De Anima (On the Soul)
94. Summa I q.77 a.6: How the Powers Flow from the Soul's Essence, Properties in Geometry, and Grace and the Theological Virtues
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/094-summa-i-q-77-a-6-how-the-powers-flow-from-the-souls-essence/

[0:00] Whether the powers of the soul flow from its what essence from its very nature. To the sixth, he proceeds. One proceeds thus. It seems that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.

[0:21] And the first objection is based on the idea that nature is determined to something one, right? So the objection is from one simple thing. There does not naturally proceed diverse things. But the essence or nature of the soul is one and simple. Since therefore the powers of the soul are many. And diverse, they cannot proceed from the very nature of the soul. Damascene says that from which something proceeds is a cause of it.

[1:06] But the essence or nature of the soul cannot be called a cause of the powers. As is clear to one going through. Each of the kinds of causes.

[1:21] Therefore, the powers of the soul do not flow from its what. Essence or nature. Now he's going to show and apply the objection the kind of causes that are involved there.

[1:36] Moreover, emanation or or flowing from. Names a certain motion. But nothing is moved by itself. As is. Clear in the seventh book. Of natural hearing in the physics. Except perhaps for reason of the part, as an animal is said to be moved by itself because one of its part is moving, and the other is moved. Nor, is the soul itself moved as is proved in the first book about the soul.

[2:09] Therefore, the soul does not cause in itself its powers. But now against all of this is the idea that the powers of the soul are are like certain natural properties of it. But the subject. Is the cause of its own accidents. Once it is put into the definition of the accident, as is clear in the seventh book of the metaphysics. Therefore, the powers of the soul proceed from its, nature essence as a cause.

[2:42] They're like properties of the soul, right? Okay. Just like if you make two, you made something what. Half of four, right? Half of four is a property that follows upon being what. Two right.

[2:58] And being a third of six and a fourth of eight, right? All these. Relations follow upon being two, right? So the idea that it follows upon what the soul is that it has certain what powers, ah, because of its very nature.

[3:15] Now Thomas, in the reply here, he makes. I think I've gone over this with some of you before. He makes a very nice. This is a very nice text for many reasons, but anytime you want to distinguish between a substantial form and accidental form, this is a good text to come back to, right? Because remember, the soul is a substantial form,

[3:42] and I might mention again, going back to the great dialogue, the Phaedo. Socrates is defending this position about the soul. He's looking upon the soul, is a what complete substance. Simmias brings in a Pythagorean opinion, right? Which is that the soul is an accidental form.

[4:21] Okay. Now it's either one of those opinions. The truth, the whole truth, or nothing but the truth about the soul. Is the soul a complete substance? No. Socrates thinks, huh? No. In fact, they have a little early dialogue, a little dialogue where Socrates asks, "Am I a soul, or am I a body, or am I something composed of a soul and body?" Right. And he reasons that he's just a soul.

[4:55] Okay. So. This is not true, and this is not true, right? But there's an element of truth in both, right? Because the soul is actually a substantial form.

[5:17] So to see it as something substantial, as Phaedo did, is to see part of the truth about it, right? But it's not a complete substance, huh? To see it as a form, there's some element of truth, right? An accidental form, but it's not an accidental form. It's actually a substantial form. And these are the two most probable opinions about the soul. Once you discover that the soul, or at least the soul best known to us, the human soul, once you discover that the human soul has an operation that's not in the body, right?

[5:52] And therefore, in existence, it's not in the body, right? You could easily jump to the conclusion that it's therefore a substance, quite distinct from the body, and just temporarily imprisoned in the body, right? Okay. But vice versa, if you saw the formal

[6:12] aspect of the soul, right, and how the body has to be disposed to the soul, you might jump and think it's an accidental form. But the truth is, there's a bit of both.

[6:27] If you think of the unity of soul and body, right, then you think of the soul as being some kind of a form, and so the accidental form idea arises here. But actually, it's a substantial form. So he says, substantial form and accidental form, partly agree and partly differ. Now they come together in this. There's two things that both substantial form and accidental form are an act, as opposed to a potency.

[7:02] And by each of them, or both of them, something is in some way an act. But they differ in two things. First, because the substantial form makes something to be what simply.

[7:27] I noticed there. When I was born, or maybe before that, when I was conceived, right, I came to be, right. That's being simply right. When I studied Euclid, did I come to be? Only in a certain sense. Yeah, I came to be a geometry. I didn't come to be then, did I?

[7:49] See the difference, right? So through accidental form, one has being only in some qualified sense. Okay. I take my medicine and it restores my health, right? Is that my coming to be then? No, that's when I come to be healthy. When I was conceived or generated, then I came to be. That's when I got my my soul. So substantial form causes or makes being simply, and its subject is a being that exists only in what potency.

[8:25] That's the first matter. But the accidental form does not cause being simply, but being such or so much or in some way having itself, right?

[8:42] So when I generated a a son, did I come to be? Not you. I came to be a father. You see, but yeah, I got to qualify, right? I came to be in some way, right? Okay.

[8:58] And the subject. This is the second difference. The subject of accidental form is an actual being, a being in act. Okay, so when I came to be a geometer, right? I didn't come to be simply, did I? I came to be a geometer, and geometry came to me, an actual man, right? Okay. Now, from those two differences, he says, once it is clear that actuality per prius, before, is found in the substantial form, before in its what?

[9:40] Subject, because its subject is only matter in the first sense of matter, being in potency, and because the first is a cause in each genus, the substantial form causes being an act to its subject, but the reverse. With the case of the accidental form, actuality is found in its subject,

[10:08] in the subject of accidental form, before it's found in the accidental form. Whence the actuality of accidental form can be caused from the actuality of its what subject? Huh?

[10:25] Thus, that the subject, in so far as it is in potency or ability, is able to receive an accidental form, but in so far as it's something in act, it is productive of that accidental form. And I say this about the proper and per se accident, what in logic we call the property, right? For with respect to an extrinsic accident, the subject is what receptive only, right?

[10:52] Okay, like if you stab me with your sword, right, and give me a shape I didn't have before, right? Okay, I'm only receiving that, right? I'm not giving that shape to myself, right?

[11:08] Yeah. But what is productive of such an accident would be an extrinsic agent? Now, the second thing in which substantial form and the accidental form differ is because the less principal, less chief thing is an account of the more chief thing. So matter is for the sake of substantial form, but in the case of accidental form, it's reverse. Accidental form is for the sake of the completion of the what subject, right?

[11:37] Okay. So no, so we're very different from God, right? God in his nature has every perfection, huh? We in our nature are lacking any perfection, so we need to acquire what geometry and all these other arts and sciences and virtues and so on to complete ourselves, right? Huh? So all those things I acquire, my geometry, is for the sake of completing Duane Berquist I'm more complete when I have geometry and courage and justice and all these other virtues and habits, huh?

[12:19] Now he says is manifest to the things that have been said before that the subject of the powers of the soul is either the soul alone, right,

[12:32] which is able to be a subject of accident according as it is something of potentiality, as has been said above, or it's the composite of soul and body, right? But the composite of soul and body is an act of the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether the subject of them is the soul alone. Or the composite of soul and body, they flow from the what?

[13:00] Nature of the soul is from a principle or source or cause, huh? Because as has already been said, an accident is caused by the subject according as it is an act, and is received in it in so far as it is in what, potency, huh? So though the soul is defined as an act, it's not pure act like God, huh? There's some potency there.

[13:28] Now the first objection says, huh? How can there be many and diverse things following from one nature, right? One simple nature, okay? Now Thomas says something very important here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that from one simple thing, many things are able to proceed naturally in a certain what, order, right?

[14:00] And in a second way, and also on account of the diversity of the what, receptors, huh? Thus, therefore, from the one essence or nature of the soul there proceed many and diverse powers,

[14:18] both on account of the order of the powers, and also because of the diversity of the bodily what, organs, huh? Okay. I notice now,

[14:33] in a way, you see that even in the Trinity, don't you, huh? Because from the Father proceeds naturally what? The Son, the Son, right? And then from the Father and the Son as one principle proceeds naturally the what? Holy Spirit, right? See, there's a certain order there, right? Which Augustine calls the order of nature, right? The order of origin, one from another, huh? See. So that's one way you can get multiplicity, right?

[15:04] Many from one, huh? See. But even the Trinity don't get many from one without some order there, right? See, you don't have from the Father proceeding the Son, the Holy Spirit, as we're ex equal, right? But the Son proceeds from the Father, and then from the Father and the Son together proceeds the what? Son, huh? The Holy Spirit. Yeah, yeah, the Holy Spirit, yeah. Excuse me. Okay.

[15:32] And there you can see something reflected of what's going to be in us, because the will maybe will proceed from the fact that we have reason, huh? Understanding, huh? And of course the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love, and the Son by way of what? Understanding, huh?

[15:57] Now the second objection was saying, what kind of causes are involved here? Were there any causes? It didn't show that no causes were; just asserted that they weren't there. He said, "To the second, it should be said that the subject is a cause of its own proper accident in many ways. It's a cause in the sense of the end or purpose of it, huh? And in some way, it's an active cause, a little bit like a mover or a maker.

[16:27] It's also like a material cause insofar as it is receptive of the accident. And from this, one can take that the nature of the soul is a cause of all the powers as an end, right? That's one of the four kinds of causes, and as an active principle, like a mover or a maker, right? And as some of them, namely the understanding and the will, it's also what a cause in the sense that it receives these as their subject, huh?

[17:02] So it's a cause in more than one way, huh? So the soul is in some way the end or purpose of all its powers. They're there for the sake of the perfection of the soul, huh? Okay, it gives rise to them like an active principle, almost like a mover or a maker, but not really in the strict sense of mover or maker. And it's also responsible for the existence of some of them because it's the subject of some of them, right?

[17:31] But others, the body is. Now the third objection was going back to what we learned in natural philosophy that nothing moves itself, right? What is the flowing? You might say of the powers of the soul from the soul is that a kind of

[17:52] change of the soul by the soul? Well, he's not saying that, right? He says the flowing of proper accidents from a subject is not through some change transmutation, but it's through some natural what resulting, huh? Just as from one natural thing results, as from light there actually results what color, right? Huh? What is this emanation? Well, it actually, means literally they originally flow from, right? Huh? Okay.

[18:28] Now, notice, go back to something simpler than this. We usually exemplify the geometry first, right? Let's take a very simple theorem in geometry: when straight lines intersect, right? What's the theorem about straight lines intersecting? That the uh what do we call them The opposite angles are equal. Yeah, yeah, absolutely. These two angles will be equal. These two that matter too, right? Okay. Now, how is that proven in geometry?

[19:04] Do you remember? I don't know. I don't care. Well, it goes back to a couple things, right? One is the definition of right angle. Yeah. Now, most students don't know what the definition of right angle is. They think the definition of right angle is ninety degrees. Ninety degrees. And I tell the students, they say, "Now,

[19:29] you're saying it's ninety out of three hundred sixty parts of the circle, right?" Why don't you just say it's a fourth of a circle? It's going to be simpler.

[19:41] That's the first little thing I say there, right? Sure. Okay. Isn't it easier to divide the circle into four parts and divide it into sixty equal parts? So why divide into three hundred sixty parts and you can divide just into four parts?

[19:58] Okay. Okay. Now, how do you divide a circle into four equal parts? Well, you take the center circle and you draw a straight line through the opposite side, right? And then you draw another straight line at what? Right angles, right? Yeah. To that same, the right angle to this line to that. Well, now you got a little problem, right? Because you got to know what a right angle is before you know what a right angle is.

[20:27] Yeah. So you have to know how to draw a straight line at right angles to another line before you can what? Divide a circle into four equal parts. So they're out of order, the mind, right? The modern mind is out of order, in all kinds of ways. now what is the definition of right angle? Well, when a straight line meets a straight line, it makes equal angles.

[20:55] We call those angles right angles. That's the definition of right angle. See? And Euclid will show that it's possible to draw a straight line to meet another straight line to make what? Equal angles, huh? Okay. Now,

[21:13] it's not too hard to see that if a straight line meets a straight line, it's either going to make two right angles, or it's going to make angles equal to right angles. Yeah. So that if you divide these two right angles, don't subdivide this, but subdivide this one, you got these two parts, right? And you can divide this angle and this angle into the same two parts, so they're obviously equal, right?

[21:43] All that's got to be known before you come to this theorem, right? So now, let's give you a letter. If this is a straight line meeting a straight line, then a plus x must be the two right angles or equal to right angles. Yes. So a plus x equals two right angles, and since this is a straight line meeting a straight line, for the same reason, b plus x must be the two right angles.

[22:15] Oh yeah, yeah, yeah. Now it's just a question of the axioms, right? Yeah. Quantities equal to the same are equal to each other. Sure. So a plus x must be equal to b plus x. Right. And equals subtracted from equals, share angles being. Now, you may not have considered the fact that in a way here you're going from cause to effect, aren't you? Cause to effect. Because the intersection of these lines, right, is the cause of there being angles, right?

[22:55] And the straightness of these lines is the cause of this down here. Yeah. And therefore of there being what equal. Equal. Hmm. Okay. Now notice if you ask me what is this, I would define it as intersecting straight lines. Mm-hmm. Okay. I don't put angles into the definition of intersecting straight lines. Okay. Let alone the equality of those angles, right? But the natural result of straight lines intersecting, right,

[23:31] is that equal angles are formed there and also here, for that matter, right? Okay. It naturally follows from the lines being straight that those angles that are formed will be what equal. So this is said to be a property of intersecting straight lines to have opposite angles equal. Yeah. The same way later on. when. We take up the triangle to show that if you make a triangle, the interior angles will be equal to what two right angles?

[24:03] Huh? That's a property that follows upon, that flows from, right? Okay. Well, this is even a simpler theorem here, right? Hmm. Okay. Well, now it's something like that in the case of the soul, right? We're saying given the nature of the soul, there is some natural result of that, and that's the powers of the soul, right? Okay. Just like given the nature of the triangle, it follows upon it that there will be angles equal to right angles.

[24:35] Okay. Now an extrinsic accident would be green or yellow or red. Does that follow upon being a triangle? No. No. That would be due to something other than the nature of triangle, right? Mm-hmm. And the cause of the triangle being green would not be its nature as triangle, would it?

[24:58] But it is a result of its nature as a triangle that it has three angles equal to two right angles. You see that? Okay. Now obviously the powers of the soul are not to the soul like green is to the triangle,

[25:15] right? Because then you would have, you know, irregularity as to what powers we have, right? Sure. So the powers of the soul are to the soul like the equality of these angles to two right angles are to triangle. It's a natural result of it, huh? Okay. Okay. And notice, huh, when I draw these straight lines, once you have the nature of intersecting straight lines, you naturally have equal angles formed, huh?

[25:46] You don't have to take these straight lines now and now transform them so that they have these angles equal. That naturally results from their intersecting straight lines that show equal angles formed. So he says it's a natural result of what the soul is that it has these what powers, right? And notice we know the soul through its powers, right? But we know that the powers of the soul are not to the soul like green is to triangle, but they go always with the soul.

[26:19] So the powers of the soul are to the soul like the equality of these three angles, the two right angles, is to the what triangle, or the equality of these angles is to the intersecting straight lines. You see, or like half of four is to two, right? If you make two, the natural result of making two is you have something half of four, a third of six, a fourth of eight, and so on.

[26:47] It naturally follows upon it, right? So it's what they call a modular property, as opposed to a pure accident. Is it different? A modular property? They call it property as opposed to an accident, right? A property has a cause in the very nature of the thing. That's what he's saying in the reply to the third objection, right? It's not that the soul is what changing itself to have these powers, right?

[27:28] But to have these powers is a natural result of what the soul is. Just as one doesn't have to change those intersecting straight lines to make those lines what those angles equal, right? But it's a natural result of what intersecting straight lines are that equal angles, equal opposite angles are being formed. Do you see the idea? Okay. That's what this third objection flowing is as a result.

[27:59] Yeah, emanatio emanatio, yeah, the flowing from, yeah, yeah. You'd say follows upon another way of saying. Follows upon, yeah, yeah. Okay. But you borrow that word from flowing, just as from the the the stream actually flows the water, right? I was I was at Bath in England there, right? Yeah, yeah. And of course, you know, t here is a tremendous amount of water being produced all the time there, flowing all the time, and it flows down into the into the Avon, the river that goes by Shakespeare's Stratford and Avon, you know, and and you see that where the water's going.

[28:34] Otherwise, the poor place would be flooded. He's coming, right? You know. Uh huh. Yeah. So it's a natural what? You know, emanation or flowing from that underground thing. It's very very strange. I forget what the number of gallons is, but it's tremendous, right? How much water is coming? Come in there all the time. It's at a constant temperature, right? You know, warm. You can you can bathe in there, right?

[29:00] Yeah, sure. Very famous place, and the they knew about it before the Romans came. The Romans made Roman baths, and they've been you know reconstructing them and and excavating the the baths down below. Very interesting place to to see. There was a temple there and all kinds of things. You know, they tell you about it. Um, there's all kinds of ideas about the powers of these waters.

[29:25] I was going to ask the guide there whether whether it flows into the Avon before the Avon goes to Shakespeare's place, right? That explains why Shakespeare's such a great.

[29:37] You know, that's an old idea, though. You know, Achilles was dipped in the magic water. You know, he became invincible except for his heel because his mother held him by the heel. That's why the Achilles heel was the vulnerable part. You got my joke. My mother dipped me. You know, but she held me by the nose, and that's why I have this bad nose. Yeah, right. in general, I've had pretty good health in life, you know, but I've always. had problems with my nose, you know, from the time.

[30:01] I think in grade school I'd blow my nose until noontime, and then kind of stop, you know, for the day. Then it was lunchtime. Yeah. So now my joke is, my wife said, "You got a cold again." I said, "No, no, it's just it's not in remission right now. It's always there, you know, but sometimes it's the remission." Now,

[30:22] let me make a little theological footnote here to this business, son. It's kind of interesting, huh? You talk about the three great theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity.

[30:39] And you talk about sanctifying grace, huh? You talk about faith, hope, and charity. Love you. Okay. Now, what's the relation between sanctifying grace and faith, hope, and charity? There.

[31:10] Well, where are faith, hope, and charity? Where? Where are they? Where are they? In the soul. What part of the soul? What power of the soul? Faith is in the intellect? Yeah, faith is in reason, right? The intellect, the understanding, and hope and charity are in what? Yeah, so they're in those powers that have the soul as a subject, right? Yeah.

[31:44] So one is in reason or the understanding; the other two are in the will. Yeah. Now, what's the subject? Now these are powers of the soul, right?

[32:02] Now, where is sanctifying grace? What is the subject in which sanctifying grace is? Yeah, sanctifying grace is in the soul. Okay. Now, notice, huh I didn't maybe dig into that I could have

[32:38] what naturally flows from the soul naturally now, right? Is the powers of the soul, and especially reason and the will, right? Which not only flow from the soul, but they're also in the soul, right?

[32:56] Now, as as Saint Peter, for example, teaches us in his epistles. Grace here is really a share in the divine what nature, okay. So, grace, being sanctified grace, is in the soul as in its subject, and just as the naturally follows from the soul, reason and will. So, when grace is in the soul, there flows from the soul into the reason and the will, faith hope, and what?

[33:31] charity, huh? And especially the connection between grace and charity is strong, right? Okay. But you know, there could be some kind of maybe unformed faith if you lost grace, right? But it wouldn't be formed faith; it wouldn't be the the full virtue there. Um, you see, it's kind of analogies here, right? That just as the powers of the soul naturally follow upon or flow from the soul, right?

[34:09] So, the theological virtues in the powers of the soul flow from grace in the soul itself. So it's not only one's reason is being elevated by the virtue of faith, right? And one's will is being elevated by hope and by charity, right? But one's soul is being what elevated, right? By grace, huh? So if you understand the relation of the soul to its powers, right?

[34:53] By kind of analogy, right, likeness and proportion, you can understand the relation of grace to faith, hope, and charity. That just as the powers of the soul flow from the nature of the soul, right? So the nature of the soul is elevated by sanctifying grace, huh? As opposed to actual grace, as they call it, right? But sanctifying grace, they're naturally followed, you might say, right, from sanctifying grace, certain virtues in those powers that will elevate them, right?

[35:33] So just as my soul is being elevated by grace to a certain likeness to God, right, and being raised above what it is naturally, right, it's as you see something supernatural, right? It's grace that is a as Saint Peter teaches us is a is a kind of sharing in the divine nature, right?

[35:59] Well, then we start to share in something of what God's operation too, right? And there, but of course, in us it's going to be in our powers, right? Which are not the same thing as our soul. Partly the same as the soul, and so it's going to naturally flow from grace, the elevation of the soul, certain virtues that elevate the powers that are in the spirit, right, in the immaterial part of the soul, and those are faith, hope, and charity, right?

[36:33] So just, but now you can also say this: that just as the reason and the will are not the soul, right, but they're like properties of the soul, following upon what the soul is, right? So faith, hope, and charity are not exactly the same thing as sanctifying grace, but they follow upon sanctifying grace. Okay,

[36:59] you see that they flow, the word. But but notice how how how how we often say grace never what goes against nature, right? It elevates nature, right? And you can also say here that, in a sense, t here is good harmony between the fact that reason and will flow from the nature of the soul, and then that faith, hope, and charity flow from the grace which elevates our soul and makes it, in a way, like like God, more so than it was before it received the grace, huh?

[37:41] Okay. So that's helps you understand a little bit the relation there. So if you understand this, you can understand in the relation of soul to these, you can understand better the relation of grace to faith, hope, and charity, sanctifying grace.

[38:02] I mean, it wouldn't really make sense, you know, for the reason and the will to be elevated, not the soul itself, because after all, it's the soul that is understanding and what willing through these powers, right? So my soul understands through its reason, right, and my soul wills and loves through its will, right, and so the soul is going to be elevated as well as the reason and the will.

[38:37] See the idea? It makes sense when you start to think about it. This is the way it is. Yeah. If faith, hope, and charity flow from sanctifying grace.

[39:04] And our sanctifying grace, which faith and charity reside for an ear, reason and will, yet not in the soul, yet so very distinguishing then, the sanctifying grace, which inheres in the soul from faith and charity. No, no, it's reversed in sense. We're saying that faith, hope, and charity flow from the soul elevated by grace, right? See, that just as as the reason and the will follow upon the very nature of the soul, right?

[39:49] Um. So when the soul has been elevated by grace to a kind of partaking of the divine nature, you know, those Words of Peter were kind of taken over in one of the the cans of the mass, right? You know, and what talks about God partaking of our nature, right? When He became man, right? But as Augustine says, God became man so that man might become God.

[40:16] Okay, God became man so that man might eventually partake of something of of God's life, huh? Okay. And so, so it's to be expected that when the soul is elevated to a kind of partaking of the divine nature, that something is going to follow from that, right? In those powers that naturally follow upon the soul, okay. And the connection between grace and charity are especially what, especially strong, right?

[40:51] Huh? Because if you lose charity, you lose grace, right? And vice versa, they go together, right? They tie up that way. Um. Question you have about that? What will and

[41:15] how will sanctifying grace then affect if it adheres in the soul, faith, hope, and charity are not strictly speaking sanctifying grace, but they what will what effect will sanctifying grace have on the vegetative and nutritive powers of the soul? Since sanctifying grace appears in the soul, yet the faith, hope, and charity are in the intellect and will and the spirit. So, but yet grace, in a certain sense, you know, there's another kind of there's another kind of overflowing, you know.

[41:57] Like, for example, when you understand something that you've been trying to understand, right? Or if I see some truth that I didn't see before, right, an interesting truth, you know, I tend to feel better physically, right? Say, you know, but that's kind of an overflow from the the top down, right? Huh? A little different type of overflowing there, I think. And it's not quite the you know.

[42:29] If my body is very tired, maybe I won't have that so much, right? Because the body is not disposed, right? Okay. But you know, certainly when a man's will is very strong, right, it's going to influence his emotions, huh?

[42:48] So, if somebody really loves you, like you know, I think John Paul II does, right? That's going to be reflected in a certain emotional warmth there, too, huh? Say.

[43:01] But that's a little different type. There is some similarity there, right? Okay, and you know how even you know the use of our reason might sometimes influence our imagination, because when I when I think I I I'm going to imagine something too, right? So the command of reason, the imagination forms. I want to think about the triangle or these theorems I had on the board a minute ago, right?

[43:35] My reason, in a sense, is commanding my imagination to form intersecting straight lines or their form a triangle or something like that, right? Before I can put on the board, and I might think of those geometrical theorems. Sometimes I'm not even going to the board, just you know, form the triangle, the intersecting lines in my in my head, right?

[43:59] Okay, I don't know what we're getting to that so much. That's interesting to talk about so much, you know. But I think it's perfectly relevant here, you know, to see something of the what likeness of ratios here, right? That in some way grace is to faith, hope, and charity to some extent, like the soul is to reason and will. In what sense? Well, given the nature of what the soul is, there are certain powers, right, that naturally follow upon what the soul is.

[44:39] Okay, just like a property of geometry, right, follows upon what intersecting straight lines are, what a triangle is, right? Okay, well then, when that nature is elevated to a certain likeness to the divine, by grace, which is a kind of partaking of the divine nature, as Saint Peter teaches us, then there flows right from the soul elevated by grace into the powers that follow naturally upon the soul a certain elevation, right?

[45:15] So I'm elevated by the light of faith, my reason, right, and the natural light of reason that we'll be talking about when we talk about the act of understanding, right? But there's an added light,

[45:29] and one's reason sees how good it is to believe, right? Okay, so there's a certain light there, you know. It's kind of like Cardinal Newman, you know, talks about after his conversion there, you know, to Rome and so on, right? That mysteries of the faith he had some difficulty with, you know, accepting, you know, as an Anglican, you know, often became easy to accept, right? I see, and they stood out as things to be raised, right?

[46:02] So his mind had been elevated, you know, by that, and then hope and charity, right? The acts of the will now have a certain what vigor that they didn't have before, right? You see, but so the certain, you know, I don't want to, you don't want to identify these things because faith, hope, and charity are really what what we classify in logic as habits, huh? As virtues, huh?

[46:33] The first species of quality Aristotle talks about, then, while reason and will would be in the second species of quality, the, you know, innate powers and so on. It's a different thing, right? Okay, and and again, it would be the soul and grace. Grace is like a a disposition of the soul, right? Okay, but nevertheless, it's a certain likeness of proportion, there, right? That just as the powers of the soul seem to flow from what the soul is, right?

[47:07] So faith, hope, and charity flow from grace, right? And it's even more intimate than that because the grace is in the soul, and faith, hope, and charity in those powers, right?

[47:22] That's very interesting, huh? To see the way that is. Oh. In grade school, you know, we had the geography book, and we're reading about some foreign country where they speak prop with peanuts. Oh yeah, yeah. So I'm pretending to eat peanuts, you know, and and his sister is saying, "Just as soon as I was eating peanuts, eating eating in the land, " I said, "Just pretend to eat, " you know.

[47:54] Yeah. Well, don't pretend to eat. I look like I'm eating peanuts, you know. It's like a kid reading about all about peanuts and production peanuts, you know, in in this geography text. Pretending to eat peanuts. You're really taking it in. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Exercise of your imagination. I speak about why you guys, if I don't.

[48:27] So. So that's a little thing to think about after you think about how the powers of the soul flow from the soul, right? You say the first powers are habits, and the second powers are what again? I say if you study logic, right, in the category substance, quantity, quality, towards something, Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of qualities, right? And the first kind he talks about is habit or disposition, right?

[48:59] And the second kind of quality he talks about is these natural powers, huh? The third kind of quality he talks about is sensible qualities like hot and cold and black and white and so on. And the fourth species of quality he talks about is figure or shape, huh? Now Thomas talks about that teaching of Aristotle in the

[49:26] Prima Secundae, right? When he's going to start to talk about the virtues. Well, the virtues are one kind of quality, right? And so he calls the teaching of Aristotle about quality and the four species of quality, four kinds of quality, and he explains the order that Aristotle gives them. It's beautiful, right? The order he gives, but it's tied up with the fact that nature is what comes first, now.

[49:56] And by the habit or disposition, you're well. Or ill disposed towards your nature, so because the connection of habit with nature, he puts that first, even before the natural powers, right? Because the powers can be disposed ill or badly by the habits that they have.

[50:21] So if I have have cruelty, right, bad habits like Saddam Hussein has, I'm ill disposed towards being a man, right? If I have the various virtues, then I'm well disposed towards being a human being. I'm courageous. I'm just. I'm temperate, and so on, right? But if one of these things gets out of line and is badly disposed, then I'm badly disposed towards my nature as a human being.

[50:57] Okay, but we can't go into all that right now. But as I said, Thomas does give a very nice explanation, and unfortunately, we don't have a commentary on the categories that's really adequate to the work. And but you know, you get little snitches here and there that I try to bring together when I lecture on the categories, where Thomas will discuss you know one of the categories maybe in particular, right?

[51:24] Yeah. But he does have kind of a general explanation of the distinction of the ten categories in the third book of the physics, third book of natural hearing, and the fifth book of of wisdom, right? And then he distinguishes all ten of them in a kind of a general way, right? But then there are other texts where he discusses one category or another in particular in more detail, and he happens to in the Prima Secundae, talk about quality a lot because he's about to take up the qualities called virtues, and so he wants to distinguish them from all the other ones.

[52:01] So he all the other qualities, so he recalls the teaching of Aristotle, okay, about the different kinds of quality. That's really a very fundamental work, the Categories of Aristotle, and

[52:18] not a very well understood work, right? And and Porphyry wrote the famous Isagoge, originally an introduction to the Categories, because some guy was trying to understand the Categories, I can't understand them, and so Porphyry wrote the Isagoge, introduction to the Categories, where he explained what these words that Aristotle uses, genus, species, or in Greek genos eidos, diaphora, and so on, what these words mean, and so that became a kind of standard thing.

[52:52] I was looking at Averroes, you know, the Arab philosopher. Muslim philosopher down in Spain, and he's going to you know he's called the commentator of the Middle Ages because he commented on all Aristotle's books. He's going to comment on the Categories, and someone said, "You better comment on the Isagoge too." so, Averroes says, "Okay, okay, because I have so much demand for me to comment on that."

[53:13] And when I first went to Laval, we read Albert the Great's commentary on the Isagoge That was a paraphrase, huh? And here's a paraphrase of the Categories too, but but it's not as good as Thomas would have done, right? And and Thomas, you know, but you have to kind of pull together many different texts where Thomas happens to talk about, you know, this or that aspect of the Categories.

[53:41] What do I have any commentary on it? The only commentaries we have of Thomas on the logical works of Aristotle is a commentary on the whole of the Posterior Analytics, right? And then an incomplete commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, but there's no commentary by Thomas on the Prior Analytics or on the Categories or on the book about places or his refutations. But there are times when he talks about these things a bit, right?

[54:08] As it comes up,