De Anima (On the Soul)
78. One Soul in Man: Predication, the Sign from Intense Activity, and Souls Compared to Numbers
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/078-one-soul-in-man-predication-the-sign-from-intense-activity/

[0:00] So now Thomas is going to ask, huh? He's going to show a difficulty here. Suppose I am a man by my understanding soul, and I am an animal by a sensing soul, right? And the sensing soul is not the understanding soul; it's an entirely different soul. Then we say man is an animal. What kind of a predication is this, right? Was it accidental, like a triangle was green?

[0:38] Man is an animal. Was that accidental? No. But that's per se. Which one is it? Let's see how Thomas develops this a bit here.

[0:59] Things which are taken from diverse forms are said of each other either per accidens if the forms are not ordered to each other, as when we say the same thing is white and sweet, right? We say the white is sweet, right?

[1:20] Or if the forms are ordered to each other, there will be a predication per se. In the second way of per se, because the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate,

[1:35] just as surface is a praeambulum, it was before color, right? If therefore we say that a a body with a surface, right, is colored, it will be according to the second mode of predication per se. Otherwise, you see that second mode of per se. Well, if you think of color as we experience it in our daily life, right? Color is always something spread over a surface, right?

[2:03] So it's not accidental to color to be what spread over a surface. But that surface is what is as the subject in which the color is.

[2:25] If therefore there is a different form by which something is said to be an animal, and by which something is said to be a man, it would follow either that one of these cannot be said of the other except per accidens, if these two forms to each other have no order, or that there is there a predication in the second way of speaking per se, if one of the souls is to the other a preambula, something presupposed.

[3:04] But both of these are manifestly false, because animal is said of man as such, right? Not by accident. For man is not placed in the definition of animal, but the what reverse. Therefore, it is necessary that be the same form to which something is an animal, and through which it is a man. Otherwise, man would not be truly that which is an animal, and thus animal would be said of man what

[3:43] per se. Yeah. And I said that grammatically. Otherwise, man would not be truly that which is an animal, right? So that animal would be what per se said of man.

[4:10] That's a mouthful to digest, huh? Is animal said of man? Let's ask it this way: Is animal said of man as, let's say, number is said of two, or as half of four is said of two,

[5:03] or as green is said of triangle? That's not the third one. No. That's the one that's was clearly not it, right? Yeah. Okay. See if I say something that happens to be what? An animal, just like a triangle, happens to be green, right? Now, of these other two ways, you see it's the second way here, right? Then. Man would be in the definition of animal, okay? And it seems it's not that, but simply the reverse, right?

[5:43] So it seems you're going to be forced to say this, right? Yeah. That man is what an animal, as such, okay? And therefore, it's going to be through what the same form that he's a man and he's an animal. If it's not, it would have to be the accidental, right? Like white and sweet in his example, or my example here, triangle green, or it'd be like what animals like a property of man.

[6:21] Property of man to be an animal has a property of two to be half a four, or a property of the triangle to have its interior angles at the right angles.

[6:31] But it'll make these two possibilities, and you're forced to the third, right? When you say animal of man, you're saying this is what man is. That they're one and the same, right? Even though animal is saying in a more general, right, in a more vague way, you might say what man is saying. Okay. Just like when I say a dog is an animal, right? Now, if you had the cat around here, and I said this, what's your name, Lucy?

[7:05] Lucy is a cat, right? And Lucy is a what animal, right? Am I really saying two different things about Lucy? No, I just like if I say Lucy is a cat, and I say Lucy is is orange or whatever she is, right?

[7:26] To be orange is not what it is to be a cat, is it? But Lucy happens to be both what a cat and orange, right? Okay. But that's not the connection between man and animal, right? I happen to be both a man and an animal. I happen to be a man. I happen to be white. See? The way it is. No.

[7:52] An animal can't be a property of man because then man would be in the definition of what animal, and just the reverse, right? What do you say Yeah. If if if animal was a property of man, right, then man would be more basic in meaning than what animal, right? It enters into the understanding what an animal is. But in fact, it's the reverse, right?

[8:24] Yeah. What an animal is enters into what a man is, right? It's a pre-animal. So you are forced to say that when you say man is an animal, you see Socrates is a man, you see Socrates is an animal. You are not saying two different things of Socrates, right? Because what it is to be a man is to be an animal. Are you saying, going back to the animal man comparison, you can't get something less than something out of something, or something greater out of something less, which is why, which is why animal has to be part of man, but man can't be part of man Yeah.

[9:04] The example of Lucy there was more less controversial, right? She's a bit irrational, so. But if I say that Lucy is a cat, right, and you all mean that's true, right? Yes. And then I say Lucy is a is an animal. You mean that's true, right? Mm-hmm. So we have a cat and an animal.

[9:30] Different things. No. No. Yeah. Because to be a cat is to be an animal, right? Yeah. Okay. Even though cat is more particular, right? More distinct than animal, right? Say. But Lucy's being an animal is not something other than her being a cat, is it?

[9:54] In reality, it's not something other, is it? Because a cat is by definition an animal. Animal. Four-footed animal, right? Okay. So when I tell you that that Lucy is what a cat and she's four-footed and she's an animal, am I telling you three different things about her? Well, well, well. Huh? She heard me.

[10:26] When I tell you that Lucy is a cat and that Lucy is orange, I am telling you two different things about her. In reality. You see. Did you see

[10:49] the form of Zwingli? You know, it involves a lot. You see how logic is presupposed to what theology to study the soul, right? Aristotle distinguishes those senses of there is other sense beside me, but distinguishes them in the in the second book of the Posterior, in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, and in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. But Plato made this very what popular, right?

[11:29] The idea of kath' hauto right, as Aristotle says in the Post Analytics, an episteme, science, is about something that is what, that parts and properties kath' hauto So the geometer never talks about a triangle being green, does he? No. You wouldn't know that by your reasoning it out. It'd be at best a matter of sensation, right? I saw a green triangle.

[12:12] That seems to me, if you're taking the soul by which man is an animal, and the soul by which he's a man, it's really two different souls, right? And you're almost back in saying, you know, the thing is white and sweet, huh? You know, it's not really one thing anymore. Yeah. That's going back to the first argument.

[12:35] Now Thomas gives us a third argument, what is kind of a sign, huh? Third, it appears to be impossible through this. It's a very important sign. That one operation of the soul, when it becomes very intense, impedes what? Another, huh? Which in no way would happen unless the principle of actions was one in its very nature. Do you see that? If you really had two different, you know, one soul that is sensing, another soul is understanding, then the intensity of the sensing or the intensity of the emotions would not interfere with the what?

[13:19] Thinking, right? It's a entirely different thing doing that. That's a matter of experience, right? You know, when you're emotionally upset, which is something bodily and something that pertains to your animal nature, right? Then your thinking is what? Impeded, right? Yeah.

[13:38] Remember that famous thing we mentioned here before—the famous words there of uh of um Saint Francis of Assisi, right? When they wanted to get the Franciscans to do a little theology. You seen that? You might have heard. Don't extinguish the spirit of. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He was, yeah, I know. He was giving permission for the Franciscans to study theology, right? Right. Provided you don't extinguish the what?

[14:08] Spirit of prayer and devotion. Yeah, devotion. Yeah, which is the act before prayer, right? That's kind of interesting. He's making that as a qualification, right? Because the intensity of the act of reason in theology, right? Yeah. Right. Could impede the intensity of what? Devotion. Devotion, which is an act of the will. And Saint Francis knew that, right? Now,

[14:40] sometimes you know, too. You know, Saint Paul says, "scientia inflat, inflates the value of his importance," right? You have? Pride, and that way gets in the in the way too, right? But more basically, here it gets in the way simply because of the intensity of the activity.

[15:01] You see, that's a sign of the uncommon source. That's a very important sign. More proportion to you. Yeah. Other arguments, huh? Sure. I have to look back, as I mentioned last time, we were talking about Saint Teresa of Avila and so on. But but sometimes in in in a man. Like Augustine or Thomas, you know, you know the act of reason is so intense there, right? Huh? You see, you don't see that maybe they also had devotion too, right?

[15:44] Yeah. When they talk about about the man, the woman, huh? And the woman having maybe as Saint Francis de Sales said, a more what? Loving. More loving nature, right? Huh? More devotional. On somebody's orders, they always pray for the devout female sex, right? In the translations, I see it, in the Latin, huh? Have you seen that? No. Yeah, I see. I see, you know, right through some of the, you know, Dominicans and things in the translations.

[16:19] But at first I thought, you know, gee, but as they say, that the women are more devout than men. But actually, what you are doing is you are praying for nuns. You pray for the priests, and you pray for the devout female sex. That's a kind of a what phrase referring to religious woman, right? See, But it's interesting that they're named from what? Devout, devout, which is an act of the what of the will, huh?

[16:48] See. So the intensity of devotion might what impede the activity of reason itself, right? See. But vice versa, the intensity of the act of reason, as Saint Francis was aware of, could get in the way of the what of devotion, huh?

[17:18] Okay. So you are saying devotion is a part of the will. And devotion is is is the principal act of the virtue of religion, right? Right. And it's an act of the will primarily. Why is intellectual study not an act of the will? Well it's an act of the reason itself? It's commanded by the will, right? Okay, but the act itself is one of of reason rather than of the will.

[17:45] And this kind of contrariety, you know, in quotes, between love and knowledge, huh? Like we said before, I gave a whole talk on this one time. The first talk I gave on Thomas Aquinas College was on that contrariety of love and knowledge, which Aristotle talks about in the sixth book of Wisdom.

[18:10] Love is chiefly in the thing loved, while what truth is chiefly in the what in the mind, huh? So we speak of of what giving your love to somebody, right?

[18:34] But in the case of mind, instead of giving, we say what? Take, right? You take the genus, right? Huh? See, the first act of reason is sometimes called in Latin there, simple apprehension, right? Simple grasping, right? See, can you grasp what I am saying? When you grasp something, it's what? Contained in your hand, right? When your mind grasps something, it's what? Contained in your mind.

[19:09] So that's a perfection of the mind to be able to grasp things, right? But do we use the word grasping to perfect to to name love or perfection of love? Grasping? No, see, Even the popular words you know, love isn't love until it's given away, right? You see, when Thomas is explaining the names of the Holy Spirit, huh? And the names of the Holy Spirit there is donum dei, the gift of God, right?

[19:37] Huh? Yeah. And Thomas explains why the Holy Spirit, rather than the Father or the Son, is called the gift of God, right? Because he says everything we give to somebody, everything else we give to somebody, we give to them because we what? Love them. Therefore, love is the first gift.

[20:01] So, notice how we speak. Now we say, "I left my heart in San Francisco," right? The song says, right? But Christ speaks the same way, right? You know, laying up treasures for yourself, you know, because where your treasure is, yeah. And Augustine has that famous thing in Latin. You know that the the soul is more ubi where, amat quam animat, right? Soul is more where it loves than where it animates, right?

[20:32] So the lover is said to be in the thing what loved. So love, in a sense, goes out to the thing. But knowing is reverse; it's putting the thing into the knower. That's that's why the will, especially in this life, is more proportioned to God than the reason is, right? Just like I can more easily jump into the ocean, you mean I love God, right? Then I can put the ocean inside of me.

[21:23] So the good is in things. So the heart, in a sense, goes out to the thing. I left my heart in San Francisco. Doesn't mean I had a heart transplant. It means that I love somebody or something there, right? Okay.

[21:51] Okay. That's why you know the knowledge of the good and bad, the knowledge of opposites is the same. So the knowledge of sickness is also a knowledge of what health, right? But the love of sickness and the love of health are incompatible.

[22:13] Just as in reality, health and sickness exclude each other, right? So because the heart goes out to the thing as it is in itself, I can't love sickness at the same time I love health. I can't love vice and love virtue at the same time. But I can know both at the same time.

[22:36] So in a sense, the movement of of love and the movement of reason are just the reverse. One is from the heart into things, and the other is the reverse.

[22:48] I said to students kind of a popular way there. I say it's always bad to lose your mind. So it's not always bad to lose your heart. It depends on who you lose it to. Okay, to lose your mind that's always bad. There's this kind of contrariety there between loving and knowing. Is that this might be not related, but in loving something or really being interested in something,

[23:21] sometimes you become much more involved in intellectually engaging. Sure, sure. In that sense, the two kind of are compatible, as opposed to one being. That's that's all saying contrary in quotes, right? Not strictly speaking, contrary, right? Right, right. Because you can love to know, and you can you know love what you know, right? I mean, the two can help each other. That's true. But because of their way of operating, right?

[23:51] Right. The lover doesn't analyze the beloved. in the way The way the student analyzes the subject, right? You want to know something? You take it apart, right? That's not how you love somebody. Take them apart. That's why a lot of psychologists have the biggest divorce rate. That's what they say. Yeah, yeah. They take apart people rather than love them. yeah. You know, they used to say about Mozart, right?

[24:30] That the whole man was in his ear, right? Oh. Well, there's an intensity there, right? Yeah, right. See, Mozart's listening to some music, right? If it's good music, then he's really what

[24:53] his operations are sort of impeded, you might say, right? Yeah. So who did Mozart listen to? Mozart, Now, Bach, and Haydn, and so on, Handel. Mozart revised the Messiah, right? There's a big controversy as to whether Mozart improved it or not, right? Because you know at Christmastime, sometimes they have these, you know, at Tower Records someplace they have these in a whole section of Messiah. There's all kinds of, you know.

[25:27] It's kind of hard to figure buy which which what should I buy, right? But some you know would say... You know the Handel-Mozart, dash, you know sometimes even, and some would be you know the original. one way You see actually Mozart improved it you see. So, but. Handel's a very great composer too.

[25:51] You know, so you know, Christmas time when they sing the hymns in church, you know, like "Joy to the World," you know, Joy to the World you know come down from Handel, right? The music, and you can tell the better ones, you know, they come from somebody like Handel or some some composer knows what he's doing. Yeah. Um.

[26:12] But I see a painter tends to what? Overdevelop his eyes. He's completely into his eyes. My brother Mark always tells me this. You know, it's in Detroit. There, visiting a friend who had some artist friends, right? And these guys are painters and so on, and they're very intense about the shade, right? And it's kind of almost monstrous in some sense, because if he walked into this room here, it's going to get his attention.

[26:43] Oh, I've never seen a shade of red exactly like that. On his eye. Oh, look at that little blue. Oh, oh. They're just you know much you know much more intense than we are. You know, they're completely absorbed in their eyes.

[27:04] Had a girl stood one time, and we were talking about, you know, with the eyes are the most noble senses, right? And I said, "Well, you know, most people, if you ask them, they'd rather what go deaf and go blind, which is a sign that they they value their what eyes above their ears." Yeah. She said she'd better go blind than deaf, you know, but she played the organ and so on, and she's into music, right?

[27:31] See, and you know the famous thing about the the Frenchman, right? The doctor said you're going to have to give up drinking wine because if you do, you're going to go blind. And he said,

[27:54] "J'ai assez vu. I've seen enough." but je n'ai pas assez vu. I haven't drunk enough. But in a sense, people are really absorbed in these things. And you, you, what's his name, Parker, the guy who does all these famous wine reviews. If he gives a you know good review to wine, next day you know shoot up in price, you know, from ten dollars to fifty dollars and like that, you know.

[28:22] And he tastes wine all day long, right? Of course, he can't swallow it because you'd be drunk, you know. But he's completely absorbed in the tasting of wine, the sniffing of wine, and doesn't leave you much room for anything else, huh? But the intensity of one. Faculty, right, gets in the way of the other ones. So you know, Dr. Perquis, so how do we? All right, when Saint Francis said that, it would.

[28:51] How do you pass? You know this idea that I guess some of the Franciscans ran with that. You know that's why we should study theology because. Well, you got to realize. You got to realize that Saint Francis was giving approval for the study of theology, and he was doing so because he saw the need, right? Right. For the Franciscans.

[29:14] Not maybe as much as Dominicans, right? Sure, sure. But but nevertheless, he saw the need. The Franciscans should know some theology, right? Right. And but he wanted to have them, you know, avoid extinguishing devotion in their study of theology. But wouldn't

[29:34] I? I must be. Okay, he he he loved he loved the study of theology, and I'm familiar with the history there, actually, in some ways. But if if study theology is the idea that it only diminishes devotion and prayer if it's done too intensely, or I mean, well, I mean, there's maybe a time for things, right? And there's a time maybe we need to be doing one or the other, right?

[30:08] Okay. I remember when a friend of mine was in the Dominican, right? You know, and I think was on. It was every Sunday. I think they would they would attend two masses. And the first mass was a meditation mass, right? Oh. And you would be singing or doing anything of that sort. Oh. And you'd probably seek communion at that mass too, you know. Mm-hmm. And then it's kind of a quiet mass, meditation mass, right?

[30:36] And the second mass was more a high mass, you know. We were expected to be singing as part of the choir, whatever it was, and so on. Well, it's interesting, isn't it? Yeah. Because in a way, there's even a little different intensity there, right? When you're singing in the chapel or singing and trying to stand key and so on, and and praise God in a beautiful way and so on, and edify those who are listening, right?

[31:01] When you're just trying to what. Listen oneself Yeah, Dulce Superius as Thomas says, huh? What is that? Sweetly savour Christ in the Eucharist, huh? So the the singing could be to some extent a distraction, right? Yeah. From sweetly savoring Christ and Eucharist, Uh. So there's a lot of you know things where the intensity of one diminishes another. Yeah. Oh. That's interesting. It's also, I guess, when you're talking about working the intellect, in a sense, you're you're taking, you're you're kind of focusing on yourself, and sometimes you get lost in a thought, you you forget what.

[31:40] About anything else, yeah. You know, I remember watching that movie. You know, John Paul the movie, and when he was a kid, he'd always pray before each subject. So he'd always go and pray for about five minutes, and then go into his subject, read or whatever, and then go back and pray. I always found that really interesting. Yeah, why don't we all do that? Because it was combining the two.

[31:58] It was combining devotion with intellect, and it's in an interval, but rather than having every subject. And I guess that's you know that's the that's that's the tension is trying to as Francis saw trying to bring the two together without. Yeah, when you talk about reading scripture too a lot, you know, and not just read scripture like a modern scriptural scholar does, you know, with very dry thing and so on, but it's oratio and lectio, right?

[32:24] Prayer and and reading, you know, and that's why I, you know, from a practical point of view, I like St. Alphonsus better than Saint Francis de Sales, right? Saint Francis de Sales has got you know the treatises on these things, explaining the things, but Alphonsus will have the kind of intellectual meditation, and then you'll have the the prayer, right? You know, you know. Well, Francis, you read it now.

[32:52] you've got to pray. but he doesn't have the prayer for you there, something to you know. So it's a question of balance, right? I know myself. You know, sometimes too, you know, I read literature just to kind of, but yeah, relax and refresh my imagination, and so on. If I pick up Shakespeare, I find so many things to think about that sometimes gets in the way of it's not as relaxing as it should be, right?

[33:19] To be a you know inferior poet, but people are appropriate for me, right? Shakespeare gets me thinking too much, and but again, I mean, the imagination is something different than the reason, and one gets very intense; the other is sometimes diminished.

[33:39] So this is this is the good argument Thomas has here, right? Yeah, it is. You know, nobody knows what Aristotle died of, but but one one legend is, or one account is that he died of chronic indigestion. Fought on overwork. Because it's interesting, right? Thinking too much and interferes with

[34:05] just what. Digestive tract. I don't know if there is any truth to that. I mean, but I mean, that's one of the accounts that come down from antiquity. He died of chronic indigestion, fought on overwork. It would be a good example what he's saying here, right? Because they're they're the activity of the vegetable soul, right? Is. And and you know we've got this old cat the house there.

[34:26] You know she sleeps most of the day now. You see, and she really, you know, she looks so comfortable there. You know, yeah. And me, when I go to bed at night, sometimes I can't sleep because my nose is bothering me, or or I am thinking about something, and you know, if I get really thinking about, I'll think all night about it, and so my thinking gets in the way of my sleeping, right?

[34:45] And the cat doesn't have that problem, you know. So she sleeps so, you know, relaxed and so. My mother used to, you know, and she didn't particularly like cats, but but she found it kind of relaxing to see the cat there, you know, in the kind of the clothes basket, sleeping. You know, makes you kind of restful. That's rolled out and sleeping, huh? But

[35:13] Father Boulay, there, one of my teachers I mentioned before, you know, Father Boulet had this problem of of insomnia, right? I'm sure it's because of his mind, and it became quite a chronic problem, huh? And they tried to, you know, see if there's some kind of sleeping pill that would help him to sleep at night, but I guess these pills leave you groggy, I guess the next day sometimes, and they had him in the hospital one time for a few weeks.

[35:37] They're experimenting with ways to help them sleep. So, now Aristotle they say would go for two or three days without sleep. Let me, I go one night without sleep. At least I don't conk out because it wouldn't go on, you know. But

[35:56] the other story was that Aristotle would sit there with a, with a, you know, brass ball in his hands, you know, and a basin underneath it. He started to fall asleep, and it fell out of his hands. Well, that's obviously you know fictitious, I think, you know, but I mean, it shows you kind of the intensity of the man. See, but Aristotle especially when he was younger, he would go for a day or two, you know, without sleep, thinking and thinking about something.

[36:21] So, that's a good sign then that the soul. These are all powers in one soul, rather than, than powers in distinct individual souls. Thus, therefore, he concludes: it should be said that the same in number is the soul in the sensing soul and man, and the understanding soul, and the feeding soul, right? Yes. But in what way this happens is easily considered if one pays attention to the differences of species and forms.

[37:05] For the species and forms of things differ from each other according to perfect, more perfect, and less perfect. Just as in the order of things, animated or living things are more perfect than inanimate things and unliving things, and animals more perfect than plants, and men than what brute animals. In each of these, there are diverse grades of genera, and therefore Aristotle, following Plato in the eighth book of the Metaphysics, likens the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of what unity, huh?

[37:48] Remember how I was pointing it out with Shakespeare's agitation to use reason. You know, Shakespeare says, "What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed a beast no more?" But notice he says a beast no more. Yeah. See, as if the difference is like numbers, huh? More or less, huh? Yeah. So

[38:18] you add to one, and you get two, and you add one to two, and you get what three, and you add one to three, and you get four. Yeah. So you add to body. Life, and you have a what plant, right? And you add to the plant sensation, and you have a what animal, right? And add to animal reason, and you have a what man, Man, right?

[38:51] You see, take away reason from man, you nothing but animal, right? Take away sensation, animal, you nothing but a plant, right? And that's how we spontaneously do that. children. People are dying sometimes, and they they've lost their what use of their reason, right? And lost maybe the use of their senses even, right? You see, they're they're vegetable, right? Okay. Oh yeah. But because of the higher things don't appear there, right?

[39:18] So I kind of paraphrased before us Shakespeare's argument. I say, what is a three if it be half of four? Say that again. What is a three if it be half of four? Two and no more. Yeah. Yeah.

[39:36] So what is a man, right? Right. If his chief good is no more than the chief good of the beast, then he's no more than a what? A beast. A beast, yeah. That's the way he's worse than a beast, right? Because a beast is as much as he can be, right? Yeah. He says this man is less than he is. Yeah.

[40:01] Now this is very interesting when you try to understand how God knows too. Bell make an allusion to that when he gets on here. And in the second book about the soul Aristotle compares the diverse souls to the species of what figures of which one contains another as the pentagon contains the what quadrilateral the tetragon and exceeds it, right? Or the way we have in a parallelogram you have two triangles, right?

[40:32] Huh? So one includes the other, right? What's that? In a parallelogram, right? Yeah. Two triangles. Oh yeah. Okay. Okay. Thus, therefore, the understanding soul contains in its power whatever the sensing soul the brute has, and the feeding soul the plants. Just therefore, as the species which has the figure the pentagon figure is not to another figure a tetragon is another pentagon, because the tetragon figure would be what superfluous, right?

[41:09] From the fact that it's containing the pentagon. Is a tetragon a multi? Tetragon would be four sided. If I say you know, you could say that in the in the square there is what containing two triangles, right? Huh. Okay, so the higher contains what the lower does, but something more, right? Yeah, something like that. It contains a friendship, huh? Aristotle distinguishes the friendships. He distinguishes the friendship of usefulness, right?

[41:48] But we're friends simply because we are useful to each other. And then the friendship of pleasure, where we find each other's company pleasant. Then the friendship based upon what human virtue, right? Okay. But Aristotle says, if your friend has human virtue, he will also be more useful to you than someone who doesn't possess human virtues.

[42:17] And he's going to really be more pleasant to be with. Pleasant, because not to guard your wallet. Yeah. I mean, you have two people who are bad, right? They might enjoy each other's company because they're similar in character, right? But they're similar in something that is not actually pleasing. So if you and I are two cowards, you know, we get along because we're both cowards. But we're not really being proud of being a coward, are we?

[42:50] But if you and I are both courageous men, right, huh? Well, then we like each other not only because we're alike, but because we're alike in something that is what actually pleasing, right? So

[43:12] Hamlet and Horatio, right, have a friendship based there on virtue, right? And so they're truly more useful to each other than two bad men can be to each other, right? And they really have more reason to enjoy each other's company.

[43:31] So two saints, right, have more reason to enjoy each other's company than two sinners. Two sinners enjoy each other's company because they're alike, But two saints are alike, too. But the two saints are alike in things that are naturally pleasing,

[43:50] and the two sinners are not. Something that is naturally repulsive. So the higher has what the lower has it, but has in a what fuller way more perfect way, huh?

[44:14] Bach, you know, he's been described as Mozart with something missing. Sorry, who? Johann Christian Bach, you know, the youngest son there of Johann Sebastian. Mozart, you know. This you know likeness of music of J. C. Bach to Mozart, huh? Mozart's a young person, you know, sat on J. C. Bach's lap, right, and played and so on. But J. C. Bach has been described as Mozart with something missing,

[44:47] and Dryden, you know, the poet laureate of England, there, your famous poet. He was a young man. There was, you know, two plays of Fletcher and performed for everyone as Shakespeare. Now you hardly ever see a play of Fletcher, right? I can never see a play of Fletcher on stage. You do. Never heard of him. But there was a time where two of his plays were being performed for one of Shakespeare.

[45:10] As he started to hear these plays more, he realized how superior Shakespeare was, and in fact described it by saying that Fletcher was but a limb of Shakespeare, like an arm or a leg of Shakespeare, right? He had something of Shakespeare, but not the whole of what Shakespeare had.

[45:30] So the higher has what the lower has. But something. what? More So you see this in the poet there when they describe you know the ideal woman there, right? You know, like when Shakespeare's farewell to the stage there, you know, Ferdinand meets Miranda, right? right? He's like this thing about that woman and that thing about that woman and something else about that woman. But Miranda she got everything, right?

[46:07] And but that's kind of a common place among the poets, I must speak, you know, the woman is combining, right? All these excellencies that are divided in the other ones. So the higher has what the lower has, but in a superior way. That's the way the angels are, huh? The higher the angels are, the fewer ideas they have, but the more they understand and the better they understand by what they have.

[46:34] So we understand more and better with fewer ideas. Take it to God who understands everything with one thought. Who said that? Thomas will explain that. Yeah, yeah. Brevity is a soul of wit.

[46:56] You heard my little poem there, right, huh? Oh yeah, what is it? God the Father said it all in one word. No wonder when that word became a man, he spoke in words so few and said so much. He was the brevity and soul of wit. Is that the source of it?

[47:15] Brevity is a soul of wit. You see, Shakespeare puts it in in the mouth of a man who's very tedious and long-winded, like me. And but it's very true. Brevity is a soul of wit. And the wiser a man is, the more he says with what fewer words, Fewer words, yeah. The way the fool multiplies his words, as the sapiential books say.

[47:45] So just like in the pentagon, there's a tetragon, right? So likewise, through the same soul. So, so likewise, neither through another soul, right? As Socrates is a man, and through another soul, an animal, and but through one in the what same, right?