De Anima (On the Soul)
95. Before and After: Senses of Priority and Why Breathing Isn't Better than Philosophizing (ST I q.77 a.7, Part 1)
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/095-before-and-after-senses-of-priority-and-why-breathing-isnt/

[0:00] right? So you can kind of, if you read off Thomas and reread him and reread him, you'll find little hints, you know, to help you to understand the book, but.

[0:15] Okay. Amen. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, ordered luminary images, arouse us to consider more quickly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. Do you thank our Lord for the coming man today? Amen. Amen. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:46] Amen. I think that's the time of the Incarnation, really, isn't it? Yeah. right. The Annunciation, so. Yeah, that's a good. point. It's the feast of not only the Annunciation, but the feast of the Incarnation, huh? Sure.

[1:06] So up to Article Seven here in Question Seventy Seven, if you recall, Article Six was whether the powers of the soul flow from the what soul, right? And some of them flow from the soul into the body, right? And others remain within the soul itself. But now he's asking a similar question about does one power of the soul proceed from another power of the soul?

[1:37] Now, to the seventh, one proceeds thus. It seems that one power of the soul does not arise from another, for of those things which come to be together.

[1:52] One does not arise from the other, but all the powers of the soul are together created with the soul. Therefore, one of them does not arise from what another. Well, of course, Simul, at once or together is the opposite of what before and after. That chapter I gave you from the categories on before, that's followed by a chapter on Simul or together. And

[2:31] so, there's more than one sense of together, and more than one sense of one thing arising from another, right? So, you could say, for example, that a property arises from or comes from the nature of the thing. So, from the fact that the number two has come to be Simul together is going to be what half of four, right? So, half of four is going to follow upon this number being two, but not follow upon it later in time.

[3:14] It's not that you have two existing and then after a while it becomes half of four. No, at once when it's two, it's half of four.

[3:28] It's not that you have a triangle, you know, a plane figure contained by three straight lines and so on, and after a while the angles start to become equal to right angles. No, at once together. Remember Aristotle's example there of this doesn't mean every cause is necessarily simultaneous with the effect, but remember the example Aristotle in the categories there where he said you're sitting down, right, and the statement you are sitting down being true are together in time, right?

[4:10] Whenever you're sitting down, the statement you are sitting down is true, right? And whenever the statement you are sitting down is true, you're sitting down, and yet you're sitting down is the cause of the truth of the statement you are sitting down. If you stood up, then that statement would cease to be true, but there's no time lapse there,

[4:41] so it's possible for one thing to arise from another or come from another and still be together in what time or duration. Now, sometimes you know when you're looking at objections to the. Trinity, you know, and somebody was saying, "Well, if the Son proceeds from the Father, or the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, then the Son would be after the Father in duration, or the Holy Spirit would be after the Father and the Son."

[5:15] Well, that that doesn't follow, huh? But we're kind of thinking of the fact that we're usually thinking of a maker in the sense of a man who makes a pie or makes a chair or something like that, where it's through some kind of a motion, right? It takes time that he eventually what produces the object. In that case, the cause has a before in time, so the house builder exists before the house does.

[5:47] Because the house takes some time to build? But two doesn't exist in time before half of what four does. Moreover, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident, an accident in the sense of a proper accident, right? Like a property arises from a subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another, because one accident is not an accident of another.

[6:29] Therefore, one power does not arise from another. Thomas is not going to maintain that one power is the subject of another power, right? But that one power arises from the soul in a certain order from another power, and he'll explain the ways that takes place in the body of the article.

[7:00] But the opposite does not arise from its what opposite, huh? But each thing arises from something like it, species, huh? So dogs, what produce a dog, right? Cats produce a cat, right? So if you divide the powers by some kind of opposition, which is the way we divide things in general by opposites, right? How can one arise from the other, huh? So he says the powers of the soul are divided by opposites as diverse species.

[7:33] Therefore, one of them does not proceed from the other, huh? Now the reply to this is taken from something more known, the said contra, namely the act, right? But against this is that the powers are known through their acts. But the act of one power is caused by another, as the act of imagining from the act of what sense, huh? He's not using imagining there, phantasia, which is a Greek word for imagining or imagination, in the sense of this creative thing we sometimes use the word imagining too, right?

[8:15] But he's thinking of the fact that if I look at you for a little bit, right, and then close my eyes, you kind of what remain in there, right, an image of you, huh? And that arose from my what seeing you, right? So I'm no longer seeing you now, in the sense of of my eyes no longer seeing you, right? But something of your image and your color and so on remains in my eye.

[8:39] If you recall what Aristotle said there in the third book about the soul, he's talking about this. It's a little bit like billiard balls, right? I knocked this ball and then it was already. Knocks that ball, right? But the second ball maybe doesn't move as strongly as the first ball did, right? And that's another one, even weaker, huh? So my image of you is not as vivid of your color and shape as my eye is, huh?

[9:09] Okay. And of course, the longer you are away from the sensation, the more it tends to fade. So apparently, it's a commonplace among witnesses to accidents that if three or four people see an accident take place on the street, and you ask them right away to write down or what they saw, you ask them another next day what they all saw, you get much more agreement with the first day than the second day, huh?

[9:42] Because the images are what weakened by their distance from the first mover there, huh? From the so he speaks of imagining there as a motion caused by the sense and act. That's an interior motion.

[10:00] Yeah. So, or you could say, for example, that the object of the will, the will loves or desires something that reason what knows in some way. Or the emotions, huh? You smell something, you taste something, and suddenly you have this hunger for it, huh? I used to work with this package store. He had a a habitat there on I don't know Labor Day, some day like that.

[10:29] He had his whole family over, you know, sons or daughters in the neighborhood. And he cooked, you know, bacon and eggs and all this stuff on the outdoor grill. That smells going on around the neighborhood. But he started like at six in the morning or something like that. You know, people trying to sleep. You know, on the day off and so on. Because that's one of these things.

[10:48] So there's an order between what you smell and this, you know, desire to eat. Or you could be laying in bed, right? And someone's cooking bacon or something, you know, and all of a sudden you you realize you're hungry that you weren't while you were just laying there, huh? And the you know mopping the cat, right? And we sit down to dinner. She comes around and she looks up at you, you know, with those big eyes, and wants a little bit of chicken or something or whatever it is you're eating, right?

[11:16] A little piece of that or several pieces, huh? But she's she's she's a little more polite than the other cat used to be. Now he says, "I answer it ought to be said that in those things which proceed, go forward, right? From something one, right? According to a natural order, huh?

[11:52] As the first thing, which is the same thing as the beginning, is the cause of everything, so that which is nearer to the beginning or to the first is in some way a cause of those things which are more what remote.

[12:11] It has been shown earlier above that among the powers of the soul there is a multiple, many kinds of order, right? And therefore, one power of the soul goes forward from the nature of the soul by medium of a what another, right? And now he's going to talk about what a couple of orders here at least, because the soul is the beginning and the cause of the powers in more than one way.

[12:49] It's a cause in the sense of end, which is one of the four kinds of causes, and it's a cause in a way like the maker or the mover,

[13:01] and it's also a cause in some way like matter because it's the subject of the powers, either by itself or in junction with the what body, right? Now,

[13:16] if you go back to that text that I gave you from was the twelfth chapter of the Categories, where Aristotle distinguishes the four central senses of before. Do you remember that? Some of you had that. And the first meaning he gave of before was before in time,

[13:36] and like yesterday is before today, huh? And the second sense of before is in being, right? If this can be without that, but not vice versa. Aristotle gives example one is before what two, okay? You could say bricks are before a brick fireplace in the second sense because bricks can be without a brick fireplace, but not vice versa, right? Okay.

[14:07] Now, what is before in being may often also be before in time, but they're not the same sense of before. And I give example sometimes, you know, of a loaf of bread. If you get an unsliced loaf of bread and you take a nice long knife, you slice off one what piece of bread, right? And you slice off a second one, right? And then you slice off a third and so on.

[14:33] So one is not only before two in being here, but in time, right? Yeah. And two is before three, right? But if I say to the person in the bakery, "They're going to cut the sliced loaf, " and they have a machine there, it goes from zero to what twelve or thirteen or whatever the number is.

[15:02] And usually, you have one in time before two, right? But if you get two for one, right? You have twins, then you have two children at the same what? Time, right? So one was not before two in time in this case, right? If you had twins, but one would still be before two in being. One can be without two, right?

[15:29] And one of those children died, you still have one of them, right? Just like you got to part the brick fireplace. That's a real brick, or what? But since they knock these things apart, you know, and they actually sell the bricks, people like for some reason these old bricks, you know, they have been weathered and so on. But the bricks could still be without the brick wall. An example I often give is that of the word cat.

[15:54] If I write or print the word cat, the letter c is before the word cat in time as well as in being. But if I have a stamp, you know, where I just stamp the page and the whole word appears at once, then c is not before the word cat in time, is it? But it's still before in being. That's two different senses. Then the third sense of before is in the discourse of reason.

[16:23] Okay. Now, to each of these senses, you can attach other senses that, by assuming proximity, like any before in our knowledge, could be attached to that third sense. And then the fourth sense of before is much different. That's the sense of better. Better. Okay. What's the third sense again? Before in the discourse of reason. Before, therefore, in our knowledge, we lose to that, right? Just like the first sense of before in time, before in motion, huh?

[16:58] Or before in in place, huh? And Shakespeare, I think, I mentioned how he puns upon before in place and before in what? Goodness and being loved, huh? Because in in

[17:18] also it ends well. The Countess forces the the the daughter there, the doctor, to profess her love for her son, the Count, right? And she kind of kneels before the Countess, huh? And then she says, "And before you, in high heaven, huh? I say the next to heaven and before you I love your son to heaven, and before you, I love your son." So she's kneeling before the Countess, right?

[17:43] You know, the confession there, and but she next to heaven, and before the Count, she loves the son. That's the fourth sense, right? As opposed to the first sense. I'm kind of leading into something here now. In a moment, when Aristotle gets to those four senses, then he says

[18:09] there seems to be a fifth sense, the sense in which the cause is before the effect. And he gives that example where a cause might not be before in in being

[18:24] because you're sitting down cannot be without the statement you are sitting being true, right? That statement cannot be true without you're sitting. Yet you're sitting is the cause of its being true. I don't think that's fifth in place. I think it has a certain affinity of the second sense. That's kind of the crowning sense of before. Well, I was dealing with the students there. About the apology of Socrates, and Socrates says he's been examining the Athenians, especially about all the goods in human life, and he's been examining them about their seeming preference for the goods of the body and outside goods over the goods of the soul.

[19:13] And Socrates thinks this is a mistake. So at that point, I usually, you know, kind of stop and and discuss this, right? You know, which is better, the goods of the body or the goods of the soul or the outside goods? Huh? And I said we're going to, you know, award here, reward here, the gold medal and the silver medal and the bronze medal, right? Huh? But which gets the gold medal?

[19:42] Well, usually I take the outside goods and I pose them to both the goods of the body and the goods of the soul, the outside goods compared to the what? Inside goods. Okay. And I say now, we've already found out earlier in the course that the end or purpose is always better than what is for the sake of the end. So then at this point, I make an induction to show that the outside is for the sake of the inside.

[20:12] So my eyes and nose are not for the sake of my glasses, I think, but my glasses are the sake of my eye, and my body is not for the sake of my clothing, but my clothing is for the sake of my what? Body. And I tell them if your body was for the sake of your clothing, you'd be like one of those mannequins downtown in the department stores that are there to display the clothing, right?

[20:37] And I said, my ear for the sake of getting my automobile to to to school every day, or is the automobile there for the sake of getting my body and me to to school? Huh? And so is your notebook? Is your mind for the sake of your notebook? Or is your notebook in your book for the sake of your mind? Inductively, you can see that the outside is for the sake of the inside.

[21:01] Since the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, then we're going to have to say the inside goods are better, and therefore award the bronze medal to the outside goods. Then we say which is better now, the goods of the body, the goods of the soul? I say if you knew enough about the body and the soul, you'd know the body is for the sake of the soul, but you don't know enough about that.

[21:23] So then I go back to what we learned in Socrates or Shakespeare's imitation, right? They'll admit that man is better than a beast, right? Was man better than the beast by the goods he has in common with the beast? Obviously not. Therefore, he must be better than the beast by the goods he doesn't have in common. Those are the goods of the soul. So they must be better goods.

[21:48] And then I say, which is better, man or God? Right? Well, they admit that God is better. Well, the goods of the soul are more the godlike goods, huh? Than the goods of the body, huh? And of course, we're talking about the end or purpose of man: the act with reason, according to human virtue, and so on. And the end is always better, and the goods of the soul are obviously closer to the end.

[22:11] So finally, we end up awarding the gold medal to the goods of the soul, and the silver medal to the goods of the body, huh? Well, I say then to them, what do the Athenians have to say from their position? Well, they can't really think of anything to say in defense of the Athenians, huh? And they admit the Americans think the way the Athenians do. So I say, your whole life is based on a mistake.

[22:45] So I said, well, let let me help you. I try to help the opposite side. See, I say, huh? So my standard question is, which is better, to philosophize or to breathe? I know what they're going to say.

[23:03] So I was saying to breathe, right? I said, okay, now everybody who thinks to breathe is better to philosophize, raise your hand. Every hand goes up in the class, at least this class. Okay, how many think that to philosophize is better to breathe? But no hands went up, so I did this.

[23:23] Now there's one girl there who had been particularly quick to say, you know, breathing is better than philosophizing, right? So I said to her, no. Why? Why do you say breathing is better than philosophizing? And she gives the reason I think we most have in mind: that if you're not philosoph, if you're not breathing, you won't be doing anything else; you'll be dead, right? But if you're not philosophizing, you'll still be living, right?

[23:51] Okay. Okay. See now, what have you shown me? You've shown me that breathing is before philosophizing in the second sense of before. It's before in being, right? Yeah. But I didn't ask you whether it was before in the second sense. I asked, was it before in the fourth sense? Is it better? And can you say because it's before in the second sense of the word, therefore it's before in the fourth sense?

[24:21] Is that is that logical? See, I said, what if we said, you know, Chaucer is before Shakespeare in time, therefore he's better than Shakespeare? Is that a good argument? Huh? You can't reason because he's before in time, but therefore he's before in goodness. You can't reason from one sense of before to another sense, can you? No. No. That's that's that's the most common mistake in thinking, according to the father of logic.

[24:52] So that was no good," I said. "And you're deceived by the most common kind of mistake. Even though you we've talked to the senses of before, but you're still deceived, right? So now they did their kind of question. What did he do, right? Well, let me try to strengthen your argument a little bit more," I said. "Okay," I said. "Now,

[25:14] isn't the opposite of the worse better?" I say. Now, if someone says, for example, which is worse, if my cat gets killed or my son gets killed, which is worse? Son. Okay, so if it's worse that my son be killed than the cat be killed, then my son must be better than what? Cat. The cat, right? Huh? Okay. And what would be worse to have my ballpoint pen stolen by one of you guys, or to have my car stolen by one of you guys?

[25:49] Huh? Well, it's worse to have your car stolen. This car The car must be more valuable than the ballpoint pin, right? So that's probable, right? That the opposite of the worse is better. Now I said, what should be worse for me to stop philosophizing for the next hour, or to stop breathing for the next hour? Well, obviously, it'd be worse, right? To stop breathing, right? So now you have an argument, some probability that breathing is better than what philosophizing, huh?

[26:25] They said, however, I said, there is an important exception, huh, to the rule that the opposite of the worse is better. And what is that? Well, again, you got to know the senses of before and after. When the lesser good is before the greater good in being, in the second sense of before, that is when the lesser good can be without the greater good, but the greater good cannot be without the lesser good.

[27:02] Then the loss of the lesser good is worse than the loss of the greater good, because the loss of the lesser good will entail the loss of the greater good as well, while the loss of the greater good in that case would still leave you with the lesser good, with something. You see the idea? What would be an example? Well, example you just gave there, right? Breathing is before philosophizing, huh?

[27:32] In being, right? So if you stop breathing, you'll stop philosophizing as well. Right. But if you stop philosophizing, you won't stop breathing. Right. So the loss, therefore, of breathing is worse than the loss of philosophizing, because breathing is before philosophizing in being. And therefore, the loss of breathing also will result in the loss of what? Loss.

[28:04] Of philosophizing, right? But the loss of philosophizing would still leave you breathing. Isn't it? Now, the theological example is that of faith, hope, and charity, right? And Saint Paul is very clear. Church is very clear that charity is the greatest of the three virtues, right? So charity is better than hope, and hope is better than what? Faith. Yeah. But which is worse, to lose charity or to lose hope?

[28:38] Which is worse, to lose charity or to lose faith? Well, if faith is before hope and charity in being, as it is, then the loss of faith. Will entail the loss of hope and charity too, but the loss of charity would not entail the loss of hope or faith. So in that sense, the loss of the lesser good, faith, would be worse than the loss of charity, because it would involve, because it was being before and being, the loss of those as well.

[29:23] Yeah, it seems like the theological concept of faith, hope, and love, where obviously charity is the greatest, but faith, in the other sense of time, is is. Yeah, and also, but also, also in in being too, you say. But but with with breathing and philosophy, it's always breathing's more important. There is no well. No, no, no. Is it more important to be more necessary or better? More necessary.

[29:54] Yeah, yeah, yeah, and that's the second sense of before. It doesn't mean better though. So you're mixing up the second and the fourth sense of before. And as I say, you know the proposition I develop with them before I get into this is that the end is always better than what's for the sake of the end. So medicine is better than health, and knowing is better than studying, and having money is better than making money, and so on.

[30:19] And they kind of admit this inductively that the end is better, right? And then you you can also show it by that very universal statement that when the same belongs to two things, right? But to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause. You for that statement haven't you here? Usually, Aristotle or Thomas stated, maybe stated very briefly, you know, and it kind of looks more so.

[30:48] propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis, right? And if I always expand on it a little bit, huh? On account of which, more so. Okay.

[31:09] But more clearly, huh? This way. when the same belongs to two things, but to one of them because of the other? Okay. It belongs

[31:44] more to the cause. The one that is the cause. Yeah. Usually, I illustrate that with something very simple to begin with. I say, suppose sweet belongs to sugar and to my coffee, but to my coffee because of the sugar I put in it, which is sweeter. Sugar. Yeah. And the hot is said of the fire, the fireplace there, and of the air around the fireplace. But it's said of the air around the fireplace because of the fire, which is hot.

[32:35] The fireplace. Yeah. And a very obvious example: if wet is said of what water and the dishcloth, for the dishcloth because of water, which is wetter.

[32:50] And salty is said of salt, and my French fries, but of my French fries because of the salt, which is more salty. Okay. At the idea is basic principle. Okay. Now, when they apply it to every part of philosophy, like for example in logic, suppose in a syllogism,

[33:18] the conclusion is known, right? And the premises are known, but the conclusion is known through the premises, right? Which is more known? Yeah. And of course, if the premises were not more known than the conclusion, you wouldn't use the premises to prove the conclusion. You see the idea? No, sorry. Say that again, please. Yeah. If known is said of the premises of a syllogism, right? Perfect argument, right?

[33:50] And of the conclusion, huh? Okay. But it's said of the conclusion because of the premises. Right. Then the premises are more known than the conclusion. Okay. Is that always the case? Yeah. Okay. And because it wouldn't make any sense to say the premises were not more known than the conclusion, because you wouldn't try to prove, you know, one thing to another unless what you're using to prove the other was more known to one known.

[34:18] Yeah. Okay. Can't you prove it? Aren't they all the same? No. No. No. That's that's a subtle thing about this, huh? Yeah. Okay. Um. And then you're talking about a mover, right? And you say,

[34:38] "Who's moving this erasure? Me or the chalk? You. Yeah, but you could say that some way the chalk is moving too, right? Yeah. Right. But mover is said of me and the chalk, but of the chalk because of me, right? Right. So I'm more the mover than the chalk is, right? Yes. Understand the example is, you know, you're standing edge of the cliff, and I feel like I put a pole to your back, and chomp!

[35:15] over you go, right? Yeah. Now you punish the pole or you punish me for this crime? I didn't touch you. The pole did it, huh? But the pole pushed you over insofar as being moved by me, right? So I'm more the cause of your death than the poor pole, pole, right? Okay.

[35:45] Well, then we apply this to the end and the means. You have two. Things that are good are desirable, right? But the means is desired for the sake of the end, like medicine, say, is desired for the sake of health. So good is said of health and of medicine, but of the medicine because of health, which is gooder, which is more good or better.

[36:17] Yeah, yeah. And if knowing, if good is said of knowing and of studying, it's good to know, right? It's good for you students to study. But if studying is good because it leads to knowing, right? Which is gooder, better? No. Knowing, yeah, yeah, yeah. So

[36:44] going back to breathing, then, see, is breathing the end or purpose of life? Say, told them when I was a little boy, they used to see you eating a lot of candy or something, and they say to you, you know, in grade school, you eat to live or do you live to eat? And the answer is supposed to be that you eat to live, right? Huh? That's the correct answer.

[37:12] But some people get a little mixed up, right, about what this is all about, right? But does anybody think that his purpose of life is to breathe? See, do you live to breathe, or do you breathe to live?

[37:29] Now nobody makes breathing their end, right? But you know they make eating their their end, right? Eating would be the end, not the breathing. Okay. So therefore, breathing is for the sake of something else. That something else has to be better, right? And so, philosophizing is the end.

[37:53] Then breathing is not going to be as good as philosophizing. So they're finished off. Nothing to say. We know how important it is to see the different senses of before, right? Because first of all, you point out to them that they're arguing that breathing is better than philosophizing because it can be without philosophizing, not vice versa. So they're actually showing that breathing is before philosophizing in the second sense of before.

[38:32] Well, I didn't ask you was before in the second sense. I asked you which was what. What? In the fourth sense. In the fourth sense, which is better? And the main reason for saying that something is better is that it's the end.

[38:52] The same if I argued from some other sense. If I said, you know. I came before you in time, I say to the student. Therefore, I'm better than you. Oh no, you're better than me.

[39:05] I said, this is obviously a bad argument, isn't it? You see, what comes before in time might be better or might not be. You simply can't reason from one to the other, though, right? And

[39:19] well, but then when they try to, you know, I try to help them, you know, and then I try to help them with the idea that it's worse to stop breathing, huh? And there's some probability in saying the opposite of the worst is what Is better, right? That's true for the most part. But the exception is when the lesser good is what before in being. Then the loss of the lesser good is worse than the loss of the greater good.

[39:51] I took a very obvious example of that. I said, which is better, just to live or to live well? Well, they all admit that to live well is what better than to just live. But you can live without living well. But you can't live well without living, huh? So you're going to say living is better than living well?

[40:15] Mixing up two different senses of before. Now, one thing that that you see is that sometimes this is before that in more than one sense of before. So Homer, for example, is before in time, you know, Aeschylus or Euripides and so on. He's also before in sense of being better, huh? But when you see the order reversed, you very clear the different senses. So Chaucer, you know, Chaucer comes before Shakespeare in English literature, but all the critics put Shakespeare before Chaucer.

[40:55] But two different senses of before clearly there because it's just the reverse. Chaucer is before Shakespeare in one sense, and in the reverse sense, Shakespeare is before Chaucer. Now, all that's to lead up to what Thompson was saying here, right? If that isn't bad enough, the five senses of before, when you talk about the cause being before the effect, there's more than one meaning of the word cause.

[41:25] And what's most essential here is to see the difference between a cause in the sense of matter or the subject or something, and a cause in the sense of of the mover or maker or the end or the purpose. And they're going to be before in two different ways, huh?