De Anima (On the Soul)
90. Essential vs. Incidental Differences, the Fallacy of Accident, and Replies to the Objections
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/090-essential-vs-incidental-differences-the-fallacy-of-accident/

[0:00] Okay. Now, in the second paragraph, in the way my text is dividing, we move to the next part. Now he's going to give some more subtle distinctions here about what we mean, right? By saying that they're distinguished by their objects, huh? What sort of differences among the objects, right, are going to give rise to different powers? But nevertheless, it should be considered that those things which are what per accidens, right?

[0:38] Those things to translate them in English by happening, huh? Do not diversify something in what species or kind, huh? For example, because color happens to the animal, right? We do not diversify the species of animals by difference of color, but by difference of that which belongs to the animal as such, to a difference of the what sensing soul, huh? Which sometimes is found with reason as in man, and sometimes without reason as in the cats around here, okay?

[1:22] The dog, huh? Whence rational irrational are differences that are divisive of animal, constituting diverse species of it, huh? Now, just like you know, when you talk about triangle, huh? In geometry. there's an easy example here

[1:49] Now, do you distinguish kinds of triangles by red, white, and blue to be patriotic? No, because we'd say red, white, and blue are accidental, right? They happen to triangle, right? But if you go and examine inwardly what the very nature triangle is, it's a plain figure contained by three straight lines. You could divide triangle by equilateral, isosceles, and scalene, huh? because those are different ways of being what?

[2:28] Three sides. The three sides are three lines, and those lines can be equal or unequal, right? You have the three possibilities: equilateral, isosceles, scalene. huh? And so, they would give you different kinds of triangle. Right, but red, white, and blue don't. Okay, or to go back to something before that, you go back to to rectilineal plane figure, plane figure contained by

[3:01] straight lines. Well, it can be contained by three straight lines, or it can be contained by four straight lines to be quadrilateral, pentagon, hexagon, so on. Right, but you don't what divide it again into red, white, and blue. That's accidental, right? I thought it was easy to see clearly what's accidental, what isn't, right? And there is a fallacy in logic called the fallacy of the accident.

[3:34] And the father of logic, there, the philosopher, says that this deceives even the wise, and it did deceive his master Plato, right, one time. That be the same thing as the exception? accident exception? No, No, it's not accidental in that sense. It's something that

[3:59] it's opposite here of as such. Say, I'll give you a simple example of an argument from the accidental here. Socrates is a man, right? Man is something what universal, right? Therefore, Socrates is a universal. Socrates is a man. Man is a universal. Therefore, Socrates is universal. Seems to be a syllogism, doesn't it? Because Socrates is a man, that's true, right? And man is something universal, isn't it?

[4:37] So Socrates is is universal. But it's breaking one of them rules of a valid syllogism, isn't it? What's wrong with it, though? see? it's a little hard for people to say what's wrong with it.

[4:55] Well, the point is that the reason why man is said as Socrates is not because man is universal, but because man signifies what an animal with reason, and Socrates is an animal with reason.

[5:15] But the universality that animal with reason has in the mind—that's accidental, right? To man, insofar as it's said of Socrates. But I think the thing that deceives us is when the accidental is what

[5:36] always there, like in this case, right? Because nothing is ever said of something like that without being universal. Yeah. See, but it's not said of it by reason of its being universal.

[5:51] Very, very subtle thing. But you know, you found that in a sense when you are studying motion, and we said, "Heraclitus says day and night are the same thing because day becomes night and night becomes day, huh? " Or the sick and the healthy are the same thing because the sick become healthy, right? Everybody says that, don't they? The young become old. Now you are what you become, right?

[6:20] Therefore, the young are old, and if you are young and not young, and old and not old, what's wrong with that? See? They're not taking account the subject, which is the thing that remains. Yeah, yeah. Constant. But is it the sick as such that become healthy, or is it the body that has sickness that, as such, becomes healthy? Does the sickness itself become healthy? No. No. See, when when you know somebody's converted, when the bad become good, let's say, right?

[7:00] Does badness now become good? No. No. But that to which badness happened, that which happened to be bad, right, has become good, right? But the badness has not become good. I love the sinner, but not the sin, right? Okay. I saw this beautiful thing there about this pro-life woman down in where is it, Peru? And a couple of other things they they gave. I don't know if you heard these or not, but I guess she was selected to bring up the gifts there when the Pope came down there for his mass.

[7:41] And you know what she said to Pope? Kind of interesting, huh? You know how the Pope is sometimes called the what servant of the servants of God? Kind of a humble title. She said, "The Pope, I am the servant of the servant of the servants of God. " That's very well said, right? But anyway, she has some of these terribly, you know, anti-life people, right? You know, people really devilish, right?

[8:06] And she says, "I know our Lord said, you know, we've got to love your enemies. " She says, "Huh? " But didn't say how to love the devil.

[8:15] Some people just seem to be, you know, all devilish in their devotion to to killing the little ones. So. Okay. So you are being deceived there by the accidental, aren't you? And sometimes we say, you know, that the ugly want to be beautiful, and the poor want to be rich, huh? But to the ugly. As such, want to be beautiful? No, because then the ugly would no longer exist.

[8:53] Some would be wanting its own disappearance. Do the sick want to be healthy? It's not the sick as such, is it? Yeah, it's something else, right? It's the body that wants to be healthy.

[9:12] You are saying, in a certain sense, something that is something sick can't be something else. Whereas the person who is sick isn't sick in and of himself. So therefore, he has the ability to move away from being sick. Yeah, the body, my body, can become healthy. Right. But the sickness can never be healthy. See. Right. So the accidental is kind of strange thing. You know how the ancients thought that.

[9:44] Well, I was in the airport in London. There, you know, you know they had these things there, you know, little doodads for sale, right? Well, they had this anti malaria kit there. Oh. I was pulling it out to my wife there, and it had pills to take, you know, to prevent you from getting malaria, I guess. And it had kind of a mosquito absorber or something you could use, right?

[10:09] And I saw people are going from London down to these places where malaria is prevalent, huh? Okay, but anyway, the ancients thought that malaria was what caused by the swamp air, and it's actually not caused by the swamp air. That's a mistake, but people didn't get malaria unless they were in the swamp air, and so they thought that swamp air was unhealthy. in The air, but it's really what the mosquitoes in the swamp air that causes the malaria.

[10:42] So if you slept in the swamp air but had the netting around you, you would separate out what was accidental. Yeah. But maybe even the mosquito is not causing it either. Right. But something that happens to the mosquito, right? So the mosquito, as such, is not the cause, right? But you could make the mistake, you know, of thinking that the swamp air is the cause of this disease.

[11:03] It's unhealthy air that corrupts the body. You see, because in your experience, no one ever had malaria who didn't go into that swampy air. I think I think t here is a in Holland. Well, back in the eighteenth century, I was reading a book about John Adams being a you know ambassador over there during you know the you know Independence War. War of Independence. He said that there was this sickness called this dank sickness from the stench of the canals, and of course at that time they thought that it was from the smell.

[11:37] Yeah. And they realized they touched something and then it got into them. or something like that Sure, sure. So basically, I think that what might have happened is the Europeans took this. Smell of the air that they equated with the Holland dikes in the in the winter that just made everybody get deathly sick. A lot of them got deathly sick with the same thing now. Maybe I don't know.

[11:55] It's possible. When I was a little boy, I used to hear my mother say, "Sometimes put on your thinking cap." I don't know if you ever heard that from your parents or grandparents, something like that. But they say this goes back to Middle Ages, where the professors, you know, talking to the university, they wear this gown, see, and so the common man there, he never saw anybody lecture without one of these hats on.

[12:22] So he thought, "Well, if I could get one of those hats, you know, I could I could go around and lecture nobly on these things." See,

[12:31] but that's pretty accidental, I think, to their teaching, huh? So he says, but nevertheless, it should be considered that those things Which are per accidens, right? By happening, do not diversify species. For since colored happens to animal, the species of animal are not diversified by the difference of color, but by the difference of that which per se happens to animal, right? Through the difference of the sensing soul, which sometimes is found with reason, sometimes without reason.

[13:10] I've given you this already, but repeating it. Once rational or irrational differences divisive of animal, constituting diverse species, huh? I remember when I was studying fiction and drama and so on, huh?

[13:26] Now usually we divide drama at least into tragedy and what? Comedy, right? Okay. But now, what about a drama in English and a drama in, let's say, French or Spanish or something?

[13:45] Is that going to give you different species of drama? No. No. See? You say that's in a way more or less it seems somewhat anyway accidental to what a play is, huh? Why, as a representation, you know, of something laughable or a representation of something serious and so on, right? Tragedy and comedy seem to be per se differences, huh? See, but whether you're you're writing it in French or in English or Spanish, right?

[14:19] These seem to be kind of what accidental, huh? See. And of course, my brother Mark and I used to kind of he would joke, you know, my brother Mark especially about

[14:32] when you're in a regular college there, you have a French teacher or a Spanish teacher, right? And as if their formal object was qua French, right? Well, you could be reading in in a French class, you could be doing grammar, let's say, with with the first year students, and other people you read doing literature, history, and then maybe they're you're doing something in history or maybe maybe you're doing a philosopher or who knows what in French, right?

[15:00] Sure. And they're all put under what French? Sure. But what kind of a unity is that? It's accidental. It's really accidental, you see, because whether you're reasoning in French or reasoning in English, you're going to be following the same rules of reasoning, huh? Sure. And if you're reading a drama in English or reading a drama in French, you're going to say, well, now is the plot got a you know beginning, middle, and end, or does the are the characters you know interesting and so on, right?

[15:31] Sure. Is that really going to be different principles by which you you judge these things? But it's kind of an accidental unity there. But notice that there is a practical reason, maybe, why the same person would teach French grammar and French literature. Sure. But really, French literature and English literature belong to the same study, the poetic science.

[16:02] And and French grammar and English grammar are are both parts of kind of universal grammar. Right. Same. But in practice, you got to know French grammar if you're going to teach French literature. Sure. You got to know the language in a sense, huh? So it makes some sense the same person teaches both, but but they're really quite different sciences. And therefore, you have to get really, you know, something, you know, philosopher in French or something like that.

[16:33] Sometimes they try to talk me into teaching a philosophy course in French, right? So these French students get even more exposed to French, right? My French is not good enough to get a philosophy course in French, but some people could do that. Interest in all things French, qua French, might be philosophy, it might be history, it might be literature, might be grammar as French, but it's kind of accidental.

[17:07] Thus, therefore, not just any diversity of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, right? But a difference of that to which what the ability looks per se, huh? Okay, that's a little bit hard to say. What does that mean concretely? Just a sense as such regards a what? This is the third species of quality. Aristotle talks on the categories, huh? This undergoing quality, huh? Which per se is divided into color, sound, and others of this sort, huh?

[17:46] So color and sound act upon things in different ways, huh? And therefore, there's another sensing power of color, namely sight, another sound, namely hearing.

[18:03] But to a passable quality, an undergoing quality, as the colored, it happens to be musical or grammatical, right? Or even large or small, or a man or a stone, right? Okay. And therefore, according to differences of this sort, the powers or ability of the soul are not what distinguished, huh? Okay. So when you get later on, and especially in the beginning of the next question, when he starts to distinguish the five genera of powers, like the De Anima anima, right, then you have to descend, right, down to seeing in each case what's per se and what is per accidens, huh?

[18:52] So notice if I was dividing animal as such, I might divide animals a dog and cat and horse and elephant, right? But would those be differences of color as such? No, see. But red and green and yellow would be right. And more generally, are they differences of sensible as such? See, the dog and a cat sensible in a different way. No. And the dog and the cat might both be brown, right?

[19:23] Or both black or something, right? See. Okay, now the first objection was saying that act is what, after ability, huh? In being, right? And Thomas admits that. To the first, therefore, ought to be said that act, although it is after being, after ability and being, and it doesn't mean absolutely speaking, because in the ninth book of wisdom, of course, you find out that act is altogether, simply speaking, prior to ability, huh?

[20:01] But we'll leave that ninth book of wisdom here. But if you're talking about the abilities of the soul and the acts which their ability, you might have the ability before you have the act. In fact, you would, right?

[20:14] Okay. So although the ability of the soul is after, I mean the act rather is after the ability and being, is nevertheless before in what? Intention, right? Because the ability he means is what is for the sake of the act, right? Okay.

[20:38] And according to definition, just as the what, end is said to be before the agent, huh? So, the carpenter, let's say, is building a house before the house exists, right? But he's intending a house, right? And that explains why he's doing everything he's doing, right? And so, the definition of what he's doing is what, not making a cake, but building a house, right? So you couldn't explain what he's doing without bringing a house in, could you?

[21:11] Even though the house is going to exist after he gets through building, right? But because his building is ordered to that, you can't understand what his building is unless you see what it's ordered to, and you couldn't define it, right? And distinguish it from your mother making an apple pie, right? Where everything is ordered to the apple pie, huh? So the carpenter is getting wood and bricks and so on, and your mother is getting dough and apples and so on, right?

[21:42] And so the intention is quite different, huh? What it's ordered to, huh? So baking a pie and making, building a house, differ, right? Because a pie is something quite different from a house.

[22:03] You philosophers talk about such obvious things, right? Now the objection to the object was that the object could be extrinsic. He says the object, although it is extrinsic, is nevertheless either the beginning or the end of the action, and to the beginning and the end are proportioned those things which are what intrinsic to the thing, huh? So my eye is proportioned to what color out there, right?

[22:32] To receiving color, right? And my ear to receiving what sound, huh? So even though the sound might be outside my ear to begin with, huh? My ear is what adapted to receiving that, not receiving color, right? So, what is intrinsic is different because it's adapted to something extrinsic that is different. Okay, just like the nut and the bolt, right? The bolt is what, and and and the nut, or the nut could be extrinsic to the bolt, right?

[23:07] But the bolt is what, adapted to fit this nut, huh? Is that? And see, my my ear is adapted to what, fitting that, right? And so the way the the the size and so on of the bolt has to fit that extrinsic thing, the nut that's going to be screwed into, right? And so my ear has to be different from my eye because it's going to receive sound rather than what, light or color.

[23:37] So that's the replies he has to those first two objections. Now the second objection was saying, "Hey, if objects' distinguish powers aren't contraries, what are furthest apart? " But notice the full definition of contraries are what are furthest apart in the same what? Species. Species that are furthest apart, yeah, in the same genus, right? Right. So in the genus of color, black and white are furthest apart, and in the genus of taste, sweet and let's say bitter, right?

[24:10] Okay. So the object is the genus, right? And so it's going to include both what contraries. To the second, it should be said that if some power per se regarded one of two contraries as its object, right? It would be necessary that the contrary pertain to another what power ability, right? See. But a power ability of the soul does not, as such, regard the proper notion of contrary, but the common definition, the common genus of both contraries.

[24:58] Just as the object of sight, as such, is not what the white, but the what color, right? Which includes both contraries. And this, because one con one of the two contraries is in some way the what definition of the other, since one has itself as perfect and the other as what imperfect, huh? This is a common saying among Plato and Aristotle that there's the same knowledge of what contraries, huh?

[25:34] If you read Plato's dialogue, the Symposium, you know that dialogue. Symposium means what? Drinking together, and these men have come together to celebrate the victory of Agathon, the tragic poet. His tragedy won the top prize this year, and someone proposes that they give a speech on love, and so there are six speeches given on love, and the last one is given by what? Socrates, huh? And Socrates, of course, when he has a chance to speak, he says, "I seem to have misunderstood the purpose of this.

[26:17] " Um, when you said that we should try to speak well of love, I thought you meant speak what? Truly about that. See, he's punning or playing on two meanings of speaking well, because everybody else just about has been speaking well of love in the sense of praising it. Oh, I see. Now you know when we say in daily speech sometimes you know he spoke well of you.

[26:46] What does that mean? Praised you. He praised you, yeah. You see, but as you know, praise is sometimes flattery, huh? See, so if I say to one of my students, you know, you're another Einstein, see, I speak well of him, don't I? But do I speak truly of him? But if you read Plato's dialogues, you see them in the Apology too, right? Um, the word "speaking well" or the word "good speaker,"

[27:24] Socrates likes to point out that these phrases are equivocal. Now, in the Apology, Socrates is going to defend himself, and he alludes to the fact that his prosecutors have said, "Now, they said to the jury, 'Now watch out for Socrates. He's a good speaker. Don't let him pull the wool over your eyes. '" And Socrates says, "I don't know what they mean by saying I'm a good speaker, huh?

[27:51] I'm certainly not a good speaker in the way they are, huh? If by 'good speaker' you mean someone who just says the truth, well then, I suppose I'm a good speaker, huh? " See, well, notice the difference here is between speaking well in the sense of speaking persuasively, the way rhetorician speaks, and speaking truly, which is the way the philosophers try to speak. That's two different meanings, right?

[28:17] And usually in daily life, when we speak of a good speaker, we mean he speaks persuasively; he can get up before a crowd or a large group of people and and kind of sway them, huh? You see, but he may not what? Sway them by the truth at all, huh? You see, he may project a certain image of himself, huh? Or he may move their emotions in a certain way, and the way he says things cleverly, and so on, sugared words, as Shakespeare says.

[28:49] But so actually, what they call the the trivium—grammar, rhetoric, and logic—they're all, to some extent, about speaking well, but in a different sense. Oh. And grammar speaking well means speaking according to the rules of some language. Mm-hmm. But rhetoric, the usual meaning we have in mind, it means speaking persuasively. But in logic, it means speaking what truly. So I often say to students, you know, if I say a man is a stone, grammarian would say, correct, nothing wrong with that.

[29:33] Man am an animal, wrong. From the point of view of grammar, man is a stone is better than man am an animal, right? Man am an animal is incorrect English, isn't it? Mm-hmm. Man is a stone, nothing wrong with that, as far as English is concerned, English grammar, right? Right. Magician would look at that. and he'd say, Man is a stone. Oh my gosh, that's false. " See, man am an animal.

[30:05] May not be said too well, but that's true. Man am an animal, right? I say to students sometimes, you know, I is your professor, right? Wasn't I? Wasn't I your professor? That's what the grammarian would say, right? grammarians say no. But if you say, you know, I am a a chair, right? Fine, fine, that's fine, right? I is your professor. That's that's wrong. That could be rhetoric if you're trying to teach ghetto ghetto kids and connect them.

[30:35] Yeah. So yeah. Yeah. Rhetoric is based upon something often called likelihood. Hmm. Likelihood is a very strange thing. Aristotle in the book *On Poetic Art* says that a a likely impossibility is better in drama than an unlikely possibility. It tells you how far outside of reason it is. huh? And you can see that when you read Homer or something like that, you know, the gods and guys—it didn't bother me at all when I read it, you know, because it makes it so likely, huh?

[31:18] And you know how there's a disagreement between Zeus and Hera, his wife, about the Trojan War, you know, because one's on one side, on the other side, and somebody's asking Zeus to do something, and he realizes going to produce friction with Hera, it's going to be difficult living with the woman. It's ridiculous to have the gods, you know, like us, you know. But it seems so likely, huh?

[31:47] And now they give the example. There was a Cicero there, where Cicero was narrating something about the man he's defending, and he seems to be sticking in irrelevant things, you know, like the man was late because his wife wasn't quite ready yet, you know. And oh yeah, I was thinking,

[32:05] it all seems very, you know, very real, huh? You see, my old professor Kasurik and De Koninck, Kasurik had got up to Laval as an older man, older than most students, so he'd become kind of friendly with Deconic in a way that people more same age could be, huh? And so they they were used to kidding each other a lot, see. And so when I went to Laval, Kasurik gave me a little bit of advice, see, that that De Koninck might just out of habit make some, you know, smart remark about Kasurik huh You know, like if I was to say In class, you know that I was a student of Kasurik, you know.

[32:46] Well, then you must not know anything, or something. Oh, yeah. Some kind of, you know, some kind of war. He said, "I wouldn't get, you know, shook up by this thing, see." And I remember one day at Laval there. It was April Fool's Day, see, and I didn't realize April Fool's Day, see. Oh. And so Father Stromberg, who's actually from my hometown, there taught the College of Saint Thomas.

[33:11] But Father Stromberg was a student up there at the time, and he came to me and he said. De Koninck just heard that Kasurik was going to Russia, you know, one of these tours or something like that. Oh. And De Koninck's first remark was, "I hope he keeps his mouth shut over there more than he does here. We never get back, right? " And that's just, you know.

[33:38] And then when I walked away, you know, I suddenly realized it was April Fool's Day, see. And I thought that Father Stromberg had kind of pulled a thing on me, you know, like you do on April Fool's Day, to get me to believe that Kasurik was going to Russia, see. Now, as a matter of fact, he really was going to Russia, but he actually took pictures of the CIA, which is extremely dangerous, huh?

[34:02] But. huh? Yeah, they asked him to take pictures of certain things, you know, and that was his wife was scared stiff, you know, and she couldn't relax until he got back to Vienna and called and wanted to get things out of Russia, you know. But anyway,

[34:17] I thought that Father Stromberg had tried to, you know, you know, deceive me right on April Fool's Day, and he made it sound so real because I think he invented the thing, you know, about De Koninck, because that's exactly what De Koninck would say if he heard that, right? So it seems so plausible, huh? Well, that's what persuasion is. You tell a, a like the poets say, you know, tell a believable story, right, or a likely story.

[34:45] And there's certain ways, you know, you know, you know, the kid coming home late, now, and he's been somewhere where he shouldn't be. You know, he's got to try to make up a story that his parents will believe, right? And and some kids are better at this than others, right? And they're better natural rhetoricians than other ones are, and sometimes the truth doesn't seem very what likely, and you know things that have happened sometimes to you or others in your lifetime that people would tend not to believe because they're so what.

[35:17] Unlikely, huh? Given human way, human beings usually behave, huh? Okay. Um. So, Socrates likes to distinguish these senses of speaking well, but in the Symposium he distinguishes between speaking well. In the sense of what, praising something, right, and speaking well in the sense of speaking truly, huh?

[35:53] In the apology between speaking well, in the sense of speaking persuasively in a way that's going to convince the jury, right, and speaking well in the sense of speaking what truly again, huh? Okay. Now, where did I get into that? Something stuck. Something happened there. Oh, oh, yeah. No, I got talking about the, about the. Symposium, right? Oh yeah, yeah. And the symposium, where Socrates makes that distinction, right?

[36:32] But anyway, at the end of the symposium, two of the speakers, the last two speakers before Socrates, are still sober. Everybody else has kind of fallen underneath the table, so to speak, and Socrates is talking to Aristophanes, the comic poet, and Agathon, the one who won the prize for his tragedy, right? And the last bit of conversation is Socrates is saying, "If you guys knew what you were doing, you could both write both what, tragedy and comedy, huh?

[37:03] " Oh, yes. Aristophanes apparently could write only comedy, and Agathon maybe only tragedy, huh? But Socrates is hinting there that there's the same knowledge of what, contraries or opposites. So the doctor knows both health and what, sickness, right? And nobody would know better than a doctor how to make you or me sick if you wanted to do so, right? His knowledge lends us to that, huh? And logic is the art of correct reasoning, but also of what, incorrect reasoning, huh?

[37:41] And so from logic I know how to teach, but I know also how to deceive. In Aristotle, in the fifth book of the Politics, he teaches us how to preserve a government and how to overthrow it. Same knowledge, huh? Of contraries, huh? So I mention that because Thomas is saying here, it's not something unheard of that contraries belong to the same what knowledge. In ethics, we study virtue and what, vice, right?

[38:14] And Aristotle teaches us how to become virtuous, but you also could understand from that how to become what, vicious, huh? I told you about this kind of a way when I was first teaching philosophy in California Saint Mary's College, and this one student I thought was a pretty good, statement, because he had some understanding of this. He said, "You guys shouldn't be teaching ethics," and we said, "Why not?"

[38:39] He says, "Well." In ethics, you learn not only about virtue, but also about what vice, huh? If you learn how to be good and how to be what bad, right? And most people, he says, are inclined to be bad. So you are corrupting them by teaching them ethics.

[39:01] Pretty good argument, right? What? Is that Saint Mary's of Moraga? Yeah. Right on the empty side there, have a Spanish mission, you know, style the way where she puts a couple of cortiñas to get from my office to class and so on. Very nice. Um. So

[39:21] it's commonplace, huh, that there is the same knowledge of contraries or opposites, and they stand out against each other, don't they? Contraries or opposites. So white against blacks, the stars against the black sky—they kind of stand out. So this is the answer Thomas gives, right? That if you had an ability that was an ability as such to see white, then it had to be a different ability to see black, right?

[39:52] But if this is an ability to see color as such, right, then it's going to include both what white and black under it, huh? Okay.

[40:05] See that? Now the third one is a more subtle thing, huh? To third, it should be said that nothing prevents that which is the same and subject to be diverse in its what definition, huh? And therefore, is possible to pertain to the diverse powers of the soul. Now let's go back to the third objection there. Remember, he takes the example there of the very same object being known by something, right, and being what desired, right, huh?

[40:48] Okay. But is it an object of the knowing power and object of the desiring power in the same way, huh? You have the same thing when you talk about the will and reason, huh? And Thomas will talk sometimes like the will know. I mean, the reason knows the truth about the will to some extent, anyway, right? What the will is and what its object is, and so on, right, huh?

[41:28] But the will wills sometimes the good of the what reason, right? Okay. So the same thing could be the object of what. The reason and the will, right? But not in the same way, right? Insofar as it's true or knowable, it's the object of the reason, and insofar as it's good or lovable, it's the object of the what? The will or the heart?

[42:08] Just as the eye and the what sense of touch know surface and shape in a different way, don't they? The one knows it through color, and the other knows it through hardness, the resistance of the thing.

[42:26] So that's a kind of of a subtle distinction, there, isn't it? So you can know food and what desire food, right? Is it the same object that is known and loved? In some way, it is right, but not in the same way, right? Okay. So you can have that kind of a subtle difference in object,

[43:04] and have a what difference in powers corresponding to it? Okay. So the food, in so far as it is sensible, it's an object of the senses, right? In so far as it's desirable, it's an object of the emotions or the feelings, huh? So it's very subtle, huh? To find out exactly what distinction of objects gives you a distinction of what powers, huh? You notice that same thing comes up with the virtues then later on, huh?

[43:40] When you talk about the, for example, the theological virtues, what the three theological virtues have in common is that their object is in some way God Himself, right? Okay. But why is faith and charity different, huh?

[44:01] Well, God is the object of what faith, in so far as He is the what first truth, huh? Okay. I am the way, the truth, and the life, right? In so far as He's the first truth, He's the object of faith.

[44:16] I believe God who can neither deceive nor be deceived, right? But in what way is God the object of what of charity? As good. As good. yeah. yeah. It's. Goodness itself, right? Okay.

[44:38] That's a good example of that. Yeah. How about hope? Well, that's not as easy to see, right? But to some extent, hope relies upon the power of God, but also His mercy, huh? Okay. That's the object of charity because He is good. Good. Yeah. Now the goodness of God and the truth of God are not something different in God. Like God has two different parts, right? Right.

[45:31] But God is not in the same way the object of faith and what charity, huh? So there's a kind of formal difference there, but

[45:53] a little bit like you know, a woman is is a wife and she's a what, a mother, right? Huh? The same woman who's a wife and a mother.

[46:10] See, but the love of a wife, the love of a mother, I think are quite different, aren't they? You see, so the love that that a man has for his mother, and and the love that he has for his wife are not exactly the same kind of love, are they? Huh? Okay, but the children might be loving the woman as their mother, and the husband is loving her as his what, wife?

[46:40] Huh? Okay, the same woman, isn't it? Right. See, but she's the object of two different kinds of what, love? Right. See. Okay. Well, if you have a sister, right? Huh? Say, you might love this woman as your sister, right? But her father loves her as a what, Daughter. daughter. Right. And the love of a sister, love of a daughter, are not the same kind of love, are they?

[47:11] And you say what distinguishes these two loves? Well, loves have to differ by their objects, right? Huh? God was the same woman that you're loving, right? See, but I'm loving her

[47:30] as my daughter. My daughter is Maria. I love Maria as my daughter, right? You see, but my sons love her as their what, sister, right? And it's a different kind of love, huh? Okay.

[47:48] Or you know, I love my son Paul as a son, but my my son Marcus would love him, or my daughter Maria would love him as a what? As a brother, right? Huh? It's different, right? See, I love my brothers Marcus and Richard. I love them as a brother, right? My father, or my mother didn't love them as a brother. You know, but as a a son, right?

[48:15] It's not the same love, I don't think, is it? See, it is a different love, isn't it? Okay, but it's a different love. It's got to have what, one love, difference from another, not by being loved, but by what it is that you're loving, right? See, so this is this is the kind of difference that Thomas is talking about. It's a more subtle thing, right? You see.

[48:46] You see what I mean? That's kind of a subtle thing, isn't it? See, okay. So, but the difference is greater there between, let's say, faith and charity. I'm loving God as what? As the first, I mean, I'm believing Him as the first truth, right? God is the first truth. God as the first truth is the object of faith. God as goodness itself is the object of love.

[49:18] That's subtle, right? The food is the object of my what? Sense of smell, taste, right? In so far as it's what? Sensible, tastable, smellable, right? But the object of my hunger, in so far as it's good, right? Nourishing, yeah. It's different, isn't it? It's kind of subtle, isn't it? So that's what Thomas is pointing out there in his reply to that objection.

[50:02] This is the reply to the objection. Nothing prevents that which is the same in subject. This is a common way of speaking including back to Aristotle. to be diverse according to its what? Ratio, right? But not the way you know. especially in English a little more appropriate English. We could say what?

[50:28] My wife, right? Or you, you know, this woman as wife is the object of the husband's love, right? This woman as mother is the object of the son or daughter's love, right? This woman as sister, right?

[50:46] Is the object, right? Of the brother's love, right? This woman as daughter is the object of the father's love. So Ophelia is the what? She's loved by her brother, right? The Laertes, huh? And she's loved by her father, Polonius, okay? But the love is not the same exactly, right? And she's loved by what? Hamlet, right?

[51:18] But the love of each is different, huh? And you know the famous scene there where where where he jumped down to the grave there, right? Huh? The burial of Ophelia, right? Whose love is greater, right? You know, Hamlet's love of her, right? Or the brother's love, huh?

[51:39] It was a different kind of love. Romeo's love of Juliet and her father's love and mother's love, right? Juliet is quite different, huh? Different kind of love.

[51:55] Well, there's a distinction of acts by their objects break down here now? You see, is is the love of of Juliet's father for her and the love of Romeo for her are those loves not distinguished by object because the object in this case is the same, right? Well, he says what We would say, following Thomas here, although it's the same in subject, right? It's? The same woman, in other words, you're talking about, right?

[52:24] It differs secundum eandem rationem, right? According to definition, say she's loved by by Romeo as wife, huh? But she's loved by the father as what daughter, right? Huh? And they both think she's dead. And she's not dead, right? And they both have sorrow, but it's a somewhat different kind of sorrow, huh? Okay. So again, you can see there's sorrow. The sadness has the same object, right? The dead one, huh?

[52:58] But not the same way, right? When it's like a dead daughter, right? Your only daughter. Terrible thing, right? This is, you know. But Romeo, it's like, you know, only things, you know, it's only happiness, right? Now, and so on.