De Anima (On the Soul)
84. Metaphorical Theology and the Metaphor 'Sweet'; Q.76 A.6: No Accidental Dispositions Between Soul and Body (Simply vs. In Some Way)
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[0:00] This question for you. I don't know if you have any light for it. um, something I keep running across. Um, it especially comes up in the context of Eastern Church things. And a good example today how we have feast of Saint Ephrem, and of course we have feast of Saint Thomas Aquinas. So anyhow, people would kind of set the two apart, and they'd say Saint Ephrem was the poet, and see he has this.

[0:27] I was just reading this one line the other day. It's like he's refreshingly non-dogmatic. Yeah, they they put the two against each other, kind of like where supposedly Saint Thomas has to dissect God, you know, where where uh, Saint Ephrem, who's who's completely unhellenized, you know, they do this kind of thing, and He respects the mystery, supposedly. I suppose. You know, the their basic bottom line seems to be that there's sort of like different logics.

[1:01] You know, there's the unhellenized logic, and then there's kind of stuff. Um, it's kind of like what to do with that. Well, how do you explain it?

[1:18] Certainly a fallacy. Did you see Thomas's commentary on divine names of Dionysius? No. Well, in the beginning of the commentary, he divides the works of Dionysius, Some of which we have, and some we don't have, I guess. Mm-hmm. And

[1:48] and according to the names that you might use in talking about God, yeah. Okay. Now, in the book on the divine names, are names that are said properly of God. Yeah. They can also be said of creatures with a different meaning. Mm-hmm. But then he has another book which is about names said metaphorically of God. Yeah. Thing. Um. Now, um,

[2:24] there's a little contrast between those two. Take a name like, say, "good," which would be like the first name in the divine names. good can be said of God, and it can be said in some way of the creature, right? Mm-hmm. But good is found first of all in God, and fully in God, and only in some kind of secondary way in the creature. Okay. So, although we might know the goodness of the creature before we know the goodness of God, when you come to understand the goodness of God, you realize that He's the fountain of all goodness and so on.

[2:59] And the name "good" is more applied to Him than to us, like when Christ says, "In one sense, God alone is good." Yeah. Okay. But now, if you take a metaphor, metaphorical name, the Lord is my rock. Yeah. Well, does the name "rock" belong more to God than to the thing in the backyard? here? No. No, there it belongs more to the creature, really, and said of God metaphorically and not properly.

[3:28] God's not really a rock, but there's some kind of a distant likeness there. So they're quite different, those two, right? Right. Now, if one man had written the the divine names, another guy written the symbolic theology or the metaphorical theology, you'd say, "Well, they just don't think the same way." These two guys, do they? You know, but actually, Dionysius has what? Both of those, right? Yeah. Okay.

[3:54] And then he has apparently another book. I don't know if we have it on the what on the Trinity. See, and these are things now where you can't really find an adequate, you know, thing in creatures, huh? And and it's kind of unique the names of the Trinity and so on. See, so notice that that variety. See, yeah. Okay. Now,

[4:21] Thomas does both of those. Now, if you read the commentaries in Scripture, he's doing in many cases metaphorical theology. As I say to people, the metaphor "sweet," which is a very common one, and it's used in Scripture, and it's used in you know romantic love and so on very often, sweet and sweetheart. Um, but in all my reading of the poets as well as the philosophers, no one has explained the metaphor "sweet" better than Thomas.

[4:59] And it's in the commentary on the Psalms that we have, which is incomplete, but he's explaining you know taste and see how sweet is the Lord. And why is God called sweet? Huh?

[5:17] And as you know, a metaphor is based on some kind of likeness. Yeah. So Thomas is explaining the metaphor "sweet," and he sees three likenesses. And these three likenesses can be used not only talking about God, but but other things more known to us. He says the sweet is pleasant. Yeah.

[5:44] The second thing he says about the sweet is that it's restful, quieting. And I've seen that with with my own children. Yeah, yeah. You know, when you're driving across country, did I mention that I did? Yes. Uh huh.

[6:13] Did I? Yeah. Yeah. Get some candy. Well, what I did was, you know, you know, sometimes we drive out to Minnesota. It's a 24-hour to get out there. We could do it in three days of eight hours or two days of 12, and either one is hard. But you know, so you're driving some distance. See, well, after a while, the kids get very restless in the in the back seat and so on.

[6:35] And so I went out to the drugstore. Where was? And I bought a number of these, you know, what are they? 35 cent things like M and M chocolate coated peanuts and you know some other kind of candy, Skittles or something, right? I buy three of you know three different ones. And then three more different ones, right? Three more different ones, okay. I put three. I have two children.

[6:59] I put those three things in a little bag, and I fold it over and staple. Put another few things in a little bag, better staple, and no. So I don't know how many bags there, but enough to handle them. And then I put these seven or eight little bags in a big sack, which stayed in the front seat with my wife and I, and the three little ones there in the back.

[7:24] And then you know, of course, they're not going to look at each other, and and when you no one can stand anymore, they push back there. It's time for a daddy treat. So we'd pull out one of these things, and each one of them would get one of these three things. But they were good. They you know share with each other. Oh, you know, and so and they talk and laugh and so on, and they go on for half hour, almost an hour, see.

[7:47] And then you you you see, so it has a restful thing, and and as I mentioned, you know, the old standard practice for the police when they found a kid who's lost, oh yeah, crying, what you do with this kid? You know, he's just a pain in the ass until you find the parents. And the typical thing that they did in the New York police always was to go get an ice cream cone, and the kid would calm down and so on.

[8:11] See, so that's very much, you know, sweet, properly speaking. It's obviously pleasant. Everybody likes candy as a kid, and sweet things, and but it also makes the kid what at rest, so to speak. And then the third thing that we look for for the sweet is that it's refreshing. It revives you. So you see people, you know, running down to those machines there to get a candy bar or something because they're getting kind of out of energy at the end of the day, huh?

[8:44] And you can't do that here, but it's a very common thing. People have their donor or coffee or something, right? So those are the three things he sees in the sweet. Huh? It's pleasant. It's restful, and it is what refreshing. Refreshing, yeah. See, and so the word "sweet" can be carried over and applied to things. See, now apply it first, you know, in human things.

[9:17] Take a very common metaphor. It's actually two figures of speech. You speak of your sweetheart, huh? Okay. Or, or the most common metaphor the husbands and wives use is honey or something of this sort, right? Um, it's called my daughter, honey biscuit. Okay.

[9:39] Now, honey is a little more concrete, you know, particularly in sweet, but still, it's basically based on the metaphor sweet. Well, what do you mean by sweetheart? What does that mean? What is sweet saying about that person's heart? Pleasing. Yeah, your sweetheart is a heart that loves you, right? And is it pleasing to be loved by somebody? Yeah. See. But now, is it also restful in some way to be loved by somebody?

[10:10] Security. Well, what I usually do is use the modus contrarii here by the opposite. You know, if you sense hostility, people hate you. It makes you kind of what? Uneasy. Yeah. Even if you don't fear, you know, physical harm from them, right? Is kind of uneasiness you have. It makes you kind of restless. Yeah. Why, with somebody who loves you, you kind of get rest. Yeah. See, that really is so, isn't it?

[10:42] Yeah. That's a little different than pleasing, but I mean, it's really it, huh? Okay. And then we find it refreshing to be. With those who love us, you don't find it refreshing. If somebody hates you, I remember a nice phrase of William F. Buckley, you know, because he was fighting a lot of things, but he talked about the tenacious ill will of some of his opponents. Those are the words "tenacious," you know, not easily getting up that ill will, you know.

[11:13] Okay, so that's what you mean by sweetheart, huh? Okay, it's a heart that you find pleasing, right? Restful to be. Okay, now take another metaphor that I see Shakespeare. Shakespeare sometimes, instead of saying "your beautiful form, " he says "your sweet form. " Oh yeah. See, now "sweet" there is a metaphor for beautiful. Now, of course, we usually define the beautiful as that which pleases when seen, huh?

[11:47] So obviously, it has that likeness, huh? The sweet is pleasing, we said, huh? The beautiful is pleasing, huh? Okay, but we also speak of the beautiful as being restful.

[12:01] Well, people spontaneously do that, don't they? When you, I see some beautiful scenery. If you look, if you're in a house or a place where you can look out over the ocean or look out over the mountains and so on, we often speak of as being so restful. Yeah. You go out to a beautiful garden, huh? So restful, huh? Beautiful place, huh? Can't only sit there and you're you're um

[12:29] uh willing to sit there and just be at peace, huh? Rest. And then we have an expression about a beautiful girl. She's a sight for sore eyes. Oh yeah. Isn't that true? And that's refreshing. I know myself. I used to go to this one reading room that was attached, I think, to the library when I was in college. There, had a beautiful painting on the wall. So I'm sitting here reading this Latin and so on.

[13:02] I was thinking, I was kind of what restful to look up sometimes at that painting, and kind of what refreshes your eyes. Do you see that? So you have the same three things, huh? Now, if you apply the word "sweet" to God or to Christ, huh? See.

[13:27] Well, God is what pleasing to the mind, right? Pleasing to the heart, huh? The Christ will say, "Come to me, all you are burdened, and I will what refresh, refresh you. See, it's refreshing in a sense to turn to God, huh? And what did Augustine say to us, man? As for thyself, our hearts are restless until they rest in you. So God is. Pleasing, restful, and refreshing.

[13:56] Yeah. So it can be called metaphorically sweet, huh? Yeah. So Thomas, you know, understands these metaphors. Yeah. If you read the the not just the Summa, Summa gives some of the reasons why we have metaphors in Scripture. Okay. But there are other metaphors, other reasons he gives in the in in the sentences, the commentary in the sentences. Yeah. And one that kind of strikes me, you know, that is not in the Summa, is that he gives the other one, is that every part of us should be subject to God, huh?

[14:32] Okay. Now primarily it's our reason and our will that are subject to God, our reason in believing God and our our will in in hoping and loving Him and obeying Him and so on. But notice how we bring even our our legs into subjection to God, because we come into church and we we genuflect, right? And we kneel down, huh? And things of this sort, huh? So even our legs, which are not the most important part of us, right?

[15:02] And then then we fold our hands, or we do this, or something of this sort. We have these ways we hold our hands when we pray. Some people, you know, when I grew up, we always pray, put your hands together like this. Um. But you know, not all people adopt to the other way of holding their hands like this, huh? But which is a higher part of us: our feet, our hands, or our imagination?

[15:26] Imagination. Yeah. And Thomas says even the imagination should be subject to God, huh? And in using these metaphors, you are in a way bringing the what? Imagination. Subject. Yeah. Yeah. Um.

[15:45] And then when you have you know a beautiful church, right, or a beautiful painting, right, beautiful stained glass and so on, the eye in some ways is what in the service here. And beautiful church music, huh? When you sing, hear this, and then the the ear, right, to the ear, you're being raised to God, huh?

[16:15] So the fact that that prayer, prayer is actually an act of reason, huh? But it's not opposed to prayer that you genuflect or that you, right. You know.

[16:30] In Worcester, I you know I I like the the windows in the French Church downtown, huh? You know, any much better than the ones in the cathedral, huh? Then the cathedral, I think they're they're very good than the ones in the cathedral. But but Sunday this last Sunday we happened to go to Saint Rose of Lima there because of time wise and they're they're more modern. Things they kind of can figure out a little bit, you know.

[16:57] But you can't sit there. Many of the way you can sit there, you know, in the French Church downtown, look at these beautiful, you know, representations, scenes from the life of Christ. So,

[17:11] Notre Dame. Yeah, Notre Dame. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Too much more. Ready to begin again? Yeah. Okay. Thanks. Yeah. Article 6. Whether the understanding soul is united to the body through accidental dispositions. To the sixth, he proceeds. One proceeds. Thus, it seems that the understanding soul is united to the body

[17:57] with accidental dispositions being what in between being the medium, huh? First objection: For every form is in a matter that is proper to it or private to it, and disposed for it. But the dispositions to the form are somewhat accidents. Huh?

[18:26] So you heat up a man too much, you cool him down too much, you kill the man, right? So you need a body that is disposed in terms of these accidental qualities in a certain way to be a suitable body for man. So aren't these accidental dispositions? The objection is saying, aren't they

[18:47] in between, in a sense, the soul and the body? Therefore, it is necessary to understand before that there are some accidents in the matter before the substantial form, and thus before the soul, since the soul is a certain substantial form. I notice the problem's going to be with that is that you'd have something, what, between the substantial form and whatever is the subject of it. Yeah. Yeah.

[19:26] And the substantial form is the first act. Okay. But still, there seems to be something the objection, huh? That you can't have the soul joined to a body with just any kind of disposition as far as hot and cold and wet and dry and so on.

[19:47] Moreover, diverse forms of one species require diverse parts of matter, but the parts of matter are diverse. But diverse parts of matter cannot be understood except by the division of what continuous quantity, which he sometimes calls dimensive quality. Okay.

[20:15] Especially continuous quantity, lines, surface, and body. Right. So we speak of what one dimension, two dimensions, three dimensions. Right. So he uses that sometimes to mean what we call continuous quantity. Therefore, it is necessary to understand dimensions in matter before the what substantial forms, which are many of one species. And I'll go back to what we were saying before. How is it possible to have what many things of the same kind? In the material world, because you have enough matter, and so your mother or grandmother lays out the dough, spreads it out, and if she has enough dough, she can make what several dozen cookies with her cookie thing.

[21:09] Christmas trees at Christmas time, right? So you have to understand in the dough already that it has what dimensions, right? And so you can divide it and form many cookies. So don't you have to understand if there is many men, right? Don't you have to have many matters to explain this multiplicity of individuals, and therefore got to have continuous quantities so you can divide up the flesh and blood and bones among us, huh?

[21:46] Moreover, the spiritual is applied to the bodily through the contact of what power, not through the contact of dimensions. But the power of the soul, the virtus of the power. There you have to. The Latin is a little more.

[22:07] There's two words there, huh? But virtue sometimes is synonym for power. But the virtue of the soul is its power. Therefore, it seems that the soul is united to the body by reason of a what potency, which is a certain accident, huh? But against all this, he says, is that the accident is what after substance in time and in definition, as is said in the seventh book of Wisdom of the Metaphysics, seventh book after the books of Natural Philosophy.

[22:45] Therefore, one cannot understand some accidental form to be in matter before the soul, right? Which is the what substantial form? Just like we said before, you could have another substantial form in the matter before you have the soul. Otherwise, it would be something accidental itself, right? Well, how can you have matter receive accidental forms before it receives a substantial form? Then the accident would be before substance, huh?

[23:17] Why accident is by definition a thing that exists not by itself but only in another. Why substance is by definition something that exists not in another. So substance is before in time and definition accident. So how can you have accidental forms be an intermediary between the

[23:41] matter and the soul? That's one thing that. Why I still don't quite understand the original question and even follow the different objections, why they would think this to begin with. But it seems that that the human soul cannot be united to just any kind of body, right? It can't be united to a body that's too hot or too cold, right? Okay. Or too wet or too dry.

[24:12] Okay. The soul cannot be united to a body that's dry as dust, or a body that's as wet as water, or a body that's as hot as fire, or as cold as ice, right? So, it's by identifying the subject of the soul with the body that has certain what accidental qualities, certain temperature, right, certain hot and cold and wet and dryness and so on, and therefore these accidental qualities are to be understood as in between, and the soul and the body that receives the soul.

[24:58] As the explanation for why they're inquired for this. I mean. Yeah. Well, basically, the idea that you can't have just any form and any matter because the two of them are relative to each other, and so,

[25:20] and then the objection is saying that, well, to make this body relative to the soul, you have to give it certain what qualities. Okay. And those qualities are accidents. That's the that's the third species of quality. First one is habit or disposition. Second is power. Third is what sense qualities in the first objection, you have. Okay. Now the second objection is taking what quantity, which is also an accident.

[25:55] You may recall how how the Platonists and the Pythagoreans, to some extent, and say Descartes among the moderns, Descartes, you know, makes extension the substance of material things. Right. And quantity is the first accident Aristotle talks about, right next to substance. As I always kind of playfully say, Descartes never grew up,

[26:28] because if my quantity was my substance, then how could I grow up? Wouldn't be the same substance anymore, would I? Oh. So it's really the same substance here. That was knee high to a grasshopper, as they say, and now much taller than a grasshopper.

[26:51] Okay. And then the third one, huh, is based upon another species of quality, which is the power. He's saying that the how do you join a spirit, an immaterial thing like the soul, to the body? We can't join them like we glue together two different surfaces or two different bodies, because the soul isn't a body at all. The way they're joined is by it's suggesting in the way in which we speak of an immaterial power as being applied to something when it's acting upon it.

[27:37] Thomas did also one in the Summa contra Gentiles, where he speaks of how touch first means that the surfaces of two bodies are in contact, right? But then we use the word touch in a little different sense, where one thing is what moving another thing, huh? And and the common example that is, I I touched you, my my misery touched you, huh? And you felt sorry for me, right?

[28:07] See, we say about somebody it's a soft touch. We're not talking about about body surface touching body, but one thing as what acting upon the other, right? Okay, and he said, well, that's the way that one body has. I mean, that's the way the soul has to touch the body, not by two surfaces being what brought together and made one, huh? Because the soul doesn't have any surface; it's not a body, but it does have power, right?

[28:40] And so it's not by the application of its surface to the body that's united to it, but by the application of its power. And therefore, it's through its power or powers that the soul is what joined to the body. But the powers are in the category of quality; they're accidents of the soul. So the soul is therefore joined to the body through accidents of the second species of quality.

[29:07] In the first objection it's joined to the body through accidents of the uh of uh well, partly the the maybe the third, but partly the first two. And then, in the second objection is taking quantity as being in between, huh?

[29:26] So he says, I answer it ought to be said that if the soul were united to the body only as a mover or motor, nothing would prevent, huh? Nay, rather, it would be more necessary. That there be some dispositions in between the soul and the body. For the power, there would be the power, right, on the side of the soul, to which it moves the body, huh?

[29:55] And there'd be some. how is translated habitudines there some suitability, right, from the part of the body, huh, by which the body would be mobile or movable by the soul, huh? The soul, would not join to the body, simply as its mover, right? Well, between the soul and the body would come the power that the soul has to move things, plus a certain suitability or suitable disposition of the body to be moved by that power of the soul.

[30:35] But we saw before that that the soul is joined to the body as also its what form, and and as a substantial form. But if the understanding soul is united to the body as a substantial form, as Has been said above. It is impossible that some accidental disposition falls as a middle between the body and the soul, or between any substantial form, for that matter, and its what matter, huh?

[31:11] And the reason for this is because matter is an ability or potency to all acts in a certain order. It is necessary, therefore, that what is first simply among acts be first understood in matter. But what is first among all acts is what being to be It is impossible. Therefore, to understand matter to be hot or to be so big or so large before it actually is,

[31:54] but it actually is as being an act to the substantial form, which makes it to be what simpliciter right? Are you people looking in English? Some of you, how do they translate simpliciter in English?

[32:24] Simply or not? It's almost towards the end of the body of the article. Yeah, yeah, it's just before reply, version one. Yeah. To be, however, an act, it has the substantial form quae facit esse simpliciter, which makes being simply. Absolutely. Is the word absolutely?

[32:53] Yeah. I read translated simply, huh? Without qualification, huh? All right. What's the sentence in English? The whole sentence. Well, if I am in the right place, I have, but matter has actual existence by the substantial form. All right, that's right. Which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said above. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I don't know if that's the best way of translating it. At least, you know, when Thomas used the word "absolute,"

[33:28] he usually contrasts absolute with relative. Okay. Okay. I know myself. Sometimes I am talking about a distinction that you can see in some science. I sometimes talk about absolute distinction and a relative distinction.

[33:55] And take for example numbers. The distinction between odd and even is an absolute distinction. But the distinction between double and half is what? Relative. Yeah. So if it's an absolute distinction. Absolute really means what? In itself, not towards another. So if in itself it's odd or even, it can't be both, can it? Right. The odd can never be even, even never be odd, because that's an absolute distinction, distinction in itself.

[34:34] But double and half, it's relative distinction. So a number cannot be both double and half the same other number, right? But a number like four can be double of two and half of what? Eight, right? See. That's kind of interesting, not to see the difference there between an absolute distinction and a relative distinction, and both are important, aren't they? Now when I'm in logic and I say to them, "What's the difference between a genus and a species?

[35:10] " Is that an absolute distinction or relative distinction? No, no. See, because something can be both a genus and a species, but a species is something more universal, and a genus is something less universal. So quadrilateral is a species of rectilineal plane figure, but it's a genus of square and oblong, and see, and odd number might be a species of number, but a genus of seven and three and five and so on.

[35:51] Okay. What about the distinction father and son? Yeah. Well, for an absolute distinction, if you were a father, you couldn't be a son. Right. A son. But we know a man can be both a father and a son, but not towards the same man. See. So I'm a son of Reno Victor Berquist, but a father of Paul Berquist. What about the distinction between mother and daughter? Same thing, right?

[36:25] But now what about the distinction of man and woman? Absolutely. Absolute, I say. Hate the. You see the difference? Yeah, I think I said that, but I'm. Yeah, yeah. So I say that's the way Thomas uses the word "absolute" as the you know contrast with relative, huh? See. Okay. Now the the Latin word here is "simpliciter, huh? And

[36:56] you'll find this in St. Thomas. Simpliciter is very often contrasted with secundum quid huh Okay Now, simpliciter here is a Latin equivalent of the Greek word haplos. Okay, and sometimes we translate simpliciter as simply right. Yeah. And over here they'll say not simply,

[37:29] but in some way. Okay. Now that's a kind of distinction that takes people a long time to see the kind of distinction it is.

[37:43] But if you go through the different parts of philosophy, this distinction, this kind of distinction, comes up again and again and again. Take for example when you talk about the good. If someone asks you, huh, if you're a little boy or a little nephew or somebody, Daddy, is it good to drink this? And I'd say it's a delicious poison, huh? Daddy, is it good to drink this?

[38:16] What would you say to him? No, no. Yeah, simply. If you don't qualify it as a good or bad to drink it, you don't qualify good or bad. Just say it's a good or bad to drink this particular beverage, which is a delicious poison. You'd say it's what? Bad. And you wouldn't even say simply. Says bad period. See, but you're speaking simply then, right? Yeah. But you could say that delicious poison is in some qualified way, in some diminished way, good.

[38:50] It's good tasting. Yeah. Right. That's a very perfect way in which anything good tasting is good to drink. Now, as I tell the students in ethics and elsewhere, our

[39:16] life—we're doing something bad because in some way it's good. Yeah. Or we're not doing something good because in some way it's bad. So is it good to get up on Sunday morning and say and go to mass? Yes. Okay. But it's going to keep from getting some more sleep. So in some way you could see it as being what? Bad, huh? Is it good to murder somebody who annoys you?

[40:00] No, it's bad. Okay, but in some ways, good. It eliminates the annoyance of your life. Now, is it good to rob the bank? No, it says bad to rob the bank. Thou shalt not steal, huh? But in some qualified ways, it's good. It does increase the money in your pocket, book, if you don't get caught, right?

[40:36] So we are choosing things like robbing the bank. You know, you know the famous bank robber. He got caught many times, and the judge, one day, kind of just out of curiosity says, you know. Why do you rob banks? He says, "Well, that's where the money is."

[40:57] Is the other problem? That's the money is. See, so we're choosing something bad by grabbing the bank because it's good in some way, huh? We choose adultery, let's say, or fornication, because in some way it's good, it's pleasant, huh? And vice versa, we don't do what is good, like study, for instance, because in some way it's bad, prevents you going to party, prevents you from, you know, it's uncomfortable in some way or something of this sort, huh?

[41:35] Or you don't get up and go to mass there because you want to sleep longer. So we're always doing something bad because in some limited and perfect way it's good, or

[41:51] we're not doing what is good because in some way it's what bad, huh? There's nothing in this world that is so good that doesn't prevent you from doing something else that's also good, huh? So we're always making that mistake, right? And then when you read the great dialogue called the Meno Mino, huh? Well, in the Mino you have this sophistical objection of Mino, where he says to Socrates, Socrates doesn't know what virtue is, and and Mino has been shown not to know either.

[42:28] And Socrates says, "Let's put our heads together and try and figure out what it is." And Mino says, "Well, how can you go looking for what you don't know?"

[42:37] And well, he's not seeing that the unknown, some unknown somehow, can be known in some way, huh? Now I always, you know, using my example, there is some example I take in class. I'm saying I'm going to make this girl contradict herself, huh? And so I always ask the question, "Do you know my brother Marcus?" And she says, "No." I said, "Now you all heard what she said."

[43:17] She says, "No, my brother Mark." You all heard that, okay? I say, "Now do you know what a man is?" Yeah. What's the way my brother Marcus? So you do know my brother Marcus. You know what a brother is, don't you? Yeah. That's the way my brother Mark is. See? Well, did you really contradict yourself? Aristotle, in the book on sophistical refutations, refutation is a contradiction, but sophistical is an apparent one.

[43:45] He's saying no, because somehow there, my brother Marcus, unknown to her, but in some way. My brother Mark and every man and every brother is known. You know what a man and what a brother is. Do you see?

[44:04] And the other, other, you know, very stock example is knock, knock. You know, is that the door? No. You say no. You open the door. It's your mother. No, it's my mother. Right? See. Well, do you or do not do your mother? I say, yeah, you know, your mother, but in some way, your mother is unknown to you. She's unknown as a person knocking at the door.

[44:37] Somebody's coming to dinner tonight. Who? I won't tell you. But now, do you know who's coming to dinner? In some way. Well, you might know. It might be some good friend of yours coming to dinner. It's going to surprise you.

[45:00] But you don't know who's coming to dinner. Okay, and someone you don't know. So, again, the distinction comes up in in wisdom when you're talking about the distinction between act and ability. Now, if I say, "Is a wooden chair over there?" Right. Okay. So, is there a wooden chair in this room? We'd say so without qualification, huh? Now, is there a wooden chair in the tree out there?

[45:36] I wouldn't say so simply without qualification, would I? You can see there's a chair in potency, in ability, out there. But you couldn't say chair. Yeah.

[45:49] So being an act is to be simply, and to be in potency or ability is to be in some way. Now Socrates gets mixed up in that, not with being, but with knowing, in the Meno. The slave boy knows things by which he is able to know how to double a square. But does he know how to double a square in the beginning? Socrates is claiming they already knew.

[46:19] But actually, the slave boy cannot be said to know double a square because he's able to know it. I I saw some hope as a teacher that my students will come to know something through my teaching. You know, hope springs eternal in human breast. But

[46:43] I wouldn't say they know these things because they're able to know them. That'd be nice if you could be said to know simpliciter, which you're able to know. But you know that isn't so, huh? And as you go, you know, through Euclid's theorems, you can know the next one through the ones you already know. Does that mean you know the next one? No, no. So that's that's a very important kind of distinction.

[47:11] Yeah. Now it also comes up with substance and accident. You can say that substance, substantial being, is being simpliciter accidental being is being in what? In some way, huh? Yeah. But not simply. No. We've got to be before we can be in some way, and that's why substance is

[47:39] naturally before accident. And that's what this these objections are what running up against, huh? Yeah. Okay. So as they say, he uses the word simpliciter in Latin, which is usually contrasted with quid in Latin, huh? In English, we used to say simply and in some way or in some respect, but you know, it's a little problem with exactly how to best translate it. Aristotle, if you read him, he'll say he'll make the distinction between simply and not simply, right?

[48:19] But in some way, you know. Okay. But Thomas usually uses the word absolute in contrast with relative. Okay. Great. Perfect. Yeah. So he says, to be an act, it has through substantial form, which causes to be or being existence simpliciter right? Okay. Whence it is impossible that any accidental dispositions, which would give existence only what in some way, would pre-exist in matter before substantial form. And since the soul is a substantial form, consequently neither before the what soul.

[49:08] Now, to the first objection, which is taken from the accidents that the body, right, huh? That the soul is joined to has. To the first, therefore, it should be said from the fore said that the more perfect form, in its power, contains whatever there is of the lower forms. And therefore, existing one and the same, it perfects matter according to diverse grades of perfection.

[49:47] For through one, it is one and the same form in its essence as to what it is, by which man is a being an act. And by which he is a body, and by which he is living, and by which he is an animal, and by which he is a man, rather than four or five substantial forms. There, huh? Yeah. One thing. It is manifest, however, clear that each genus follows what?

[50:20] That that each genus is followed by its own what? Accidents, huh? They're like properties, huh? If thus, therefore, matter understood as perfect in being before what? Understanding its being bodily, right? And so on about the others, huh? Thus there are pre-understood accidents which are proper to being before what bodiliness,

[51:04] and thus there are four-understood dispositions in matter before form, not as regards all its effect, but, as regards the what posterior. What he's saying is that the higher form gives what the lower form does, right? So you might understand it's giving what the lower form does before you understand it's giving what the what higher form does, huh?

[51:34] Just like you might understand in the number four, two before three and three before four, but it's really just one number. It's not the number two plus the number three plus the number four because then it would add up to what four, three, seven, nine. Okay.

[51:53] To the second, it should be said that quantitative dimensions, this is the continuous quantities, are accidents following upon bodiliness, right, which belongs to all matter. Whence matter, thus understood under bodiliness and dimensions, is able to be understood as distinct in diverse parts, that it may thus take diverse forms according to further what grades of perfection. Although the same form, in essence,

[52:36] although it is the same form, right, in essence, which gives diverse grades of perfection to matter, nevertheless, according to consideration of reason, it what Differs differs, huh?

[52:58] So we can consider, right, that the human soul is responsible for the body being a body, right? Before we understand as being responsible for this diversity of organs that you have in different parts of the body, okay,

[53:21] and maybe understand human soul as what being responsible for this diversity of parts you have in the body before you understand the soul as having what understanding or having reason, huh?

[53:35] But that's according to consideration of reason, just like I can consider animal common to dog and cat, and, horse, leaving aside the what differences among them. Do something like that in geometry, don't we?

[53:57] You might say, let's say this is a square, right? Now, four equal lines make this to be a square, right? But can also say that this is a quadrilateral.

[54:17] And is it a quadrilateral by another set of four lines besides the four ones that make it a square? No, no, no. It's the same four lines that make the square. Could be a square, and make the square to be a quadrilateral.

[54:38] But when you consider those four lines as making the square to be a quadrilateral, we leave out the fact that the four lines are all equal. Yeah. And just keep the idea of the the lower perfection, you might say. Yeah.

[54:56] Now, is it a rectilineal plane figure? Just going up above now quadrilateral. What's the genus of that, right? Is it a rectilineal plane figure by straight lines other than these same four straight lines? No. Yeah. So you can say these four straight lines make it to be a rectilineal plane figure, they make it to be a quadrilateral, and they make it to be a square. But it's kind of by consideration of reason that we separate out the more general from the what particular, and so we separate quadrilateral out from square and these other figures, rectilineal plane figure out from the square and triangle and pentagon and hexagon.

[55:45] That's not exactly the same. It's all light, so you can see, huh? And so someone might say, we got to have four sides before you can be a square. It's not as if what you have four lines there before you have four equal lines. No, you have four lines. You're going to be either equal or unequal. You're going to have you know one or the other right away.

[56:24] Now, to the third, it should be said. That's the one that says that the soul is joined to the body by spiritual contact, and that's through power. To the third, it should be said that a spiritual substance, an immaterial substance, which is united to a body only as a mover, is united to its power, right?

[56:49] But the understanding of the soul is united to a body. As a form, right, and therefore to its own what existence, right, which it shares with the matter. But you can say that it administers it and moves it through its power, okay, and virtue.

[57:18] Jake Claire. Yeah, I guess I'm not sure why I could have probably missed this, but all through there, it has potentium et virtutem, and also potentium et virtutem at the end. Yeah, no, no, that's the way he says in the Latin. You see, it's united to if the spiritual substance was united to a body only as a motor, a, mover, right? It is united to it, and the Latin says per potentium, vel virtutem, there he's taking them almost as synonymous.

[57:56] I don't have vel there. I don't know, I have et. Yeah, yeah, but then then next sentence says, "But the understanding soul is united to the body as a form to its being, but it administers it and moves it through its potency, and then it says et et virtutem, right? I have et in both places. Yeah, now mine has vel first and then et. Now, now you got to be careful the word virtue, see, because

[58:29] sometimes virtue is defined as the ultimo potentia, huh? Yeah. Okay, and there it becomes kind of what a strong name for what power, right? Kind of excellence of power, and there it's fairly close to the meaning of virtue. It on in ethics, we talk about the virtues as opposed to the vices, right? But you use this term sometimes even for things that don't have virtues in the moral sense, okay, and

[59:15] so they're almost synonymous, but not quite. Yeah, you see, right, and that's why Thomas has a little hesitation there, huh? Yeah, and it was like I mentioned with that definition of was it hope last week, where he speaks of the kingdom of heaven, eternal life, and they're somewhat the same thing, but if you wanted to make some distinction, you could say well, eternal life, according to our Lord in chapter 17 of St.

[59:47] John, he says, "This is eternal life to know you, the Father, right. And him whom you have sent, huh? So eternal life is to see God, really, as He is, huh? To see God face to face, huh? What's the kingdom of heaven? Well, the kingdom of heaven is, as Thomas defines it, the ordered society of those who see God, right? So in a way, it includes eternal life, and it brings in this kind of

[1:00:30] community aspect to it, yeah. Now, there's one Psalm there, one thirty-two. Behold, how good it is, and how pleasant for brethren dwell at one. There's been the precious ointment upon the head, that ran down over the beard, the beard of Aaron, down upon Apollo's robe. Is it due like that of Hermon which comes down upon the mountains of Zion? For there the Lord announces blessing, life forever. But notice huh when the precious oil upon the head comes down on the beard, the beard, of Aaron and down upon the collar's robe.

[1:01:06] Well, that refers to the ordered what society, huh? And you could take it, you know, Christ is is by the name of Messiah, the Anointed One, right? Yes. And then it flows down upon, let's say, the apostles or upon the priests, huh? Down upon the laity or something, you know. But there's an ordered society there, and it's beautiful if you look at Vatican II, huh? Vatican II very much emphasizes the fact that Christ is King and Priest and Prophet, and that all the rest of us, but to different degrees and different kinds, share in those, huh?

[1:01:47] So you go to the document in Vatican II on bishops, right? And they'll talk about the bishops' share in the kingly and the priestly and the prophetic thing of Christ, huh? Right. Then you go to the priests. The document priests will talk about the priest's share in these same three things. They'll go down to the laity and talk about the laity's share in these three things, huh?

[1:02:13] Right. And although the priesthood of the laity is different in kind, huh? Yeah. From from the priesthood that's tied to sacrament orders and so on. Nevertheless, it's a sharing in the what threefold offices of Christ, huh? Yeah. He's King, Priest, and Prophet. Which corresponds to the first three Gospels, huh? Matthew emphasizes the King and and Mark the the prophetic, huh? And Luke the priesthood, huh? That's why that's why they mentioned, like in Luke, you know, that the details of the passion are more explicit that he, that he sweat blood, in the garden there.

[1:03:01] And as Thomas points out, it begins in the temple. Right. And it ends in the temple. Yeah. And it goes to the temple more often than the account than the other Gospels do, huh? The temple is the place of the priest, huh? Mm-hmm. Why and

[1:03:24] why in Matthew you emphasize the what the kingship of Christ? Mm-hmm. And the the adoration of the Magi is just in in Matthew. Mm-hmm. His descent from David and so on. Mm-hmm. And at the end you have you know the kingly role go forth and teach all nations, make disciples of all nations, and so on. Um. So it's kind of different way that the Gospels the Gospels end, and then.

[1:03:52] So that that's emphasized now, but but it says, "Behold how good it is and how pleasant where brethren dwell at one." Well, it doesn't mean just got a got a heap or a pile there, right? Do the do upon you know, and it comes down, and you know, it's also argument against the female priest. It comes down upon the beard, right?

[1:04:18] Unless you go back to the old circus, where they have a bearded lady. Remember the old bearded lady. But the the someone asked my brother Mark what you know people wear beards more often now even in you know in the you know around the world a little bit. What do you think about bearded priests? He said well it's fine, he said if they're man enough to wear one.

[1:04:42] That's true, you know. So, but but there you see it's an ordered society, right? But when it says the dew like that, of Hermon comes down upon the mountain of Zion, there you don't emphasize so much the order, but the the what the vision itself, huh? The beatific vision, huh? It's compared to do, huh?

[1:05:06] Not sure how to get out because of the metaphor there, but but Shakespeare often helps you to understand it, huh? It helps you understand metaphors. He always speaks of the golden dew of slumber. See, he gives to his beloved in sleep. you know, it says in the in that psalm 126. Um.

[1:05:31] Unless the Lord build the house, today be in vain to build it. Unless the Lord guard the city in vain, does the guard keep vigil. It's vain for you to rise here to put off your rest? you eat harden bread. For he gives to his beloved in sleep, right? Well, that can mean what? It can mean in the sleep of death, right? Yeah, he gives the vision after death.

[1:05:50] It can also refer to his giving people something in what a vision of some sort, right? Lighting them in the sleep of what contemplation, huh? And he kind of is drawing from the senses there, so there are good senses of sleep. There are other, you know, bad senses of sleep, the scriptures say. so for he gives to his beloved in sleep, huh? So you know,

[1:06:20] you have to you know contemplate, so to speak, God, and then you have something to give to others, right? You have to open yourself up to God, and then you receive something from God, and then you have something to give to others, huh?

[1:06:39] So as I say, when Shakespeare speaks of the golden dew of slumber, huh? It's kind of marvelous the way he says that, huh? And. So I was saying with the metaphor, sweet, you know, you can understand it partly from its use in even romantic love and so on, and the same with this idea of dew, a very interesting thing. And I, you know, I try to pin people down because I don't know the Hebrew there, but you know, sometimes the Lord said to my Lord, "Said my right hand, I make your hand."

[1:07:15] Yeah, yeah. And then use the word "dew" there. Yeah. Like the dew, I have begotten you, huh? Oh, yeah. Huh? Well, that's very that's very striking, huh? See, but you know, I'm not sure I fully understand the metaphor. But seems to be that part of the likeness is the fact that the dew seems to come from what within rather than than than like rain, see? You know, so in the morning, the the dew is right inside the flower, huh?

[1:07:44] See. And this is this is a metaphor maybe for the what eternal generation of the Son huh? Like the dew, I have begotten you, huh? Yours is princely power in the day of your birth. Like the dew, I have begotten you, huh? I think that's what it says there, but.

[1:08:08] So there, maybe you're. You're. I don't know how to understand fully, but maybe you're closer to talking about eternal life, huh? I mean, after all, water is always a symbol of life, there, huh? Yeah. In baptism and and the first philosopher who said water is beginning of all things, but he's influenced by living things. Aristotle says, huh? So water seems to be tied with life. Yeah. So, dew

[1:08:37] there is with water is closer to the idea of life, eternal life. Yeah. But but this you know ointment coming down on the head and down here brings the idea of order, right? You know, right. And the idea of an ordered kingdom, huh? In a Maronite liturgy, a common image that shows up is Christ at the last day will pour forth or let drop down whatever the dew of his mercy upon the the dead, so they will rise up.

[1:09:09] This connection of dew that will bring them back to life. Yeah. Okay. See now, you know, I try to think about that. It's like a dew like that of Hermon, which comes down upon the mountains of Zion. I know Zion is you know usually interpreted in terms of vision, isn't it? The word "Sion, that's part of the the, the hills there in Jerusalem, isn't it? But it's kind of more the contemplative part, you might say, of it.

[1:09:32] Yeah. And so I mean, not sure exactly the particular significance of Hermon, you know, the mountain, you know, but it's it's an important mountain.

[1:09:52] Well, we got two two articles this time, huh? Hey, we're really, we're really going along there, huh? I'm going to try to do the next two