De Anima (On the Soul)
98. Summa I, q. 78, a. 1: Why Five Genera of Powers, Four Grades of Life, Three Souls
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/098-summa-i-q-78-a-1-why-five-genera-of-powers-four-grades-of/

[0:00] Same Holy Spirit, you know. So, beginning question seventy-eight, huh? Let me read Thomas' little proemium there. Then he says, "We're not to consider about the powers of the soul in particular or in special." Now he says, "To the consideration of the theologian, huh? It belongs to the consideration theologian to inquire, in particular, only about the what intellectual powers, huh? And the appetitive powers, in which the virtues are what found, huh?

[0:41] Okay. But because the knowledge of these powers in some way depends upon others, right? Therefore, our consideration of the powers of the soul in particular will be three parts, huh? Into three parts. For first, we will consider about those things which are what preambles, huh? You heard that word before, right preambles to the faith, the things that what walked before, yeah, literally, huh? That are preambles to the understanding.

[1:16] Secondly, he's going to talk about the intellectual powers themselves, and third, about the what appetitive powers, huh? The desiring powers, huh? But about the first four things are sought, and first about the genera of powers of the soul. Now you know what a genus is, don't you?

[1:40] It's a general kind of thing, right? So these five genera of powers he's going to distinguish under each one. There'll be a number of particular kinds of powers, right? Okay, and he'll be distinguishing them eventually. Now this is what Aristotle did, if you recall, in the second book about the soul. After he defined the soul, right? Then he took up and distinguished the five genera of powers, okay, and then he took up the powers of the living soul or the.

[2:18] Feeding soul or the the vegetative soul, if you want to put it that way, right? And Thomas will, in the second article, talk about the three species of the plant part, right? Okay. And then he'll talk about the exterior or outward senses: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. In the third article, and the fourth one, he'll talk about the what interior senses. And he'll be more complete talking about the interior senses than Aristotle is in the what third book about the soul.

[2:53] Though Aristotle talks about them some more in the book on memory and reminiscence and so on. Okay. Now, of course, Aristotle, the consideration of the what of these three in particular, there'll be in the second, third, and fourth article, is more lengthy, right? Huh? Okay, then Thomas will be here. But there is the exception there that with The interior powers. Thomas goes a little bit more into it with the help of the Arab philosophers too.

[3:23] Okay. Now the first article: Whether the five genera of powers of the soul should be distinguished. To the first, one proceeds thus: It seems that there are not five genera of powers of the soul to be distinguished, namely the feeding parts, right? The sensing part, the desiring part, the part that is motive according to place, and the what? Intellectual part.

[4:00] Now, you know the order in which those five are enumerated. Yeah, in a way. Yeah. And in particular, you could say the vegetative powers are found in the plants and the animals, right? And in man himself, but they are all that the plant has. Then the sensitive one is something that the beasts have, and as well as man, but the plants don't have that, right? And the appetitive powers, well there are some falling upon having sense, others will be falling upon having understanding.

[4:44] But he puts it here at third because there's going to be some kind of desiring power falling upon the existence of sense. And then, if you have the higher powers, the higher senses, the senses of no exterior things, like seeing and hearing, and you desire things that are a distance from you, then you have this next part coming up, which is to move from one place to another.

[5:10] And not all animals have that because there's some low kind of animals that seem to be almost like plants in the ground and the ocean there, right? And they don't move from place to place. Their food comes to them with the movement of water. But man has all those plus the intellectual powers.

[5:35] Now, of course, if you recall in logic, we had the rule of two or three, right? And this, of course, would seem to be a what? Exception to the rule of two or three, right? Okay. But nevertheless, two or three does sometimes come up in talking about the parts of the soul, like in the first objection, right? For he says the powers of the soul are said to be its parts.

[6:03] Sometimes they call potential parts, parts of its power. But there are three parts of the soul commonly assigned by all, namely. The what living soul you could call that the vegetabilis soul because life is first found what in those powers yeah the sensing soul right and the reasonable soul right the rational soul

[6:33] so Aristotle and others following him distinguished just three souls the plant soul and the animal soul and the human soul huh so should we divide the powers into three according to these three huh therefore there are only three genera of powers of the soul and not five huh okay there is something trying to get back to three right

[7:08] now sometimes they divide the powers of the soul into two and the distinction that they make there is between whether the power acts upon the object or the object acts upon the power see so among those five genera of powers in the sensing and intellectual and the desiring powers those three they are originally at least right acted upon by their objects

[7:41] but the living powers the vegetative powers there and the one that is motive according to place they seem to be powers that act upon their what object right like the power of digestion acts upon food and so on and you're active there and moving from one place to another

[8:07] so there is one way to divide the powers into two and sometimes Aristotle or Thomas do touch upon that but at the place where they're formally distinguishing the powers of the soul they usually divide it right away into these what five huh okay

[8:26] now the second objection the powers of the soul are the sources of the operations of life but in four ways something is said to live and these are sometimes called the four grades of life for the philosopher says in the second book about the soul

[8:50] in many ways to live being said although one of these exists in something alone we say that it lives if it just is one of these as intellect and sense and motion and rest according to place and motion according to

[9:12] Food, yeah, and then growth and or decrease and growth, right? Yeah. Okay. Well, sometimes they distinguish four grades of life, they'll have the plant life, and then those animals, right? That don't move from place to place. They kind of resemble plants, but aren't really plants because they have sensation, and they'll feel pain if you stick them with a needle or something. And then you have the animals that move from place to place, and then finally you have the human life, right?

[9:42] Yeah. Okay. Well, there's reasons why there's only four grades of life, even though there are five powers, and that's because at least one of the genera powers, the desiring powers, always follow upon the knowing powers. So the sense desire follows upon sense, and the will follows upon reason understanding. So since it always accompanies that power, it doesn't give you a separate grade of life. You don't have some animal that has sensation but not desire.

[10:12] Sense desire, right? Desire for what is pleasing to the senses. You don't have someone who has a understanding but no will. See, so the appetitive powers go with the sensing or the understanding powers. They accompany them, so you don't really have a separate what level of life corresponding to them. Do you see that? See, you can have the plant powers all by themselves, without sensing powers, like you have in the plants, right?

[10:45] You can have the what plant powers and the sensing powers without motion from one place to another, as in these low forms of animal life that seem to be fixed to the for the ocean and so on. And you can have the plant powers and the sensing powers and the power to move one place to another without having understanding or reason. And then finally, you have man who has all of these that we've mentioned plus the ability to understand.

[11:26] So I was touching upon those four there. Therefore, there are only four genera of powers of the soul. The desiring power being excluded by this,

[11:41] but not really excluded; it goes along with or follows upon the other. Moreover, to that which is common to all powers, one ought not to make a special genus of the soul? But to desire belongs to every power of the soul. For sight

[12:09] desires what is suitably. Visible, Hence, it's said in the Book of Ecclesiastes, chapter forty, verse twenty-two, the eye desires what? What is gracious and and beautiful, right? And so, and it's for the same reason every power desires an object what suitable to itself. Therefore, not not to, well, not not to lay down the desiring power as one special genus of powers of the soul. And notice we even speak of plants as liking something, right?

[12:45] Oh yeah yeah. You go to the nursery there, you know, and you bring a plant, and they say, well, this plant likes a lot of sun, right? Yeah. Or this plant likes the shade. You see. So we do speak of what And seeking something suitable to them, right? Sure. And there's some you know trees that really want water, you know, and they'll get around your your your pipes, everything.

[13:10] It'd be a problem, I guess, some of these southern trees. And of course Aristotle, if you recall, even speaks of matter desiring form. Oh. Okay.

[13:29] But all he means is that matter is ordered to form; it's what perfection, it's completion. Moreover, the moving principle in animals is sense, or understanding, or desire, as said in the third book about the soul. We saw that those of you who were with me when he did the third book on the soul.

[13:54] So the animal sees something and he desires it, and this is behind his moving towards it, right? Okay. And therefore, this wants to exclude the power to move the body from one place to another, as a separate genus. Well, reduce it to desire and sensation.

[14:17] But now, against all this stuff, is what the philosopher says in the second book about the soul: the powers of the soul we call the what? Living powers, huh? The sensing powers, the desiring powers, the motive according to place, and the intellectual powers. Huh? At the same order he had at the beginning of the article. Notice it, right?

[14:47] Now, Thomas here in the very first paragraph here of the response, he distinguishes a five, a four, and a what? Three. Oh, yeah. And I playfully, huh? He points to the fact, that you're a doctor, right? Oh, yeah. Three, four, and five with regular numbers, huh? Is the first sides of a what? Right angle triangle. Yeah. So if you had say three and four,

[15:20] and this is a right angle, what would the last one be? Five. Yeah. So it's kind of a little mnemonic device that I have, right? So nine, sixteen, and twenty-five, right? Okay. And

[15:38] this is one place where three, four, and five come up. It's kind of nice to remember them because it's a regular order like that. But they're related geometrically, huh? This way. But you have something like that when you study the Trinity, huh? Because they have five notions,

[15:57] four relations, three persons, and you have to understand why is there only three persons when there are four relations, huh? Say. And why, if there is only four relations, are there five notions to make known these things? You are not going to talk about the Trinity today. I just mentioned that three, four, five will come back there, right? Okay. And here the question is: Why do you have three souls, four grades of life, but five genera of powers?

[16:38] Okay. Well, the distinction is a little bit different, right? The reason why you say there are three souls, and the reasons why you say there are four genera of powers, and the reasons why you say, excuse me, four grades of life, and the reasons why you say there are five genera of powers, right, is what different somewhat, right? But there is a connection, right? Okay.

[17:10] But why do why does the five genera of powers, after all, the five genera of powers, is the way you know the souls eventually, right? Because as Aristotle taught us, and Thomas has repeated in the earlier articles, we know the soul through its powers, the powers through their acts, and the acts through their objects, right? Okay. So the question is, how do you get from five down to what three, right?

[17:39] I see. Or why from five you get down to four? Uh huh. So, genera, the four grades of life, but only down to three souls. Okay. And then we're now used to asking about the Trinity. If there are five notions, they call them

[18:02] thoughts making known the Trinity in some way, right? If there are five thoughts making known the Trinity, why are there only four relations? If there is four relations, why are there only three persons? Why that five, four, three, right? Why nothing explain that today? But here we want to see why five kinds of powers gives you only four grades of life, and four grades of life, unless there is only three what souls, okay?

[18:40] Well, it's probably easier to see why five general powers gives you four grades of life. And the reason for that is that one kind of power, the appetitive or desiring powers,

[18:54] always accompany the knowing powers. Okay. So if you have sensation, you are going to have one kind of desiring power, what they call the sense desire.

[19:09] And if you have understanding, you are going to have another kind of desiring power, which is called the will, right? So it's not going to constitute a separate what grades you up a level, right?

[19:26] So you can have the living powers, the power of of feeding yourself, the power of growing, reproducing, right? Without having the sense powers, right? But nothing has the sense powers without having what the living powers, okay? But you can have the sense powers without having the power to move from one place to another. At least the lower senses like touch, right? Okay.

[19:54] But you don't have the power to move from one place to another without having sensation. See? So that's a little higher stage. But you can have the power to move from place to place without having understanding, right? But the living bodies that have understanding, right? They have all the other ones, huh? Okay. But the desiring powers don't give you a separate what level because they're going to follow upon or accompany the

[20:32] knowing powers, right? Do you see that? Okay. So sensation, huh? If you can sense, huh? Then you can have pleasure or pain, huh? So if something's either in agreement, right, or not, huh? So if they stick a pin in one of those kind of plant-like animals, there, right, they will retract as if in pain, huh? See? And something, you know, if the water comes into contact with them, they will.

[21:01] So we're surrounded, right? Grab it, so to speak, huh? Okay. So if they have sensation, they're going to have some pleasure or pain, and therefore something like desire, right? Okay. And a fortiori, if you have reason, you're going to have some kind of desire that's tied to reason, the ability to choose, the will itself. See? But having sensation, at least the sense of touch, isn't automatically followed by the ability to move from one place to another.

[21:33] See? That is going to give you a constant separate grade of life, yeah. Some may not be familiar with what a fortiori means that you just used. Yeah. Explain briefly what that means. Even more so, right? Yeah. You know, if someone says, if fornication is bad, then even more so is what? Yeah, is stealing. You know, your book is bad, right? A fortiori, stealing your what? Taking your life, right?

[22:10] Okay. There's these places that you have in dialectic, you know, where if something belongs, where it's less apt to belong. It will belong, or it's more apt to belong, right? Oh yeah. See. In other words Now, if fornication is bad, then you can argue that adultery must be bad, right? If stealing is bad, then murder must be bad, right? Yeah. You see? But you couldn't argue that way around, right?

[22:36] Because murder is more apt to be something bad than stealing, right? Right. Or adultery is more apt to be something bad than fornication, right? Okay. So if you say adultery is bad, you're not forced to say that that fornication is bad. But if you admit that fornication is bad, then even more so would you say say that adultery is going to be something bad? Huh? Do you see that?

[22:57] Okay. So it's not too hard to see. Do you see why five genera powers give you only four levels of life or four grades of life? Do you see why that's so?

[23:11] Because one of the five genera always accompanies one. of The others right? So it doesn't constitute a separate step up, right? In life. But why do you have only three souls?

[23:27] Well, sometimes they do so in terms of the idea. We all have when we think about the soul. We think of the soul as something kind of

[23:42] above the merely material, right? Okay. And there seems to be three distinct ways of rising above matter. And the plant soul seems to rise above matter the least, huh? Because it uses you know the qualities of matter in order to perfect its operations and so on. But it has a certain you know

[24:08] order that matter doesn't have. It can grow up and go down, right? It can move itself to some extent in growth and so on. But then you get sensation. You're getting something that seems much more immaterial than digestion does, right? Or even reproduction or growing, so. But then you get to reason that's entirely immaterial. It. Doesn't even have a body organ. huh? So there are three kinds of what rising above mere matter, right?

[24:40] Rising above non-living matter. Three distinct ways. The ability to move from place to place doesn't seem to be that characteristic of rising above matter. huh? As an automobile shows, huh?

[24:57] But anyway, let's see how he says here. And the diversity and the reason for this diversity, he says, because diverse souls, like I was just saying, are distinguished according as in diverse ways the operation of the soul rises above, right? The operation of bodily, a mere bodily nature, huh?

[25:26] Of course, Aristotle, you know, with the old chemistry of earth, air, fire, and water, right? These bodies, when you left them by themselves, either went up or went down. The heavy bodies would go down, like the earth and the water, and the light ones, the air and the fire, would go up.

[25:50] And they seems to be determined to one or the other. But the tree grows what? Down and up. Yeah. So it seems to transcend in some way the limitation of what the non-living matter, just material. Let's say what Thomas develops this. For the whole of bodily nature, huh? The living body nature is subject to the soul, right?

[26:23] And is compared to it in two ways: as what matter and as what tool, right? Okay. He says there is a certain operation of the soul which so much exceeds bodily nature that is not even what exercised through a bodily organ. And that's what we said about the reason, huh? The understanding, the universal reason.

[26:59] And we'll come back to that when we study those powers again. And such is the operation of the what reasonable soul, right? The rational soul, the understanding soul, huh? Okay. So there is an operation, understanding, and also willing, for that matter, that transcend the body, right? They're not in the body, right? Right. They very much rise above this, huh? Okay.

[27:26] Now he says there is, however, another operation of the soul below that, which, to be sure, takes place through a bodily organ, not, however, through some bodily quality. And such is the operation of the sensing soul, because although cold, hot, and cold, wet, and dry, and other qualities, bodily qualities of these sort, are required for the operation of sense, nonetheless, is not by the power of such qualities that the operation of the sensing soul proceeds, but they are required only for a well disposed what organ, huh?

[28:09] Okay. Now, as other ways, you can kind of see that, huh? You know, if I remember, you people recognize you. It's because I've seen your face, your shape, right? Your color, right? Kind of your beard and so on. And

[28:30] I have your shape and color now inside my what sense memory, huh? But if you cut open my head, do you think you'd find, you know, a little statue of you?

[28:46] No, it seems to be somewhat immaterial, right? The way it's there, huh? It's not not piece of bone or flesh or any sort of blood, right? It's chiseled out in your shape, isn't it?

[29:00] So it seems to be more immaterial than what the plant has. Plant doesn't receive in that way. And we also sometimes point out, you know, how a stock example is that of the man in the shower, right? When he first gets into the shower. The water feels what? Oh, it feels hot. Yeah, it feels hotter. Yeah, yeah. After he's been in there for a while, it doesn't feel as hot, right?

[29:28] And then he turns up the heat a little bit. See, but what has happened? See. Well, when he first was in the shower, he is receiving the heat or feeling the heat of the water, not as his own bodily heat, right? But as the heat of the what? Water itself, right? But as that starts to become the temperature of his own body, then he doesn't sense it so much anymore, does he?

[29:55] See. Mm-hmm. So there's two kinds of reception going on there, right? One is receiving the heat of the water as the heat of the water, right? The water is hot. The other is receiving it like anybody receives heat, right? Or you become hot yourself, huh? Okay. And when I go swimming in the ocean there in the summer, you know, and it's kind of cold, you first step in,

[30:27] I have to kind of, you know, gradually custom myself to it, you know. It's like I'd have a heart attack just running, running like that. You see? Um.

[30:38] Don't you get these little kids there? I remember my friend Raymond Rowe. He'd be down to the beach there, and some kid gonna come splash you, you know? And he splashed me. I hold your head in the water. He'd say. But after you've been in the water for a while, it doesn't feel so what? Cold, right? Huh? And people say, oh, it feels wonderful once you get in there.

[30:57] That's they're always saying to you, right? Huh? See, but since your body is gradually being what? Accustomed to it, right? That's actually the big part that gets accustomed to it that I can really jump in it all the way. You see? But again, I'm not feeling the cold as much as I did first, right? Because it's become what? The coldness of my body, just like of anybody, right?

[31:19] But the way the senses are receiving is something different, huh? In the way that matter receives, huh? And it's receiving the coldness of the water more in the way of sensing it in the beginning than later on, where it doesn't sense the coldness of the water so much. Okay.

[31:39] So he's going the reverse order that I did, right? He's starting from the most immaterial, working way down, huh? Because our soul, in some ways, is most known to us, huh?

[31:52] Now, the lowest of the operations of the soul are those that take place through a bodily organ and in virtue of some bodily quality, huh?

[32:05] And you can see that even in digestion, right, huh? You know that there's chemicals in my body, right? That are breaking the food down in my stomach or cold in wherever it is down there, right? And you could probably imitate those what? Chemicals, right, in the non-living world, right, and break food down by means of them, huh? Although they're being organized in a way that's unique to the living thing.

[32:31] So there, you're much closer to matter, what way matter is. But nevertheless, it goes above the operation of body nature, because the motions of bodies, non-living bodies, are from an exterior what principle or source, huh? But these operations of the plant are from an intrinsic principle, and this is common to all the operations of the soul, for everything that has a soul in some way moves itself, and such is the operation of the what living soul, huh?

[33:10] The vegetable soul. I think that's the idea of living in Latin. For digestion, for example, and those things which follow upon it, come about instrumentally through the action of heat. We could say other chemicals. You know, no more sophisticated chemistry than he has, right? As I said in the third book of the soul, right, or second book of the soul. So Aristotle would say, Are you digesting? Is it the soul digesting the food or fire digesting the food?

[33:37] Huh? We'd say, fire as a tool of that soul or that power of the soul. Okay. Of course, what Aristotle was struck by is the way in which fire in the inanimate world just kind of burns as long as there is material there to burn, right? You see. Well, in the case of a living thing, you digest the thing and you arrange it, you know, and fill out your body that way, huh?

[34:06] So it's like the the chemicals are what in the service of that soul and that power of that soul. Okay. So that that's the reason why you have three souls. They're distinguished by what? The thought that a soul is something that, in a way, is immaterial or, in some way, it's rising above matter. Huh? Everybody has a notion about the soul, right? That's why they're so kind of surprised when you speak of of the plant as having a soul.

[34:41] You see, and I'm down there at Spags with my wife or something, looking at all these plants. Everyone's got a soul, Rosalie, you know. You must think you're cuckoo, you know, It's like talking about a soul. But it makes more sense to talk about a soul when you talk about an animal, right? But especially you talk about man, right? But it's because you're thinking of the soul as being something that what is rising above matter in some way, a little bit distinguishing these things from something that is merely material.

[35:14] Okay. We sometimes attribute to the cat a personality, right, of some sort, even though it's not a person in the in the sense of the definition of a person, right? But Tabitha

[35:30] after breakfast would always what want to go outside and hunt, and Moppet wanted to go and sit in the window there and watch the world go by. Other people like that, right? You know, they go getters, doers, and so on. If you want to say that, the what the priest said today,

[35:49] Master, he said there seem to be three kinds of people, right? Huh? You know, maybe you heard this before. Those who make things happen, right? And then those who watch things happen, and then those who ask why did that happen? I don't know exactly what point you're going to make of this, but. But yet, there's kind of the differences between the cats, right? You know, the one is right, wakes you at the door, wakes you to open the door, she go out to go for a morning hunt, you know, the active type.

[36:22] The other one is like, you know, an old lady sitting in the thing there sipping her tea or something, right? And watching the world go by and commenting on it and so on.

[36:39] I know it doesn't mean to deny entirely that the genera of powers are important for distinguishing the souls, right? But the emphasis is upon a distinct, but rising above matter. And there seems to be only three ways there in which you rise above matter in a very distinctive way, at least in the case of the plant soul, much more in the case of the animal soul, but most of all in the case of the human soul.

[37:10] Okay. Of course, that's distinguished in a sense. I mean, that's alluded to when we talk about plants and animals and man, right? And the thinking of that, of that. Now he says the genera of the powers of the soul are distinguished according to their objects.

[37:35] You could say by their acts, and their acts by their objects, but they're ultimately by their objects. Now he says, the higher a power is,

[37:49] the more universal is the object that it what looks towards, huh? As has been said above. But the object of the operation of the soul can be considered in a threefold order. Now he's back to threes. He's kind of sticking up in this, he's sticking up in five through three, right? Okay.

[38:15] For the object of some power of the soul is only the body united to the soul, and this genus of powers of the soul is called the what? Living powers, the plant powers. For the living power acts only in the body to which the soul is what? United, huh?

[38:45] Okay. There is, however, another genus of powers of the soul which regards a more universal object, namely every sensible body, and not only the body joined to the soul.

[39:04] There is, however, another genus of powers of the soul that regards a still more universal object, not only. Sensible body, but universally, every being, everything. So he's thinking a distinction between the senses now, right? And the animals that have senses, they take into account other bodies, rather than sensible bodies. They can sense things, and not only sense their own body, right? But they can sense bodies around them, right?

[39:34] See, but the tree doesn't seem to be aware of the bodies around it. It seems to have all its operations tied to its own body, sending its roots down, or you know, sending its shoots out, and so on. But then you get to man, who has reason, understanding, and his object extends not only to all sensible bodies, but even to the angels and God, right? And truth and all these immaterial things.

[40:09] Now he says what the last two have in common, from which it is clear that these two second genera of powers of the soul have an operation not only with respect to the thing that is joined to the soul, but also with respect to something extrinsic.

[40:31] Okay, and that's going to give rise to a whole number of powers. For since the one operating is necessary for, in some way, that he be joined to the object about which he operates, it is necessary that that extrinsic thing, which is the object of operation of the soul, be compared to the soul in two ways, huh? Okay, now what are those two ways, huh? In one way, according as it is apt to be joined to the soul and to be in the soul by its what likeness, huh?

[41:08] Okay. And also he's thinking of there, right? This is this is the contrast, first of all, between the the knowing powers and the desiring powers, huh? That the knowing powers, in a way, arise from the exterior object coming in to be in some way, right? So the color comes into my eye, right? Or the sound comes into my ear, right? Okay, and I can remember the colors and the sounds.

[41:35] I have a likeness of the color and the sound contained in my memory, right? But then, if I sense, let's say, some good food, I'm hungry, right? Then by my desire, I tend to what go out to the thing itself, in itself, okay? That's a very important distinction which Aristotle first made and makes very explicitly in the end of the sixth book of wisdom, huh? The truth is primarily in the mind, but the good is in things, huh?

[42:15] And that's why they say in this life, anyway, the will is more proportioned to God than the reason, because reason is trying to put God into it.

[42:29] Why love is going into the object love, right? I left my heart in San Francisco, right? Well, everybody knows the famous story there: the little boy there trying to put the ocean into the little what hole in the beach, right? And Augustine says you can't fit the ocean in there, and the little boy said, "Well, neither can you fit the Trinity into your mind, right? " But notice, I can't put the ocean into me, but I can jump into the ocean, right?

[42:58] See, and knowing is like putting the ocean into me, right? But loving is like jumping into the ocean. So, so it refers to something outside, right? But the knowing is more bringing the outside. Inside, huh

[43:18] My love is going out. My heart goes out to you. We say, right? My heart goes out to those in need, and so on. Okay. So,

[43:34] let's go back and read that first part there. That sentence: since the one operating must, in some way, be joined to its object about which it operates, it is necessary that the extrinsic thing, the outside thing, which is the object of the operation of the soul, is necessary to be compared to the soul in two ways, right? Okay. In one way, as it is apt to be joined to the soul and to be in the soul, right, to its likeness, huh?

[44:05] And as far as this is concerned, there are two genera of powers, but these are the two knowing powers, right? To wit, the sensing power, right, with respect to an object which is less common, namely the sensible body, and the understanding power with respect to an object which is most common, which is being what, universally speaking, huh?

[44:30] In another way, according as the soul itself is inclined and tends towards the exterior thing, and according to this comparison, there are also two genera of powers of the soul. One, the desiring power, by which the soul is compared to the extrinsic thing as to an end, which is first an intention, huh? And the other, the power which is motive according to place,

[45:03] in so far as the soul is compared to an exterior thing as to the limit of its operation and motion. For falling upon something being desired and intended, every animal what is moved, right, towards that, huh? Okay.

[45:28] So that's kind of interesting, huh? He distinguishes what those four for the five genera of powers, right, by taking into account that you know something;

[45:45] your object is more universal than just your own body, right? The living powers are just in your own body, right? Say, but the other powers, in some way, regard not only your own body, but even sensible, but something outside you, right? Okay. More universally, the the reason than the than the senses, huh? So, but once he has that, then he speaks of a twofold what connection, right?

[46:18] Either you try to bring the exterior thing into you, right, to know it, or you desire to go out for it. That's an interesting way the way Thomas approaches that, huh?

[46:45] And you see what he's talking about the angels, you know, and he showed the angels have understanding first, right? But by understanding things outside the angel or in the angel, right? But now it's also a way in which the angels related to things outside of them. Well, that's through will, right? So he's got will as well as what understanding,

[47:09] huh? So if I'm going to have a full, we might say, connection, something outside of me, right? I've got to be able to bring something outside of me into me in some way, right? And I got to be able to go out for it, right? Okay. And I bring it into me by my senses or by my reason, huh? Okay. I go out to it by desiring it, right, and by moving to get it.

[47:42] Yeah. This reminds me of my nephew. He's five years old at the time, and I was going up to visit my my brother, yeah, a friend of mine from Ghana, yeah, black guy from Ghana, and this nephew Jack never seen a black man before, yeah. So he walks into the house, and Jack, you know, he's a real smart kid, high IQ. and all that stuff But. As soon as he was in the house, Jack is like only about two feet away.

[48:10] He's just like he was making all kinds of funny noises because his senses were taking in this, you know, the the this different smells and all. So he was just, you know, never saw a black person before. So you could see him thinking, and his mother was saying, "Are you okay, Jack?" Because Jack was kind of like,

[48:26] you know, and you could just sense all these different things going on: sensory, intellectual, and probably saying, "Oh my God, my panic is going." Yeah. So you you take it for granted, but I guess in that situation, you know, you just see something new in a lot of different ways. You just you know, it's kind of interesting all these different powers working at the same time. We see a child with a toy, right?

[48:48] I mean, the toy acts upon his senses first, right, and then he reaches out for it. He has hand and eye coordination, right? And he wants it in some way, right? He wants to pick it up. Thank God this guy had this guy, this friend of mine had a real big smile, Francis, yeah, on his face. So it was a real good impression for me, first impression, as opposed to one that usually isn't.

[49:08] My mother came from a small town in Minnesota. There weren't any blacks in Downey, yeah. We went down to the big cities, you know, with the little boy one time, and a black child came along, right? Go home and wash your face. You didn't say face and face. If it's your face, go home and wash your face. And it is some funny stories of somebody trying to, you know, you know, scrub, you know, the black guy make him white and clean, you know.

[49:33] If you probably kill the poor guy for getting skin white. Okay. So this is something of universal importance. The first talk I ever gave out at St. Out at Thomas Aquinas College was on the the contrariety of love and knowledge, huh? They're not contraries in the strict sense, but there is a kind of a contrariety in the way they work, huh? And it's because you know it's reflected in things like like to grasp, right?

[50:14] That's perfection of knowing, huh? To be able to grasp something, but grasping doesn't seem perfect love, right? Love is more what giving, right? Huh? Okay. So in a sense, the contrast between giving and taking corresponds to the what contrast between knowing and loving, huh?

[50:37] Ah, but so when I grasp something or take it, I contain it, right? In my hand, but when I give, something goes out of me, right? And that's the way love is, huh?

[50:56] And so love is said to be what in the thing loved, huh? I left my heart in San Francisco. The popular song says, "Right, Christ says, 'Where your treasure is, there your heart shall be, ' right? " Augustine says in his Latin there that the soul is more ubi amat quam animata. It's more where it loves than where it animates huh it animates, huh?

[51:23] But also, you know, if you don't want to do something, you see, my heart's not in it. Say, my heart's not in it. That's where we speak, huh?

[51:33] Um. And I would say to them, you know, it's always bad to lose your mind. It's not always bad to lose your heart. It depends on who you lose it to. You see. Okay. So there is

[51:55] a kind of contrariety in the way these two work, right? And this is a twofold relation that Thomas is saying that you have to the exterior thing, right? One whereby it comes into you, right? At least the likeness of it comes into you, right? And that's the knowing powers, huh? And they can be divided into two: the sensing and the understanding powers. But then you have these other powers whereby you.

[52:23] You tend toward something outside yourself by desire, right, and actually acquiring it by what locomotion? It's interesting that two-fold, you know, connection with something outside of us. As they say, that's you know the reason they give why the will is more proportioned to God, especially in this life, right? Than reason is, huh? Because you're trying to put God into your mind, your low mind, right? You see, Which is not adequate to holding Him, so to speak, right?

[53:06] But in the case of loving, your heart's going out into God, huh? Okay, Okay. and that's why even even. In the case of of faith, there, right? The the reason is moved by the will, huh? If the will is more proportioned to God in this life, anyway, and that's also why you can what love God in Himself, huh? But you don't know Him in Himself in this life, huh?

[53:40] It's only when He comes into your mind as that by which you understand, as well as what you understand. So that's a very, very, very, very important contrast he has there.

[53:59] When you always make that qualification of in this life, so it does change in the next life. Well, the next life, when you see God as He is face to face, then you will love Him more than you could love Him in this life. Okay. And that's perhaps the meaning, you know, of the words of Christ. There, you know, he talks about the great John the Baptist, right?

[54:21] But he who is least in heaven is greater than him. What does that mean? Well, as long as Saint John the Baptist is still in this world, right? Huh? He doesn't see God as He is, huh? Yeah. And therefore, he doesn't have the amount of love of God that the lowest saint has in seeing God as He is. Oh, yeah. But once he gets to heaven and he sees, you know, the vision that's appropriate to him for his love of God, then he will love God more than he loved Him in this life.

[54:48] huh Okay. You know, what Scripture says you know God would be all in all things, right? Omnia in omnibus, right? Huh? You know, it will be kind of

[55:01] supposedly you are going to be preoccupied with God in this world. Yeah. How pretty preoccupied, right? You know. Very interesting. See that. Yeah. Yeah. Now, just talking to students, you know, even the metaphors. Shakespeare was quoting them in logic class as a fun event. I say. Shakespeare says, "Lovers and madmen have such seething brains, huh? Such shaping fantasies that apprehend more than cool reason ever comprehends, huh?

[55:37] " At least they keep your cool. Usually, thinking of your reason, right? Keep your cool. So, and on a hot day, I always make some kind of a bad joke about logic keeping us cool. But why do you think of love as hot?

[55:53] And the reason as cold, huh? Because hot and cold are contrary, aren't they? Because the hot thing tends to expand or overflow, right? You see, and that's what love does, right? It goes out to things, to other people, and everything, right? See, so it overflows, so to speak, the heart, huh? Like the hot thing on the stove, it overflows, and you know that's where the heart goes.

[56:20] You know, my heart goes out to you. We say, right? You know, especially you see someone in need or something like that, right? Or some misfortune, you know. My heart goes out to you, right? Then you know, sympathy to somebody who's lost something. Your heart goes out to them, right? See, why the coal is kind of contracted into itself, right? And so we use the word concentrate for the mind, huh?

[56:43] In the case of the mind, distraction is impediment to deep thinking, isn't it? Tarkov says we live in the age of distraction. My students are very distracted, but

[56:57] but concentration, right? Concentric, right? You know, but the mind is what kind of retreating into itself, huh? Saint Thomas at the beginning of the day, "Hebdomadis right. He has a quote from the Sapiential books, and Sapiential book says, "Run into your house and play with your thoughts." And Thomas says, "Well, that's the mind. What kind of withdrawing into itself, right? And meditating on these things, right? Like Mary kept these things in her heart, right?

[57:33] She thought about them, huh? Okay. And well, he compares it to play because play is is pleasant and chosen for its own sake, right? And that's the way the life of the mind is, huh? But that's the way of speaking. Run into your house there, and you know, close the door, right? You know, right? And then you think about these things, huh? You know, you try to find a you know quiet place to think, huh?

[57:55] Without distraction, soundproof your door the way D. Tarkov used to do, right? He couldn't hear you knock the door. Yeah. It's interesting, though, that you love is kind of equated with with just kind of doing things sometimes that don't make sense, you know. Yeah. And at the same time, you know, we always talk about love is not an emotion, even though some people say it is. Love is a choice, so so there is this kind of like dual kind of definition going for love that can kind of you know what at one time it's an emotion, it's just you know you do something that doesn't make sense, and another time it's no, it's not an emotion.

[58:37] When you get married to somebody, you say I love you. It's a choice. It's not it's not a feeling. So it's kind of interesting. You're still kind of going outside yourself, you see. Ecstasy, you know, is is one of the effects of love. You'll find out when you do love and friendship, you know. But ecstasy is just an outside yourself, huh? And that's what we see about somebody when they're very concerned about somebody else, you know.

[59:00] They're beside themselves, right? No longer, y'all, outside yourself. You're beside yourself, right? Huh? Yeah But that doesn't describe the mind being that way, right? The mind is more concentrated in itself, huh? What did you say about love and heat, love and the warmth that sense? Why? Well, I'm saying that the the hot expands, right? Hot expands. This is a metaphor, obviously. Sure. And it overflows, right? Huh?

[59:29] See. While the the cold kind of concentrates, right? Yeah. Okay. In itself, see. And so, when you think deeply, you're concentrating, right? And it's drawn within yourself, huh? And your your body actually becomes maybe cold, huh? Don't you think? And I was at Laval there, we would have classes maybe until five or six, right? You go out in the cold weather in Quebec, and we go up to the the swimming pool there, and you pay ten cents, and you get a hot shower, and you take a swim, and then another hot shower.

[1:00:07] You come out, you're feeling ready, you know, and bear that cold weather there in Quebec, right? But your body temperature seems to go down just sitting there, you know, in a classroom, you know, you know, late afternoon, huh? Yeah. Do not. So there is

[1:00:26] a kind of contrariety, yeah. The metaphor is even expressive, hot and cold. Yeah. Okay. Sure. Yeah. Now the third distinction is between the what they usually call the grades of life, but he calls it here the modi, huh? The ways of living, which are distinguished, he says, according to the grades of life. Huh? For there are some living things in which there is only the what? Living powers, as in the plants.

[1:01:00] Huh? There are some in which, with the living powers, there is also the sensing powers, at least the sense of touch, as Aristotle would say, but not that which is motive according to place, as these immobile animals, like the what? Conchilia. That's the what? Clams. What? Any sort of shell shell animals. Yeah. Conchilia.

[1:01:28] There are some which above this have motive according to place, right? As the perfect animals, which need many things for their life, right? And therefore they need motion that they might seek the things at a distance that necessary for their life, huh? And finally, there are some living things in which, with these, there is what? Understanding, as in men. Hmm. And he gives the explanation why that corresponds only four the powers, right?

[1:01:58] These four grades of life. The desiring does not constitute some extra grade of living because in whatever things there is sense, there is also what? Desire, right? As is said in the second book about the soul. Hmm. Okay.

[1:02:17] And so that solves the first two objections, because the first objection was saying that there's only three souls, right? Yeah. The second objection says there's only four grades of life, right? Well, three and four don't agree with five, right? Yeah. But now we see why there's four grades of life. It's going up there. Yeah, that funny. Out of the south. Yeah. In Zuo, it's only four grades of life, although there are what, five general powers, huh?

[1:02:45] Because there's one of the five that always goes with one of the other ones, huh? And the more difficult reason why there's only three souls, right? Huh? Because they distinguish them by their rising above the mere corporeal nature, huh? In three kind of distinct ways that you can rise above that, huh? Now the third objection was the one taken from this more general understanding of appetite or desire.

[1:03:28] Thomas says, "To third, it should be said that natural appetite, natural desire, is the inclination of each thing to something from its own nature. So when we say that the plant likes sun, right? It'll tend to grow towards the sun, right? Okay, and it'll flourish in the sun, right? Or likes water, right? Okay, and so it likes a soil that's kept moist, huh? Or if it's near a stream, it'll, it's down there, right?

[1:04:02] Okay. But that's something that follows upon its nature, not upon what knowing. But animal desire, right? Soul desire. Who thought that? This extra genus of powers follows some form that has been what apprehended by the senses or by the reason.

[1:04:28] And for this kind of desire, there is required a special power of the soul, and the apprehension alone does not suffice. For the thing is desired in so far as it is in its own nature. It is not, however, by its very nature, in the sensing, in the grasping or grasping power, but according to its what likeness, huh? Whence it is clear that the sense of sight desires naturally the visible only towards its own act, namely towards seeing.

[1:05:09] But the animal desires the thing seen through his desiring power, not only to seeing, but also for the uses, like to eat it or something, right?

[1:05:20] Okay. If however one, the soul did not need things perceived by the sense, except for what the action of the senses, only for sensing them, right? Then it would not what be necessary to have a separate power or desiring power as a special genus among the powers of soul, because the natural desire of the powers would suffice, huh? I know

[1:05:52] it's good to know that that we use the word want, you know, all the way down sometimes even to inanimate things, you know, and he kind of puts something together, you know, and doesn't want to go, we say, right? You know, well, I mean, it doesn't, I mean, got the wrong place now, you know. So he's trying to put something together. You buy, you know, you don't have it all put together.

[1:06:14] You have to put something together, right? That way the screw goes, you know. Doesn't want to go there, you know. Doesn't want to go there, see? It's not made for that, right? But that's a a very what different sense of wanting than when you say, "I want my dinner," right? Or I want to know, right? It's like because there I have to to know before I can be said to want, okay?

[1:06:39] I don't want to just smell my dinner. I want to eat it, you see? Okay. So the inclination of the nose to smell things doesn't suffice to explain my want to eat the thing that I smell, right?

[1:06:57] If I wanted to smell it, I would need this other kind of thing. I would need hunger and thirst and so on. Okay. Now the fourth objection was taken from what Aristotle had shown in the third book about the soul that some kind of knowing, either sensing or what, understanding, and some kind of desire, right, are behind the animal moving from one place to another. So the cat sees the bird, right, and desires to eat the bird, right?

[1:07:41] And then he said, "we're going to go back there, you know, and see the way they're getting ready." He thinks that suddenly, you you know, real fast, and um, so somebody might say, "Well, why do we need another genus of power here, the motive power, right? Why not just say the sight and the what desire of the cat is enough, right?" Well, you see the reply that Thomas gives.

[1:08:10] Although sense and desire are moving principles in perfect animals, nevertheless, sense and desire, as such, are not sufficient for what moving unless to be added some other power. For in the immobile animals there is sense and desire too, but they do not have the power of moving from one place to another.

[1:08:39] And this motive power is not only in desire and sense as commanding motion, but also in the those parts of the bodies that they might be what suitable for being the appetite of the moving soul. A sign of which is that when those members are removed from their disposition, their natural disposition, like when you're what injured there, right? They do not obey the appetite to what motion, right?

[1:09:09] Oh, yeah. So, if you had a stroke or something, right? Sure. And you can hardly walk, right? Sure. And so. He's not denying what Aristotle says that that sense and desire move us to go from one place to another, but we need something beyond the sense and the desire, right? And even the these animals that don't move one place to another have sense and desire.

[1:09:37] So to convince there are five genuine powers then.