De Anima (On the Soul)
73. The Remaining Objections and Aristotle's Proof That the Soul Is the Form of the Body
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[0:00] so he says, whatever receiving ability, whatever potency that can receive, that is the act of some body is going to receive a form in a bodily way. That is to say, materially, right, and individually, right. That's going to be in the continuous, because the received is in the receiver according to the mode or way of the receiver, right?

[0:23] But the form of a thing understood is not received in the understanding in a material way and individually. But rather, it's received in an immaterial way and universally. Otherwise, the understanding would not be knowing of immaterial, universal things, but of singular things only, as are the senses. Therefore, the understanding is not united to the body as a form. Now, these objections, in a way, are saying that not understanding that the soul can be the form of a body and still have a power or ability that's not in the body, that's still hard to understand.

[1:07] Okay, but that's in a sense what the objections are, or how they are proceeding, right? Because Thomas is going to go on to explain that the human soul is a form that's not totally immersed in the body, as he'll put it. Okay,

[1:27] and that's kind of you know interesting use of the word there. But I was mentioning it, you know, he has something floating in the what on the surface of the ocean, right? Part of it is under the water, right? But part of it's above the water, right? And so this is the way the human soul is, right? It's a form in body in matter, right? But not wholly immersed in it, huh?

[1:55] And so it has some powers, like the powers of sensing and the powers of digesting and growing and reproducing and so on, right? Locomotive powers that it has only in the body, right? And then it has some powers, like the ability to understand and the ability to choose, right? The will, and they're not in the body, right? Okay, and the act of understanding as well, right? a fortiori, so it has those two abilities insofar as it's not completely immersed in the body.

[2:31] Okay, so the body was sharing the existence of the soul, as he explained, but not completely. He says comprehend that existence, huh? Okay, they're forced to that conclusion, right? Because it's the same one who is sensing and walking, right? And understanding, right? You know the old joke there. You know what is it? LBJ said about Ford there and his thing. You know, kind of insulting remark. He can't walk and chew gum at the same time.

[3:06] Not too bright. See, but if you can can walk and think a little bit, right? You know, as a peripatetic philosopher, he should, right? As the name implies, Aristotle's school is called the peripatetic school, right? It Means to walk around, right? You know, so they must have, been able, to think and walk at the same time, right? So if you can walk and sense and understand at the same time, right?

[3:29] It's the same one doing all these, right? Then your soul must not be entirely what immersed in matter, right? Because you understand not in the body, right? Yet you're not an angel, because then you would be sensing and what walking, yeah?

[3:54] Moreover, the fourth argument. These are all somewhat similar. related these ones. An ability or power in its action belongs to the same. For it is the same that is able to act, and that acts. But the act of the understanding, intellectual action, is not a some body, as is clear from the things we said above. Therefore, neither is the understanding power or ability, the power ability of some body.

[4:28] Now the fourth objection there, but the virtue or power cannot be more abstract or simple than the essence from which the virtue and the power is what derived. Therefore, neither is the substance of the understanding, the substance that understands a form of the what body, okay?

[4:58] Moreover, that which by itself has being, right? And we argued that the soul was what subsistent, right? That by itself it has existence is not united. It would seem to a body as a form. Why is that? Because a form is that by which something is. It's not what is, but that by which something is, huh? Okay, that's easy to see, because first of all, in accidental forms, huh?

[5:27] Health is not healthy. Health is that by which the body is what healthy, right? Okay. And thus the being of the form would not be of the form itself by itself, as we showed in the previous question there, right? the understanding principle The understanding principle or beginning has by itself being and is subsistent. Therefore, it's not united to the body as a what form, huh? As Thomas is going to point out, the body what shares in the existence of the soul, right?

[6:08] But it doesn't what completely absorb the existence of the soul, right? So I remember one time there, Shakespeare. I know some character was complaining. Oh, oh, yeah, yeah. The the in. Cymbeline, I think it is.

[6:40] Anyway, the man thinks that his wife, who apparently is very virtuous, has been unfaithful, right? Huh? And he's deceived, you know, by a villain, right? Iachimo huh, Italian villain, huh? But he thinks that, you know, his wife, who he thought was the paragon of virtue, is unfaithful and so on. So he has a beautiful soliloquy where he denounces woman, womankind, and it has in there we are all bastards, right?

[7:10] When the word's in there, right? You know, we're all listening. And but I remember talking to that Cicerone, I was saying, you know, you know, kind of a subtle meaning of that is, of course, that we are what we seem to be, kind of the crazy offspring of the material world and the spiritual world. Right now, we have a soul that is what the form of a body, right?

[7:35] And yet, not completely immersed in the body, and therefore, it has things in common with the angels, like the ability to understand and the ability to choose, right? So you seem to be kind of the what illegitimate offspring of matter and the spirit, right? You know, we're kind of funny, a funny creature, right down to it, huh?

[8:04] Now the sixth of mass objection. Moreover, that which is in something by itself or as such always is in it, huh? But it belongs to a form by itself or as such to be united to matter,

[8:29] not by accident, huh? But to its very nature, its very essence, huh, is the act of matter. Okay. Otherwise, from matter and form, there would not come to be one thing substantially, but only accidentally. Maybe like me and my clothes, right? Huh? See, me and my clothes are really two different things, right? Okay. Okay. But the clothes man is something one accidentally, but not one thing in the strict sense, huh?

[9:04] The form, therefore, is not able to be without its own matter, huh? But the understanding principle, Since, is incorruptible, as has been shown. It remains not united to the body when the body is corrupted. Therefore, the understanding beginning is not united to the body as what form, form, huh? This is unusual that Thomas has as many as six objections, right? Usually, just about three here, two or four.

[9:39] And see, the ideal thing to do is when you're doing this thing, you would right after the second counter, that sed contra though you you cut off the text there. See, that's all I put something half for a day or so, right? How am I going to resolve all these objections? I'm going to answer these objections, huh?

[9:58] But against this, huh? According to the philosopher in the eighth book of the metaphysics, difference is taken from the form of a thing, huh? Okay. That's interesting, huh? Because in a definition, right, you have two parts in a definition,

[10:20] and those two parts in a definition are called the genus and the difference. And usually, there'd be more than one difference, but. But the genus is the difference is, something like what matter is to form, right? Okay.

[10:46] So if you wanted to make a proportion, you could say the genus is the difference is as matter is to what form, right? I notice the comparison there, right? If I have a piece of clay, let's say, take a obvious example, the piece of clay is able to be what a sphere or cube and so on, was determined to one or another by the form it receives.

[11:10] Okay. We see this shape; it's a sphere. This shape; it's a cube, and so on. But the genus is able to be what an animal can be a man or a dog, or take a easier example. See, a quadrilateral can be a square, huh? Or it can be a what oblong, huh? Or it can be a rhombus, or it can be a rhomboid, or it can be a trapezium, huh?

[11:41] And so on, right? But the differences will determine it to be one or the other, right? Okay. So quadrilateral means you have four what should be contained by four straight lines, huh? But those four straight lines can be equal or unequal, right? They can be the right angles, or can be the acute and obtuse angles, right? And so the differences are going to determine the genus. So the genus is taken from what is material in a thing, and the differences from what is what as form.

[12:24] And therefore, you see the confusion there, you know. If you take Anaxagoras, who studied in the natural philosophy, Anaxagoras didn't understand the potency, the ability that is matter, right? And so if he looked at matter as if it were put together from all the forms. It was in potency to it, and that's Aristotle shows some means some difficulties, right? In fitting them all in there, you have the same problem there with what John Locke, right?

[12:55] He's trying to understand the general idea of triangle, and he says, was it an equilateral or a sausage or scalene? Is it a right angle? Or is well, all none of these, he says, because he can't understand that it's what none of these an act, but it's able to be all these, right? Yeah. He can't understand ability, huh? So often speak of the human mind's inability to understand ability, right?

[13:20] Not inability now in the sense that it's absolutely impossible to, but something is very difficult, huh? And so, in a sense, rather than understanding the ability that the genus has.

[13:35] Be determined by his different differences. He's speaking. If it's a mishmash of all those differences, right? In the same way, Anaxagoras was seeing matter as what composed of all the things he was able to be.

[13:57] But like, if I was to say that out in that tree out there, there's chairs and tables and doors and so on, right? It's composed of all these things. It's able to be, right? But it's actually none of those things, but it's able to be all of them, right? And through its form, it would be determined to one rather than the other.

[14:19] So, against this, according to the philosopher in the eighth book of the metaphysics, difference is taken from the form of a thing. But the difference that constitute constitutive of man, right, is rational. That's his definition: a rational animal, right? The modern biologist calls us a what? Homo sapiens, right? A wise ape, right? But ape is something animal, and wise is something like rational, right?

[14:53] So rational said of man by reason of the what? Beginning of understanding, right? So if the form or difference rather is taken from what form, and the difference is rational, rational is taken from the understanding principle, then the intellect, understanding principle, must be the what form of man, right? I should take a break and

[15:23] recharge our mode of receiving. Okay. Technical reason. Take a break. Take care. Look at how much you respond to that. Yeah. I answered that it ought to be said that is necessary to say, and that the. I notice we use the word intellectus there. He's not using their word intellectus there now to mean what? The power of understanding and the ability to understand, but the understanding soul, right?

[15:54] Okay. I don't know how you're translating your English text there, but he says intellect. Yeah, but. Not actually in my great edition down here. There's a footnote. You know, there's a nine there. Intellectus. Si de intellectuale substantia, right? The understanding substance, right? Okay, you can say the understanding soul, right? In other words, intellectus is used in Latin. I see Thomas using that just here, but he uses intellectus sometimes to mean what?

[16:32] The ability to understand, right? Sometimes the word intellectus will mean what the virtue, one of the virtues of that ability, right? Natural understanding. Sometimes it's used as here for the understanding soul itself. Principle, yeah. Okay. And you got to be aware of that because the translators sometimes don't know how to translate. So how do they translate here? Your text intellect, right? How do they translate? No, yeah, the English text.

[17:05] Yeah, we must assert that the intellect, which is the principle of intellectual operation, intellect. Yeah. Okay, maybe the yeah. Okay, but as I say, the word intellect in English probably means just the what ability to understand, right? Yeah, yeah. The principle. It doesn't. It doesn't name the substance that understands, right? Or the soul the understanding soul, right? Not? currently So in in Latin here, say the word intellectus. Most commonly, it's used in just these two senses: power or ability to understand.

[17:44] Now it's reason itself, right? Or sometimes it's used for sometimes used for the act of understanding itself, and sometimes it's used for a virtue meaning a habit and disposition, right? A virtue of the ability to understand.

[18:32] Now in Greek, the Greek word Aristotle uses nous sometimes for the ability to understand, and when he's distinguishing the virtues of reason, right, in the fifth or sixth book, rather in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he'll call one of them what nous, right? So that's imitated in Latin, see the ability to understand, right? And the virtue, what I usually call in English natural understanding, I call this virtue natural understanding, as opposed to the episteme, the reason, not understanding, right?

[19:08] Okay, but in Latin here, what intellectus sometimes has a sense of the act of understanding, and in English now, you see, we could use the word understanding to name all three of these.

[19:25] So when Thomas talks about the the first two acts of reason in logic, understanding what a thing is, right, or understanding the true or the false, well, there the word understanding is naming the act, right? But if you say man is an animal with what understanding, right? You could mean the ability to understand, right? And we could call that natural understanding if you wanted to in English understanding, right?

[19:52] Because understanding without having to reason it out, right? So it's just called by the same name. The act, but but here he's actually using it in a fourth sense, right? For the soul, the understanding of the soul.

[20:13] Okay, And see be careful there. for when you read the word right, yeah. He didn't usually use it that way, but here he does, and I see him do that sometimes elsewhere. And sometimes you see in Latin too the word mens, huh? Well. The word "mens" is sometimes translated by "mind," where it might be almost a synonym for the ability to understand. But sometimes "mens" is used, you know, when you see Augustine there, that the the image of the Trinity is in the in mente, in mind.

[20:48] But then it includes more than just the the ability to understand; it includes the will and so on. Aristotle for act of understanding that's episteme, right? The act of understanding. Well, no, that's the another virtue, reason episteme. Oh, okay. What would he use for act of understanding? It would be noe would be one word, right? Translated to "nousa." Oh, okay. Somebody uses the word. It's

[21:32] like the word for discourse there. Discourse. Hmm. No, but I can't remember the word now. But anyway, here the point that's important is that the intellect is being used for the understanding soul, right now. Yeah. Yeah. Because the power ability to understand is not an act or form of the body, right?

[22:08] The power, the ability to see, is an act of the eye or, right, of a body. The ability to digest, by food, right, is is an act of a body, right, one part of the body, right. Okay, but the power or ability to understand is not the act of a body, right? But the understanding soul is a form of a what body, right? Okay.

[22:41] So it's necessary to say that the understanding, see, that may not be the best way to translate in English, and that's why he's saying as a footnote here in the in the Marietti edition, See the intellectualis substantia, right, the intellectual substance, right, the understanding substance, or you can say the understanding soul, but that's something that they're talking about here, right? That part.

[23:08] So I answered that. Not to be said. It is necessary to say that the understanding soul, right, which is the beginning, starting point of the intellect operation, is the form of the human what body, right? Okay.

[23:28] For that by which. And this is going to make Aristotle's demonstration that you have in the second book about the soul. And if you were here when he did that, Aristotle first approached the definition of the soul in the second book there by six divisions. Remember that he had three divisions on the side of the soul and three divisions on the side of the body. Because the soul has to be defined as something of another, right?

[23:56] So he writes it it through the division, right? And then after you write the definition of the soul as the first act of a natural body, so on. Then he had a demonstration, right? And that was a syllogism, right? And there, the syllogism was: the soul is that by which we first live, see, hear, so on, understand, right? And that by which we first do these things is the form of the body.

[24:23] Well, he's repeating in a sense that demonstration here, right? Okay. He says that by which first something operates is the form, the act of that to which the operation is attributed.

[24:43] Just as that by which the body first is healthy is what health, right? That would be like a form, right? And that by which the soul knows first is science. Whence health is the form of the body, and science is a form of the what soul, right? Now, why is that so? He's going to give a kind of a reason for that, right?

[25:11] And the reason for this is because nothing acts except in so far as it is what. Yeah. Whence that by which something is an act is that by which it what it acts, huh? Okay. Now that's something that's really developed originally in the philosophy of nature.

[25:34] You say, well, I'll try to show it in a kind of simple way here Here, you eat a chicken. Okay. Now, if I can eat a chicken, and sometimes I eat a pig, you know, luau or something, you know, or a part of a pig anyway, a pork chop or something, right? And sometimes eat a cow, right? A steak or something, right? Sometimes eat a fish, right?

[26:18] I would say something in common with the cow and the pig and the chicken, right? After you eat it, well, yeah, something in the cow or in the pig or in the chicken. Or the fish has become meat, become human flesh and blood and bones, right? Okay. Now is that as matter as form that what we have in common? Matter, matter, matter. Yeah. See, and that's why I have to chew my food, right?

[26:50] And then break it down with all kinds of acids I have inside and be right, and then kind of build it into something like human flesh and blood and bones and fat and so on, right? Okay.

[27:07] Okay. Now, do you hear me going around here and quacking or something, like the bird does, or like the cow does? Not yet. Oinking like the pig, right? See, you don't see me with the operations of the what? Chicken or the thing, right? Yeah. But I do some some different operations, right? Yes. So what is this? What by what do I first have the operations of a man as opposed to the operations of a chicken, or the operations of a pig or cow?

[27:50] On the soul, right? Well, is it you see what I have in common with the pig and the chicken and the cow, right? Right. What do you have in common? Is the matter, right? Huh? Matter. Okay. But the operations of a man and the operations of a cow and a pig and a chicken are not the same, are they? That's right. Okay. And sometimes human being runs around like a chicken with his head cut off, but it's not exactly the same way, right?

[28:19] Not exactly. And vice versa, you know, if a lion were to eat me, right? Huh? Yeah. What does the lion have in common with me, right? Right. Would the lion start acting like a human being? Does he eat me? Start reading Aristotle.

[28:34] No, no, no. But again, there's something in me that's able to be a lion. Right. And if the lion ate me, that in me which is able to be a lion would actually become a lion, right? Yeah. Okay. So that which is able to be a man or able to be a cow or a pig or a chicken is what we call matter, right? But that by which this is actually a man or a cow or a pig is going to be as what form, okay?

[29:12] And it's through that also that it has it does what a pig does or what a chicken does or what a lion does or what a man does, huh? So yes. So the form is both that by which you are actually what you are, right? Right. The matter is that by which you are only what what you are in ability, right? Okay. But you're actually what you are through your form, and through the form also that you have this what the operation or the doing of this kind of thing, right?

[29:44] So that by which you're first able to do something is going to be what form rather than matter, right? Okay. And this is why Aristotle, in the second book of the Natural Hearing, there, say, ing with the Physics, how he shows that nature is both matter and form, okay? But he reasons that nature is more form than matter because nature is that by which something is natural, and by matter it's this or that natural thing only in ability.

[30:20] While through form it's actually one natural thing rather than another one. Yeah. So that by which you are actually A natural thing is more nature than that by which you are only a natural thing in ability. Right. The same thing is true about art, right? See. We take the Pietas there in Rome, right? Is it a work of art because it's marble because of its form? Its form.

[30:51] Yeah. Yeah. The form is more by what it is by by art than the matter, isn't it? Yeah. The same with in nature, right? Form is more nature than what matter, because by the form you are actually a pig or a chicken or something else, huh? By matter you are all these only in ability. So that by which you are actually a natural thing is form, and it's through your form also then that you have the doing or the operation, the action, the activity of a man or a pig or a lion or whatever the animal might be.

[31:31] You see that? Yeah. We come back to the genus differences. Yeah. Yeah. Matter is. Yeah. Yeah. See, you ask, "What does an animal do?" Right? Well, you've got to descend in a sense to what? What does the pig do? Or what does the chicken do? Or what does the lion do? Or what does the man do? Right? And that's going to be tied with its difference, and therefore with its what?

[31:59] Form, right? What's formal in the thing? Okay. Now, even more generally, if you go back, you know, to wisdom, you talk about ability in the passive sense. Now we're talking here in form. Um. Something we seize because it's able, right? To see something, huh? But you give something that you actually what? Have right. So we say, in general, that something acts in so far as it is what in act, huh?

[32:37] It's able to give something or to do something because what it actually is. So what is actually hot warms what is able to be hot, right? Okay.

[32:54] You see that? I am a little confused about about the phrase in act. This is so. I am not sure what you are referring. Well, let's take example here, huh? You rolled the dough there to make the Christmas cookies, right? Okay. Now, are these? Is that dough in the shape of Christmas trees? Not yet. No. But it's able to receive that shape, right? Okay. But now I have a little piece of metal here that's in the shape of a what?

[33:25] Christmas tree. A little handle here, right? So this is giving. What shape that it actually has to the dough, which doesn't actually have that shape, but's able to receive it, right? Okay. So the thing that actually has something gives to the one who's able to have it, huh? So we say that in general, something is acted upon; it undergoes; it receives, insofar as it's able to have something, right?

[33:57] It's in potency to having something, but it receives it from something that already actually has that. So is the cookie cutter Christmas tree in act? It has actually the actual shape that the clay has only in what ability, right? So I can use the the thing to give that shape. Okay. To these things, huh? Okay.

[34:23] So this is the general principle he's saying here, right? And the reason for this, he says, is because nothing acts except according as it is in act.

[34:34] Whence that by which something is in act is that by which it acts, huh? So it's manifest that, however, that that first by which the body lives is the soul. And since life is manifested by diverse operations in diverse grades of living things, right? That by which we first do each of these operations of life is the soul. Now you call it the definition the demonstration of Aristotle.

[35:14] Well. The soul is that first by which we are nourished, right? Fed, sense, and move according to place, right? And likewise, by which we first understand.

[35:28] And then that's the minor premise, right? And this beginning or principle by which we first understand, or is called the what? Intellectus, sive anima intellectiva. Now I know how your English comes out there, but there he explains the sense in which he's using the word intellectus there. So if you have the Latin you have the Latin there huh Yeah, Yeah, Hoc ergo principium. huh this principle, this source, quo primo intelligimus, by which we first understand.

[36:00] Whether we call it the intellectus, right? sive anima intellectiva. See that's the way I was translating it. His footnote there translating intellectus before there. sive intellectualis substantia but maybe better, like I was doing it, sive anima intellectiva, right? What Shakespeare calls my understanding soul. Okay. Got the feeding soul and the sensing soul and then the understanding soul, right?

[36:29] Is the form of the body, right? Okay. And this is the demonstration of Aristotle in the second book about the soul. And this is put in the form of syllogism, right? This is the

[36:47] it's in the first figure syllogism, right? You say the soul is that by which we first live, sense, move, and understand. That's the minor premise, huh? And

[37:16] this is almost like the meaning of the word soul, right? Huh? If you may, you may recall before when we talked about the soul, that when you first pick. up. the first book of of the soul, of Aristotle, and after the proemium and so on, Aristotle goes into the opinions of his predecessors about the soul, right? All kinds of strange opinions, right? Some more probable, I think, than others.

[37:45] But there is all kinds of disagreement as to what the soul is, but absolutely no disagreement as to the existence of the soul. Yeah, really. I mentioned how, if you use the word soul today in contemporary society, sure, you might have not only disagreement as to what the soul is, but disagreement as whether we have a soul, right? Yeah. See. And something strange there when you see, you know, in Shakespeare's play there, like I mentioned in Much Ado About Nothing, where the Beatrice says, you know, I'm as sure that the Hero is innocent as I am that I have a soul.

[38:20] You know, like that she even uses that way. He's, you know, speaking as he's speaking like the Greeks, right? Well, and when you see the word animal, right? Animals have a soul. That's why we're getting from, you know, the existence of the souls is obvious that there are animals around, right? Right. You see, and you say, well, what's the problem here, right? What's the problem with the word, right?

[38:43] See, that when we hear the word soul today, we think of it usually in the context we've heard about it in church or something like that, right? Where they're talking about this immortal human soul, you know, the spiritual soul, and there you've got a very particular understanding of what the soul is, right? And that's not obvious, right?

[39:09] What the Greeks understood by the word soul was something, what, the first beginning or cause of life within living bodies. Correct. And they know that there are some bodies that are alive and some are not. Right. There may be some ambiguous cases, but the dog and the cat that we met here today, I was obviously alive, right? Your body, my body is alive, right? But these chairs are not alive, right?

[39:34] Okay. Without my mind about that, right? And that we all think that that a living thing has, well, moves itself in some way, right? Okay. So it has the source of its life within itself. So whatever that first beginning is, that's what we're calling the soul, right? In that sense, the existence of the soul is what obvious, right? Okay. The comic used to take kind of a joke there in in one of the Molière's comedies there, Mr.

[40:06] Jourdain, huh? And Mr. Jourdain, you know, is told by somebody that he's speaking prose and not poetry, right? And you mean I've been speaking prose all my life? but I never knew it.

[40:20] Well, the point is, he's what. He doesn't what? Word to it, what? He never. You would have to know what that name for it, right? Yeah. But you know, he he he knew that all along, right? Okay. So it's a problem just in the name, you see? Yeah. Okay. Yeah.

[40:46] So this is almost like what do you mean by the word soul? The soul is that by which we first live, sense, move, and understand.

[40:56] And we're all aware of the fact that we have these operations, right? That we do these things, right? Sure. And we do so by reason of something within us, right? Okay. Okay. And that by which we do these things within us, that by which we first do these things within us, is what we mean by the word soul. Okay.

[41:18] Then, if you understand that something does something by reason of its form, right? You can now supply the major premise, right? That by which

[41:34] we, being a body, right, we first live, sense, move, and understand, is the what form of the body, right? Okay. Yeah. So that's the soul, just in the first figure, and this here is the middle term, right? Uniting form with the soul, right? Okay.

[42:22] Just like if I was to argue in this way, and they'd say, "Health is that by which the body is what healthy, " and that by which the body is healthy is the what form of the body, right? Huh? Okay. It's not the body itself, is it? No. No. Okay.

[43:04] I said the shape of the ball is that by which it first is a ball, right? And that by which it first is a ball is its form, right? Okay. It's not the rubber that's first a ball, is it? No. No.

[43:22] Okay. And notice, you know, if you can kill a living body, right? Huh? And the matter of which it is made, right, can become something non-living, right? It's not through the matter that it's first alive, is it?

[43:42] No, no. Or just take my my other favorite example, right? This is the word cat, right? Now, is it first the word cat, the letters C, A, and

[44:01] T? No, no. Because you have the same letters over here. Yeah. So, by the letters C and A and T, it's the word cat only in ability. It it is first the word cat with in what?

[44:21] Yeah. In this case, the form would be the order, right? Right. Okay. So it's not the matter which it's first the word cat, is it? No.

[44:39] Just a just a chair or a table here. Okay. Now is it first a table by what? By being wood? No. No. Because by being wood, it's only a table in ability, right? Mm-hmm. So it's first a table by its what form? Huh? Okay. Makes sense. Mm-hmm. No. Okay. And does a bowling ball roll because it's what's the bowling ball made out of anyway? I don't know.

[45:14] Bowling ball. But wherever the material the bowling ball is made of, it does it does it roll because it's plastic or if it is made of? No. No. It first rolls because of its what form, right? Form. Yeah. As operation, right? Huh?

[45:34] A little bit late there. Yeah. I know you and so. Okay. So that's a demonstration of Aristotle in the second book of the soul, right? Seventy-six hundred. Okay. Now he's going to proportion himself a little more to you here, right? After giving Aristotle's demonstration again, if someone wishes or wants to say that the understanding soul is not the form of the body, right? Huh? It would be necessary that he find a way in which this action, right, which is to understand, is the action or activity of this man, right?

[46:17] Why? Because everyone, you and me, experiences within himself that he himself is the one who understands, huh? Okay. Once you experience within yourself that you understand. That you're the one who understands. Now I understand. You know, now I understand. Don't you see it? You know, you're trying to understand something. Now I understand, right? You know, the experience within yourself that you understand. Okay.

[46:47] I think there's a little division here. An action is attributed to something in three ways, as is clear through the, or by the philosopher in the fifth book of the physics. For something said to move something or to act, either by itself as a whole, as the doctor heals, or by a part as a man sees through the eye, or per accidens, right, by happening, as we say that the white builds, right?

[47:18] We say that the musician builds, right? Because it happens to the builder to be white, to be musician, or something else. When therefore we say that Socrates. Say or Plato understands. It is clear that we do not attribute this to him, Socrates right? Because it's attributed to him, insofar as he is a what? Man. A man, huh? And this is essentially predicated of him, huh?

[47:51] Either, therefore, it's necessary to say that Socrates understands by himself as a whole, as Plato posited, right? Saying that man is the understanding soul, right? And in the Marietti edition here, they give you the reference there to the Alcibiades. There's two Alcibiades. This is the first Alcibiades. But that's the one I mentioned before, where Socrates says, "Am I a soul, or am I a body, or am I something composed of soul and body?"

[48:23] And he concludes that he's just a soul. And if I remember the argument, there kind of weak in some ways, but if I use something, right, I'm different from what I use, right? So if I use a hammer or a saw, my hammer or saw, I'm not what I use, right? But you can use your body for good or for bad, right?

[48:54] So the user and the used are not the same, and you use your body for good or for bad, and you're not your body, right? You're just your soul.

[49:06] Interesting, huh? Argument, huh? Okay. Or so either you know that's all we are as an understanding soul, or it's necessary that the understanding be some part of Socrates, right, huh? Okay.

[49:30] And the first he says it cannot stand. Ah, he says, right? This has been shown above, and this is exactly how Thomas is, on account of this, right?

[49:44] That's the very same man who precedes himself to what? Both understand and sense, huh? Say. Now you heard me say it before, right? Say.

[49:58] When your body's in pain, especially, right? You know, and you're thinking about how you can get rid of that headache or get rid of that stomach pain or whatever it is, right?

[50:12] It's part of your experience that the one who's feeling pain is the one who's thinking about what to do about it. Yes. See. At the same time. And since we sense only in the body, right, huh? The one who understands must also be what? Bodily, right, huh? Feeling pain in his body, right? Okay.

[50:34] Without trying to sound too selfish, right? It's one thing, you know, to be standing over somebody else who's in pain, right? Or you're concerned about them, right? But there's an urgency when you're the you're the one in pain, right?

[50:51] You know, you know, you know, the patient is you know yelling at the nurse or somebody, you know, somebody to come to relieve his pain and pressing his his beeper beeper, and nobody's coming. You know, they're out there talking there, you know, and think you're you're you're just you know bothering them, you know, and you're in considerable pain in there, you know, beeping your thing, okay? But you're but when you are in pain, right?

[51:14] You're very much aware of the fact that that you're trying to relieve that pain, huh? Okay. Hence, it is necessary that the body be some part of man.

[51:30] So that's that's to be the argument against saying that man is just the what? Just the soul, right? Huh? Okay. The soul and body. It remains, therefore, that the again, intellectus there is used for the what? One.

[51:53] Yeah, or else it could be used also for the understanding there, but the understanding which man understands is some part of Socrates, right? Huh?

[52:03] But I think he's using it more in the sense of the understanding soul here, right? Okay. As you did previously, right? Okay, intellectus scilicet anima intellectiva. It remains, therefore, that the understanding soul, but which Socrates understands, is some part of Socrates, right? Huh? Thus, that the understanding soul is in some way united to the body of Socrates, right? Okay. That makes sense. Yes. Okay.

[52:37] Why? So what you're saying here is that the soul that understands, the soul by which you understand, is united to my body, right? Huh? Because it's me feeling pain in my body, right? It's me sensing, right? Huh? Do you see that? Okay. It's me reading, and I hope understanding what I'm reading, right? Right. It's not the computer reading for me and me understanding, right? No, it's me reading my eyes, right?

[53:13] My eyes are getting tired reading, right? Not right, but you know, it's me reading and understand what I'm reading, right? I'm not understanding what I'm reading, but it's a me, okay?