De Anima (On the Soul)
82. Replies to the Objections, Knowing the Composed Before the Simple, and the Catechism's Definition of Hope
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[0:00] Yeah, a little break here and do our exercises, you know. Which, as you recall, was based on the definition of the soul in the second book about the soul, and there the soul was defined as the act of the first act, right, of a natural body, right, composed of tools, right, having life and potency, huh? And here that seems to be saying that the soul was one thing, and the body is something else, right?

[0:34] And so if you think of the soul as one thing and the body is something else, and the soul is coming to a body, that body to be a body has got to have already a substantial form, or a body is a body, right? but? Thomas says you're misunderstanding the way that he's defining this, huh?

[0:58] To the first, therefore, it should be said that Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of the body only, but that it is an act of a natural body composed of tools, right? Organic, having life and potency, and that such potency does not what exclude the soul, right? In other words, it's not a body that

[1:32] is not yet alive, but a body that is in potency to the operations of life, huh? it's a living thing. whence it is manifest that that in which or of which the soul is said to be the act, the soul is also included. Okay. In that way of speaking, in which it is it could be said that heat is. Is the act of the what of the hot, huh?

[2:04] And light is the act of the lucid, right? Okay. Not that there is a part from light or without light by itself the lucid, right? But because it is lucid, right? Through light, huh? And likewise, it is said that the soul is the act of a body, etc. Because through the soul it is a body and it is organic, and it is having life in potency. But the first act is said to be in potency with respect to the second act, which is operation.

[2:46] And such a potency is not abjiciente, that is to say, not excluding the soul. Now, notice in that way of understanding the definition of the soul,

[3:02] you are saying that the soul is the what? Substantial form of this composite, right? Which is a living body, which is a body what that's organic, right? Having the operations of life in potency, huh? Okay. Now that that is a way that you might understand the definition of the soul, right?

[3:33] Now, it's like if. I was to say, health is the act of the what? Healthy body, right? Or act is the health is the act of the form of the healthy, right? Well, healthy includes health, right? Sure. Okay. Now, why would we define the soul in that way?

[4:06] By saying which part is it, right? Of this composite of soul and body, right? Well, which is more known to us, the simple or the composed? I said the composed. What? Composed. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, suppose one defined a point

[4:34] as the end of a what? Line. Finite line. Okay. Now, finite line is a line that has what? An end, right? Mm-hmm. So, finite line is a line that has a point.

[4:53] Okay. Okay. So, when I say that the point. Is the end or limit of a finite or limited line? Yeah. When I say limited line, I include the point, don't I? Sure. See? Okay. But when I say that the point is a limit of such a thing, right? Right. I'm distinguishing what the point is from the rest of it, right? Right. You see what I mean? Yes.

[5:22] So he said, in that sense, Aristotle is defining the soul. If by body you understand what the the the body we see, right? Huh? Okay. You understand, you know, the living body, right? The body that is alive, right? Huh? You know, it may not be digesting food at this moment, right? But it but the body is alive, right? But the body that is alive has a soul already, right?

[5:50] And I'm saying, what is it in the living body that is a soul? Was not the matter, but it's the what? The form, the act, that is a soul, right? You see that?

[6:12] Just like if I was to say that existence is the act of the existent. Existence is the act of what exists. Okay. Yeah. Now, what exists is the composite, right? Yeah. Of the substance of what it is and its existence, right? And I say that existence is the act of the existent. Now, you might want to understand the soul in that way because we understand the composed.

[6:54] We know the composed before we know the what. Simple part, right? You see that? Okay. Or if he said the soul is the substantial form of a living body, right? A living body is a composite, right? Of some substantial form and matter. But what is the soul? It's the substantial form in such a thing, right?

[7:34] So, living body is not a living body, by something other than a substantial form. Right. Which you're pointing out that is, right? Or if I say the point is the limit of a limited line.

[7:55] Okay, or you can say finite, but finite is a Latin word for limited, right? Well, limited line is not a line without limit, right? It's a line that already has a point, right?

[8:14] You're pointing out that the point is not the continuous line, but it's the limit of that continuous line, right? So that's one way of understanding the definition, right? Because the objector is understanding the definition of a body, right, in there, right, as a living body, right,

[8:49] as an actual substance, right, and therefore he's pointing out which part of that composite is the soul. Okay. Is this analogous to what you were talking about—the sanctifying grace being in the soul and in the operations of sanctifying grace, being the second act, almost so to say, the gifts, the virtues?

[9:29] Well, if you said that, if you took the abstract word and said holiness, right? Holiness is the is the grace of the sanctified soul, but the sanctified soul includes grace, right? But you're saying that the what the holiness is the grace of such a what soul, right?

[10:00] Would you say the first act, like you're saying? In a sense, yeah, yeah, but but but it's you're you've got a composite which is more known to us, right, than the simple components of it, right? And so you're making known which part of that composite it is, right? More of a logical distinction. No, it's not logical. I mean, it's logical, but I mean, it's a distinction in the thing, right?

[10:40] Mm-hmm. Is it a real distinction? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. Because it can be at rest, it cannot be. The operation cannot be performing the operation. No, I'm saying, I'm saying that in general, the composed is more known to us than the simple. See. Now, you see this even in mathematics, right? Because we define a body in mathematics, the three-dimensional thing, a as length, width, and depth, right?

[11:16] Yeah. And then we go to surface, and we say the surface is length and width without depth, right? Yeah. So there's negation there, right? Yeah. And then the line is length. Yeah. Without width. Mm-hmm. And then finally, Euclid says the point has no parts, right? Yeah. It has neither length nor width nor depth, but position only, right? Mm-hmm. So notice as you go from the body to the surface to the line to the point, you're going from the composed to the simple, right?

[11:52] Mm-hmm. But you keep on negating as you go along, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. So. The the reason why we negate there is because the composed is is what we first know. So what we first know, as we learned in the De Anima, was that what it is is something sensed or imagined, and something sensed or imagined is always composed, huh? And so when we try to know something simple, we tend to negate in part, right?

[12:27] Something of the composed, right? Okay. Um. So it's not surprising, though, when we try to know God, who's altogether simple, right? That we know God negatively, right? Huh? Because even the point is no negativity. you know, if you look at Euclid, there, the point is defined as something that has no parts, right? But you could add it has position, but no parts. You see, and

[12:57] so in general, it's not strange that the composed is known by us before the simple, and the simple, in some ways, known through the composed. So in this way of understanding the definition of the soul, right? You're defining the soul by through the the living body, right? Huh? The body that is alive, right? You're saying it's the what first act of substantial form of such a body, right?

[13:25] But when you say living body, you already have a composite that includes the soul. Okay. And even the expression "substantial form" means, in a way, the form of a substance, right? A form within the genus of substance, huh? So you're thinking of the composite when you think of the substance, right? And the substantial form is one of the components of the substance, of the material substance, anyway.

[14:06] The matter is another one, huh? It's interesting how in a more universal way, when you talk about act and ability, right? And the things that we know best of all are the things that are a composit of act and ability. And when you try to go to know God as pure act, right? Or know the first matter, which is pure ability, you use negation, don't you? See, when you say God is pure act, what does pure mean, right?

[14:48] Well, it's negation of ability, right? There's no passive ability there, right? No ability to be actualized. So it's act without any. Ability to be actualized, right? But the other extreme, we talk about first matter, and we say that's pure ability, right? It's nothing. Then pure is negation of what act, right? So, what do we know first? Pure act or pure ability, or something that has both act and ability in it?

[15:25] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And sometimes I compare it, you know, to a little bit to the definitions of beginning, middle, and end in the book on the poetic art. You know, Aristotle defines the middle, right, as what has something before it and something after it. Okay, he defines the beginning as what has something after it, but nothing before it. He defines the end as what is after something but not before something, right?

[16:03] So, which is defined, in a sense, by negation of part of something else? Well, the beginning, the end, right? One is defined by the negation of before, and the other by the negation of what after? After, yeah, yeah.

[16:27] Appetizer before, not after anything, right? Dessert it's after, but not before anything, right? The main chorus is after the appetizer, right? But before the other, right? You see, that's kind of interesting, right? And and notice how when we speak of time, right? If time has a beginning,

[16:57] or if time has an end, you have to use negation in a sense, huh? In other words, the now, which is the beginning of time, is not after any now, is it?

[17:14] And the now, which is the end of time, is not before anything, right? But every other now is before something and after something, right? So that's the middle, right? And you know, sometimes people who think that they can show by reason, you know, that the universe always was, they think wherever now is a be now before now after, right? So time must have always been, right? But if there is a first now, and that's what's referred to in in the Bible in the beginning, right?

[17:42] That's the now that is before nows, but not after any nows, right? Okay, it has no now before it, right? So you have to use negation there, right? Well. In a sense, God is the beginning. You know that the highest thing, the lowest thing, is first matter, right? That's why Thomas says, you know, when he discusses the opinion of David Dinant, who said that God is is the first matter.

[18:08] Thomas says he most stupidly taught. Now Thomas is not, you know, just using rough language there, right? But you couldn't take anything further away. If you said God is a stone, you'd be closer to the truth than to say he's the first matter, right? Because he's pure act, and first matter is pure ability.

[18:33] Aristotle can say that form is something godlike because it's an act, right? That we saw in the first book of natural philosophy there. The profound common understanding of Plato and Aristotle that form is something godlike, right? But form is said to be godlike more than matter because form is an act, and God is pure act. While matter is only ability.

[19:01] Okay. So, what's more known to us is the things that are composite of act and ability. And here you have a particular case of that, in a sense, right? The living body is a composite of act and ability, right? Of form and matter, and what is the soul? What's the form in there? It's not the matter, right? Okay. You see the way you understand the definition, right?

[19:30] And there might be another way of understanding it too, but but but this one is sufficient for resolving, right, the objection. Now the second one is again the person's misunderstanding. He hasn't studied the third book on the soul there, where Aristotle points out how the soul moves the body, right? Well, you're moved. What, if you recall from our study there,

[20:03] you have three things there, right? You have the good, which is known and desired, right? And then you have the knowing power, which can be the reason or the imagination, right? And the what, desiring power, which can be the will or the emotions, right? Okay. And they're like mover mood mover, right? And then you have an organ of the body, right, which is moved by desire, right?

[20:32] And then that moves the other parts of the body, right? So it's not like the soul; its very existence is moving the rest of the body, right? But the soul, through this one power, is moving the other parts, right? So there you already have the bodily aspect due to the soul's as a form giving. The body aspect as well as higher ones.

[20:59] So he says. The second, it should be said that the soul does not move the body through its being, right? By which it is united to the body as a form, but it moves the body through the what motive power, right? Whose act presupposes already the bod body

[21:22] effectually an act through the soul. So you got to already have the different parts of the body, right? Actually informed by the soul before the soul can what use one part of the body to move another part of the body. It's not just the soul all by itself, right? Huh? Is moving the body, right? Huh? But the soul is moving the body through a power that is already what in a body, right?

[21:51] Huh? I mean, if we already have a body there, so that you can have motion, huh? You follow that reply the objection there. Got to think about that a little bit.

[22:07] What's the beginning of this motive power in the soul? Is it? I'd like they could see maybe the You see, the soul is the source of many powers, right? Yeah, I agree. But it's the source of most powers in some part of the body, right? Okay, so the power of of digesting, right? The power of growing, power reproducing. These powers are all in some part of my body, right?

[22:40] Which is soul in forms, right? Okay, but it's also the source of some powers, like the understanding, of the will, as. We saw that are not parts of the body, right? But the motive power again is like the digestive power and so. On it's a what body or part of the body, right? Okay. Oh, okay. Okay. So does does the disembodied soul have the motive power, or does this mean that it wouldn't?

[23:09] It wouldn't have that. No, wouldn't it? The root of it, you could say, is there, right? But but but the actual power is not there because that power can exist only in a body. Only with the body. Yeah, yeah. So the separated sense soul doesn't have senses actually, right? Yeah. Okay. Except it isn't a root, huh? So it's joined the body again. It's going to give rise to those powers again, right?

[23:34] Okay. Okay. Now the third objection was based on the if this if the soul is responsible for the body being a body, right? Then it's the lowest form of all, right? That's right. And it says to the third, it should be said that in matter there are considered diverse grades of perfection, as to be, to live, to sense, and to understand, and those are arranged in a certain order there, right?

[24:04] But always, according to the what? But always according to the what. But always the one that's coming to the one that went before is more perfect. For the form, therefore, which which gives only the first greater perfection of matter, is most imperfect. But the form which gives the first, the second, the third, and so on, is most perfect. And nevertheless, it is what immediate to matter, right?

[24:43] Okay. So we talked about that a little bit before. huh? That solution to that thing. Well, what is St. Paul says? There was a famous passage there. where He says what? Charity does all these things. You know, it believes, it hopes, it does all these things. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's doing what the lower what? Oh, yeah. Virtues are doing right. Uh huh. Okay. Yeah. Okay. But there, you know, you can still have the lower virtues, right?

[25:27] Because they don't give being what? Simply, right? Say. I say charity, in a sense, is commanding the other virtues, right? Right. It's not replacing them, right? See. So it's not exactly like this, is it? Understood. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. See, although it's giving a certain perfection to all of them, right? Huh? That they wouldn't have otherwise, right? And you don't have charity without. Yeah, yeah. But Thomas will say, you know, the man who has charity, his hope is perfected, right?

[26:00] Right. Because we hope to receive good things from our friends, and charity is a friendship with God, right? Huh? So once you have that charity with God, that friendship with God, you have much stronger hope that He's going to give you, right? Then you do when you don't have so much friendship with God, or don't have it at all, God, right? Okay. Yeah. That's not pretty clear.

[26:25] I think in St. Gertrude, you know, I was reading St. Gertrude over my trip out there a little bit. I was looking. My daughter had a copy of Saint

[26:36] Catherine, the dialogue. You know. Mm-hmm. And I guess you got to be kind of careful the dialogue because the the traditional divisions of the dialogue are not really in Saint Catherine, right? Okay. They don't really fit the text. I mean. Oh. And but anyway, she had kind of a more authoritative text there, you know, where they kind of figure out the way that things constructed actually, you know.

[26:58] Ah. But anyway, but but anyway, that's another problem. But you get this sense, you know, very much of friendship with God, huh? You know, another self, you know, the idea, you know, a friend is another self, right? You know, it's the old Greek proverb, huh? When I first studied Greek, you know, they give the Greek proverbs in the Greek "ho philos esti allos autos," a friend is another self, right?

[27:21] But you see very much this idea of a friendship, you know, of Catherine with with our Lord, right? And therefore, her hope is stronger than those who don't have so much what friendship with God, right? Huh? Say. So in that sense, you're perfecting hope, right, and giving it a perfection that wouldn't have on its own, right? But charity doesn't replace friendship. It doesn't replace hope. Right. See.

[27:49] So why can you have hope when you have charity? Well, because they're not substantial forms, are they? Say in substantial form, then charity would have to what replace hope, right? Say rather than commanding hope.

[28:12] Incidentally, in that in that new catechism, you know, just repeat what Thomas says on that charity is the form of all the virtues, right? Okay, but it's not a substantial form, right? Huh? And and so you got to understand what he's meaning when when he says that, right? Say it's not replacing that, huh? Okay, that's interesting. Yeah, thing. I'll come back to a little bit later on if we talk about.

[28:39] We have some time to talk about a little bit. Okay. Now to the fourth, it should be said huh? That Avicenna, mistakenly, of course, Thomas is doing that thing, laid down that the substantial forms of the elements of earth, air, fire, and water remain as a whole in the mixed body, right?

[29:03] That mixture comes about according as the contrary qualities of the elements are reduced to a middle. But this is impossible, Thomas says, huh? Because the diverse forms of the elements are not able to be except in diverse parts of matter, to which diversity is necessary to understand dimensions, without which matter is not able to be divisible. But matter subject to dimension is not found except in body.

[29:37] But diverse bodies are not able to be in the same place. Whence, it follows that the elements in the mixed body would be distinct according to their what place, huh? And thus, it would not be a true mixture, which is according to the whole, but to the senses, huh? Which would be according to what minima juxta seposita. That's what I was comparing to the my daughter is what cinnamon and sugar combination there, right?

[30:09] For the kids to put on their toast, right? Huh? What does that mean, doctor? Well, you've got very small pieces of cinnamon sugar, right, alongside each other, but you don't have something one from those two, right? It's still two things. juxtaposed. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, Thomas is using the word mixture there for something that is really a new what thing, right? Huh? Yeah. Okay.

[30:34] Now Averroes huh? His commentary in the third book on the University De Caelo et Mundo in Aristotle says that the forms of the elements. Incidentally, you know that that word that worked of Aristotle is usually called in English De Caelo et Mundo, right? But notice here he just calls it De Caelo, right? Well, in the Greek, the Greek. Word can mean "celum" in Latin, or it can mean the universe as a whole.

[31:03] And you really should understand the title of that work of Aristotle's as about the universe. But they translated it by the wrong word, "De Celo, And since Aristotle talks not only about the heavens but about the earth in there, then they figured they got to call it "De Celo" de Mundo. I don't see that here. Do you guys see that? anywhere else? in English, Aver was out to impose it in "Three de Celo."

[31:30] On the heavens, what did they? say I'm lost. I don't know. It's right after this. He discussed what Avicenna said and objected that. Second paragraph. and then he takes Averroes. Yeah, did you give the reference to where Averroes says this. I'm sorry. I just went over here. But in Thomas, he says that Aver was maintained. Yeah. That the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection. Yeah, it doesn't give the reference to where he says this, huh?

[32:02] Yeah. Okay. It's in his commentary on the third book of the De Caelo et Mundo. He doesn't give the reference. That the forms of the elements, right? On account of the imperfection, are in between substantial forms and accidental forms. Well, as Thomas will say, that's impossible. but. Anyway, and therefore they receive more and less, right? Which a substantial form cannot. And therefore they are reduced in the mixture to a middle, to a mean, and there is what put together or blown together from them one form.

[32:43] But Thomas says this is even more possible, right? For the substantial being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition or subtraction varies the what species just as in numbers, as is said in the eighth book of Wisdom, there metaphysics. Once it is impossible that the substantial the any substantial form receives more or what less, huh? So I can't, in that sense, be more a man than you, or less a man than you, right?

[33:20] That's really the way in which we're equal. Nor is it less impossible that there be some middle between what substance and accident. That's a complete what exhaustive division, right? Because a substance is a thing that exists not in another, and accident is a thing that exists in another, right? So you either exist in another or you don't. There's no there's no other term, right? Right. And therefore it ought to be said, according to the philosopher in the first book on generation and corruption, that the forms of the elements, right, do not remain in the mixed body and act, but only in what their power in some way, right?

[34:07] For the qualities, the proper qualities, the elements, although what in less vivid form, right, in a reduced form, right, in which there is the what power of the elementary forms.

[34:30] And this quality of mixture is the proper disposition for the form, the substantial form of mixed body, as example the form of the stone, or of some what soul, right, huh? So he's talking about the that that mixture of the the quality of the mixture, right? Heat a man up too much. Cool them down too much, you finish them off, right? So it has to be a body that's not too hot and not too cold, huh?

[35:01] Not too dry, not too wet. You become as wet as this water here, you'd be finished, right? You become dry as a piece of paper you are on, you are going to be dead too, right? Okay. So that misunderstands what what a mixture is there, huh? So, I want to talk a little bit about hope here. Yeah, that's good. What time do you want to stop now?

[35:25] Because you had some question there about you know getting to dinner or something, or what the abbot wants you to do or something. What time do you want me to stop? No, that's that's covered. The class stops at ten and five. Okay, we'll stop at ten to five. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Now, I had time to get thinking there a little bit about the theological virtue of hope, which to some extent I think is is an neglected child, right?

[35:53] You know, it's kind of commonplace about children. You know that the get three children, the middle one gets kind of neglected. Yeah. Because one is well, he's the first born, the oldest, you know, and the other one, the youngest one, gets a certain attention because he's youngest, right? The one in the middle doesn't know what to do, right?

[36:10] Yeah, yeah. Um, I think t here is some truth to that, huh? But but I wouldn't want to exaggerate too much, right? So I think faith gets a lot of emphasis because it's the the first of the theological virtues, right? And presupposes the rest. And charity is the greatest of them, right? And the culmination, right? But hope in the middle gets kind of what?

[36:33] Short shrift. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So what's what struck me when I went back to and looked at the catechism of the Catholic Church, right? That when they take up faith, hope, and charity, and get to hope in particular, that the first paragraph there, in a way, contains a definition of what hope is, huh? And

[37:03] it seems to me that you could distinguish six parts of that definition. Six parts at least for discussion, right? That there are six stops you should make, right? To note distinctly, definition, huh? Okay. And you know, you know the way Thomas when he when he takes up, say, a famous definition that he accepts, like the definition of of eternity from Boethius, the definition of person, right, huh?

[37:37] You know, sometimes they have an article or more than one, and one objection will attack one part of the definition, another one, another one, right? And maybe you have you know four parts of the definition, four objections, one attacking each part, right? And it focuses your mind. Like nothing else will upon every part of the definition, right? Okay. And if you look at at the question on the definition, say of law, Thomas is is developing a definition of law that has about four parts, right?

[38:12] And he has an article on each part of the definition, right? You know, so you get used to to to stopping and pausing with the definition and and unfolding it, you know. Um. When I worked on the definition of comedy, they're trying to complete the the lost part of the Poetics, right? I had to emphasize each part of the definition there.

[38:42] Now, in in the first paragraph there on hope, it gives what I think is a kind of a definition of hope, and the first part of the definition is that hope is a theological virtue. Okay.

[39:02] Of course, the theological virtues are unique in that they have God in himself, God as an object, right? Huh. Okay. And you know the common thing we we we learned you know from Aristotle in the study of the soul, and we learned from Aristotle in the study of human virtue is that we distinguish powers or habits, virtues by their acts, and we distinguish acts by their what objects, huh?

[39:39] And ultimately, therefore, it's by their objects, and so the theological virtues have as their object what God himself, right? And maybe that's why we call them theological virtues, huh? Because when you study theology, you find out that the subject of theology is God, and if anything else is talked about in theology, it's in reference to God. So to call these theological virtues maybe is not so much, although it's true that they're studied in theology, right?

[40:13] But because they have God himself as an object, huh? Anyway, hope is a theological virtue. That'd be at the genus, right? The definition, huh? Now the second part, I like to maybe make it shorter than than they would. It's a theological virtue by which we desire. Okay. And and I have to stop there, you know, even before I say what you desire, because there you see the difference between hope and faith and charity, right?

[40:47] Because charity is obviously a theological virtue by which we love primarily, right? And and faith is a theological virtue by which we believe, right? But hope, it says, is a theological virtue. Is the theological virtue by which we desire. Okay, that's interesting, huh? Okay. Then the third part that I think you want to note distinctly is what you desire by this theological virtue. And in the catechism of the Catholic Church, there it uses two speeches, huh?

[41:33] And they're not entirely synonymous, but they're connected, right? And they are the kingdom of heaven and eternal life. Okay. And I appreciate them using both, right? Huh?

[41:56] But eternal life is defined. In chapter seventeen of Saint John, right, where Jesus Christ says that eternal life is to know you, the Father, right, and Him whom you have sent, huh? Okay.

[42:14] But the kingdom of heaven is defined by Thomas as the ordered society, right, of those who see God, right. So seeing God as He is, or seeing God face to face, that's eternal life, right? Okay. And the kingdom of heaven is is the ordered society of those who see God face to face, to see Him as He is, right? So those are not really saying altogether different things, right?

[42:50] But I think the fact that uses both, right, allows your mind to make a lot of connections you wouldn't make otherwise. And I was mentioning there during the break there that

[43:08] when you go to the Summa Theologiae, Thomas will speak of eternal life, but also eternal beatitude, right? Um, which fits in very nicely with this eternal life. But then, as as we learn from Augustine and Thomas, they always tie up the Our Father with hope, huh? So when Augustine and Thomas divide theology according to faith, hope, and charity, they do the creed, the Our Father, and the commandments of love, and the Ten Commandments.

[43:39] Um, and later on in in the text here on hope, it makes a connection between prayer and hope, right? And then, especially between hope and the Our Father, and it says explicitly that the Our Father, by the Our Father, is both expressed our hope, and our hope is what nourished, huh? Exercised by this, huh? And of course, if you if you read Augustine and Thomas and the Our Father, when they speak of the order, the seven petitions, the seven askings, right?

[44:17] We ask for what we desire, and so Augustine and Thomas says you are being taught there both what to ask for, but what to desire, and by the order of the petitions, the order in which to desire these things, huh?

[44:32] So that fits in very well with hope being the theological virtue by which we desire the kingdom of heaven, right? And of course, in the Our Father, we say Thy Kingdom Come, right? But since Thy refers back to the one to whom we are praying, and He's addressed as Our Father, who art in heaven, right? You can very nicely tie with Thy Kingdom, the kingdom of heaven, right?

[44:59] So I think it's beautiful that that it has that. And illuminates the connection later on between hope and the what our Father right by using the word kingdom of heaven. Well,

[45:14] it's not if you're saying two different things altogether by kingdom of heaven and eternal life, huh? Eternal life is emphasizing right the life of the mind, right? In knowing God as He is face to face and seeing Him as He is, right? Okay, but the kingdom of heaven brings in the what the ordered society of those who are enjoying this this vision, okay?

[45:45] So that's the third part, right? It's the theological virtue by which we desire desire what the kingdom of heaven and eternal life, right? Okay, a very very rich text there. Okay. Now, what's the fourth part of the definition? Well, the fourth part is as our happiness. Now, I think that's interesting that that's made explicit in in the statement there in the Catechism because it's you're bringing out that you're desiring the kingdom of heaven and eternal life, not just as one even one of the greatest if not the greatest among the goods you want, right?

[46:30] But you're desiring it as your very end or purpose, huh? As your very what happiness, huh? Okay, so that's adding a precision, right? That's very important, huh?

[46:46] It's how you're desiring this, right? You're desiring it as your very end or purpose, as your very happiness, as your beatitude, huh? Is your chief good, right? I mentioned how how Thomas in the Summa there in the Secunda Secundae he refers sometimes to eternal life there, sometimes to eternal beatitude, right? But beatitude names the what the chief good of an intellectual creature, okay? And of course the the beatitudes as they're called, right?

[47:16] They're singled out, right? So when you get down a couple paragraphs below that, I mean, but there's number of paragraphs. He has two paragraphs connecting hope with Scripture, right? And and one is you know the Old Testament how this is fulfillment of the, but then the second paragraph is on the New Testament and the the things that are mostly emphasized there explicitly are the beatitudes and the Our Father.

[47:44] Beatitude at the beginning of that paragraph, the Our Father at the end, huh? The Our Father, you know, expresses our hope and nourishes it, right? But the beatitudes in the beginning, that's the beginning of the sermon on the Mount, right? Beatitudes are instructing us in hope, right? What we should desire, what our beatitude is, and something about how you get there.

[48:09] So, the theological virtue by which we desire the kingdom of heaven and eternal life as our happiness, right? Now, the fifth and the sixth parts, as I was mentioning, the break there.

[48:25] From what I you know know about hope and have heard all my life about hope, I'd probably come up with something like the sixth part, right? But the fifth part is kind of interesting that they make this explicit. The fifth part in the definition is trusting in the promises of Christ.

[48:46] Okay. Of course, the beatitudes is part of the promise, right? Okay. He says, trusting in the promises of Christ. That's the fifth part, right?

[49:04] Okay. Now the sixth part is the one I would think about more, and relying not on our own strength, right? But on the grace of the Holy Spirit. Okay. Now, one's always been taught that about the the hope, right? That you're you're you're you're not

[49:25] hoping in your own in your own ability to get this, right? Huh? But in God's help, right? You're hoping for this this good through His help, right? Okay. But

[49:42] immediately following that, in the same paragraph, where you have that definition that I've been trying to break down, you have two quotes as I was mentioning. I think from St. Paul, but you know, I can't remember the exact. But one is connecting hope with the promises of Christ, and the other is connecting hope with the Holy Spirit and His grace, right? So you know, very striking, you know, the use there, huh?

[50:10] They also have a quote. It's either there in one of the later paragraphs, connecting hope with what joy, right? Huh? Remember that text I was talking to you about at the end of Thessalonians, huh? Where

[50:24] he says rejoice always, right? And then he said pray always, and then giving thanks always, right? And Thomas says, well, how can you rejoice always? It's a pretty bad place for. He says, well, you can rejoice always in God, right? In God's goodness outweighs anything that bothers it down here, right? But I was tying that up with the three theological virtues. Remember, you know, using that with the text from Sing Joyfully to the Lord.

[50:52] But if you stop and think, you know, Thomas's reason there in regard to hope, in particular, you could say that if you rejoice in God. Well, that has a connection with all theological virtues because they're all about God, right? See, so there's a reason to rejoice always because of all the theological virtues, right? But anyway, there's a text in there which is dealing up with a connection to joy and hope, in particular, right?

[51:25] I just can't remember the Latin of Thomas speaking of it, right? You know. Okay. Okay. Now there is a interesting use here. It seems to me you can make of the third tool of dialectic. Okay. Now the third tool of dialectic is the tool of difference, right? Finding differences, the ability to find differences among things. The fourth tool is the ability to find what likeness, right?

[52:07] Now Aristotle gives the various reasons for what the usefulness of dialectic. The first reason he gives that it's useful to exercise your mind, and when he gets down to the third and fourth tool, he says that the mind is exercised more in finding differences between things that are close together than between things that are far apart, right? Okay. When he gets down to the the fourth tool of dialectic, he says reason is exercised more in seeing the likeness between things that are further apart.

[52:44] So just the reverse, right? Okay. But seems to me that might be very interesting to compare three desires here, right? Okay. And the first desire is wonder. And the second desire is a natural desire for what happiness, huh? Okay. And the third desire is that of hope. Okay.

[53:18] And if you appreciate kind of the the the the likeness of these things, right? Then your mind's going to be exercised, and what there is a difference between them, right? Now, what's kind of interesting about wonder, huh? Is Aristotle and Thomas and Plato and the Greeks point out wonder is this natural desire to know, not for the sake of making or doing, right? But just for the sake of understanding, and therefore it's a desire to know what and why, right?

[53:56] It's a desire to know the cause, huh? And as this desire develops, if the cause has a cause, it's a desire to know the cause of the cause, and therefore ultimately a desire to know the what? Ultimate cause. First cause. First cause. And to know the first cause is wisdom, so it's a desire for wisdom, right?

[54:19] Now, when you study the natural desire to happiness, you find out in the first book of of the Ethics that happiness is some kind of activity of man, right? And it's an activity in accordance with human virtue, which perfects our activity, right? And then after you go through all the virtues, you find out that it consists more in the activity of some virtues than others, because some virtues are better.

[54:48] And in the tenth book, Aristotle distinguishes the highest kind of happiness is the activity. Of reason in accordance with wisdom, and therefore, really, in knowing the first cause. Well, now, because we're interesting, what is the difference between what wonder, the natural desire to know the cause, and the natural desire for happiness? Huh? And incidentally, when they talk about happiness in the catechism of the Catholic Church, they have a nice quote there from Augustine about how the desire for happiness is natural to all men.

[55:32] It's been placed in all men, right? So it's a natural desire there, right? As opposed to this, this supernatural thing, this hope, right? So, what's the difference between wonder and the natural desire for happiness? Because wonder is ultimately a desire to know the first cause, right? To know the first cause is our ultimate happiness. So, what's the difference, right? Huh? Right. But now you come to hope, and those is something supernatural.

[56:06] You can see that it's a what desire for eternal life, which is to know God, and it's a desire of this as your happiness, right? So, in a way, it's a desire for happiness, huh? Well, the text, you know, if you go on, if you read the whole text there on hope, it speaks of how hope is elevating that desire that we have for happiness, right? And elevating our our hopes, huh?

[56:39] Okay, your natural hopes, huh? And there's a couple of places where where it speaks of this, huh? So it's purifying, you might say, our desire for happiness, huh? From the dross of where we we seek happiness sometimes, where it's not to be found, right? Or in things that are going to really diminish our our ultimate happiness, right? And so, I think it'd be very interesting just to compare those three desires, right?

[57:13] Compare wonder, the natural desire to know why and what and why to know the cause, and the natural desire for happiness, right? How do they really differ? They seem to leave the same place, right? And then, and then,

[57:32] this hope, right? Huh? Which is, in a sense, a desire for happiness too, right? And and seeing this happiness in knowing God, I think I think kind of exercising the mind there to see the thing, huh?

[57:58] Wonder seems to be a beginning, and happiness an end, and hope is like a middle. Yeah, I say if our happiness is ultimately to know God, right? And desire and wonder, when it's developed, it's ultimately a desire to know the first cause. It