De Anima (On the Soul)
86. The body of Article 8: the whole soul in every part, kinds of wholes, and the Holy Spirit as the soul of the Church
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/086-the-body-of-article-8-the-whole-soul-in-every-part-kinds/

[0:00] Okay, I answer. It ought to be said that just as has already been said in other places here, if the soul was united to the body only as a mover,

[0:14] it could be said that was not in every part of the body, but in one part only, right, to which the others are moved. But because the soul is united to the body as a form, it is necessary, as Augustine says, that it be in the whole and in each part of the body.

[0:35] Now he says it is not an accidental form of the body, but a substantial form. Now he's going to bring out another difference here between the substantial form, right, and the accidental form. The substantial form is not only a perfection of the whole, but of each what part.

[1:02] For since the whole consists of its parts, the form of the whole, which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form which is the what composition and the order, huh? Like the form of a house, huh? So the order arrangement of a house as a whole. Is that found in each part of the house? No. See, is even the arrangement of the chair you're sitting on?

[1:32] Is that found in each part? No. Now, you know, I mentioned the opinion of Cebes. He brings in there the Phaedo right so the soul is the harmony of the body, right? But that's a very common opinion that the soul is what the harmony of the body, or it's the order of the body, or the arrangement of the body, huh? You know, though the modern scientists would not use the word soul, right?

[1:59] But if you ask them why is this body alive and that body is not alive, well, it's the arrangement of the matter, you know. The arrangement of the matter as a whole is found in the whole and not in the parts. Just like my automobile engine out there. imagine the human body to be kind of a machine, like the engine of my automobile out there, and the whole engine's got a certain arrangement, right?

[2:23] That's found in the whole engine, but not in each part, is it? Right. So they're misunderstanding the kind of form the soul is. The order of the engine, right? The arrangement of the engine is an accidental form. It doesn't give the parts of the automobile their existence, right? If I replace the radiator, the carburetor, or one of these other parts, right, that can just by itself, right?

[2:53] You put them together and then you get the thing to run, huh? That's the way they understand man, right? Okay. But that's to understand the soul to be an accidental form. Yes, most of all, denying the human soul, that we know it can't be an accidental form because if it were an accidental form, it would have no activity except that in the body. But we talked about the reason and the will too.

[3:22] We have acts like understanding and willing that are not in the body. The soul, he says, is the substantial form, whence it is necessary that it be a form and an act not only of the whole but of each part. And therefore, when the soul recedes,

[3:47] something is not said to be an animal or a man except equivocally. Okay. Notice the difference between saying a white man or a black man, right? When I say white man or black man, I add something to man, right? But they're still man, right?

[4:09] Okay. White man, black man, both a man. What about a dead man? Use adjective dead man. Is a dead man a man? No. No. But grammatically, dead man is the same as what white man. You got a noun modified by an adjective, right?

[4:31] But the adjective white or black doesn't really change the meaning of man. A white man and a black man are man in two different senses of the word. They're accidentally different, right? But not in what it is to be a man. But a white man and dead man—they're not man in the same sense.

[4:52] If you call dead man a man, is to use the word man in equivocal sense, something of the shape, right? The same he says is true of the parts, right? The hand and the eye. The hand or the eye of a dead man is not really the same as the eye of the what living man, because it no longer has the operation of an eye, which is to see, right?

[5:19] He gives that sign for the philosopher. A sign of which is that no part of the body has its own. Operation or activity, the soul receding.

[5:33] Whenever everything that retains its species, its nature retains the operation of that specific nature. So Aristotle says that the eye of the dead man is called an eye, just like the eye of a in a statue. It's eye being used equivocally, right? And the eye of the dead man, in a way, doesn't see any more than the eye of the what statue sees, right?

[6:13] But an act is in that which is the act, which is necessary that the soul be in the whole body and each part of it.

[6:25] Now he's going to go into a discussion of wholes and parts here, okay? In different meanings of whole and part, in some meanings maybe we haven't met before, huh?

[6:39] And that the whole is in each part of it can be considered thus, huh? For since a whole is what is divided into parts, according to a threefold division, there is a what threefold totality, huh? Now you're going to meet in this text a number of meanings of whole and part, and something like the text that Aristotle has in the fifth book of wisdom, where he takes up whole and part, right?

[7:17] But the four senses of whole and part that he gives, huh? In the fifth book of wisdom, three of them are found here, right? One of them is not found here. And there's a sense of whole and part here that's not in Aristotle, right? Because it's kind of in between two kinds that he talks about. So he leaves that to a more subtle consideration of whole and part.

[7:48] Ah, let me explain just very briefly the the text of metaphysics. That's more basic than this. And see what Thomas is doing here. Usually in a introductory logic course,

[8:13] I just distinguish two kinds of whole. Two meanings of the word whole, and they are the composed whole. Which Thomas often calls the integral whole,

[8:35] and then the universal whole. Okay. Now the original meaning of the word "whole" is the composed whole. Now we speak of the composed whole as the word "composed" means in Latin. It's a whole that is put together from its parts.

[9:14] Okay. But it's not set of its parts. Okay. But not set of its parts. Okay. So the word "cat," for example, is put together from the letters C, A, and T. And is the word "cat" set of the letters C? No. Or the chair you're sitting on is put together from the legs and the back of the seat. It is the seat of chair. Is a back of chair?

[10:00] Is a leg of chair chair? No. But the chair is put together from those parts, right? Okay. Now, by kind of proportion analogy, we say sometimes the general is the particular, like a whole is to parts.

[10:20] So we might say that odd number and even number are particular kinds of what number, right? Okay. Now, number is set of odd number. Number is set of what even number, right? Or we might say that a dog and a cat and a horse are particular kinds of what animal, right? So animal can be divided to dog and cat and so on, just like the chair can be divided to the legs and the back and so on.

[10:53] But it's not really a whole and part in the same sense, is it? So the universal whole is just the reverse. You can say it's set of each part,

[11:10] but not put together from them. Okay. So animal is set of dog, cat, and horse. But is animal in general composed of dog, cat, and horse?

[11:35] Well, if animal in general was composed of dog, cat, and horse, then to say that a dog is an animal would be to say a dog is something composed of cat, horse, and animal. Okay.

[11:52] But notice how we speak of the particulars under the general. And the word particular comes from the word part, doesn't it? So we see it as being something like a part. So they call it the universal whole and the subject parts, as opposed to the composing parts of the whole. That's really the first distinction to see among wholes of parts. Distinction between the composed whole and the universal whole.

[12:23] Now, usually, I do in logic is I go through every art and science, starting from the lowest all the way up the top, and point out that in every science we divide a composed whole into its parts, and we divide universal whole into its parts.

[12:44] Okay. So you take any one you want to, but let's say you divide sentence into what noun and verb and adjective and adverb, right? Which kind of division is that? Composed. Yeah, because a noun is not a sentence, a verb is not a sentence, right? But the sentence is composed of these, right? But if you divide sentence into statement, question, command, big

[13:17] division, right? Okay. But take any science. Take chemistry, right? The chemist divides atom into nucleus, electronic shell. What kind of division is that? Composed. Yeah, yeah. Or if he divides it into protons and neutrons, electrons, right? Okay. But you look at the periodic table. It has all these elements divided. What kind of division is that? Universal. Yeah, because the hydrogen atom is an atom, the oxygen atom is an atom, right?

[13:56] But a proton is not an atom. Electrons not an atom, right? So every science divides these two ways. With Aristotle in logic, even he studied the statement. He divides the statement into noun and verb. Right, the subject, predicate, copula. His first kind division. He divides statement into affirmative and negative. Second kind, right? See, the affirmative statement by itself is a statement. Negative one is, but the noun, the verb are not, right?

[14:28] So in every art of science we divide them, right? If you're in theology, you divide what sacrament into the matter and form of sacrament. Okay, what kind of division is that? Yeah, yeah. So water is not the sacrament of baptism, is it? In the words, "I baptize you in the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit." That's not the sacrament of baptism. You've got to be pouring the water and saying the words, right?

[14:58] But if I divide sacrament into the seven, what division is that? Yeah, yeah. So if you go through the different arts or sciences, in the science of political philosophy, you divide government into the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. What kind of division is that? Yeah. Nobody knows by itself. Who's that? Huh? You heard what? Was it Andrew Jackson? did? Like the decision of the Supreme Court at this time, He said let them let them what?

[15:36] Apply it, enforce it themselves. Oh. so the legislature passes the law, the president doesn't carry it out, or vice, you know, you wouldn't have a government very long, would you? Huh? You know. If you divide government into monarchy and oligarchy, democracy, and so on, well, then that's this. Yeah. So if you go through the arts and sciences, you'll see that in every art or science we divide in these ways, sir.

[16:06] In the poetic science, we divide a plot into two: what beginning, middle, end. Or we divide a plot into tying the knot, untying the knot. What kind of divisions are those?

[16:19] Composed hole, right? Okay. You divide plot into tragic plot, comedy plot. That's the second kind here, right? Okay. That's the fundamental, most fundamental distinction about holes, sir. But now, in the fourth or fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of holes and parts, sir.

[16:50] And he has universal whole in there, but he has three kinds of composed hole. And one we've spoken about before, the quantitative parts, right?

[17:05] Ah. So we divide the circle into two semicircles, right? That's example dividing a quantitative hole into its parts, sir. Or you divide the chair, right? Or you divide into its parts, or you divide the book into pages or chapters or something, right? Okay. And then you have this other sense we spoke about earlier today, when you divide something composed of matter and form into what he calls its essential parts, sir.

[17:40] Okay. So the division of the word "cat" into the letters C, A, N, T is a different division than into the letters and the order, right?

[17:57] So you have the quantitative parts, and then you have the essential parts, matter and form. And then there's the third one, which is the parts of a definition, the genus and the what differences, sir. Okay. But notice all of those are composed what holes, sir? So the semicircle is not a circle, right? Even part of a line is not the whole line, right? Can't say to be the whole line of it.

[18:29] So a five-inch line is not a ten-inch line, although it could be a part of a ten-inch line. And a genus is not a definition. Any difference is not a definition, but it's composed of these, right? Okay.

[18:45] So one way of dividing the different senses of whole and parts that Aristotle has in the fourth book of Wisdom, he has three kinds of composed whole, and then the universal. whole. Okay. Okay.

[19:01] Now, there's another way of dividing it. and that is you could say that of those four senses of whole and part, two are about wholes and parts of the world outside of us,

[19:18] and two are about whole and parts only in the mind. Now the division of the general to the particular, the universal, right, or the more universal to the less universal, that's found only in the mind, isn't it? Because outside the mind, all you have is singulars, right? So when I divide animal into dog, cat, and horse and so on, this is a universal things, isn't it? Where do you find animal separated from individual animals?

[19:54] Only up here, right? Where do you find the definition? Up here, and the definition is composed of universals too. So the division of a definition into its parts, and the division of universal whole into its parts, those two divisions take place only in the mind. You only have those distinctions there in the mind.

[20:24] But outside the mind, in things, you have quantitative parts, and you have essential parts. In the rubber ball, you have form and matter, don't you? In the word cat and the board, you have the letters and the order there, right? And you obviously have quantitative parts of the world around you. You see? So if you examine those, it's rather interesting, huh? You can divide them into three and one, right?

[20:57] Three kinds of composed whole, as opposed to the universal whole, right? But then, if you look at whether the whole and parts are in the mind or in things, right? Two wholes and their parts only in the mind. Although they have a foundation in things, a remote foundation. But immediately in things, you have two kinds of holes, right? Okay.

[21:30] Now Thomas will refer to some of these, but not to others, right? So he doesn't talk about the universal whole here at all. Okay. But he talks about another kind of what Whole, which he calls the what potential hole. Okay. Aristotle is kind of hitting at this through the De Anima when he talks about the parts of the soul. The soul is a potential whole. but Aristotle doesn't distinguish that explicitly in the in the fifth book of wisdom.

[22:09] So let's follow Thomas' text here. And that the whole be in each of its parts. Now this is the the thing that's really puzzling, right? That the whole soul is in each of its parts of the body, the body can be considered here in this way. Because since a whole is what is divided to parts, a whole is something that has parts, right? Can be divided to parts in some way.

[22:33] According to a threefold division, we can distinguish three kinds of holeness, right? For there is a whole that is divided into quantitative parts, huh? As the whole line or the whole body can be divided into quantitative parts, huh? Okay. Okay. That's the first one that Aristotle would give in the fifth book of wisdom, huh? There is also

[22:57] a whole that is divided into the parts of what? The definition, right? And of the essence, huh? As defined into the parts of the definition, and the composed is resolved into matter and form. But, those are two other meanings that Aristotle gives, huh? And the reason why he puts those together, even though one is more the mind, huh? Is that the genus is to the differences something like matter is to form, right?

[23:32] Just as wood can be shaped in various ways, huh? So when you add to let's say triangle, the differences of isosceles or scalene or equilateral, you determine make actual something that's only potential. In the genus, there, huh? As

[23:54] I mentioned before, how John Locke gets all fouled up in this and Berkeley, huh? Because John Locke tries to understand the universal whole as being composed of all the particulars, and he doesn't know what to say, huh? It's all none of these, okay.

[24:14] So in material things, the genus is taken from what is more material the thing, huh? And the difference is based in something more formal. So he compares those. Two, there are two different senses of whole part there, but they're analogous, right? Now, the third whole, which is not explicitly spoken about by the philosopher in the fifth book of wisdom, is the potential whole, right? Which is divided into the parts of the what?

[24:42] Power, huh? Okay. Well, can, you speak of the whole power of something or a part of that power, huh? Okay. See. Okay. It says the first way of wholeness does not belong to forms, except perhaps by accident, huh?

[25:16] And to those forms only which have, a different relation to the, what? Quantitative whole and its parts, huh? He gives? the Example of whiteness, right? Which, in its definition, equally has it in the whole surface, in each part of the surface. So you look at the wall there; it's white. And white there, you could say, is ah, not more the whole wall than it is in the part, isn't?

[25:47] it? It's kind of indifferent to a white, but it's on a small surface or a large surface; it's still white. But you can divide in some way the whiteness by dividing the wall, because the whiteness is in the wall. And therefore, the surface being divided, whiteness is divided by accident. But a form which requires a diversity in parts, as is the soul, and especially the of perfect animals, where if you divide them, you don't have little animals, but you have no animal at all anymore.

[26:22] As opposed to the some worms you cut them, and then the parts what regenerate or something, right? And they can go on living, huh? But you cut up a man, and you know, you no longer a man, right?

[26:38] So he says, but a form which requires a diversity in parts, as is the animal, as is the the soul, and especially of the perfect animals, as opposed to the worm, does not equally have itself to the whole of the parts.

[26:55] Whence it is not divided, per accidens by the division of quantity. Thus, therefore, quantitative wholeness cannot be attributed to the soul, either as such nor by accident.

[27:14] But the second kind of wholeness, which is to be noted according to the perfection of the definition and the nature of the thing, properly and as such belongs to forms. And likewise, that third kind he talked about, the wholeness of power, because form is the what principle of operation. huh? It's through your form you're able to do something. huh? Through your matter you're able to what receive, right?

[27:45] But through your form you're able to do something, do what give, huh? Okay. Through my ability to know, right, and be able to receive something, right, but through someone else actually knowing something, I can be what taught by him, right? And act as what form is act, right, as opposed to ability.

[28:19] If, therefore, one were to question about the whiteness, whether the whole was in the whole surface and in each part of it. It would be necessary to distinguish, because if one makes mention of the quantitative wholeness, which the whiteness has by accident, because it is a subject that is quantitative, the whole would not be in each part of the surface, huh? Okay, so the whiteness of the wall over there is the whole whiteness in each part of the wall.

[28:51] No, say. It's spread over the whole wall, right? And likewise, one would say about the totality of its power, because whiteness, as in the whole surface, is more able to move the eye than whiteness which is in some part. The only example of the white barn in the summer, huh? No. But the white barn is so big when the sun shines on it, it's kind of what?

[29:22] Blinding, right? Huh? Oh. Say. Okay. So the the the larger white surface is going to affect your eyes more than a small white surface, right? Okay. In other words, the white being spread over a long surface has more power to move your eyes than the white over a short surface, huh? Okay.

[29:55] But if one speaks of the wholeness of the species and of the essence, the whole whiteness is in each what part of the surface? What it is to be white, in other words, huh? Is found in a small part of the surface as much as is found in the whole.

[30:16] But because the soul does not have quantitative totality, neither as such, huh? It's not a quantity, nor by accident, right? It's not a form that can be what. Be in a surface or in a body, and that body can be divided. You still have that form, right? Okay.

[30:37] It suffices to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body by the totality of its what? Perfection in nature. Not, however, according to the what? Wholeness of its power, huh? Because the soul is not in each part of the body according to every power it has. But power of seeing is in the eye, of hearing in the ear, and so on through the other parts of the body, huh?

[31:14] Now, this last paragraph is going to be important, also, for distinguishing what's going to be said here. Nevertheless, it should be noted that because the soul requires a diversity of parts, huh? It is not in the same way compared to the whole and to the parts, huh? But to the whole first, and what, to itself, as to what is

[31:44] proportion to it, right? Is proper perfectible, right? So we defined the soul as what, the first act of a natural body composed of tools, right? So this is what is its proper perfectible, and what's proportioned to it. But it pertains to the parts per posterioris. What does that mean? According as they have an order to the whole. Okay.

[32:14] So my soul informs my whole body, first and as such, it informs my liver or my hand in order to what the whole. Okay. And so, if my liver or my part gets cut off or taken out, yeah. So no longer had any order to the whole. Yeah. It would no longer be informed by my soul. Yeah. Okay.

[32:42] Let's see how he applies to the objections and the basis of this. Now the one from Aristotle, the text there, again is a misunderstanding of the cause of the motion of animals, just like he had with Augustine in the previous reading, if you recall, right? Because Aristotle, speaking there, about the moving power of the soul, the soul's ability to move the body, huh? And that's a what power of the soul that is in one part of the body, huh?

[33:12] Okay. He's not talking about the soul insofar as it gives what existence, right? To every part of the body. So the second objection was solved by the last paragraph you just read.

[33:27] Wherever the soul is in the body, which is an act, objection again, but the act of a body composed of tools, therefore is not except in such a body. But not each part of the body is a what body composed of tools, right? Therefore, the soul is not each part of the body. What Thomas is saying, it's in the whole body first and through itself, right? It's in the parts because of their order to the whole.

[33:57] Okay. Just like the what? What is what is say Leo say? Huh? The Holy Spirit is the soul of the church, right? Mm-hmm. So we like this a bit, huh? What is it that that the Holy Spirit perfects?

[34:19] First, it as such the church. Okay. But he also perfects as one of us, huh? As we are ordered to the whole, yeah. What is it? As we are part of the of the church, huh? So if I'm cut off from the church. Through my sin or excommunication or something of this sort, huh? Then I'm not rejoined to the Holy Spirit, huh? See, if you understand the way the soul is, you can understand why they speak of the Holy Spirit as the soul of the Church.

[34:50] You can understand how the individual Christian, right, is united to what the Holy Spirit, huh? Insofar as they're a part of the Church, huh? So there's some difference which we would say that that the Holy Spirit is in the Church and the Holy Spirit is in what us, huh? Yeah. There's the whole Church is more proportioned, you might say, right, to the Holy Spirit, huh? I don't want to, you know, overextend it like this, but I think it's very interesting to like this there.

[35:21] Yeah. As far as the Holy Spirit, I always had this discussion with certain individuals about. if you're. Baptized and the Holy Spirit is within you in in a sense. whereas if you're not, and if you're not a child of God. Then it's not in the same sense within you. So it's maybe outside of you trying to impact you or something. Would you agree with that, or could you explain it in another way, or is there a difference?

[35:43] Well, I mean there's certain ways that John Paul II example has spoken more authoritatively on, you know, people who are not who never had the faith preached to them and so on, right? And they don't fall to the old, but we're trying to live. Because Saint Paul says, you know, no one can please God without faith. And Thomas comes back upon that and says, well, how much must you explicitly believe in order to be saved?

[36:16] No one can please God without faith. That's Saint Paul says. And Thomas says, well, does everybody have to believe as explicitly as everybody else? See,

[36:28] because even the history of the Church, now certain mysteries of the faith were more clearly defined as time went on. Like, say, the you know, the Immaculate Conception in our time, or the Assumption, or something like that, right? And I've read, you know, the Dominican there was Father Báñez, right, who was a spiritual advisor of St. Teresa of Avila, right, And a very holy man, in his own right.

[36:54] When it comes to the question about the Immaculate Conception, he's very strong about that. You know, he got almost heretical to hold this, right? See, but it not been officially or formally defined, right? But after it was defined, you know, if you look at the official text, I guess that's the one that uses the expression that now, if you don't believe this, you are suffering shipwreck. You are suffering shipwreck.

[37:16] You see. But but when Thomas says, what must everyone believe to be saved? Right. Who have not been introduced, you know, even to the teachings of the Church and so on, they must believe that there is a God and that He rewards the good and punishes the the bad. He must believe that.

[37:36] But you have a very what implicit belief in in our Lord, becoming man and so on. But you got to be kind of careful, right? God can

[37:52] bestow grace and say even outside the what sacraments, yeah, yeah, sacramental grace, so again, living God, right? So you got to speak very carefully about those things, huh?

[38:08] But there could be a way in which you know might be different degrees in which someone can belong to the Church, huh? And there are a lot of dead members, right? Who might, you know, if they don't reform, be cut off, you know, like the the pruning parable there, in, the Gospel, right? But then the guy comes along and says, well. You know, tear that up. he says, well, let's give him another year.

[38:34] I'll manure it a little bit more and a little bit of stuff. " You know, and that's what I guess some spiritual director has to be a little bit like putting manure in something, right? You know, I remember this one guy who'd been in the Dominican, you know, talking about his spiritual director, you know, and how he come on there almost, you know, almost hitting the guy, you know.

[38:56] He was training you out, though, you know. He was manuring you, and seeing if you you're better the next year, huh? So, okay. So now the third objection is saying using that proportion, Aristotle does so that the soul is to the whole body as this power is to that part, right? And so, saying, "Well, if you say then that the soul is in each part, the whole soul, would you be saying that each part is an animal, right?

[39:25] " But that's overlooking that distinction we saw there, right? At the end of the of the body, the article that the soul is what the whole body first and what as such, right? And it's in each part of the body, in particular, because of the order it has to the whole body, right? That's not what went to make that kind of analogy there to the to how that's used when they talk about the Holy Spirit being the Church and each person in the Church, right?

[40:01] So we're not saved as an individual, but we're saved as a part of the Church, right? And yet the union of the Holy Spirit with us is is something immediate. He's not like the accidental form of the Church. We say the whole Church, but not each one of us who are there. So he says, "To third, it should be said that the animal is what is composed from the soul, the whole body, which is the first and perfectible.

[40:30] There's proportion to it, huh? What does that mean? Well, the soul is able to perfect, right? The whole body, and not just one part of the body, right? So this is the perfectible there's proportion to it, huh? They say, less so with the Church, because the Holy Spirit could what you know, as far as they bigger the Church he wanted to, right? Okay, but the Church is more proportioned to him than the individual, huh?

[41:01] Okay, he's apt to be perfected, not just of one soul, but of you know the whole Church. Thus, the soul is not in the part, right? Is what is first and is proportionate, and perfectible, right? Hence, it is not necessary that a part of the animal be an animal, right? Any more than because the Holy Spirit is in me, if he is, right? I am the church.

[41:32] I am a church. right? I am by myself. Now the fourth objection is saying all the parts or powers of the soul are in the essence of the soul. If therefore the whole soul is in each part of the body, it would follow that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body. So, now Thomas, in his reply, says first of all, to the fourth, it should be said that of the powers of the soul, some are in it according as it exceeds the whole capacity of the body, namely the understanding or intellect or reason, and the what will.

[42:17] In that sense, Hamlet speaks very formally, doesn't he? He's talking about his choosing Horatio as a friend. He says, "Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, it could have been distinguished. Her election has sealed thee for herself. "

[42:42] As if it's the soul that is choosing him as a friend, huh? Because the ability to choose, which is the will, is in the soul but not in the body. I think I mentioned, you know, how Bob O'Grady taught me there at Saint Anselm's, one of my former students, you know, when he was studying some modern scientists and a man who was doing, you know, mapping the brain like they try to do, huh?

[43:14] One way they try to map the brain is by getting some victim or some some volunteer, and they stimulate, I don't know, electrically or something, different parts of the brain, right? That's kind of strange because you stimulate and say, "Oh, I taste chocolate, " huh? You know, "Oh, I remember my mother, " or you know, "What something happened, " right? But no matter what part of the brain they stimulated, the guy said, "I just made a choice.

[43:48] " So he concluded that the ability to choose, the will, is not in the brain. If it's not, in the brain it's not either part of us, huh? So kind of interesting, huh? You get a little insight there, but we can show that the the ability to choose is not in the body, the same way we show that the reason is not in the body, and that's in terms of its what of the universal extends to it, it's extending to immaterial things and so on, huh?

[44:26] So he says of the powers of the soul, some are in it according as it exceeds the whole capacity of the body, and these are powers like the understanding and the will. Whence powers of this sort are said to be in no part of the body,

[44:46] but the other powers are common to the soul and the body, right? Like the ability or power of seeing, the ability or power to digest, right? Whence,

[45:03] whence each of such powers is not necessarily in whatever the soul is in, but only in that part of the body that is what suitable for that power, huh? But only in that part of the body which is proportioned to the operation of such a power, huh? You see, when the soul is separated from the body, do you still have the power to see and hear and smell and taste and touch?

[45:38] No, no. Soc Socrates in the Phaedo, right? When he alludes to the ghost stories that you had in Greece, like we have, and like sometimes we associate these stories with the graveyard, huh? See, it seems that the souls of those who have died, some of them are from time to time hanging around the graveyard, huh? And Socrates says, well, those are the souls that were lovers of the body, and they're cut off from the whole purpose of their life, right?

[46:12] Everything they enjoyed was tied to the body, huh? And so these souls, are just to get back in the bodies, they get some more of those pleasures, you know, but they can't have the pleasures of the senses anymore, huh? When they're separated from the body, because the those powers are in the soul, not as in a subject, right? But only as kind of a root or source of these powers.

[46:35] But the power is going to actually be in the what body, right? Okay. So in a sense, this objection is kind of imagining that the soul would have all these powers in itself, it was all by itself, right? And then they'd be on every part of the body, right? But those powers have their root in the soul, but they're fully realized in this or that part of the body that is suitable for the operation of that part of the soul, which is an operation performed only in the body and through the body.

[47:07] That's the only kind of powers that the that the animal has, and therefore it's only that the plant has, huh? But man has these other unusual powers that are not in the body.

[47:22] The last objection was saying that if in each part of the body there was the whole soul, each part of the body would immediately depend upon the soul. Therefore, one part would not depend upon another, nor one part would not be more principal than another, which is clearly false.

[47:43] He says, "To the fifth, it ought to be said that one part of the body is said to be more principal than another, on account of the diverse powers, huh? Of which the organs, whose organs are what parts of the body, right? For that which is the tool or organ of a more principal power is a more principal part of the body,

[48:09] or even that part which, to the same power, more principally serves, huh? So what we're saying the other day there about hope, huh? Why was hope metaphorically called the helmet of salvation? Remember that?

[48:37] You wouldn't even desire to think about things if you didn't have hope. Yeah, yeah. Was because by hope we desire the kingdom of heaven, right? And eternal life is our end, is our goal, right? So in a way, that desire for the kingdom of heaven and for eternal life is going to direct us in our whole life, as by the head that we are what the other parts are directed.

[49:07] So the the powers that are in the in the head, especially the sense powers, right? But not just these outward senses, but the inward senses too, huh? The memory and the imagination and so on, right? So you are being directed by these powers here, and these other parts, huh? Yeah. And therefore, this is the more principal part of my body, my head. If I lost that, I'd be at a loss.

[49:33] And if I lost a head, which would be not good either, but I wouldn't be maybe finished off with a you know missing leg or hand or some other thing like that. But now you are talking about how what the powers that have their bodily seat here are directing the powers that have their body seat somewhere else. Okay. Can I get the heart as again a principal part too, maybe?

[49:58] Because it's diffusing what blood throughout the whole body. You have trouble if your blood stops going to your brain too. So those are two principal parts. So that's why Thomas when he when he when he spake those words there. Put on the what breastplate of. Justice. But also the breastplate of faith and charity and the helmet of hope. You know, we want to protect the heart and the head is kind of principal parts in battle, right?

[50:34] But then he comes back and says, "Well, why is it that faith and charity are metaphorically, you know, spoken of the breastplate, which protects the heart, and why is the helmet, right, applied to hope? Well, particular thing he sees is that hope, insofar as it's the theological which we desire the ultimate end, it's kind of directing us, as we said earlier, right? Because the head directs to the body, huh?

[51:05] But the heart, especially, seems to be the source of what of life, huh? And Thomas says, "Well, the life of the soul is Christ, huh? " And Saint Paul says in the epistle there, it was Ephesians, I think it is, one of the epistles. Saint Paul says, "Have Christ dwell in your heart through faith, right? " And then he affords charity through charity, you know. You are God, and God is in you, right?

[51:31] So he applies the word breastplate to faith and charity. As two virtues, the Scripture sometimes speaks of as through which Christ dwells in you, right? He's your life, right? If you preserve your life by faith and charity, you preserve your head by hope. It's interesting.

[51:57] You have another metaphor for hope. It's called the anchor. A little different, though, huh? But the anchor, you know, is what keeps you from getting adrift.

[52:10] So if you keep your your your your eyes or your goal, the what the final end is, right? Praise the end, as they say, right? And you know whatever happens, you know. They were talking on the radio there today. I guess they found some El Qaeda. You know, plan to. I don't know how you know you know how confirmed this is yet, but that they were planning to simultaneous, right?

[52:39] Assassinate several prominent Americans. You know, imagine the shock that would have the country. If several very prominent Americans on the same day all of a sudden, you know, sure, it's kind of clever on their part too, because you you can't protect these people that much, right? Right. I mean, somebody who wants to at least you know, you know, John F. Kennedy said, you know, and since when history proved it, he says, if somebody wants to trade his life for mine, not much I can do about it, you know.

[53:09] It'd be very hard to to protect all these prominent citizens, you know, and but but but you know, for the shock effect, you know, you see, you know, just one man is killed that's shocking, maybe if you had suddenly ten, fifty, twenty very prominent Americans dead, it would be it would be a shock to the country. I mean, and you know, that's what they want to do that that shocking effect, you know, upon upon us.

[53:37] So. Have a big effect on the stock market. I'm sure. I'm sure. Yeah, affect a lot of people. Yeah. So next time we can go on to question sixty-eight, where he starts to descend to the powers and take them up in sub detail, right? Seventy-seven. Yeah, we'll try to do two articles a weekend, right? Yeah. So you can prepare the first two articles in question seventy-seven.

[54:07] And and seventy-seven is he says here he's considering the powers of the soul in general, right? And then he's going to descend to some of the powers in particular, right? That was relevant to this part of theology.

[54:25] So he calls it. To use the anglicized word, here historia Okay. Now historia in Greek means kind of investigation, huh? Okay. And Thomas says the reason why he calls it investigation is that it's the nature of investigation to be incomplete.

[54:54] Aristotle is not going to determine all the questions about the soul, but certain key ones, right? Okay. To me, that's kind of interesting what Thomas does because it explains what we call history as a separate discipline.

[55:13] It's the nature of history to be incomplete. Well, history is especially incomplete, huh? It's what historians said. I think truly, history is always more complicated than we think. Human beings, huh? And what motivates them, and why they did this or made that mistake, huh? It's very hard to tell, right? Huh? And so, by antonomasia, history is named by antonomasia, because that's not the only place where investigations are what.

[55:50] Incomplete. but most of all, there, especially there, right? It's kind of amazing, you know, the way historians are always revising history. You know, it's always revisionists, You know, and sometimes surprising things and so on. You know, so

[56:15] there are always new facts coming to light. You know, they had in a recent U. S. News and World Report there. They had whole magazine is devoted a big section to spies, right? Oh. And they're going back, you know, to spies in the times that George Washington used during the. And some of these spies, you know, incognito, and so on. And some of them are just coming to light now.

[56:36] Wow. And from what one account says, I've read many accounts of the capture of Major Andre, the British officer that was communicating with Benedict Arnold, the traitor. Oh. And the accounts I'd always read is that you know, was that Major Andre was caught kind of by bad luck. Oh. And well, apparently that wasn't just bad luck. Somebody was on to something fishy about this connection between Andre and and Benedict Arnold, right?

[57:12] And Benedict Arnold, you know, got out just before Washington came, right? Hmm. And Washington would have hung him you know. But so I mean, you always knew little things coming to light that nobody knew about. So in these contingent human affairs, huh?

[57:43] Most of all, our investigations incomplete. Yeah. And therefore, by antonomasia, we call this history. But even in philosophy, there's a story. There's an investigation, right? But you are able to to reach a conclusion that you are. I mentioned that also here because, as I say, Aristotle was aware of the fact. Thomas is aware of the fact. that Aristotle is aware of the fact that Aristotle's aware of the fact that he's not considering all the questions he might have about the soul, right?

[58:20] Considering fundamental ones, huh? So