De Anima (On the Soul)
87. Summa I q.77 a.1: Is the Soul's Essence Its Power? Act and Ability, Properties, and Augustine's Hard Sayings
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[0:00] there'll be a lot of things in here that are more explicit than in Aristotle. But number three there will be quite a bit of Aristotle there, right? The difference is Thomas speaks it up a little bit, interesting ways. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our Light, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas and John Duns, and help us to understand what you've written.

[0:37] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So this is the second part about the powers of the soul. So Thomas says in his proemium here, then we ought to consider about those things which pertain to the powers or the abilities of the soul. And first, in general, in question seventy-seven here, right? Second, in special, in particular, starting in the next question seventy-eight. So about the first, about the powers of the soul in general, eight things are asked, right?

[1:19] Eight things are sought. First, whether the essence of the soul is its what power, and second, whether there is only one power of the soul or many.

[1:39] And third, in what way the powers of the soul are distinguished, and fourth, about the order of them to each other. Distinction always comes before order, right?

[1:56] And the fifth one now, whether the soul is the subject of all its powers. Of course, as you can anticipate, there the soul is the subject of some powers, but other powers it has in common with the body. And the sixth question, whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul, like properties, like effects from the nature of the soul. And seven, whether also one power arises from another,

[2:33] and the eighth question, whether all the powers of the soul remain in it after death. That's a question about the powers that it shares with the body, right? Okay.

[2:47] Now the first article. To the first one proceeds thus: It seems that the essence of the soul, its very nature, of what it is, is its power. For Augustine says, this is one of Augustine's ways of speaking. It's kind of obscure sometimes.

[3:07] For Augustine says in the ninth book about the Trinity that the mind, knowledge, and love are substantially in the soul, or to say the same thing, essentially. Their substantia and essentia used to mean what a thing is. In the tenth book about the Trinity, that memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, one nature.

[3:37] Thomas is going to understand this in a way that's not opposed to what he's going to be showing in this article. But Augustine, the De Trinitate course, is talking about the image of the Trinity in us. He has a certain way of emphasizing this image that might be a little misleading here if you don't know the whole context.

[3:59] Moreover, the soul is more noble than the first matter, but the first matter is its own ability. The first matter is is what ability or substance, huh? And the first matter is its ability or power the same thing. Therefore, much more should the soul be its own power or ability. Moreover, a substantial form is more simple than accidental form. A sign of which is that the substantial form is not what made more so or less so.

[4:38] Right? It's not intensified or diminished. Huh? But it consists in something indivisible. So, if you take you know you and me substantially, one man is not more a man than another, and one dog is not more a dog than another. Oh yeah. Okay. Yeah. In that sense, it'd be like a circle, right? One circle is not more a circle than another, is it?

[5:08] Moreover, the sensing power is that by which we sense, and the understanding power that by which we understand. But as Aristotle says in the second book about the soul, and this is in the demonstration, if you recall, the definition of the soul that the soul is that by which we first sense and understand. So isn't it the same as its powers then?

[5:37] Moreover, everything that is not of the essence of a thing is an accident. If therefore the power of the soul is of something besides its nature, its essence, it follows that it be an accident. And now another strange quote from Augustine, which is against Augustine, the ninth book of the Trinity, where he says that the foresaid. Are not in the soul as in a subject, as color or figure in the body, or any other quality or quantity.

[6:11] For whatever is such does not excel or exceed the subject in which it is. But the mind is also able to what love other things and to know other things. Again, Augustine's way of speaking there is a little difficult, right?

[6:33] Moreover, as Boethius says, a simple form cannot be a subject, but the soul is a simple subject, since it is not composed from matter and form, as has been said above. Therefore, the power of the soul there cannot be a power of the soul in the soul as in a what subject.

[6:59] Moreover, an accident is not the what principle of a substantial difference. Essential difference, but sensible and rational are substantial difference, differences, and are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore, the powers of the soul are not accidents, and thus it seems that the power of the soul is its essence. So we sometimes define man as an animal that has what reason, right? Well, man is what he is through his soul.

[7:31] So his soul must be his reason, right? That's what the objection is saying, huh? Okay, so it's unusual to have that many objections, right? Yeah. But against this is what Dionysius says in the eleventh chapter of the celestial hierarchy, that the celestial spirits, meaning the angels, are divided into what essence, virtutem, which means power, there, right? In operation, huh? So the nature of the angel and his power and the activity that he has are not the same thing.

[8:13] Well, much more therefore would it be true of the soul that these three are not the same thing? That other is the essence, other the power, and operation too. But consider the first two here, of course, and this one.

[8:33] Now Thomas says, "I answer: It should be said that it is impossible, impossibile est, to say that the essence of the soul is its power, although some say this.

[8:53] And this can be shown in two ways, as far as the present intention is concerned, huh? Now notice the first argument here. First, because ability and act divide being, huh? Now, when we study wisdom, we'll find out that there are two main divisions of being, huh? And being in things, and one is the division according to the figures of predication, and that's the division of being into substance, quantity, quality, relation, and so on.

[9:31] And the other is the division of being into act and ability. Okay, and these two divisions can kind of crisscross, right? Because in every genus, like substance or quantity or quality, you can talk about ability and act. I'm actually five foot ten, at least I used to be. If I'm not shrinking in my old age, huh? But before I was actually five foot ten, I was able to be five foot ten, right?

[10:04] I'm also a logician. But I was able to be a logician before I was actually a logician, huh? I'm also a father, right? But I was able to be a father before I was actually a father. So you have ability and act in every what genus, huh? And they correspond to each other, huh? So the ability for

[10:30] one activity corresponds to that activity. The ability to see to the ability to hear, right? To see, rather, the ability to hear to hearing, huh? The ability to be five foot ten to that. Okay.

[10:47] So he says to go back to the whole sentence here. Since ability and act, potency and act, ability and act, divide being, and each genus of being, it is necessary that act and ability be referred to the same genus. And therefore, if the act is not in the genus of substance, then the potency or ability for that act, which is said to that act, cannot be in the genus of what substance, huh?

[11:20] But the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance. So my understanding is not what I am, is it? No. My loving is not what I am. My walking is not what I am, right? And my seeing or my hearing or my smelling, huh? Okay. But only in God, huh? Is the substance of a thing and what it does the same thing, huh? So in God, there's no difference between God and His understanding or His love.

[11:57] So Saint John could say God is love, right? You could say God is understanding, but you couldn't say that I am understanding or I am love, even though I might understand something and love something, right?

[12:14] So only in God, huh? God alone is the operation His substance, huh? That's one of the things we show. We take up the operation of God, huh? Incidentally, when we know God from creatures, huh? The substance of the creature and its operation not the same thing. And so when you come to talk about the substance and the operation of God, we have two thoughts, because we start from the creature, huh?

[12:46] When you get to God, they correspond to one thing, huh? So we have two thoughts about the one thing. Okay. That's why you compare it sometimes, you know, to a circle, huh? Same. And what's one in God? Is what many in the what creatures, right? And so the end point of this line here on the circumference, and this line here, and this line here, the end points are really different, aren't they?

[13:20] But the point at the other end is one and the same for all of these, huh? But if you are coming to know that point in the center from the circumference, you might say, well, it's the end of this line, right? It's also the end of this line. See, you have two thoughts about it, right? It's the end of that line, and it's the end of that line.

[13:44] But then you realize it's one and the same point. point at the end of both, right? And so when you start from the substance of God and the operation of God, huh? You come back. You have two thoughts, but you have to negate the distinction that you have in creatures, huh? And so eventually you'll say the substance of God, what He is, and His understanding and His loving are the same thing, huh?

[14:09] The same way in us, huh? The understanding and the what loving are different acts, huh? But in God you don't have any composition, you don't have multiplicity of acts, huh? But We have two thoughts about the one God, huh?

[14:36] So he says the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance, but in God alone whose operation is His substance. Whence the power of God, which is understood as the principle of His operation, would be the very same thing as the divine what essence, huh? Because His operation is His essence, which is not able to be true neither in the soul nor in any other creature, not even in the angel, as has been shown above when we spoke about the what angel, huh?

[15:14] As we can recall it already. Do you see that idea then? He's saying that ability and act are relative to each other, huh? And if one is in the genus of substance, then the other could be the genus of substance, right? But if one is in another genus, then the other has to be in another genus, huh? And so since the operation of man, the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance, right?

[15:44] Then the ability, which is proportioned to that, is not going to be the genus of substance. But it's going to be in the category of quality, huh? The second species, huh?

[15:59] Second, he says this also appears to be impossible in the soul, huh? For the soul, by its very nature, is an act. That was in the very definition of the soul. It's the first act of an actual body composed of tools. If, therefore, the nature of the soul, the essence of the soul, was the immediate principle of operation, the soul would what?

[16:30] The soul always what has a soul and act would have the operations of life. Just as always, what has a soul and act is alive.

[16:46] For insofar as it is a form, it is not an act ordered to a further act, but it is the what last end of generation.

[16:58] Whence that it be in potency to another act, this does not belong to it. According to its very essence, because it's a what? It's a form. It's an act by its very nature. So, as soul, as form, as act, it's not ordered to what? A further act, huh? Because act, as such, is related now not to what? A further act, but if anything, to ability, right? Okay. So the soul, insofar as it's an act, is not going to be an ability to something.

[17:34] That's contrary to what an act is. And therefore, the soul itself, according as it is subject in some way to power, is said to be a first act, huh? Ordered to a second act.

[17:52] But we find that what has a soul is not always in the act of the operations of life. Whence also in the definition of the soul it is said that it is the act of a body having life in potency, meaning the operations of life in potency, huh? Which potency is not what? Excluding the soul from being in the body. It remains, therefore, that the essence of the soul is not its power.

[18:23] Again, he summarizes the argument there. For nothing is in potency according to act insofar as it is an act, huh? So it's not the soul insofar as it is soul that is an ability, because then an act insofar as it's an act would be a what? An ability. That seems like a what? Contradiction, huh? This is one of those subtle questions that Aristotle doesn't investigate, right? In the soul, huh?

[18:57] So any question about those two arguments? When it talks about that which has a soul, not always having an act, operations of life. Yeah. That's sort of the sense of like you know someone's sleeping. Those trees out there, yeah, they're not going to have the operations of life for a while, right? Oh, okay, yeah. But those trees are not dead, right? They still have the. Okay. Yeah.

[19:19] That's what makes them to be a tree, right? Yeah. Okay. And of course, when you and I are asleep, we're almost like we're dead, huh? Yeah. Sleep, thou ape of death.

[19:31] Shakespeare's always comparing sleep to death, huh? Yeah. Okay. So, two arguments then, right, huh? One is that ability and act act should be in the same genus. So, if the act called operation is not in the genus of what substance, only in God is the operation of substance, well then the ability for that act is going to be not in the genus of substance. Those are relative to each other, huh?

[20:04] And the other reason is that the soul, being an act, As such is not an ability. Act as such is not an ability. And so the ability has got to be something other than the soul itself. It's something added, huh? Something that's an accident, and therefore an accident is a second species of quality, huh? Now as you apply to Augustine's, they're going to be kind of difficult here, but let's look at what Thomas says here anyway.

[20:38] What did Augustine mean when he said that knowledge and love are substantially in the soul or essentially? Do you mean that the very substance of the soul, the very essence or nature of the soul, was its knowledge and love? Well, Thomas says no, that's not what Augustine meant. To the first, it should be said that Augustine speaks about the mind according as it knows itself and what loves itself, huh?

[21:09] Now, of course, he's trying to what develop the understanding of the image of the Trinity in us, huh? Okay. And of course, when we speak of of God the Son as the Word of God, we mean God what understands himself, right? In understanding himself, there proceeds a thought, and this is the the word, huh? And then, in knowing himself, he what loves himself, right? And then there proceeds the Holy Spirit by way of love, huh?

[21:45] So Augustine speaks about the mind according as it knows itself and loves itself, right? Thus, therefore, knowledge and love, in so far as they refer to the soul itself, now not as a subject but as a what object, right? They refer to the soul itself as known and loved, huh? Then they can be said to be what substantially or essentially in the soul. Why? Because the very substance or essence of the soul is what known and loved, right?

[22:23] So Augustine's way of speaking there could be misunderstood, right? He's saying that what you're knowing and loving in this case is the substance of the soul, huh? And therefore, um, it's kind of could be misleading to say that therefore the knowing and the loving is in the substance of the soul, right? Okay, but that's what you're knowing and loving is the substance of the soul.

[22:51] And likewise, one should understand what he says elsewhere that there is one life, one mind, one essence. Okay, that's one way he has of understanding it. Now, this. is. Difficult to what see right? Now,

[23:09] occasionally, you get these ways of speaking that are hard, even in Scripture. You know, like when it says about Christ, you know, that He's the firstborn of creatures, right? Say, well, He's not a creature, though. You see, and the way of speaking there is difficult, huh? Okay. Now, there's another way of understanding this, and this involves an understanding of a kind of whole that Aristotle doesn't talk about explicitly in the

[23:39] fifth book of Wisdom, but I think he understands, and what's sometimes called the potential whole or the potestative whole, huh And sort of in between two wholes that we do talk about, what we call the composed whole,

[24:05] and what we call the universal whole. Thomas is going to explain it, in this way. perhaps Aristotle doesn't talk about it there explicitly, huh? Doesn't want to confuse you more than necessary, huh?

[24:24] Okay. Yeah. Or, as some say, this way of speaking of Augustine is verified by the way in which a potestative whole is said of its parts, huh? Which is a middle between the universal whole and the integral whole, And, what I call the composed whole. Thomas calls the what integral whole, huh? Okay.

[24:54] Now, remember how we said last time when I distinguish those. Usually, in class, I'll say the composed whole is put together from its parts, huh? But it's not said of its parts, huh? So the chair you're sitting on might be put together from four legs and a seat and a back, but you can't say that a seat is a chair or a back is a chair, right?

[25:20] Huh? It's only all these put together that make up a chair. Okay. But now the universal whole is the reverse, huh? It can be said of each of its parts, but it's not put together from them. So animal can be said of dog and cat and horse and so on, and you can say a dog by itself is an animal, and a cat by itself is an animal, and a horse is, huh?

[25:53] So he says the universal whole is present to each part according to its whole essence and power. As animal to man and to horse and to cat and dog and so on,

[26:09] and therefore properly it is said of what each of the parts. So we can say properly that a dog is an animal, right? A cat is animal. But the integral whole is not in each part, is it? The whole chair is not in the seat. Neither according to its whole what nature, right? The whole nature of the chair is not in each. Nor according to all of its what power, right?

[26:41] Perfection. And therefore, For in no way is it said of of each part, huh? And if you were to say it in some way, it would be said what improperly, right? It might be said about all of them together. It would be said that the what the roof and the wall and the foundation of the house. Okay, but not each one of them individually, right? Only? the whole? huh

[27:09] So um that's like that's like those figures of speech, metonymy Yeah, yeah, but I mean, just in a kind of proper speaking, okay? Now he says, why do we say that the potential whole is in between those two? Well, it's present to each of its parts according to its own nature, but not according to its whole power, and therefore, in a way, it is said of each part, but not so properly as universal whole.

[27:41] And in this way, Augustine says that memory, intelligence, and the will are the one what essence of the soul. So the soul is present in each one of its powers, right? But not according to all its powers, huh?

[27:58] So this is a little different explanation of these what kind of difficult way that Augustine has. You know, there's a way of speaking that the other great doctor does, Hilary. You know, Hilary of Poitiers. He has a famous book on the Trinity, and Thomas quotes it. And one place where Hilary says the Father is greater than the Son by his what dignity as Father, right? But the Son is not less for this reason, huh?

[28:35] Well, that's a little bit strange. It seems to me because if you say he's more than the correlative, that is is less, right? You say, but the Father has the dignity of being what the Father, right? Which the Son doesn't have. So he's more in that sense, but the Son is not less because the Father has that dignity. I think that's a little strange the way of speaking, huh?

[28:58] You know, and you have to kind of understand that that way of speaking, but Thomas just says false, but it seems to be a little strained, difficult to to use words in that way, huh? Okay.

[29:23] So notice, like we were saying before, the the soul is found in what each part of the body, right? In that sense, the essence of the soul is found there, but not all of its powers found in each part, huh? So the ability to walk is not found in my eye, and the ability to see is not found in my my leg, right? So the soul, in its essence, is present, but not in all of its what power, right?

[29:52] In the case of the universal predication, like animal, the whole essence of what an animal is, a living body of sensation, is found in dog. It's also found in cat, and according to its whole power of what being able to sense is found in dog and cat and so on. Okay.

[30:14] So this potential whole can in a way be said of its parts, right? So it's difficult, huh? Difficult that that distinction, huh? Yeah. See, sometimes they'll speak of the soul as being a potential whole. You divide it into the human soul and the animal soul, and the the feeding soul, huh? The plant soul. Because the human soul has the full power, you might say, of the soul, right?

[30:49] And the animal has some, but not as much as man does. Doesn't have understanding and will, and the plant has even what less, huh? Okay. And some people, when they divide up friendship, they'll say that, huh? That the the perfect friendship has the full power of friendship. The friendship of pleasure has something, but not everything, huh? And the useful friendship has even what? Even less, huh?

[31:22] That's kind of a hard notion, huh? You can see why Aristotle doesn't bring it up in the fifth book of wisdom, huh? But he does seem to speak, you know, in terms of what we call potential whole. But Thomas, a number of places there, will make that kind of whole distinct, huh?

[31:40] Now, the second objection. Just look at for a second again. The soul is more noble than first matter, but first matter is its power, therefore much more of the soul.

[31:53] Now, but notice, huh? The second ought to be said that the act to which first matter is in power is substantial form, and therefore the potency of matter is not other than its essence, huh? Notice what he's saying, huh? The power of first matter, which is first matter, is in the genus of substance, huh? First matter is what substance and ability, and through the substantial form, it's an actual substance.

[32:27] So, as we said in the in the body of the article, act and ability are in the same genus, huh? And so, when you say first matter is its is is its ability, right? You're talking about ability that's in the same genus as matter. But if you said that the soul was its own what ability, right, to understand or its own ability to will, then you'd be saying that what they're in the same genus, huh?

[32:55] And therefore, understanding and willing would be in the same genus as the soul itself. In substance, but they're not. That's why the soul can't be its own ability.

[33:08] But matter, the first matter, can be its own ability, because its ability is in the same genus. Its substance in ability, and the act in which it is an actual substance is also the genus of substance. So you're talking about matter and form in the genus of substance there. When you talk about operation and whatever the ability is for operation, they're not in the same genus as the soul.

[33:37] The soul is in the genus of substance, and the operation is not in the genus of substance. Only in God are they the same. So the ability can't be in the genus of what substance, huh? The ability for operation, that is to say, right? So that's the idea that ability and act are relative to each other, right? And they divide each genus, but the ability and act in that genus are are what are being put together, huh?

[34:09] Not the ability in one genus and the act in another genus. Okay. A third objection: the substantial form is more simple than the accidental form. form. A sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified or diminished, huh? It doesn't, neither more nor less, huh? But it consists in something indivisible. In that sense, we're all what created equal, right? One of us is not more a man than another.

[34:45] You're taking man in substantial sense, right? You're taking man in sense of being courageous, right? Well, that's something you can have more or less of, right? So one man is more a man than another in the sense of being courageous, right? But that's not man in the genus of substance, is it? In the genus of substance, one man is not more man than another. Even if one man is what taller or shorter than another man, he's not more man, huh?

[35:16] Than the what other, right? But accidental form is its own power, right? Therefore, much more substantial form, which is a soul. That's like the second argument, right? Except now you're dealing with a what accidental form like this what quality called power, right? And that's relative to what a quality or disposition, which is the act of understanding or the act of the will, huh?

[35:52] So he says, I to the third, it should be said that action is of the composed thing, just as being, for it belongs to the thing to exist that exists to act.

[36:06] But through the but the composed through its substantial form has existence substantially. But through the power which follows upon the substantial form and operates,

[36:22] whence thus has itself the accidental form, the active accidental form, to the what substantial form of the agent, as in the old physics, right? As heat is to the what substantial form of fire, so has the power of the soul to the what soul.

[36:44] Be the same as light to fire, heat. Heat to the fire, yeah. Would it be the same as light? Perhaps, yeah, yeah, yeah. But heat is maybe a better, simpler example. Okay. Okay.

[37:03] I don't know if he didn't say it explicitly. here. But it seems to be in a way you've got something like to reply to the second objection, because you have now an ability that is in the genus of what quality, and that ability, right, is for the act. It is also in that genus, huh? Yeah.

[37:27] Okay. Hmm. Okay. But notice in a sense of proportion there, he's saying in a sense that the just as through the substantial form you have existence in a substantial way, so likewise through the what accidental form that follows upon the substantial form, you have some kind of what operation, right, through the ability to understand.

[38:10] Now the fourth objection was based upon what we saw in the Deanima, that the soul was said to be that by which we first sense and live, sense, understand, and so on. Okay. Now Thomas is going to solve that simply by saying you've got the immediate principle, right, and the remote one. To the fourth, it should be said, huh, that that

[38:40] the accidental form, this very thing, that the accidental form is a principle of action, it has from the substantial form. Okay. That's why later on you get down to that. What is it? The sixth article, he'll be talking about how the powers of the soul flow from the what essence of the soul,

[39:04] and therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action, but not the what proximate one. And according to this, the philosopher says that that by which, and actually in my text here now, when he quotes the thing again, he leaves out the word first, but it should be in there, right? The philosopher says that the soul is that by which we first sense and understand, huh?

[39:32] Okay. But not whereby we sense, understand in an immediate way, huh? That's by the ability to see and the ability to understand, huh? Okay. So do I understand by my reason, or do I understand by my what soul? We could say both, right? Yeah. Yeah. I understand because first of all, because I have a soul, right? But immediate sense because the soul has the ability to what understand, right?

[40:03] You see that? Hmm. The first reason why I have. The ability to understand is because I have a human soul. If I had a dog soul or a tree soul, I wouldn't have that ability, right? Okay. But in immediate sense, I do this because of my what? Reason. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay.

[40:31] Yeah, that's not an impossible distinction to understand, is it? Yeah, makes sense. Suppose I teach geometry, right? When I teach geometry, take a little different example right now. By my reason or by the art of geometry and my reason, what would I teach you geometry by? Well, it's both. Yeah. And you could say what? By teaching you geometry, it's more proximate to it the knowledge of geometry that I have in my reason, right?

[41:01] Yeah. But you could also say it's by my reason that I would teach you, right? Mm-hmm. The one would be more proximate, huh? You see that? Mm-hmm. Yeah.

[41:16] So it's likewise by my soul that I understand. Mm-hmm. My understanding soul, as Shakespeare calls it, huh? But in proximate sense, I understand by that ability that the soul has to understand, huh? Yeah.

[41:34] Look, Shakespeare, there when Hamlet is saying why he chose Horatio as a friend, huh? Since my dear soul, he says, was mistress of her choice, huh? And could have been distinguished, huh? Her election has sealed thee for herself, huh? So he's chosen Horatio as his friend by his what? Will, right? Right. Now he's very precise there when he says that Shakespeare, because the will is not in the body.

[42:08] Okay. So it's by your soul that you actually make a choice. But it's also by your will that you make a choice, huh? But the will would be the what? Proximate source, huh?

[42:30] So my soul, by by its reason, understands, and by its will, it chooses. Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice. Now the fifth argument here.

[42:55] Again, it has one of these strange quotes from Augustine. First, everything that is not of the essence of the thing is an accident. If therefore the power of the soul is apart from its essence,

[43:11] it would follow that it's an accident, which is against Augustine, the ninth book about the Trinity, where he says that the faculties said are not in the soul as in a subject, as color or figure in the body or any other quality or quantity, because whatever is such does not exceed the subject in which it is, but the mind does exceed the subject in which it is because it can love other things and what, know them right.

[43:37] It reminds a little bit what Aristotle said after he got through with the sensing and understanding and understanding in the De Anima. He says the soul is in some way what, all things right, because it can what sense all things and material sensible things and understand all things to some extent, and so it has them all in them. That's a little bit the way Augustine is speaking here in a sense.

[44:04] Thomas makes an interesting distinction here, and if you recall, this is logic. To the fifth, it ought to be said that if accident is divided according is taken rather the word accident according as is divided against substance, then nothing can be a middle between substance and accident. Why? Because they are divided or distinguished by affirmation negation. Because a substance is a thing that exists right, not in another as in a subject right, and accident is something that exists in a subject.

[44:42] So it got to be one or the other right, either you exist in a subject right or you don't. Okay. And in this way, since the power of the soul is not its essence, is necessary that it be an accident right, and thus it is in the second species of quality. If you go back to Aristotle's categories, the first species of quality was habit or disposition, like health is a quality of the body right, or virtue of the soul and so on.

[45:18] The second species of quality was inborn power right, ability. Third species of quality was the sense qualities like red and yellow, hot and cold, and the fourth species of quality was what figure shape right. Thomas in the Prima Secundae, there he explains the order of those four right. Okay. Anyway, it's in the second species of quality.

[45:48] If, however, one takes accident according as it is laid down to be one of the five universals, now he's going back to Porphyry right, genus, species, difference, property, accident. And accident has a different meaning there. See, because a property. As Porphyry uses the word "property," could be an accident in the first sense. huh? Now remember the Father Henri de Lac, who taught logic there, went to Laval.

[46:15] He taught logic. He and his friend, Father Baumgartner—I don't know if you knew of Baumgartner—he was rector of the seminary there. But they both went to Laval, right? And they both wrote their doctoral theses in logic, right? And so Father de Lac used to teach the logic course, and he says, you know, after he teaches so many years, you know, he despair after a while that students will ever see the difference between those two meanings of accident.

[46:43] There's some things, you know. I mean, you can talk to your blue in the face, and the students are just not going to get it, you know, or most of them won't get it, right? And

[46:57] okay, if one takes accident according as it is what laid down one of the five universals. Thus, there is something in between. Substance and accident, huh? Now, you see, when you make the distinction there of between genus and difference and species on the one hand, and property and accident, right? The first three are signifying something inside the nature of a thing, what it is, inside its essence or substance, right?

[47:30] Property and accident are both signifying something outside the nature of the thing, outside of what it is, huh? But the difference between them, right, is that the accident has no connection with the nature, while the property is connected with the nature and follows upon the nature, like an effect of the nature. Okay. Remember that. Yeah. So when Porphyry defines accident, there is something that be present or absent, right?

[48:04] With the same nature of the thing, while property in the strictest sense is something that belongs to only one species, to every member of that species, and always. So it can't just be present or absent. Okay.

[48:21] Ah. So in that sense, there's something in between substance and accident, huh? Because to the substance pertains whatever is essential to the thing, whatever pertains to what it is. But not everything, right, which is outside the essence, can be said in this way to be an accident. But only that which is not caused from the essential principles of species. The proprium, which we translate in English as a property, is not of the essence of the thing, but it is caused, right, from the essential principles of the species.

[49:02] Hence, it is a middle between the essence and accident, as said in the way Porphyry saying it. And in this way, the powers of the soul can be said to be in between its substance and accident, as if they are what natural properties of the soul, huh? Okay. So notice, huh? If I say the triangle is green,

[49:33] Does green signify anything in the nature of triangle? No. It's outside the nature triangle, right? Does it have any connection with the nature of triangle? No. No. So you can never reason out or think out that triangle is green. Right. If you if a triangle was green, you'd know it only by sensation. Mm-hmm. But you wouldn't see by knowing the nature of triangle, it's a three-sided plane figure, you wouldn't see any connection between that and being green, huh?

[50:06] But now if you say the triangle has interior angles equal to two right angles. Is that what a triangle is? No, no. It's something outside the nature of what a triangle is, but something that follows upon right a triangle that it has what three angles equal to two right angles. And you can actually, if you've studied, you know, Euclid, you can actually prove, right? You can reason from what a triangle is to its having this what property, right?

[50:53] Euclid, what he says, extend the side of a triangle, and then you draw a line parallel to the opposite one, right? Then by the parallel theorem, you know these two angles are what? Excuse me, these two are equal, right? And then the alternate angles equal these two. So, and the third angle has up to two right angles, right? Or sometimes if they do it separately, this here shows exterior angles with two opposite ones.

[51:24] Do like that. Those equal, and these two equal. The third one makes two right angles. So you can actually reason out from what a triangle is that the interior angles equal two right angles. But you never reason out that it's green, huh? Okay.

[51:47] So, with the triangle is green, would that be an accident? Yeah, this is this is what we call a predicable accident, right? Accident now not as opposed to substance, but accident as opposed to what property? This would be a property, huh? Okay.

[52:07] Now the property doesn't have to be in the same genus, huh? And probably will not be, right? Let's take a very simple example of a property here. Two is half of four.

[52:26] Now, is half of four signify something inside the nature of two? Let's stop and think. Two is a number, isn't it? Right. Okay. The number is in the category of what quantity, huh? The second genus. Half of four. Half is what? Is that a number? Is half a number? It's a what you call a relation. It's a relation, yeah. It's towards something, right? Yeah. Okay. Okay. It's a relation.

[53:12] Relation is not a number, isn't it? So these are going to be in different categories, huh? Okay. Two is in the second category of quantity, and half of four would be in the what? Fourth category, right? Which is Aristotle calls it pros ti, towards something, right? Adaequatum translated to Latin, huh? Towards something, right? But sometimes they use the abstract word relation. Okay. I mentioned how in the Gospel Saint John, how the word is actually Greek said to be what?

[53:48] Towards the Father, towards God, huh? Which fits in very well with the distinction of the Trinity there on the basis of the relations. But notice here, you have a little bit like what you have here in the case of the soul and its powers, right?

[54:09] You know, if I, if Socrates asked me what is two, and I said two is half of four, well, Socrates would ask me the same question he asked Euthyphro. Is it two because it's half of four? Or is it half of four because it is two? Half of four because it is two. Yeah. But this is really a cause of that, right? Yeah.

[54:35] And you can see the arbitrariness of saying two is two because it's half of four. Why isn't it two because it's a third of what? Six. Or because it's a fourth of eight, or a fifth of ten, right? Well, those are relations that belong to two and that follow upon what two is. What makes two to be two is that second what? One.

[55:06] You add one to one and you got what? Two, right? Okay. And there's a relation that follows upon that. So the powers of the soul will they be like to the soul like green is to triangle, or like has right angles, you have right angles, is to triangle.

[55:31] Hmm. Or just a few simple examples here. Will the soul's powers be to the soul as green is to triangle, or like half of four is to two?

[55:45] Half of four. Yeah, yeah. It would be something in another genus, right? But it follows upon the first, right? In this case, two is in the genus quantity, and the species of number, right? Discrete quantity. Half of four is in the category of what? Relation, right? Now, in the case of the soul, let's say the ability to choose, ability to understand,

[56:21] the soul is in the genus not of quantity, but in the soul in the genus of what? Substance, huh? It's a substantial form. The ability to understand is in the genus of what? Quality, right? Huh? So in this case here, you have a quality following upon a substance. In this case here, you have a relation following upon a number, or generally speaking, a quantity, right? So you have things in different genera, and therefore they can't.

[57:00] What's another genus can't signify something inside? the nature of the thing, that's in another genus, can it? No. Um. So a relation cannot signify what a quantity is, and a quality cannot signify what a substance is, but it can follow upon that as an effect follows upon a cause. Follow upon the nature of it, huh? Okay. That's what he's saying. Where it flows from, right? Huh? You know.

[57:35] You make it two; it flows from two to be half a four, third is six, and the other such things, huh? What Augustine says, Augustine, that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject should be understood in the foresaid way, huh? Going back to the what response to the first objection. Insofar as he's comparing them, right, to the soul, not as to the one loving and knowing, because then they would be in the soul as a what subject, right?

[58:28] But insofar as they compare to it as the loved and the what known, right? And in this way, his proof proceeds, because if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, right,

[58:56] then it would follow that the accident transcended its subject, right? Why? Because the other things are loved by the soul too, such as God or your neighbor or something of that sort. Do you see that? Well, I mean, again, the way of speaking is a little bit confused, but but if you're talking about what knowledge and love in comparison to the soul, well, how is is knowledge and love related to the soul, right?

[59:30] Right. See. Well, you can say that the soul knows and loves, right? Right. And then you're seeing the knowledge and the love as being in the soul as in a subject, right? Okay. And they're in the soul and only in the soul, right? They're not in God. They're not in your neighbor, are they? Right. Okay. But you can also look at knowledge and love and say, well, they have another relation to the soul.

[59:57] The soul can be known, and the soul can be what loved, but here it's not limited to the soul, is it? Because I can love God. I can love my guardian angel. I can love my neighbor, right? I guess my guardian angel is my neighbor, maybe, but you see what I mean? I can know and love something else. Notice that distinction we made before. Just a little different context here, but remember that

[1:00:37] amphibolies fond of, you know. I teach a course called the Philosophy of Nature, but I kind of like Shakespeare's name—I mean Shakespeare's name for the Philosophy of Nature. He calls it the wisdom of nature, and I kind of like that. Whether Augustin, the wisdom of nature, or you know Shakespeare, because you could say that this phrase "wisdom of nature" has two meanings. It could refer to the philosophy of nature, right?

[1:01:14] It could also refer to what the philosophy of nature is about. So the wisdom of nature, in one sense, is about the wisdom of nature. In another sense,

[1:01:31] the wisdom of nature, in the sense of the philosophy of nature, right, is about the wisdom that nature shows in what it does, which is really due to God's wisdom, huh? Aristotle's in the biological works, right, and he's studying the way animals are put together and the way their parts are arranged, huh? And he speaks of what appreciating the mind that designed these things, right? Says appreciating the divine mind through what seeing the marvelous order of the things the divine mind is what made, huh?

[1:02:07] You see why I might admire Shakespeare's mind or Mozart's mind or Thomas's mind for the book or the play or the piece of music that they wrote, huh? Okay. Now, another one of my favorites, as you know, is is the phrase "word of God."

[1:02:28] Okay, the word of God has more than one meaning, huh? And you could make a sophistical argument by mixing up the two meanings, huh? I could say what

[1:02:42] the Son of God is the Word of God, and the Word of God is the Bible. Therefore, the Son of God is the Bible.

[1:02:52] What's wrong there? You made a jump there, isn't that correct? Well, no, I mean I made a mistake in my thinking there, huh? You can say truly that the Son of God is the Word of God, right? Okay, we learned that in St. John, huh? We're also told other places that the word of God is the Bible, right? That's why the Constitution there in the Vatican II is called the Word of God, okay?

[1:03:23] So, I have two different meanings here of Word of God, right? In one case, the Word of God means the Son of God. In the other case, it means the Bible, right? But there's actually a connection between the two, because the Word of God, in one sense, meaning the Bible, is chiefly about the Word of God. In the other sense, huh? And it's very beautiful the way the Vatican II develops that, right?

[1:03:49] Because they'll go to the fact that the Son of God, Word of God, in that sense, became flesh, right? In the Word of God, the sense of the Bible becomes flesh. It takes on human language and expresses things in a kind of human way, and so it fits in the sense what it's about. That's a beautiful language that they have there in Vatican II, huh?

[1:04:15] So, you could say that the Word of God, in one sense, is about the Word of God. In another sense, the wisdom of nature, in one sense, is. about.