived fairly near to where DeConic lived. You know, and I guess they were going to discuss that afternoon, DeConic and Dion. I'd see Dion out there walking back and forth. You know, he's thinking about something. He's gonna. And so I knew I had to say, you know, very quickly, you know, hello and move on. You know, but that's different.

[44:39] It's kind of like that, but so interesting. I've finally one of my brothers I just converted. Finding Dion, that's kind of interesting. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But I mean, I used to say to him, you know, why don't you become a Catholic? He says, "Well, I'd say you know, faith is a gift, you know, and I guess it is. " But you know, you know, he said he could see this, and I guess he'd go sometimes to the American Catholic Philosophical Association, and you know, he meets even these, you know, priest philosophers, you know, and oh, you can't be, you know, for him, you know, Thomas and Aristotle were the only really great philosophers.

[45:28] The ones he had learned more from them than from the other philosophers put together, you know, and oh, you can't possibly mean that, you know. Yes, he does mean this, you know. But it's good to have somebody around like that who who who is not a Catholic, right? But who can see the excellence of Plato and Aristotle, you know. My teacher Kasurik at one time had given up study of philosophy because he had just kind of this dogmatic teaching, you know.

[45:54] Or you're you're Catholic, you read Thomas and like that, but with no real understanding of the text, you know. Of the reality, yeah. But then he ran into DeConic, you know, and he'd heard about DeConic, and when he first went up, he's a little bit older than most students, you know, so a little different relation there. And he said, you know, if you teach philosophy the way I was taught to me in the states, he said, I'd get up and leave your class right away.

[46:15] He told Deconic that. Deconic says, "fine, " But then you could see how you know. attached Kosurik was to Deconic, you know, because he really got what he needed, right? And I I can remember myself when when when that first time I met DeConic and first saw him, and he came down and he you know gave a series of lectures various places, and and gave one talk here at the Saint Paul Seminary and one at the college and a number of other places.

[46:42] And so I remember one time he he got up on the stage and he was talking. There's some little problem with microphone, you know, and he jumps up, runs up the stage, fixes the microphone, you know, runs down again, you know. But you can see that you know, even little things like that, you know. So, so.

[47:05] But you know, this pride is really, you know, what Thomas called in the Summa Contra Gentiles is the Mater Erroris, you know. But in the commentary in the epistles of Saint Paul, you know, where Saint Paul talks about the causes of deception and so on, and Thomas says that you know, false imagination and pride, you know, that's like the the roots are there and so on. And but then he goes in, you know, explaining how pride is a cause of deception, you know.

[47:36] And two ways, you know, one way is you overestimate your abilities, so you apply your mind to judging something beyond your capacity, and you easily fail that way. And the other way is that you don't you don't respect the teacher, you know, the one that the teacher you should respect, like like Thomas, you know. And then you he he would prevent you from making a lot of errors or call you back from a lot of errors, right?

[48:05] And so, pride is in those two ways a cause of deception. First, going again was what going beyond your ability. Yeah, yeah, because of pride, you overestimate your abilities. You think you're better than you are, right? And therefore, you can judge something, you know. Um.

[48:31] Yeah, you know, see Dion, you know, he didn't know, he didn't know. I mean, you couldn't, you couldn't, you know, get him to shoot his mouth off, you know, like most professors would do for you, you know. And

[48:53] but then they say the other thing is they say that that it makes you unteachable, you know, because you don't listen carefully to the teacher and so on. And

[49:06] does this pride thing? I was thinking about. It seems like one of the characteristics with the the modern philosophy is this emphasis on will. Is that yeah? Oh, yeah. And is that they put they put the will above reason? Yeah. And you know, part of it is, of course, for the democratic customs, because the love of freedom is kind of absolute. So, for Hegel, for example, was a very influential philosopher.

[49:31] Hegel's dates are about seventeen seventy eighteen thirty one. But for Hegel, the end of all history is freedom. So it's like the supreme good of all things, huh? And you know, people like Sartre in the twentieth century were influenced by Hegel. There, you know, for Sartre, it's not important what you do, but that you do it freely, that you admit that you're freely doing it, huh? And in one sense, Sartre is is good because he's defending the reality of our freedom, right?

[50:03] But he's making that kind of you know what's important is that it be done freely, you know. But what you know, you can do, you know, good things or bad things. Really, you know. So freedom is good if used, you know, wisely and so on. But freedom absolutely is not absolute good. But if they see freedom as the greatest good, it's the will that is free. It's not reason that is free, huh?

[50:32] And remember that beautiful phrase there of Aristotle in the first book of Natural Hearing, where he speaks of how all the Greek natural philosophers were trying to understand change by contraries. And usually, when when I get to that point, you know, I'll kind of stop and I'll say, Unbeknownst to Aristotle, the Chinese at the same time were trying to explain change by the Yin and the Yang as contraries.

[51:03] And unbeknownst to Aristotle, the modern natural scientists are trying to explain things by attraction, repulsion, and other contraries. But when Aristotle speaks of this, he says that they all say that changes by contraries without giving any reason for this, as if being forced by the truth itself. He says, and seems to anybody ancient or modern or East or West for that matter. When they think about change, they think of contraries.

[51:33] And but the phrase of Aristotle is interesting. Forced by the truth itself, huh? Yeah. And Thomas takes that phrase over too and uses it in the Summa Contra Gentiles for a number of things. But that's kind of you know perfection of reason, right? When it's forced by the truth itself, but force is the word, you know, is not like freedom, you know. You know. Um.

[52:04] So I mean, they prefer the will to the reason, but also the imagination to the reason, because the imagination is more free than what reason, huh? Yeah. And remember, Aristotle is contrasting imagination and reason, and he says, showing the difference, and he says, I can imagine something good or bad, right, without any reason to do so, right? But I can't really think that there's something good or bad without some reason.

[52:35] So I'm free to imagine terrorists out there going to come in here and they hate monks and they're going to rub us out and philosophers can rub us out. I can imagine that, but I can't think right now that there are terrorists out there. I don't have any reason to think there are terrorists out there, right? See, or I can imagine somebody out there is going to, you know, bring us in some to eat and drink, you know.

[52:58] But I don't think so. I have no reason to think so, right? See, and if I just imagine this horrible person out there, I don't. I don't feel any fear now. That's I'm so brave. But if I thought there was somebody out there, terrorists, that I'd be looking for a way out of here. You see. And so it's a freedom for the imagination. Now they're also influenced, you know, by experimental science and preferring the imagination to reason.

[53:29] Because experimental science sees, you know, the wonderful thing is the invention of the hypothesis, right? And then the testing of it is just experimenting and calculating and so on. But the real mover is the imagination that imagines these hypotheses. Einstein says they're freely imagined. So they kind of reduce