De Anima (On the Soul)
89. Q.77 a.3: Powers Distinguished by Acts and Objects; Active vs. Passive Ability
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[0:00] the third article, which is involved in things that we saw very explicitly, Aristotle, and then we'll try to look at the fourth article too. That there's an order among the powers, huh? In the name of the Father, the Son, and the, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, and help us to understand what you have written.

[0:39] In the. Name of the Father, the Son, and the, Holy Spirit, Amen. So, we're in this general question on the powers of the soul, and now in question seventy-seven, article three, something we learned in Aristotle that the powers or abilities of the soul are distinguished by their acts, the differences in their acts, and the acts are distinguished by their objects.

[1:14] So that's what this article, first article, is about. Then we take a little break and then do the fourth article. Okay, try to do two articles each time and then take a little break. An logical place to take it, huh?

[1:32] To the third, one proceeds thus. It seems that the powers, you can translate, potential powers or abilities, are not distinguished by their acts and their objects, for nothing is determined to its species, its particular kind of thing it is, through that which is what posterior or afterwards, after the thing, or which is extrinsic to it, huh? But the act is after the ability, huh?

[2:13] The object is, however, extrinsic, huh? Therefore, through these two things, the acts and the objects, the powers are not distinguished. Now we can say, secundum speciem huh according to the species, according to the species, according to the particular kind of thing they are, right? Okay, The species name is a particular kind of thing, and genus names a what? General kind of thing, huh?

[2:45] Moreover, he says the second objection: contraries are what differ most of all. So he sometimes defines contraries as the species furthest apart in the same genus. So in the genus of color, right? The contraries are black and white. But are furthest apart.

[3:13] Happened to be talking about that in natural philosophy today, and so I said, "Every woman is beautiful. Some women are beautiful. Some women are not beautiful. No woman is beautiful. Which statements are contraries? The first and last. Yeah. See, so the one who says every woman is beautiful, one says no woman is beautiful. They're far as far as you can be, right? That's what the idea of contraries is.

[3:47] If, therefore, the powers are distinguished by their objects or according to their objects, it would follow that there would not be the same power of contraries, the same ability for contraries. That would seem to be the greatest difference you could have, right? Which is clearly false, almost in all cases. For example, the knowing power is the same knowing power for knowing both what white and black, which are contraries, and taste the same for the sweet and the what?

[4:25] Sour. Bitter. Bitter. Yeah, yeah. It's kind of interesting, you know, because Socrates in the dialogue called the Protagoras, right? He wants to reason from the proposition or the statement that something is only one contrary, and of course sometimes people want to say there's two contraries to sweet, sour and bitter, but really I think it's bitter that's a contrary, what's furthest apart from from sweet. Right. See, but sour is maybe next to bitter, so.

[5:00] But it's not really the the contrary. So that's interesting objection. Moreover, the cause being removed, the effect is removed. If, therefore, the difference of powers was from the difference of objects, the same object would not be able to pertain to diverse powers. But this is clearly what false. For the same thing is known by the knowing power and desired by the what? Desiring power. Of course, remember Aristotle talking about how what is the mover in animals, and how you're moved by knowledge and by desire.

[5:58] But then he kind of reduces them to one, because the thing known is desired. So this is taking that kind of thing. Where I smell the good food, right, and I desire that food, then, right? So it's the same object that I smelled and that I desired. So

[6:24] if a difference of objects gives a difference of power, the same object should give you the same what power, right? But obviously, the ability to sense and the ability to desire are not the same what power, huh? Interesting objection, huh?

[6:47] Moreover, that which is per se, huh, as such, that causes something in all things causes that same thing. But some diverse objects, right, which pertain to diverse powers, belong also to some one power, as for example, sound and what color. They belong or pertain to two different sense powers, to sight and to sense of hearing, which are diverse powers, and nevertheless they belong to one power, the common or the central sense, huh?

[7:27] And you remember that from the De Anima huh Aristotle, in the, beginning of the third book. There he argues that we sense not only the difference between, let's say, white and black, or between sweet and bitter, but we sense the difference between white and sweet. But the eye can't do that because it doesn't know both, right? The eye knows white but doesn't know sweet, and the sense of taste knows sweet but doesn't know white.

[7:56] And therefore, there must be a what internal sense, huh? Where the private senses, the outward senses, come back to a common center. He calls that the common sense, huh? I sometimes call it the central sense because of the equivocation there of common sense in English, huh? Um, and incidentally, that was a good example of how sometimes what we know by inward experience and what we know by outward experience is the same thing, huh?

[8:33] We might know by inward experience that we sense not only the difference between white and black or between sweet and bitter, but we sense the difference between white and sweet, and therefore we know they come back to a common center. But maybe when they, you know, do anatomy or something like that, right? They might find that the outward senses come back to a common center, huh? And then you'd know by outward experience what you know by what inward experience, huh?

[9:01] That the outward senses are joined to the inward to a common center, huh? But there are some things, right? We know by outward experience. We don't know by inward experience. Like when we map the parts of the brain or something of that sort, or attempt to map the parts of the brain, it's very confusing. But other things we might know only by inward experience. If, for example, our reason and our will are not bodies, we'll never know them except by what inward experience.

[9:35] I never find a choice as you cut up the brain. There's oh, there's a choice. I cut into a choice there. Well, choice is something, an act that is not in the body. And if understanding is an act that's not in the body, like we have reasoned before and we reason again here, when you come to take up those things, then they are known only by what inward experience.

[10:01] But it shouldn't shock you necessarily that something can be known in diverse ways by two different things. We're just reading a fragment today in class. There from Empedocles, he's talking about the road from the senses into reason, but he singles out the sense of sight and the sense of touch. And the sense of sight, among all the senses, has a certain clarity that none of the other senses have.

[10:32] So it has some excellence over the other senses, whereby we might mention that sense in particular. But the sense of, and it's the sense of distance, but the sense of sight, much more distant than sound is. All of our astronomy is based upon eyesight in a way. But the sense of touch excels the other senses in terms of certitude. And for a Christian, we always take the example of the doubting Thomas.

[11:00] Unless I put my finger in his sides, he's not going to believe. And sometimes the apostles are in doubt. Are they seeing a ghost? And the Christ, you know, will eat, and you know, you can feel that he has flesh and blood, right? And so you're more sure about that. But those two senses together have an excellence that none of the other senses have too, because they're the only senses whereby we know the shape of an object.

[11:28] So I can see the shape of this glass, and I could, just feeling it, know the shape. But hearing and smell and taste don't know. Taste, insofar as it is touch, yeah, but not just the taste doesn't tell you that. And notice how important the shape of an object is for knowing it. When we identify most things in the world around us, more by their shape than by their what?

[11:55] Color. And this desk might have the same color as that chair over there, but I know that's a chair and this is a table because of its shape. And you people are just human beings by your shape.

[12:07] Seen in Romeo and Juliet, there you know where Romeo is getting all worked up by, you know, he's lost his reason, and and and Friar Lawrence says, you know, I mean, you got the shape of a man. You know, He's not acting like a man, like a rational animal, you're acting like a beast. huh? But I just mention that because there's some things that sight knows that touch doesn't know.

[12:32] Like touch doesn't know color. I can't feel the color. But other things, like I can feel the coolness of the water here, let's say, and I can't really see the coolness, can I? But then, as far as the shape, both sight and

[12:50] touch know that. And it's like that with inward experience of life and outward. There are some things we know by inward experience that we don't know at all by outward experience of life, and vice versa. But some things maybe we know by both. An example of that is that the outward senses come back to a common what? Center. That's what he's saying here now, huh? In this objection here.

[13:20] Um, here you have two senses distinguished by sound and color, and then you have this other power that knows both of these. So how is this a what basis for distinguishing things, huh? When sometimes the same objects, sound and color, right, lead to a distinction of two powers. Other times they're being known by the same power. What does that do to the claim that it's by their objects we should distinguish these things?

[13:55] So these are interesting. What objections? Objections, yeah. The second objection: there you have objects that are very far apart because they're contraries, huh? And contraries in some way are what are most different, at least in the same genus. So here, contrary objects that that don't distinguish powers, and then you have other ones where you have the same object and yet you have different powers. Because you have the same object being known and being what desired or loved, huh?

[14:34] And yet the the heart and the mind are not the same power. And the same way down here, this other objection, we seem to have both, huh?

[14:46] Now, but against all this, huh, is that posterior things are distinguished by things that are prior or before. But the philosopher, and this is again, antonomasia, right? Capital P meaning Aristotle. But the philosopher says in the second book about the soul that the acts are before the powers, and the what? Ah,

[15:15] yeah, the acts and the operations are before the powers by what? According to reason. yeah, according to definition, you might say, huh? And still further before these are the what? Opposita, right? The objects, huh? Okay.

[15:36] Therefore, the powers are distinguished by their acts and their objects, huh? That's the first part of the article here. We're talking about how three is enough today in philosophy of nature, and I said you'll find very often now how three is enough. This is the way we usually divide the articles of Thomas, don't we? The objections, you know, including the sed contra, and then the body of the article, right?

[16:05] The response, and then the third part, the what? Reply to the objections, huh? Okay. And that's what you have in the question as disputata. You have many more objections, of course, on both sides. Then you have the body of the article, and then the reply to the objections naturally falls into these three, three parts.

[16:32] I answer. It ought to be said that power or ability, according as it is a power ability, is ordered to an act. Now, let's talk a moment on the word potentia. Just, just problems of translation here. The Greek word that potentia translates is dunamis, huh? In Latin you translate that by potentia. Now, in English, we sometimes translate that by the word what? Potentia. Yeah, but sometimes, but in this context, by the term power, right?

[17:18] Okay. So, you often see an English translation. Maybe having some English translations you have before you, the powers of the soul. Isn't that the word they use? Huh? Okay. Now, when you get to studying the word uh, dunamis in Greek or potentia in Latin, in the ninth book of wisdom, Aristotle will distinguish between two kinds of powers. Okay.

[17:54] And one you could call first the ability to act upon another, huh? What you might call the active ability or power, and then the ability to be ac be acted upon, you could say it

[18:30] by another, or you could use instead of be acted upon the ability to undergo, huh? Okay. Now, in Greek, huh? The word for both of these would be dunamis, huh?

[19:00] And the Latin word would be potentia. Now, sometimes in English we translate. dunamis in potentia not by abilities as I have done here, but by the word power that we be having the translation.

[19:21] Now, when Aristotle explains this word ability, he points out that it's a word equivocal by reason, and that there's an order among the meanings. And which do you think is the first meaning of dunamis? What's the first meaning of potentia? Is it the ability to act upon another, or the ability to undergo? Which is it? To act upon. Yeah, yeah.

[19:56] And then it's carried over to the other. But the English word power seems to be stuck on the first meaning. And you can see, in a way, in the English words derived from the Latin or the Greek word, that they have the sense more of the active one. So, dynamis is where you get the word what, dynamic, dynamite.

[20:31] See? And words like potent, huh? You see, a potent medicine is the one that reacts upon you, right? Okay. So you can see in the carryover, the word, the transliteration rather of it in English, that you think of the first sense right away. Yeah. Now the problem I find with translating it by power is that power doesn't seem to have been moved to the second sense at all.

[21:03] Yeah. But I think the English word ability has been to some extent moved, huh? Now the homey example they give in class are these ones. Let's look at this. I said, if Berquist gets into the boxing ring with Cassius Clay, it's not going to last too long. It's probably going to be called fairly shortly by the, you know, referee or a clown. Berquist is not getting any blows in at all.

[21:34] He's just being pummeled by the other guy, and so Berquist seems to be lacking in ability for this sport, huh? And all the ability seems to be in the other guy.

[21:48] But you're thinking now the what? Those the active ones. The Berquist has no ability there for this, huh? But you could say that Berquist is beatable. That Berquist is breakable. That Berquist is bustable, right? You do use the word able there, right? Said of Berquist, huh? But is he able in this sense here? He doesn't get a blow again. See? But he is able by some ability, huh?

[22:25] And there you see kind of the second meaning of ability. Sure. In the same way, when we speak of a building as being what, burnable, huh? Or the dish there is breakable. But what ability is it breakable? By an ability to be acted upon. When I say that the wood is burnable or the house is burnable, I mean it's able to be acted upon by the fire in this way.

[22:54] It's able to undergo something. Yeah. Would an example of this be, let's say, someone who is able to be acted upon is like a student, but as they're open to being acted upon, they can eventually go from two to one and be eventually, you know, able to act upon another. Yeah, yeah. To some extent, that's true. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay, just like like like we're generated now by our parents, but then later on we can generate someone ourselves, right?

[23:22] Okay. Now, I'm not saying yeah, I'm just using the expression of a student who's able to move himself. But at first, you have to be moved by the teacher, but then later on, yeah, okay. So he says a little problem in translation. I mean, it's common. You'll see me sometimes use the word power when I'm reading the translation here. Powers of the soul, but as we'll find out, and as will already be apparent in this body of this article, the powers of the soul some are an ability to act upon something, and some are more an ability to be what acted upon.

[24:07] Okay. And the senses, huh? My eye doesn't act upon the color and colors in this room, but the colors in this room and the lights in this room they act upon my what eye, right? And my ear doesn't act upon the sound, but the sound acts upon my ear, and maybe it would actually what deafen me if I the sounds are too loud. See, the same way when I taste something, if it's strong and hot or something, it kind of overcomes my sense of taste for a while.

[24:45] So, and again, the heart when you study the heart and the ability to desire, it is originally a power that is what acted upon by its object. It's moved by its object. Okay. So sometimes you have to either use the word ability, or else you have to try to extend the word power, which is not lends itself too much there in English. Okay. I think I mentioned that problem again in the translation there in the diagram there when we're studying the word passio in Latin there, and passion means originally like in the passion of our Lord, right?

[25:34] It means suffering. But the word suffering in English, which would be the translation of passio, we speak of the passion of our Lord. Huh? The little you're kind of taking the Latin word over there, and you say passion of our Lord, but the native English word would be what the suffering of our Lord.

[25:53] But then later on in in the Latin word and in the Greek word, how we speak of sensing as being a passio. See, well, then you're dropping part of the original meaning of suffering. You're keeping the idea that you are being acted upon. But you drop the idea that it's something painful and contrary to your what well-being, huh? And then eventually Aristotle says that understanding is an under is a what suffering, right?

[26:24] But again, the English word suffering is stuck on the first meaning, you see. And so you may recall those of you had me talking about those things earlier in the time of studying De Anima, that I sometimes translate it not by the word suffering but by the word undergoing.

[26:45] And it's not quite as striking, maybe, as the Greek word, because undergoing is not as strikingly something bad like suffering is at first, huh? But nevertheless, in English, you can only say that I'm under the weather. You mean that I've been acted upon by the weather in a way that's harmful to me, that that sickened me in some way, huh? And when we say about somebody you know who's had a rough time in life, we say, um,

[27:15] he's undergone an awful lot, right? You mean he's been acted upon in a way that is what? It is bad, right? Huh? To be acted upon, huh? You don't mean that he is what? Seeing all these beautiful paintings there in the National Gallery in London, or he's understood, you know, Thomas Aquinas, right? He's undergone a lot. Yeah. I talked about this one guy who was teaching philosophy there in the University of Colorado, someplace.

[27:44] Remember, brother knew him. He's describing, you know, the look upon the students' face, you know, when you're teaching them. Why are you doing this to me? You know, like you're you're acting upon them in the way that you're torturing them. Yeah. So,

[28:02] so in those two words, huh? In the word suffering, and in the word power, which you use to translate these Greek or Latin words, um, they seem the English word to be stuck on the first meaning, huh? And not move. So sometimes I'll go from suffering to the word undergoing to translate, huh? Because undergoing that word is moved more in English than the word suffering has. And sometimes instead of saying power, I'll say ability, because the word ability there has to some extent been moved in English.

[28:41] At least we do speak of burnable, breakable, beatable, bustable, right? Say corruptable and so on, right? So we do use the word able, right? And by what ability are you able to be to be breakable or burnable, right? Well, it's ability, obviously, in the second sense, right? So it lends itself something to that, huh?

[29:06] Now, also, you can see with the word ability, huh? The first sentence of Thomas, too, huh? That ability, as an ability, is an ability for something, right? And it's an ability for some what? Act, huh? Okay.

[29:27] And as I often say, how do you know that you even have an ability? When you wake up in the morning, how do you know you're able to see? By seeing. Yeah, yeah. Because some people have gone blind, right, in their sleep, and and wake up the next day and they're blind. Terrible thing. So it's only by seeing that you know you had the ability to see.

[30:00] Yeah. You know, sometimes people get you know injured and and their eyes are then covered up with these patches and so on, right? Yeah. And now is the day or time when they're going to take the patch off and see if you can see anything, right? Yeah. And this is a dramatic, you know, tense moment, right? Yes, sir.

[30:19] Okay. So you only know that you have an ability through the act for which it is an ability. So it's the very nature of an ability to be an ability for something, Whence, he says the definition of an ability must be taken from the act to which it is ordered, huh? So you could follow this through. You could say that we know that we have an ability

[30:55] by the act for which it is an ability. That we have that act, and if we distinguish between the ability to walk and the ability to see, it's because walking and seeing are not the same thing, right? And one doesn't come under the other, huh? And of course, you have to distinguish things to begin to define them. So the ratio, the definition of the thing, is through what the act for which it is an ability.

[31:24] I know I have the ability to walk because I walk, right? And you know I have the ability to walk. because You see me walking, huh? You know someone has the ability to play the piano because you see them or hear them playing the piano.

[31:41] You distinguish their ability to play the piano from their ability to walk, right? By the difference between playing the piano and walking, huh? Hence,

[31:58] that's what Aristotle's saying. That therefore the act is before the ability, not in existence, right? You might have eyes before you see. In fact, I think you would, right? You've got to have what the ability to digest before you digest, right? But the ability is an ability for something. That's the very nature of it, huh? And so, when you want to define these things and see what their nature is, you have to say what their ability for.

[32:27] And therefore, what their ability for, the act is going to be before them in definition, before them in our what knowledge, right? Even if the ability happens to be before in what existence, right? So I

[32:49] have to have the ability to be angry before I become actually angry, right? Sometimes, you know, people are kind of perverse. You know the way they are, and they want to get somebody, you know, riled up and get somebody angry, right? And so on, and so.

[33:08] Since they've never seen this person being angry, they want to see. Right. But again, you know. When if they succeed in making the person angry, and they show their anger and so on, well then it's clear they do have the ability to be angry

[33:29] I don't know how many times I heard I was in England, you know the execution they call it, murder, whatever you want to call it, of Charles the first, right? And he had to step out there and basically his head chopped off. He wanted to, you know, wear something warm so he wouldn't be what shaking because of the cold, because he didn't want people to think he was afraid when he was what shivering because of the cold.

[33:54] See, I'm kidding. Okay, but no, you know this through the what act, right? You might mistake a man as he's shivering or as he's afraid. Yeah, did he shiver? No, because he has something warm on. So he didn't show any fear, huh? Yeah. Okay. Go some stories there. The Tower of London. Okay.

[34:25] So he says the very nature, therefore, you can say, of an ability to be an ability for something, right? That's what he means, and he says that an ability, according as it is an ability, is ordered to somewhat act. Whence is necessary that the definition of an ability be taken from the act to which it is ordered, and consequently that the definition of the ability, the understanding of it, be diversified as the what definition or the understanding of the act of it is diversified, huh?

[35:06] Okay, and that's that's part of the thing, right? That the ability is going to be distinguished by the acts, but now he goes to the second thing, but the acts are going to be distinguished by the objects, right? Okay. So I might distinguish the ability to see and the ability to hear by the distinction between seeing and hearing, right? But seeing and hearing are both sensing, and how would I distinguish between seeing and hearing?

[35:34] Well, seeing is sensing color, and hearing is sensing what sound. So by color and sound, I distinguish between seeing and hearing, and by seeing and hearing, I distinguish between the ability to see and the ability to what hear. Makes sense. And this is what Aristotle had already shown in the second book about the soul, huh?

[36:04] But now he's going to give a reason here for this, huh? For he says every act. Is either of a what active ability, right? Potentia activa, right? And that's the ability to what act upon something, or also maybe the ability to do something, right? And the what? Passive ability. Yeah. Okay. That's the ability to what to be acted upon, right? Or the ability to undergo. And as I mentioned before, that the great Plato had already in the dialogue called the Sophist had said that being is what can act upon something or be acted upon.

[36:52] He had seen kind of the universality of that distinction. And incidentally, this is one way you could divide the powers or abilities of the soul. Are they an active one, right?

[37:08] Or a passive one? Do they act upon their object? Or does their object act upon them? Now, if you stop and think about it, it's got to be one or the other because if this object neither acted upon the ability nor the ability acted upon it, they really would not be connected anyway. Do you see? So the ability to digest, right, is an ability that acts upon its object.

[37:41] So you put some food in my mouth and chomp, chomp, chomp. I start to act upon it, right? And then after I swallow it, I got all kinds of things in here that act upon it. What? More breaking it down, right? Huh? So the ability to digest is an ability that acts upon its object. By the ability to hear is an ability that is what? Passive. Yeah, is acted upon by its object, sound.

[38:09] Okay. So every ability of the soul is one or the other of those, huh? Yeah. In the intellectual part of the soul, there is an active ability, huh? The act of understanding and a what passive ability, right? The ability to understand.

[38:33] So he says every action is either of an active ability or of a passive one. Now he says an object is compared to the act of a passive ability as a what beginning and moving cause, huh? For color, insofar as it moves sight, is a beginning of what? Vision. Okay. Now notice the ability for emotions is of that same kind. You insult me, right? And you move me to what?

[39:16] Maybe anger, right? Huh? Okay. You show me the instruments of torture, right? You aim a gun at me and something, and you move me to what? Fear, right?

[39:35] Huh? You tell me something bad has happened to those I love, and you move me to what? Sadness. Sadness. Yeah. See. So the object of of sadness, or the object of fear, the object of anger, is what moves us to anger or fear or sadness. You just won the sweepstakes, huh? Hundred million dollars, huh? Or a million dollars, let's say. You know, someone who's oh boy, he's all joyful, right?

[40:07] See, he's moved to joy because of the what? Good thing that. has happened, you see. Though they say most of those people end up, you know, more miserable than they were when they started off. They they did a survey in in in Canada, I think. Yeah. People who won large sums of money, and most of them were better off before they won it than afterwards. They got went crazy.

[40:33] They had divorces and all kinds of problems in their life because they didn't know how to handle this money, couldn't handle it, and so on, huh? And

[40:47] I was working at I was working the shipping dock one time one summer, you know. Guy was not a college guy, was not. But anyway, one day out of the blue, he just kind of asked me, "What do I do if I won the some, you know, some some lottery thing? " You know, I said, "Well, find a nice quiet place. " I said, "Do some study.

[41:06] " I said, "What would you do if you if you won the lottery? " He said, Well I'd get a harem, he says. A harem, a harem. So he would have been worse off, he said, if he had won than before, right? He could go crazy, right? I mean, maybe. Yeah. They they they did a similar study with a lot of your superstars coming out of college and signing these big multi-millionaire contracts.

[41:30] All of a sudden, you know, they're you know getting in all kinds of problems, drugs, that, and they say, "Well, they had those problems before. They might have had them a little bit, if at all, but a lot of times this this money is just it just. I don't know. Unless they're really you know mature, they just can't handle it. Yeah.

[41:52] So notice in the case of a passive power, like the ability to hear, right, or the ability to feel anger and so on, you're moved by the object, huh? Okay, the object is like a mover.

[42:10] He gives example there of color moving the eye, like I was giving the example of sound, huh? But to the act of an active power, right? The object is compared as a what limit and end, huh? Just as the object of the ability to grow, virtus is sometimes used in the sense of not a virtue but a power or ability, right? Um. So the the ability to grow is a what an ability that is active, huh?

[42:47] You're building up, just like a carpenter is building up a house or something. So the object of the growing power, the ability to grow, is perfect quantity, right? Okay, complete quantity for your type of animal or plant, okay, which is the end of growth, huh?

[43:13] Interesting the way we carry over the words from growth to the mind. I was thinking it was St. Paul there, the Colossians, I think. You might use that word, you know, growth is applied to the mind. But you find the Greek philosophers saying that learning causes the mind to grow. Okay, but you have to be careful. That's that kind of a, you know, it's like saying food for thought and that sort of thing.

[43:43] We do say that. Okay. So, now what he's proceeding here is taking the two kinds of ability there are and how the object is related to them, right? And he says, in this case, the object of the passive power is like a what, a moving cause, huh? The mover, right?

[44:09] At the beginning. We define the mover as whence first there is the beginning of motion, so on. But here it's related more as the what, end or limit. Okay. So just like the end or limit of house building is a house, right? The product, huh? Or the end of of growing is the what? Animal or plant in the size and height and so on. That's more or less the height or size.

[44:38] of that type of animal or plant, huh? Okay. Then he puts those two together, right? From these two things, he says, an act receives its what specific nature, right? Namely, from its beginning, and from its end or term. And Thomas again very simply says, for calefactio, right, heating something, right, differs from what? Cooling something, right, refrigerating it. As the former is from what, the hot is from something active to something hot, right?

[45:26] So when I'm what, put the water on the stove and the stove is hot, right? The heating proceeds from the heat of the stove, right, and it ends in what, the heat of the water, right, huh? And that one he says, cooling, it begins in something cold and proceeds to the what cold. So I put the bottle of wine in the refrigerator if it's a white wine and it's cold in there, and the cold what?

[45:59] The cooling begins in something cold, refrigerator, and it ends up by making me what? A liquid cold. Yeah, yeah. So that's where you distinguish acts, don't you? Right, by their beginning and by their end. Whence it is necessary that. Powers or abilities be diversified according to their acts and their objects. Now he's putting it all together, right? Because we saw in the first part of the this first paragraph that the abilities are an ability for some act; therefore, they're distinguished by the act which is an ability, right?

[46:32] And now we see that the acts are what distinguished by their beginning or end, their object, right? And therefore, it's necessary, therefore, that the powers abilities be diversified according to their acts and their what objects, huh? But in a certain order, right? Maybe by the acts immediately, and since the acts are distinguished by the objects, they're ultimately distinguished by their what object, right? Yeah. Okay.

[47:04] So I might distinguish, uh, between the reason and the will by reasoning or understanding on the one hand, and by loving or desiring or choosing, right, on the other hand. I might distinguish them by truth and by what goodness or something, huh? Whatever are their objects.