De Anima (On the Soul)
102. ST I q.78 a.4: The Interior Senses (Common Sense, Imagination, Estimative Power, Memory)
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[0:00] Okay, our outward senses, right? The ones that we see from things outside of us. And now he's going to talk about the interior or inward senses.

[0:15] And here he's going to be more complete than Aristotle is in the third book about the soul. To the fourth, one proceeds thus. It seems that the interior senses. Are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the what, private, proper, or private.

[0:38] Therefore, the common sense ought not to be enumerated among the interior sense powers, apart from the what. Exterior ones; that are proper. Now, this is you know involving a confusion of what two different meanings of common, as Thomas will point out in his reply, right? Okay.

[1:00] Common in what predication, right? That'd be like distinguishing, you know, we've got sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and sense. You wouldn't get that as one, would you? No, the sense is a set of each of those five, right? But the another sense of common. Is what we mean. We speak of a cause, right, that extends to all, like the common good, right? Okay.

[1:30] That way, God is common, huh? And of course, the the the common sense will be like a common origin of the outward senses, right, or a common terminus that they come back to. In the way that the what center of a circle is common to all the what, radii, huh? Okay. But the other end is not common, huh? To all the radii, but it's private or proper to each.

[2:02] Moreover, for that for which the, private and exterior sense suffices, is not necessary to lay down, some, inward, grasping power or knowing power. But for judging about sensible things, the private senses suffice. The private and exterior senses suffice. For each sense judges about its own object, right? Similarity, it seems enough for this that they perceive their own acts, because the act of the sense is, in a sense, a middle between the power and the object.

[2:44] It seems that the eye is much more able than to know its own vision as being more proximate to it than it would know even color, and so on. Therefore, it is not necessary to posit an interior power which is called the common sense.

[3:04] That's one reason why people sometimes say there's a central sense, right? Something that knows the acts of the exterior senses, right? As if the eye knew color but didn't know seeing, right? And the ear knew sound but didn't know what hearing, right?

[3:24] And this objection is saying that well, isn't hearing closer to the ear than sound? So if it knows sound, wouldn't know hearing too? Moreover, according to the philosopher, phantasticum, and that's taken from the Greek word, right? Imagination, is the Latin word, and memorativa the memory are passions of the first sensitive power. But a passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore, memory and phantasm ought not to be laid down to be other powers apart from sense.

[4:04] Aristotle speaks of the what image as a motion caused by the sense in act. Just like when I look at you, you know, and then I close my eyes and I continue to see you, kind of in a faded way, right? Well, that continuation of sense of seeing you is a result of my seeing with my eyes open, right? So why should that be another power there?

[4:33] Moreover, the understanding depends less upon the sense than any sensitive, any powered sensitive part does. But the understanding knows nothing without taking it in some way from the senses, as is said in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, because to whom one sense is lacking, one science is failing. So we don't have ears, you don't have the science of music. You don't have eyes, you don't have the science of astronomy or science of color.

[5:05] Therefore, much less ought there to be laid down one power, the sensitive part, for perceiving those intentions which are not perceived by the senses, which is called the estimative power. Now he's talking about how the animal is aware of its enemy, right? And is that through the sense qualities of its enemy?

[5:32] Are the sense qualities threatening? You say. Okay. Yes, to make a make a decision about what those what do you say? It's something beyond the senses. Yeah. Yeah. The instinct. Yeah. Registers. What he's thinking of there, the estimative power is what we might call is something like instinct in the animals, right? Yeah. But where when they see a certain color, a certain shape, they recognize this as friendly or an enemy.

[6:09] Yeah. It's not because the color or the shape as such is painful or. Right. You see. So these little birds that are by nature, you might say, the victim of the bigger birds, right? Right. They see them after they're born. You know, when the big bird flies over, they crouch like like they recognize an enemy. Right. And the

[6:38] sheep might recognize the wolf or something, right, as an enemy. Huh? You see, even though they've never experienced, you know, being bitten by one or something.

[6:49] They perceive something that is not a sense quality. Moreover, the act of the cogitative power, which is sometimes called particular reason, which is to bring together and put together and divide, and the act of the reminiscent power, which is which is the kind of syllogism to inquire, right? Okay. I actually used the word syllogism in that book on memory reminiscence. Huh? But it's like you're trying to say, what were you doing last Thursday, or what were you doing last Friday, right?

[7:31] You say, well, I can't remember what I was doing at four o'clock last Friday. Let's see now. I went to lunch with so and so. Yeah. Now I came back. Yeah. Then went to the library. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And finally, you work your way back, right, to what you're doing at four o'clock. It's almost like reasoning, right? You see, and you can kind of do that, right?

[7:52] So you try to remember somebody's face or his name or something like that. Where do I know that guy? You know, all of a sudden you remember where you do it. Huh?

[8:03] He says those acts do not differ less from the act of the estimative power, memorative power, than the act of the estimative from the act of the image. Therefore, either the cogitative and the reminiscing powers ought to be laid down to be other powers apart from the estimating and the memorative powers, or the latter. Ought not to be posited to be other powers apart from what phantasma.

[8:36] Moreover, Augustine, in the twelfth book on Genesis, to the letter, lays down three genre visions: bodily vision, which comes through the senses; spiritual, which comes through the imagination, or the phantasia, which is a Greek word for imagination, and the intellectual vision, which comes about through the intellect. It's interesting how sometimes they use the word "eye," you know, kind of metaphorically, for the second and the third of these.

[9:06] So, in Shakespeare's play, for example, right in Hamlet, his friends who have been on guard duty have seen the ghost of Hamlet's father at night time, but they've seen it with their very eyes, and they've told Horatio about it, and he says that's your imagination. But he goes and he sees the ghost with his own eyes. Okay, that's the first kind of vision, right? Then they come and they're about to tell Hamlet. About it, and Hamlet says, "I can see my father now."

[9:34] He's looking around for the ghost, right? He says, "In my mind's eye." He means, in that case, in his what memory, right? imagination, he can picture his father up here, right? But then you have Gregory the Great saying, "Anger disturbs the eye of the soul," and he's talking about reason, calling that metaphorically the eye of the soul, right? So you have three meanings of the word to see.

[9:59] I see with my eye. I see you in my memory or imagination, and I see in the sense of understand. Therefore he says there is only one, right? Interior power, which is between sense and intellect, namely the imaginative power. So he's saying we should just distinguish three sights, huh?

[10:33] So sometimes we say that painting appeals to the eye, right? Fiction to the what? Imagination, right? And philosophy to the eye of the soul, to reason.

[10:47] But against all this is what Avicenna, in his book about the soul, says. Avicenna is one of the great Arab philosophers, Muslim philosophers, where he lays down five sense powers interior. Thomas is going to reduce these and say there's just four, right? But Avicenna has five.

[11:09] I don't think Thomas will reply to that particularly in the body of the article he will. You have the common sense. You have phantasm, right? Imaginative. As you say, those words are the same—one in Greek, one in Latin—but apparently, in this translation, they have a sense that they're being used to different things: the estimative power, right, and the memory, right. Now these words are used sometimes by us a little differently, so you've got to see how Thomas is using them, huh?

[11:42] I answer: It should be said that since nature does not fail in necessary things, it is necessary that there be so many actions of the sensing soul as are sufficient for the life of a perfect animal, and whichever of these actions cannot be reduced to one source require diverse powers, since a power of the soul is nothing other than a proximate source of some operation of the soul.

[12:17] But it should be considered that for the life of a perfect animal, there is required that not only grasp a thing when it is present. But also in its what absence, huh? Otherwise, since the motion of an animal and his action follows upon his apprehension or knowing or grasping, an animal would not be moved to inquire something what absent, huh? So Tabitha would leave the house every morning, you know.

[12:53] She'd eat her breakfast, and then she'd demand her breakfast, and once she had her breakfast, she'd go right to the door and go out and go to this particular area, neighborhood where there was some wooded area and birds to be hunted and so on, right? See, so she was going to an absent place, right? She couldn't sense. And you know the cats and we keep them down the stairs and they come right up the stairs, and they turn the corner and right right where the dish is right, but they can't see the dish around the corner.

[13:21] I don't think. They need to have this, huh? And he says the contrary of this, of course, appears in the perfect animals, huh? Which are moved by progressive motion from one place to another, for they are moved to something absent that they have what apprehended, huh? Is necessary, therefore, that an animal, through the sensing soul, not only receive the species of sensible things when they are at the same time, right, in the present being moved by them, but also that it retain them and what conserve them, right, huh?

[14:01] How would an animal know its master and those who are friendly to it, right? Without this, huh? Now, this is the principle Tom's going to use to distinguish some of these powers. To receive and to retain are reduced in corporeal things to diverse principles. And very simple physics or chemistry here. For the moist, easily receive, right, but they retain badly. But the dry receive what with difficulty, but they what retain well.

[14:44] Maybe that's what Heraclitus means when he says the dry soul is wisest and best, huh? If you got a wet soul, if you're all wet, you don't retain anything, right? But the dry soul, right, huh? May seem to be a dumb ox in the beginning, right? But it's really what getting these things firmly, right? I say, what are we deserts? There's nothing to say where to distract you.

[15:12] Yeah, yeah. Whence, since a sensing power is the act of a bodily organ, is necessary that there be another power. Which receives the species of sensible things, here and now, and another one which what conserves it?

[15:34] Okay, that's going to be one way of dividing these interior powers, huh? The one is going to be perceiving something in what the presence of the object, right? The other is going to retain what was received, but now when it's no longer present, right? And there, the basis for that distinction is that bodily things, what receives well and quickly, doesn't retain, right? Okay, so because of the material nature of these things, you'd expect it to be a somewhat different power that receives here and now quickly, at once, and the one that retains this, huh?

[16:16] Okay, but then he's going to divide them another way, and so going to end up with how many interior senses? Four, right? Again, it should be considered that if the animal were moved only by what are an account of what is pleasing or what painful, right, or stressful according to senses, it would not be necessary to posit in the animal anything except the apprehension of forms which the sense perceives, in which it delights in or it is what repelled by, right, huh?

[17:00] But it is necessary to an animal, especially more perfect animals, that it seeks some things or flees some things, right? Not only because they please or displease because they are suitable or unsuitable to the sensing, but also an account of other what commodities, right, and utilities, or even what certain harmful things. For the ovis or that the sheep, I guess, seeing the what wolf coming, it flees, right?

[17:33] Not an account of the indecency, the the the disagreeable color or shape of it, right? But it flees it as it were as an enemy to its very nature, huh? And likewise, the bird collects the what straw, not because it delights the senses of the bird, right? But because it is useful for building a nest.

[18:04] Is necessary, therefore, that an animal perceive these intentions, huh? That this thing is harmful or it's useful, right? Apart from its being what agreeable or disagreeable to the senses and their sense qualities, which the exterior senses does not perceive. And of this perception, it is necessary that there be some kind of beginning or source, since the perception of sensible forms is from the immutation or changing of the sensible organ or the sensible.

[18:43] Not, however, the perception of the foresaid intentions. Thus, therefore, he says, to the reception of sensible forms is ordered the private sense, the five we distinguished in the previous article three, right, and the common one, right, about whose distinction we'll speak in a moment, right, a little bit later. Okay, in reply to the what first objections, huh? But to the retention or conservation of these forms is ordered, and here Thomas takes these as synonyms, phantasia seu imaginatio, right, which are the same.

[19:23] He's taking one is the Greek word, right, and the other is the what Latin word, right You didn't even get the word. Fancy from what Phantasia. For the phantasia, or the imagination is, as it were, the treasure, right, of the forms that have been received by the senses. So it's in the phantasia, it, says the imagination, that the colors and the tastes and so on of objects that have sensed in the past are what retained, right?

[20:04] So I retained in me, in my imagination, the taste of licorice and the taste of chocolate and the taste of Cabernet Sauvignon and the taste of orange juice and the taste of steak and the taste of chicken and all these, you know, and the colors of all these different things, right, and so on.

[20:25] But to grasping these intentions, huh? That's what he's using to describe what grasping the usefulness of something, right, or its harmfulness, right, and so on,

[20:44] which are not known by the senses as such, right? There is ordered what they call the what estimative power, right? Which people might more call instinct, right? Something like that. I don't know.

[20:59] And to conserving such things is the vis memorativa memorativa, right? Okay. As I say, we you got to be careful the words there because I think we use memory sometimes of what he calls imagination here, right? Okay. But Thomas is saying that there's one power that retains what is perceived by the outward senses and the common sense that receives the colors and the sounds and the taste, you know.

[21:30] So I kind of recognize when I hear a violin or a piano, what musical instrument is being played. I retain those sounds in some way. You see all the sense qualities, and then those things that are not perceived by the senses as such, like that something is useful or an enemy or something to be pursued or or fled or whatever it might be

[21:55] here and now, that's retained by this other power which he calls the what memory, right? Okay. Now the needs aren't important, but but then I see there might be some different use of those. I think we tend to use memory for both of these. I think, and I think we tend to use the word imagination for our ability to what mix and combine images that are kept in the memory, right?

[22:22] And Thomas will explain that, of course, later on. Okay. A sign of which is at the beginning of memory. Comes about in animals from some intention that something is harmful or suitable, okay? And that ratio of the past, which the memory notes, is among or to be computed, counted among these intentions, huh? Okay, that something is past that you don't perceive by the senses, still, you. That's something that's not perceived by the senses as such.

[23:01] Okay, but now he's going to talk about a little difference here in these inward senses between man and the other animals. It should be considered, however, that as far as sensible forms are concerned, there is not a difference between man and the other animals, for they are in a like way changed by exterior sensibles. But as regards those forced intentions, right? There is a difference, huh? For the other animals perceive these intentions only by a certain natural instinct.

[23:33] There is that word instinct that we still use, huh? But man, through a kind of what, collatio, or bringing together, right? A kind of gathering, right? A kind of almost reasoning. And therefore, what in other animals is called the estimative, the natural estimative power, in man is called the what? The cogitative. Cogitative, yeah. Which, through a certain what, bring together of these intentions, finds something, huh? Whence it's also called the particular reason, right?

[24:10] Now that is in the brain. That is not the universal reason that's immaterial, huh? To which the medical doctors assign a determined organ, namely the middle part of the head. Every so while they'll study the brain and they'll try to compare, find which of these four ones are what part of the brain, you know. But it's a very difficult thing, you know, to really pin that down.

[24:34] But Thomas giving the medical opinion of that time. There was an article in the Thomist, I think, trying, you know, bring together, you know, some medical observations of the brain and trying to tie this in that region, right? But it seems like they never quite get down to really saying what's what.

[24:53] So it's in the middle part of the of the head, right? And it brings together individual intentions, just as the what understanding reason, the universal reason, brings together universal intentions. So it's the universal reason, not this particular reason, that is what an immaterial power, huh? And on the part of memory, it has not only memory as the other animals in the sudden what recalling of the past, but also what recalling, right?

[25:26] Whereas, were syllogistically, it inquires a memory of the past according to individual intentions, huh? And there he's thinking of the fact, you know, what you and I do. We're trying to recall where we were at some time, right? You know, if you get called into the courtroom, you know, where were you on that day, Mister Burkes? You know, where was I? You know, when that when it happened, right?

[25:48] Maybe I can remember something about that day, right? What do I do on Thursday, right? You know, so I have an eight thirty class and a ten o'clock class, you know. Then what do I do after that, right? You know, maybe I can kind of, you know, step by step work my way back to what I was doing at four o'clock that day, huh? See, see. Well, Joe came by the office at three o'clock, and then we went out and had a beer or something, right?

[26:08] Okay, and then I remember yeah, see, you know, and that's a little bit like reasoning, right? I see. And I was playing playfully, like you know, I can't remember sometimes, you know, the way Thomas divides Saint Paul's epistles, right? So I'm kind of playing around, right? And I said, well, six is a perfect number. One, two, three. Now, square one, four, nine. That's the way they were divided.

[26:34] One, four, nine. Yeah, oh yeah. See, I just kind of, you know, it's a little bit like reasoning, right? By using one image to get to another image, huh? Okay. Now he says Avicenna posits a fifth power in between the estimative and imaginative, which puts together and divides imaginative forms, and that's the way we just use the word imagination now. When they speak of the creative imagination, the scientists or the poets like to say that they're, you know, the artists that they that they're not imitators but they're creators, right?

[27:08] Sure. As is clear, when from a form imagined of gold and a form imagined of a mountain, we compose or put together one form of a gold mountain, right, which we had never seen, huh? And I'm thinking, you know, one fairy tale there they read the kids in their little, you know, was a glass mountain, huh? And the guy's trying to get up there, and the princess is up there.

[27:32] I forget what the whole story is about, but the difficulty of climbing a glass mountain, right? I can kind of imagination, right? Because I see glass and I see mountains, I can what? Kind of create, they might say, but I'm really kind of combining the image of mountain with glass. I have, you know, they can't take it for the horse. You know, how do you get that glass mountain?

[27:53] Keep on sliding down, huh? And but he says this operation does not appear in the other animals or man, in which the imaginative power suffices. Okay. So, and again, that's what you see there is kind of the influence of the universal reason upon these sense powers in man that you don't have any other animals.

[28:24] Okay. Which action of Avicenna the other famous Muslim philosopher? Attributes it to the imaginative power in his book, which he wrote about sense and the sensible. So,

[28:44] okay. And thus, it is not necessary to lay down except four interior powers of the sensing part. And also, these are the common sense, right, which knows the sensible as such, and we'll see how it differs from the outward senses, and the imagination, which is Thomas's word for what retains, right, what has been sensed, and then the estimated power, which what perceives something as as not sensible as such, but it's it perceives what is useful, right, or harmful to the animal, and then the memory, which is what retaining that, right, okay.

[29:28] So, notice the distinction between the common sense and imagination. And the estimative and the memorative—that's based upon the fact that what we sees easily and what retains are not the same in body. So, but the distinction between the common sense and the estimative is whether the object is sensible as such or not, right? Or whether it's an intention, as he calls the perception, or what is perceived as being useful or pleasanter.

[30:00] I think I mentioned my experience with the little cat there—that my friend Roy Monroe, huh? And he, you know, Richard's kitten from the tree there, and he knew how to like cats. So,

[30:13] the kitten liked to go in the drawer, you know, and just close the drawer, and the cat would like to sleep in there. I'd be, you know, I'd cast him over, right? Yeah. So, so when I came over, he'd pull over the door, and the cat just stole the box. No, I never really gave it to him. So we started playing with the kitten, see, and we, you know, things you know, the cat grabbing, chase, and so on.

[30:34] And we we had some belts there, see, and the cat was playing with the belts and having a lot of fun. And then finally, he took this belt that was kind of what had bands on it, and that's favorite, right? And all of a sudden, the cat was afraid of that. He'd been playing with all the other belts, having a lot of fun, you know, and he grabbed it with his claws, and and this was afraid of it.

[30:54] And and if one of us held the kitten, you know, you could hardly hold it. If the other guy pushed that belt towards you, you know, he'd be starting, you know. And and my interpretation of this was that the cat saw that as a what? Yeah, as an enemy, right? See, it wasn't because the color of that was hurting his eyes, right? So it's not just sticking a pin in his eye or something like that, but because he has this other power, this estimative power, right?

[31:22] Now, maybe an older cat would not be fooled by that, right? You see, yeah. But the little kitten, you see, yeah. And of course, you know, if you ever had, you know, we had the female cat there, and the female cat had kittens, right? And they seem to know exactly what to do as a mother. Yeah. You see, and and you kind of predict, you know, if you read up about what they're going to be doing, right?

[31:47] But they're untaught. You see, and Moppet was a mother. Moppet was was one of the litter of Tabitha. Moppet was a mother at one year old, right? Now I see my grandchildren,

[32:02] I mean, that ready to be a mother at one year old, right? See, but the cat knows this, see, see. And she knows her own, right, and how to take care of them and what to do, right? See. And and I used to watch Tabitha, you know, and I'd say after the kittens were old enough to be out of a bowl, rather than have separate bowls, we had one big bowl, and all the little kids would run over there, and they all would be lapping the milk, right?

[32:31] Tabitha would stand there, you know. And she wouldn't go over and drink the milk at all until all seven kittens had left the bowl, and then she'd go over the thing and you know. Well, that's not that's instinct, right? That's this estimate of power, right? So you you see these things in these in these animals, huh? Yeah. Kind of reminds me of a cartoon where there was this thing called I can't remember the context, but it was a joke that there's no such thing as a free drop-in clinic for unwed pregnant mothers.

[33:04] You know, because they know they don't need somebody to tell them how to be the parents or give them give them the resources, and you know that's a human need. That's an animal need. That's an instinct. Yeah. Of course, you know the you know these migrations of animals are really amazing things. Oh yeah. Or even the fish, you know, they go up into the stream, you know, to you know, at in their life cycle, you know, to to spawn, right, you know, and to reproduce, huh?

[33:31] Um. Of course, animals will what fight, right? Huh? Even though it's not pleasing to the senses, they have to get scratched and so on, right? But they would do so, you know, because of this estimated power, right? They perceive this as an enemy or a threat or something, huh?

[33:53] And you notice how how you know animals you know mark out certain territory. Tabitha was especially strong this way, huh? I remember seeing you know cat some stranger cat in the backyard. All of a sudden, Tabitha come around like a mad woman, you know, you know, just no. Another cat would let's see, she'd shock shoot off like that today. Amazing, huh? Yeah. And but it's amazing too, you know, if you if you play with a cat and you look around the corner at them, you know the way they'll you know they'll they'll watch you very closely, you know, huh?

[34:24] It's like you know that's instinct. It seems to me, right? Huh? They know that you're observing them, right? That you're that you're. And sometimes, you know, if you do something to the cat, you know, they they'll react. If you're an enemy, almost right, because because they without thinking, right? Even though they know in general that that you're their friend, you feed them every day and so on, right?

[34:49] Huh? But yeah, the thing with Tabitha was, you know, you pick her up and at night time and and kind of petting her and she's purring, you know. And the moment you start to step down the stairs, you have to put down the basement, you know. Ah. You know she starts, you know, you had to watch it a little because she she could give you something, you know.

[35:13] You know, right away her whole attitude suddenly changed. You know, all of a sudden you're just darting up and purring, and just you know, then all of a sudden you're walking around, you know, all of a sudden you start the steps down, and she knows you're going downstairs, right? And so she perceives this is something against her interest, right? But it's not it's not like pinching her or squeezing her or something or doing something that's you say, you know, I'm still petting her, you know, but.

[35:37] But she she proceeds, you know. Now the first objection was saying we don't divide the common against the proper, private. Well, you don't you wouldn't divide the word sense said of these five against them, would you? But that be common in predication, huh? So he says to the first, therefore it should be said that the interior sense is not called common by predication as a genus, but as a common what root and source of the exterior senses, huh?

[36:13] Okay. So just like as I say in the in the case of the circle there, the center of the circle is common to all the radii, isn't it? Say what's a common source you might say, common root of all of them.

[36:35] So you know it's amazing how the modern philosophers are always confusing those two, two senses of common, or the two senses of universal. You know they call universale causando in Latin and causando in Latin, universale predicando and predicando, and they'll confuse what is said of all with what is a cause of all. Now the grand distinction there is is they'll confuse I am who am.

[37:09] Just I went to Matthew if I came up here and that was the the Christ attacking the Pharisees and he says you will perish unless you accept that I am, and you know we'd be talking about I am who am right? He's God, right? You see, say, but they confuse I am who am, who is the universal cause of all beings, with the that most vague notion of our mind that is said of all things.

[37:37] Everything is a being. Say, and and Hegel does it explicitly, huh? Hegel identifies the being, which is the most confused notion of our mind, the most general notion of our mind, something is in some way or other. It says almost nothing about the thing, with the one who said I am who am. And I mentioned before how in the first book of the Summa Contra Gentilas, Thomas has a whole picture of them, a whole little chapter there, right?

[38:09] Precisely refuting the idea that God is not the being that is said of all things. Say, but confusing what is said of all with what is a cause of all, and you find students and other thinkers very commonly mixing up those two, right? Now suddenly you see Thomas distinguishing the two when he talks about the universale praedicando right? Universale causando. sometimes when he's talking about the word "common," right?

[38:37] He'll say "common" by predication, meaning "common" in the sense of being said of all, right? And "common" in the sense of being a common what source? You can see it also with the word "general" in English.

[38:52] If if I the army over there, right? Huh? Well, Tommy Tommy Franks, I guess, is the general in charge over there, right? Okay, but he's general in the sense of a universal cause, right? He's in a way commanding the whole operation over there, right? But "soldier" is said of everybody, and is general in the other way. It's said of everybody, right? It's general in predication. Do you see that?

[39:20] In that sense, again, Shakespeare is wiser than uh Hegel's, I say, because he he puns on the two meanings of "general," right? When in in present Chrystia. when Chrystia comes over to the Greek camp, Agamemnon, who's the general of the whole Greek forces, right? He gives her a kiss, right? And then Odysseus wants to get it done. He says she's been kissed by the general, but she hasn't been kissed in general yet.

[39:45] That's two different senses of general, isn't it? huh? In one sense, MacArthur is the general of the army, right? Another way, soldier is general, right? Because it's said of all, right? Yeah, so people are confusing those two, and that's in this first objection, right? But common sense is not common in predication. It's not the word sense said of what sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, right? You wouldn't divide that against that.

[40:14] That'd be like dividing animal against what dog, cat, and horse, right? You got the dog, you got the cat, you got the horse, and you got the animal. No, no, that doesn't make any sense, right? Because animals divided into these, right? But it's common in the sense of what a common source, a common root. It's also the common term,

[40:34] and this is the way Aristotle most clearly points out the existence of this common sense. And this is what he talks about in the second objection here. To the second, it should be said that the proper sense, the private sense, judges about its private sensible, discerning it from other things which fall to the same sense, as sight, for example, would discern between what white and black, right, or from green, right.

[41:08] And the sense of taste would discern between sweet and bitter and sour and so on, right? But to discern or to discriminate white from sweet, neither sight nor taste can do that, right? Sight can't do it because it doesn't know sweet, right? And taste can't do it because it doesn't know white. Because it is necessary that the one who discerns or discriminates between two things that he know what both, okay.

[41:39] So if you've tasted chocolate but never tasted licorice, and I've tasted licorice never tasted chocolate, can either one of us discriminate between chocolate and it's got to be the same person, right? Who's tasted both and who knows both, right? So if we distinguish between the whiteness of the sugar and the sweetness of the sugar, right, it must be that the immutations, as Thomas says, of the outward senses come back to a common what center, and that's called the common sense.

[42:17] I call it sometimes the central sense to avoid some confusion in the word, but same thing. Whence he says it belongs to is necessary, right? To pertain to the common sense, the judgment of discretion, to which are referred as to a common term or limit, right? All the apprehensions of the senses,

[42:48] and by the common sense, they also perceive the what intentions of the senses, as when someone sees that he does in fact see, right? For this cannot come about through the private sense, which doesn't know except the sensible form which it has changed, in which immutation, sight, or seeing is perfected. From which change there follows another change in the common sense, which precedes vision. That's hard to see that second one, you know.

[43:21] And in the the animal Aristotle kind of leaves that up in the air, right? Whether the outward sense can know its own act, right? What's clear is that the outward sense can't distinguish between its object and the object of another outward sense. You've got to come back to a common center. And I say, if there's evidence in anatomy that the senses come back to a common center to the brain in some way, right?

[43:44] That would be knowing by exterior experience, but we also know by inward experience. Okay, to the third one, which is saying that imagining, right, follows upon the senses and so on. He says that just as one power arises from the soul by means of another one, so the soul is subject to one power by means of another. And according to this way, the fantasticum, the imagination, and the memory are said to be passions of the first what sensitive power.

[44:36] But first sensitive power, does he mean the common sense there, or does he mean? Well, he means the outward senses maybe, and the common sense, right? But they are what ordered on these powers, right? To that other power, so their act, you know, presupposes the acts of the other powers. So I have to see you before I can remember you. But I don't remember you by my eyes.

[45:04] I don't see you by my memory, right? But I retain what I have seen of you, right, in my memory. Now the fourth one, when people say that reason knows nothing that was not first in the senses, Thomas says, well, that doesn't mean that reason doesn't perceive something the senses don't perceive.

[45:31] So he says, although the understanding, the operation, the understanding arises from the senses, nevertheless. In the thing apprehended by the senses, the understanding knows many things which the sense is not able to perceive, like the relation of one thing to another, huh? Or I can see that you are alive, right? Even though your life is not something I can sense as such, huh? When I see you talking and smiling and moving around, my reason grasps that you are alive, right?

[46:03] Even though you don't sense your life, do I? Right. And likewise, the estimative power, right? Huh? Although in an inferior way, grasps something that the what senses as such don't grasp. So the eye doesn't grasp the the wolf as an enemy as such, right? But something else in the animal, this instinct, grasps that there is an enemy here, right? When you see the shape of the wolf, huh?

[46:38] I notice a lot of times they say these animals they they know their mother or their offspring by what? Smell. No, and I guess to even know us, I guess their owners maybe by smell, right? Oh, see, I think that's probably more so than anything than people realize. Yeah, yeah. The smell. Yeah. So it's not that the smell that he smells an enemy, right? But something else in it recognizes an enemy when he smells the smell, right?

[47:05] Or a friend, right? That's kind of interesting. Now the fifth one was talking about these things that seem to be different from the animals in our imagination or in our memory, or in our estimative power, which is called the cogitative power. Thomas says to the fifth one, that eminence which the cogitative and the memory have in man is not through that which is proper to the sensing part, but through some affinity, right, and closeness to the universal reason, according to a certain kind of of flowback or or influence of it.

[47:49] And therefore, they are not other powers, but the same, more perfect than any other animals, huh? You're going to see something like that with the emotions, huh? The emotions is something we have in common with the other animals. But a lot of people will say, well, yeah, but our emotions seem kind of different from the the other animals, right? Yeah, the emotions of man, because of their what affinity to and proximity to his will and reason, right?

[48:17] Have something that what the emotions of the other animals don't have, huh? And so you listen to the music of Mozart, right? Which represents the human emotions in a very subtle way, huh? You don't think that the animal has those same kind of emotions exactly, huh? But that's because they're kind of what you might say elevated, right? Huh? Yeah,

[48:44] just like we were saying about the fine arts, right? That they seem to involve reason in some way, as well as what the the sense of sight or the sense of hearing, or the sense of or the imagination, even, right?

[49:01] So there is an order in the music, there, right? That the reason perceives, huh? a certain partaking, you might say, of reason, huh? In the same way in the what emotions, huh?

[49:20] So it's not that we have a separate faculty there from the faculty for the emotions, but because of the proximity of our emotions to our reason and our will, they have. a Certain elevation, right? Huh? Because they're influenced by the reason and the will, huh?

[49:45] So you so you understand somebody's say kindness to you, what they've done for you, right? And you you have certain emotions, right? Or you see somebody's somebody's predicament or something, and terrible thing that's happened to them, and you feel sorry for them and pity them, right? And so on, right? And so that pity is kind of sadness, though, right? Huh? Animal has sadness too, right? But not that sadness that's kind of elevated, influenced by reason and the and the the will, huh?

[50:28] And therefore they're not other powers, he says, but the same, but more perfect than the other animals. Huh? In the same way you can say, you know, am I really got different power here? I eat and the cat eats, right? We both get up in the morning and we both want to eat. She eats and I eat, but I have a little more interesting food. I think to eat, right?

[50:48] Huh? And and I have a little more sophistication about this, right? But that's part of the influence of my will and my what reason, right? Huh? You know, say we talk about wine and we talk about the food or we talk about recipes, you know, and and we we make these fancy things. But basically I'm doing the same thing as the animals. I'm eating, feeding myself, right?

[51:07] You see? But it's been elevated because of my of affinity and proximity to my higher powers. Okay. Okay. Same way we do things like we dance with our legs or something, right? A ballerina or something. You're and the other animals don't quite dance, right? Um, but basically we got legs. They got legs, right? Okay. But there's certain things you do with our legs they don't they don't do because of the higher parts of us.

[51:45] Now the last objection was tied up with Augustine saying that there are three kinds of vision, right? And he says Augustine, the middle one of Augustine, the spiritual vision, which is through the likenesses of bodies and the absence of bodies. Once he's using that middle one as something common to all the interior what apprehensions, huh? Okay.

[52:13] That's the way Thomas solves that. Easy enough.