De Anima (On the Soul)
103. Summa I q.79 a.1: Is the understanding a power of the soul or its essence? Being and doing, God as pure act, and love as emotion versus chosen love
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[0:00] So now the next time we're going to go start question seventy nine, which is on the intellectual powers, the understanding powers, in particular, right? Mm-hmm. And so let's try to look at the first articles of that, huh? Okay. Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly.

[0:30] Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray and help us to understand all that you've written. Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're up to question seventy-nine here, huh? On the understanding powers, huh? When Thomas says they're going to ask about thirteen things, huh? Three days, huh? We'll look at the first two today, which is whether the understanding is a power of the soul or the very essence of the soul, huh?

[1:09] Of course, we saw that in general distinction between the essence or nature of the soul and its powers, right? But he's going to come back to it on this power in particular because there are some special questions about it. Yeah, okay. Yeah. And secondly,

[1:26] if it is a power or ability, whether it is a what passive power, let's say a power or ability that is acted upon by its object, at least to begin with, huh?

[1:42] Whether it's a power that acts upon subject. Of course, he's going to conclude that it is a undergoing or passive power. And the third question will follow upon that, huh? If it is a power that undergoes, that is acted upon, whether it's necessary to posit also in existence a acting upon understanding, an agent intellect. He argued that there is necessary to do that.

[2:16] And then the fourth article: whether this agent intellect is itself something of the soul. Now the fifth article is in there because of the Arab philosophers who are very influential at this time, the Middle Ages, and who think that the agent intellect is one for all men. Of course, with Avicenna, it would be, and probably Averroes too, it, would be a separate substance from us, right? Rather than a power of our soul.

[2:50] The sixth question is whether memory is in the understanding, huh? Whether the understanding, in other words, retains what it receives, huh? Or whether it's just what what its actual understanding doesn't have it in there.

[3:07] And then whether it's another power from the understanding, like in the case of the sense powers, we saw that the power that receives and the power that retains are not the same power. So the common sense. receives the changes from all the senses, but the imagination, so-called, retains those things that the common sense has received. But it's a different power. And likewise, memory retains what the cogitative power has received.

[3:42] But he's going to argue there's not different powers here in the case of the understanding, because it's not a material organ where what we sees easily and what retains are not the same.

[3:57] Now the eighth one is more a question about the the name, but notice, huh? Ratio or reason is characterized by reasoning, right? And intellectus or understanding is characterized by the act of understanding. Is my reason and my understanding the same ability, the same power? Why you have two different words there, right? And he's going to argue that they are the same power, right? But we'll see what that is.

[4:33] Now the ninth article is one that arises primarily because I think of Augustine. People like that, huh? Who speak of upper and lower reason, you could call right. Yeah. And they're not really diverse powers, but he does ask whether they are two different ones, huh? And one, you know, looking at the divine, the other looking at more lower things. Okay.

[5:02] Now with the intelligence, let's get in the word there. I guess with the intelligence is another power besides the understanding. And then a distinction Aristotle talks about in the De Anima, whether the speculative or theoretical, or to use English word, looking reason, right, looking understanding, and the practical or doing one are diverse powers. Because you argue like Aristotle would do, that's really the same power, but ordered to a different end.

[5:30] Okay. So their understanding is called speculative or looking. Speculative comes from the Latin word for looking, when it's aiming merely at knowing the truth about things. Okay. But it's called practical when it aims at doing or making something. It's directing us in our doing or making.

[5:52] And of course, when we take up the virtues of of the intellect, foresight or prudence or practical wisdom and art, the reason about making are going to be virtues of the practical reason. But natural understanding understanding and reasoned out understanding and wisdom itself will be virtues of the looking reason. intellect. Now the twelfth one, Whether synderesis is some. separate power that's like the part. Synderesis usually is the word he uses for what we naturally understand in the practical order, right?

[6:32] Like do good and avoid evil, right? It's the same power that knows those things that underlie all morality and what we've spoken of before is reason or understanding. And then the same question asked about conscience, huh? Does your conscience bother you about some things you've done, huh? You know, all your life you probably heard, you know, the sister, the priest, or somebody talking about your conscience, huh?

[7:03] Was that some other power that you have there, right, huh? But notice the word conscience comes from what con meaning with and scientia. With what? Knowledge Yeah, yeah, with some knowledge, right? As if you are what judging something, right? As good or bad, with some knowledge that you have, right? So it's not really going to be another separate power, but maybe not even a separate habit or virtue, but more an act.

[7:36] Okay, let's look at the first article here. Whether the understanding be some power of the soul, to the first, thus one proceeds. It seems that the understanding is not some power of the soul, but is its very essence or nature or what it is. And the first objection is taken from Augustine, right? For the understanding seems to be the same thing as the what mind, mind, huh?

[8:07] Mens huh Notice those two words there, huh? They say intellectus comes from Thomas understands anyway. It's coming from intus, meaning within, and legere to read, to read within,

[8:26] as opposed to the eye that reads on the outside, right? So when I read these words, my eyes see the words, but even a man didn't know Latin could see these words, right? But I read within, huh? The meaning of these things, huh?

[8:46] So we use the word sometimes insight, right? Meaning, you know, we have something up here that can see into things, right? Okay. And so that seems to be something of the etymology of the word intellect, huh? Okay.

[9:08] You know, Shakespeare uses that expression too at the end of Cymbeline, right? In the Cymbeline, the king, king's wife dies, and is coming out what a horrible woman she was, right? And the king didn't realize what a what a devil she was, huh? And so he says, "Who is can read a woman? " Huh? Yeah. See? Huh? As if you know, I'm not the only man who's been deceived about the true nature of some some woman, huh?

[9:46] Okay, Samson was led astray by Delilah, right? He lost his power because of her, right? And but no, what does that mean? Who is can read a woman? Who can what? Understand. Has insight into woman, can understand the woman, you see? He's trying to excuse himself, doesn't he, for not being aware of the fact that that she's up to all kinds of evil things, huh?

[10:11] She's been, you know, talking to the doctor, you know, and wanting to know about poisons, right? And she's experimenting with poison with animals and so on. Then she gives Imogen this this poison, saying, "Now, if you are weary and tired, this will revive you." Well, of course, the the the doctor doesn't trust her at all. So instead of something that's going to kill Imogen, what he's actually given her is something that will kind of make you fall asleep and appear to be dead, like like like Juliet, you know, and Romeo Juliet.

[10:42] But then, after a while, you you revive, refreshed. No, he doesn't trust the doctor. Doesn't trust that queen, right? So he kind of is aware of, you know, that she's not, you know, up to that up to good. she has some evil, intents. But the king is kind of naive about this in Cymbeline, huh? And so, who is can be a woman, right? Who who who can understand a woman, right?

[11:05] there's some truth to that, right? But now the word "mens, mind," they say, comes from the word "for" what? mensura to measure, huh? Oh, interesting. Because reason tends to what count things and measure them and so on.

[11:34] So they seem to be the same thing, just named from a different activity, so to say. But the mind is not a power of the soul, but it's very nature essence. For Augustine says in the ninth book about the Trinity that mind and spirit are not said relatively, but to demonstrate the very what essence or nature of the thing. Therefore, the understanding is the power itself. I mean, the nature itself, the essence itself of the soul.

[12:15] And a second objection: more of a diverse genera of powers of the soul are not united in some one power, but they're united only in the one essence or nature of the soul from which they all flow. But the desiring power, petitivum, and the understanding are diverse genera of powers of the soul, as is said in the second book of the soul. There were two different genera among the five genera of powers, if you recall.

[12:48] But they come together over in the mind, because as Augustine, because Augustine, the tenth book about the Trinity, he lays down understanding and will, which is the rational same power. They're they're in the mind, right? That's where Augustine, I suppose, is talking about the image of the Trinity, right? In in the mind, being in the soul.

[13:18] So if the mind, according to Augustine, is is the soul, and then the intellect or understanding is the same as the mind, then it would be the essence of the soul, and not some power of it. And this is a problem now with the way words are used sometimes, and we'll see what those varieties are. Moreover, according to Gregory, in the homily on the Ascension, man understands with the angels.

[13:50] Just like we sense with the what, the animals, and we grow with the plants. Our little cosmos, universe. But the angels are are called what minds and what understandings.

[14:07] So sometimes people say an angel is a mind or intellect. Therefore, the mind and the understanding of man is not some power of the soul, but the very soul itself.

[14:25] The fourth one. Moreover, from this it belongs to some substance that it be understanding, because it is what immaterial. So when we study our own what understanding, we find out that it's not a body; that's something immaterial, and something has to become immaterial before it's understandable, and that's kind of a clue to us that these immaterial substances are all going to be what understanding substances.

[14:58] But the soul is immaterial through its very essence. Therefore, it seems that the soul, through its very essence, is understanding. So he's saying the soul is something immaterial, and through being what immaterial, understand. Therefore, the soul, through being the soul, understand. This is that the ability to understand and the soul are the same thing. But against this is that the philosopher lays down that the understanding is a power of the soul, ability of the soul, as is clear in the second book about the soul.

[15:39] So the soul is in the genus of substance for Aristotle, and the powers of the soul are in the third species, second species of quality. So they're an accident, right? Something the soul has, but that is not the very nature of the soul, right? It's the nature of the soul to have these powers, right? But these powers are not the nature of the soul itself; they're accidents, but natural.

[16:03] necessary accidents. Now, what's the reason Thomas is going to give for saying they're not the same? I answer: It should be said. It is necessary to say, according to the aforesaid things, way back in earlier things, that the understanding is some power of the soul, and not the nature or the essence of the soul itself. Now, then he says, only is the immediate principle of operation. Notice that expression, the immediate principle of operation, right?

[16:37] What is most proximate to, right? There's nothing between it, you might say, in the operation. Now, the immediate principle of operation only is the very nature or essence of the thing operating, when the operation itself is what the being of the thing. Okay. Now notice how this is based upon proportion.

[17:04] For just as the ability has itself to operation as to its act, so the nature to the act which is what. Existence, huh? Okay. Let's put that in a way of proportion. here. It's, saying that to be is to the nature

[17:27] as to do is to the ability to do. Okay. Using more familiar words, huh? Yeah, that's right. Or to be in the sense of being—that's the equivocal sometimes'cause being sometimes means what is, right? But being now in the sense of what to be, right? Existence. Being the sense of existence is to the nature what doing is to the ability to do. Just stating it. Different words, same idea.

[18:19] Okay. Now, if the being of a thing and what it does were the same, then the nature of the thing and its ability to do that would be the same.

[18:33] But if the being and the doing are not the same thing, right? Then the nature, which is proximate to being, it's what is, right? And ability to do would not be the same thing.

[18:53] Just like I said, though, easier to see in this case. If I said, "A seeing is to the eye as hearing is to the what ear." If seeing and hearing were the same thing, then the eye and the ear would be the same thing, right? Okay. But if seeing is not the same as hearing, then the eye is not the same as what the ear. So he's saying that to be is the nature of the thing.

[19:25] What to do is to the ability to do. If being or existence is to what the thing is, as doing is to its ability to do. In fact, being and doing are the same thing, in this particular case here, if to be and to understand are the same thing, right? Then the nature would be the same thing as the ability to understand.

[19:55] Now, in God, is any distinction in God any real distinction between His being and His doing? No, because there's no composition in God when you study God, huh? He's all together. What simple.

[20:18] God is pure act. So, if in God, if in God to be and to understand are not the same thing, then God would be to understand and his ability is to act, He would be pure act. So, in God to be and to understand are identical. That's nice, right? It would be nice, to be and to understand the same thing, right? But the fact that I am, I understand.

[20:51] Well, you know, it's not the same thing, right? We are and don't understand anything, right? Okay. So, to be and to understand are not the same, in us, right. Therefore, what is proximate to these two acts—the nature of the thing or what it is—and its ability to understand are not the same thing. But just as to understand in me is something in addition to my being, right?

[21:28] And ever since I—I've been, I've been trying to understand at least for some time. I've been trying to understand, But my understanding is something more than my being. So, likewise, my ability to understand must therefore be something more than my nature, what I am.

[21:50] This is an interesting fragment of the great Heraclitus, where he says, "The divine nature is understanding, but not the human." You wonder what he what he understood by that, huh? You know, yeah, yeah. So, and when when when we when we when we say that God God's being is also his action,

[22:20] then how do we understand that? I could see now how you say this with being and and understanding. Yep, the same way God's nature and his will, Right. If they weren't the same thing, then God's nature would be to his understanding or willing, as ability is to act. So that would be an additional act, and therefore the divine nature would not be what pure act. Great. Yeah, but what does that mean?

[22:48] What do you say? I'd say when we study act and ability in the ninth book of Wisdom, which maybe we do some time after we do some natural philosophy, in what we call today the metaphysics, right? Right. But metaphysics means what? Meta, meta, ta physica After the books on natural philosophy, where you meet act and ability, but in a Kind of more narrow way, yeah. But in the ninth book, eventually you understand act and ability to complete the universal way, and then we take up the order of act and ability, and then you you find out that in almost every way, act is before ability, and that only in the thing that goes from ability to act, only in that thing is ability before act,

[23:40] but the thing that goes from ability to act does so because of something already an act. Yes. Okay. So the air which is able to be hot goes from being able to be hot to being actually hot because of something already actually hot. So once you realize that in the whole picture, or simply speaking, act is before ability, then you realize that the first cause is going to have to be pure act.

[24:10] Okay. Right. And once you understand that God is pure act, yeah, almost all the attributes of divine substance, yeah, that He's simple, right? Yeah. That He's, which means He's not composed, right? Yeah. That He's. Not a body. That He's perfect, right? You see. That He's infinite, right? Okay. All these things are these unchanging, right? That He's altogether one, and so on. All these going to follow from His being pure act, but then you get to talk about the divine operations that you do after the divine substance, and the reason why you have the two parts in the Summa there, like here, you have the divine substance when you take up the divine operation, is that we're approaching God through creatures, right?

[25:02] Okay. And in us, our substance and operation are not the same, right? Yeah. And so we have thoughts about the substance of a thing, and we have thoughts about the what operations of things, and we start from those things, right? You see. But it's like the center of a circle, you know. That these are separate things and creatures, right? But in God, they're one and the same.

[25:29] But because we start from creatures, we have two sets of thoughts, right? But when we say that God understands or God wills, then we have to negate any real distinction between God and His understanding, any real distinction between God and His willing, and that's why later on, when they when they take up after the treatise on the operation of God, you take up the treatise on the what Trinity, huh?

[26:00] And in order to understand why God, the Son, the Word of God, right, as Saint John calls Him, and the Holy Spirit, huh? Sometimes called the love of God, the reason why they are both God, right,

[26:21] is because the understanding of God is the being of God, right? See, and the existence of the Word of God is in the understanding of God. But if the understanding of God was something other than the being of God, then the Word of God would not be God. Right? Okay. And the same way,

[26:48] yeah, proceeds by way of love, right? Huh? If the loving or the willing of God was not the being of God, yeah, then the then the being of of the love in the act of love itself would not be the being of God Himself, and the Holy Spirit would be an accident of the Father rather than God Himself, you see. So you have to understand that in God to be and to understand and to love are one and the same thing.

[27:23] Even though we have three thoughts, right? But no one of these thoughts is adequate to express the simple perfection of God. But we have to, in speaking of each one of these, negate the the a real distinction that there is in you and I between our substance or what we are, our very being, and our understanding and our loving. There are three different things in us. Yeah.

[27:48] But in God, they're one and the same. Mm-hmm. Okay. Mm-hmm. So because these two are the same in God, then the ability, the power of understanding, or the power of willing, is the same as a divine nature. But in us to be and to do or to understand are not the same. And of course, part of the reason for that is also the fact that that to understand is something whereby we're open to everything that can understand, right?

[28:21] Hmm. Well, our being is kind of contracted to the being of man. So our being is very limited compared to the that infinite infinity of our understanding. The same with our love.

[28:42] So he says, in God alone is the same to understand as to be. You find out again if you study the angels, right? That even the angels to be and to understand is not the same thing. Yeah. And to be and to love is not the same thing, right? Okay. Whence in God alone is the understanding, meaning the power of understanding, his very what essence or nature, the divine substance.

[29:13] In other understanding creatures, meaning the angels and man, soul, the understanding is a certain power or ability of the one understanding. But it's in the genus of what quality, right? It's a natural result of the nature, right? But it's not the nature itself; it's like an effect of it, a property, huh?

[29:41] Just like when you say, "What two is half of four? " Right? Actually and necessarily, two is half of four, right? But to be two and to be half of four is that the same thing?

[29:57] Or to be a third of six, you know? Now those are all things that follow upon being two, right? But two is in the category of what of quantity, right? And to be half of four. Is in the category of relation or towards something. That's right. Yeah. In this case here, the nature of the soul is in the category of substance, but the power to understand is in the category of quality, the second species, innate power ability.

[30:33] So, but in God, there's no accidents. All these things are the very substance of God. Okay. But notice the basic reason he gives goes back to understanding first of all this proportion. Sure. And second, he's saying that to be and to understand are not the same thing, right? In this case, the to do is to understand. Okay. In the same way, to be and to love are not the same in us, huh?

[31:02] Hmm. So sometimes we love and sometimes we don't, right? Okay. Sometimes we understand, sometimes we don't. All the time we are. Okay. Now, the first objection here,

[31:28] or questions seems to say that mind signifies substance, or the problem in the word. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the word sensus in Latin is taken sometimes for the power, sometimes for the what? The sensing soul itself, right? Okay. Oh yeah. For the sensing soul is named by the name of its chief what ability or power, its highest ability, which is sense, huh?

[32:04] Okay. Just like I call the animal, the plant soul sometimes the what? Reproducing soul, right? It's the feeding soul and growing soul, but the ultimate thing is reproducing, right, huh? So if you remember from the De Anima when we studied that Aristotle finally finishes his consideration of the plant soul, it's the reproducing soul, right? Because that's the highest activity that it attains to, huh? Hmm hmm. Okay.

[32:32] While the sensing soul has as its highest activity sensing, right? Okay. But sometimes they use the word sense, and that's a common for us. But I see it in Aristotle sometimes, and I see it in other medieval authors, right? They'll use sense not to name the sense power, but to name the what? Sense soul, right? Okay.

[32:59] Now, of course, the word understanding, huh? In English, huh? We can use the word understanding to name the what? Act of understanding, right? We can use the word understanding though to name what the ability to understand, right?

[33:18] And so when you see a treatise like, you know, John Locke there, the famous English empiricist, it's called a what an essay on human understanding, right? Was he talking about the act of understanding or the ability to understand, huh? Well, if not, maybe you ought to get it clear from the title, right? Maybe now to clear in the author's but we tend to use that, right? Okay.

[33:42] And you know, well, sometimes you find even in these things like the word taste, right? The word taste is used sometimes for the act, right? Sometimes for the ability to taste, huh? You see, taste is one of the five senses, right? But then we speak of you know taste meaning the act itself, and then even the object is called taste sometimes. Yeah, the taste of an object, right?

[34:06] Okay, has a sweet taste or a bitter taste, right? Okay, that's not the act of tasting, is it? It's not the ability to taste, huh? So you'll see that we do sometimes use the word equivocally, right? To name even the object, the act, and the what power, right? Huh? See, see that very clearly in English that the word understanding is used sometimes to name the ability to understand, right?

[34:36] Sometimes the act of understanding, huh? Okay. But in Latin, they use it sometimes to name what the soul which has that ability, right? Okay.

[34:50] And likewise, he says the understanding soul sometimes is named by the name of the what understanding, right? Okay. Thomas is not inventing this; I see in other Latin authors using it in that way. I don't think in English we use it so much that way, right? As where from its more principal power, as is said in the first book about the soul, at least in the Latin translation there, intellectus is substantia quaedam.

[35:20] Okay, but then he's talking now not about the power of understanding as a quaedam substantia, but the what? There is a substance which is capable of understanding, right? Huh? And we call that substance an understanding, and sometimes they call the angels in the same way a what? Intellectus, right? And also in this way, Augustine says that the mind is a spirit, meaning you know this immaterial substance, or it's the essence, right?

[35:56] Okay. But they say, take my word for it that that that is used by other Latin authors, right? And Thomas is aware of that, right? So it's a question here about. What? The way the word is used, huh? Yeah. Yeah. He has something like that, Aristotle. To the second, it should be said that the appetitive and the understanding powers are diverse powers or diverse genera of powers of the soul, according to diverse definitions of objects.

[36:37] But the desiring power, right? Partly comes together with the understanding, and he's thinking there of the will, right? Which is the desiring power following upon the understanding, and partly with the what sense powers, as far as a mode of operation to a corporeal organ. He's thinking of the emotions, right? Sense desires, right? Okay. So, as we were saying in our study of the four grades of life, remember?

[37:12] The Reason why there was five. genera of powers, but only four grades of life, is that when you get to the sensing powers, the understanding powers, there follows some kind of desiring power upon each of them. And in Latin, they call it the sense, you know, appetite, the intellectual appetite, but sense desire and, you know, reasonable desire if you wish. What we call the will sometimes, right? And then the ability for emotions, which are something what bodily, right?

[37:43] Okay. So when I'm afraid, you know, thump, thump, thump, thump, you're aware of the bodily changes even going, you're undergoing. And when the person gets fearful, maybe he gets a little bit chilly, right? And so on. Huh? He gets embarrassed. He gets red in the cheeks, and so on. And so, the emotions, and sometimes they're called the passions, um, they are desire following upon sense knowledge.

[38:17] While the will is desire following upon what understanding, right? First Thomas says in general, appetite or desires follows upon what apprehension. Okay. So when we get to study the treatise on love sometime, and the first article in the four articles on the causes of love is that whether good is the cause of love, right? And the second article is whether knowledge is the cause of love. Well, he's coming back to that here when he says that what desire follows what apprehension, some kind of knowing, right?

[39:02] Mm-hmm. So the animal tastes something and it's pleasant when he tastes it, and then he has this what sense desire for that, huh? Okay.

[39:13] We smell something, right? And we have a sense desire, you know, to eat something, huh? If We're hungry, so on. Ah, but will the ability to choose this follows upon what reason, right?

[39:33] Now the average person has a hard time distinguishing between the love, let's say, that is an emotion, and the love that is a act of the will, huh? Okay.

[39:49] But no, take take the words of of Hamlet there when he talks about why he is had Horatio as a friend, and he says, "Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice,

[40:07] and could have been distinguished. Her election, which is another word for choice, right, has sealed thee for herself, right? Notice the order there, right? Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, he says mistress because soul of course is always feminine in Latin, right? But when is the soul mistress or master of her choice?

[40:37] Why don't we think of a child as being what so responsible for what they do as as an adult, huh? It's not reason yet, yeah. So he doesn't have a developed reason, so he can you know compare and weigh things and then choose, right? So notice the words there. Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice and could have been distinguished, right? So you can see the difference between men, right?

[41:07] Then her election, her choice, has sealed thee for herself, huh? And he goes on to give some of those reasons. For thou hast been as one in suffering all that suffers nothing, a man that fortune's buffets and rewards has tamed with equal thanks You see, some people when things go well, they get all crazy and wild, right? You know.

[41:33] Others and and and the same people when things go badly, they take my life or something. You see, but a man that fortune's buffets and rewards is tamed with equal thanks He's a man who's what? No, way right? And blessed are those he says whose blood whose blood and judgment, right, are so well commingled; they are not a pipe for fortune to play what stops she please, right?

[42:03] And he goes on and says, "Give me that man that is not passion slave, huh? And I will wear him in my what? Heart's core, in my heart of heart, that I do thee. So he sees that that Horatio is not what passion slave, huh? Or maybe most men are a slave of some passion, right? It may be a fear, right? The coward is a slave of his fear, right?

[42:33] And the the glutton or the drunkard or the adulterer is slave of another passion, huh? The man who's who's irascible is a slave of his what anger, right, huh? So once his reason could see the difference between a man who is what in control of himself and a man who's what a slave of some passion, right?

[43:05] Um, he saw who to choose as a friend, right? You see. A man who stays on even keel when things go bad or go well, right? And a man who goes crazy one way or the other when things don't go exactly the way he wants them to go.

[43:28] So that's the kind of love or desire that follows upon what? Reason, right? In Latin, they have a word there for that kind of love. Sometimes, a special word is called dilectio, but it seems to come from the word choice. So sometimes they translate the word dilexio as a, a chosen love.

[43:56] Now, is that a kind of love? You know, that the poets talk about. Whoever loves, that love not at first sight, you know. And this is a kind of what of an emotion, right? A love that's an emotion. And and Shakespeare talking about them in the play says, "Love and reason keep little company nowadays. " It's a pity no one would make them, you know, not better acquainted, right?

[44:23] So there is another kind of love which follows upon what? Sense desire, right? Huh? So you see this in Proteus, huh? Now Proteus is well named in the two gentlemen of Rona. Proteus was a sea god. Remember the sea god? And Proteus always is changing his shape, huh? Well, Proteus is betrothed to what? Julia. And of course, a betrothal in those days meant more than an engagement, right?

[44:54] A betrothal was really a solemn promise to what? Marry. So it's almost what equivalent to marriage, right? And he's confirmed with twenty thousand soul confirming oaths, right? So twenty thousand soul confirming oaths, right? He's pledged to her, right? Huh? Okay. So he's fully committed to Julia, right? For all practical purposes, you know, he'd say marry to her, right? Valentine is is the other gentleman of Verona. They're they're best friends, right?

[45:27] Valentine has gone off to the court to finish his polishing, right? And he's fallen in love with the duke's daughter, huh? Sylvia, right? Well, when Proteus is father says, "That's a good idea. I think I'll send you off to the court too. You know, so get some, you know, finish your education. " And when he sees Sylvia, wow, right? And Valentine is planning to what? Elope with Sylvia.

[45:56] Well, now what? Proteus has got kind of a thing here, right? He wants to pursue Sylvia. He's got to be unfaithful to Julia, and he's got to betray his friend Valentine, right? Okay. So now, here is a sudden love, huh? And you say it's what, really an emotion, right? A passion, right? Okay. And you can you can see Shakespeare has some soliloquies where he's kind of doing things over in his mind, right?

[46:29] Now, you know. And we can follow the the play; it's an interesting play, but the early play of Shakespeare, right? I usually ask people in the love and friendship course, you know, beginning. What is love? You know, He's got some emotion. I say, I'm so angry, So is angry, So is fear. What's a very special emotion? I mean, I mean, but that's the first meaning for us, right?

[46:54] Yeah. Because our knowledge starts with our senses, huh? And that's the first meaning of love, huh? But then the word love is is borrowed and applied to an act of the will.

[47:08] And and and later on, it's even carried over to God, right? Hmm. God is love, okay. We speak of God as what loving us, right? But is the love that God has for us an emotion, a feeling? as we call it, right? See those words, emotion, feeling, bring out the bodily nature of this act in connection with the senses, right? Because feeling is taken from touch, right?

[47:44] So, but God's love is not an emotion or feeling. It's a it's a chosen love, right? And Saint Paul says he chose us in him, right, Of eternity. huh?

[47:59] He chose to love us. First, you know God's love for us is called a what? Merciful love. Our love of God is a just love, huh? We owe this love. That's why there could be a command, right? You know, for us to love God, the same way to love our neighbor, huh? Saint Catherine of Siena says, "Don't forget to pay the debt of love to your neighbor, huh?

[48:34] " But that very words, their debt of love, right? As if this is a matter of justice. I owe you some love, right? Huh? And I owe God some sense all my love, right? You see, but does God owe us anything? No. So God's love is said to be what? Merciful. That's why St. Paul calls it merciful love.

[49:04] It's gratuitous, right? He owes us nothing. In fact, we're not we're not even there to be loved before he loves us. His love is is is the cause of our being. huh? Because God is good. We we are. So that's kind of interesting, huh? To see that, huh? That's one one difference between God's love for us and our love for God. It's merciful; he loves us. Pure mercy.

[49:38] But for us, it's it's only just that we love him, huh? So God's not obeying any command to love us. Well, we're obeying a command, huh? To love God, huh?

[50:02] I don't know if you get the Pope speaks up here, but they had his his address there. He was in Poland. The Pope speaks, you know, is usually. You know, five or six months you get the documents after. You know, because they, they, you know, this is a March, April, I guess, issue. But it had his, his speech there at the dedication of his church there to Our Lady of Mercy there in Poland there.

[50:29] And I guess around the place where he used to be when he was working man there in Poland. So it's like it's come back to full circle. But he he talks there. I mean, it begins as a quote from Faustina connecting mercy and hope, right? And then the first part of the speech there, the Pope says, you know, the only reason we have for hope is the mercy of God, right?

[50:52] And it comes back to later on. But it's a very clear text if you see it on the connection between mercy and what hope.

[51:02] Of course, even in the hail holy Queen, you know, we say we connect up mercy with hope, right? We say hail holy Queen, Mother of Mercy, our life, our sweetness, and our hope, right? Meaning that she's the object of our hope, right? You see, it's tied up with her being the Mother of Mercy. While the justice of God is more a reason to fear Him, right?

[51:26] You need that too, but the mercy is tied up with His hope. So it takes a long time before one fully understands the difference between the love, which is an emotion, and the love, which is an act of the what will.

[51:48] And the love, which is an emotion, is more known to us, and the word originates there, and it seems more real to us, right? C. S. Lewis talks about the love of the angels, and their love is much more intense than ours is. But metaphorically, he speaks of our love as ferocious.

[52:16] You know, because you might think, you know, you know, that the love of the angels is not an emotion but an act of will. It's kind of a cold, you know. But in another way, it is it all right. The seraphim, you know, are named because they're burning, right? In metaphorically speaking, they're they're burning and singing to God, right? Yeah. Sorry, I'm late. I'm not sure exactly where we're at, but I did read the article.

[52:41] I'm kind of curious if God is pure act and love. Obviously, God is also love. Would you say that we are never fully loving because, in order to fully love, you have to be pure act? We can never love as much as He loves. That's true. Yeah. Yeah. But maybe a mixture of emotion along with reason is not total. We have both going on at the same time, but but but we can.

[53:07] You know, distinguish them to some extent, right? But it's not easy sometimes. But I told you a funny thing there. I used to drive this little Polish professor crazy when I was in college with my syllogisms, right? And so one day in class, he says, "Mr. Berquist, he says, do you have an emotional attachment to the syllogism?" He's getting frustrated with me, and I start laughing. I said, "I could have an emotional attachment to a girl," I said, "but not to a syllogism."

[53:41] You know, my love of the syllogism is based upon the fact that this is the only kind of argument where the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. So your reason recognizes the goodness of this kind of argument, and if you can syllogize, you have the best argument, right? But it's not the sort of thing that your emotions would would recognize, huh?

[54:07] Yeah. Is that the kind of love that the angels would have, just seeing good, the beauty? See, we might think that the angels' love is less intense than ours because they don't have emotions, right? But actually, our love is kind of divided. You know how the flesh and the spirit war, war, and so on, huh? So we're kind of divided, and you know, divide and conquer, right?

[54:29] I mean, you're weakened that way, huh? The angel is much more intense, you see. And as they say, C. S. Lewis trying to get us out of our, you know, mistaken human way of looking at things here describes the angel's love as ferocious, right? You know, I mean, it's really, I mean, something intense. I mean, I mean, you got no idea how intense that love can be, right?

[54:52] You see, you see, and your guardian angel's love of you is is much more intense, you know, than any human love you've known. I guess you could say that that angel's response to Zachariah when he doubted that his wife could be, yeah, conceived at such an old age was wasn't anger as much as was an intense love that he showed, maybe anger, but maybe a kind of a disappointment in that seeing how much God loved him, saying for for doing this wrong, that that ferociousness came out.

[55:28] Yeah. Yeah. See, like love, like the philosopher's name from the love of wisdom. Aristotle, you know, talking about the love of the philosopher, the metaphysics there. You know, he speaks of the philosopher and the sophist, right? And the philosopher is a lover of wisdom. The sophist is a lover of the honor or glory that comes from appearing wise, right? So he says that the philosopher and the sophist differ by their choice of life.

[56:00] So we, the love of the philosopher, the love of wisdom, which is what the word means, is a lover of wisdom that. Is a chosen love, right? That's the the love is in the will, huh?

[56:14] But my love of candy, that's my bodily. You see, you know, please my senses, right? Okay. So what's agreeable to my senses moves my feelings, my bodily emotions, huh?

[56:38] And these pleasures of the mind, the people who experience both the pleasures of the mind and pleasures of the body, all universally say the pleasures of the mind are a much greater pleasure. Yeah, yeah. Aristotle says that, and even even Mill says that, right? But most people don't get that get past the pleasures of the body. Yeah, yeah. And that's why that's why you know Thomas says you know that the the educated man, the truly educated man, when he sins by the flesh, right, it's worse than when the common man does, right? See, and Thomas says no man can live without some kind of pleasure.

[57:18] So if you have no taste at all for these higher pleasures, you're going to go to what excess in the lower pleasures, huh? One guy knew in high school, he got a rough job one summer, working with a lot of lower class people, right? And one Saturday just to be you know friendly, he he decided to go out with them, you know, to their entertainments, right? Huh?

[57:42] But just like one amusement park after another, you know, and and all this frantic pursuit of of these outward and bodily pleasures, and I just it leaves exhausted at the end of the day, right?

[57:56] The I mean people will tend to go to excess in those if they don't what have any taste at all for the higher pleasures, right? Yes. But then vice versa, as they say, if if one knows these higher things and can pursue them to a greater or lesser extent, then one

[58:20] is even more guilty, you might say, right, of sin if one succumbs to the what lower ones, huh? You know. Because he has power. Yeah, yeah. He's more. He's got more. He should be able to distract himself from these things, you see. You know, and occupy his mind with things. You know, the old idea of idle mind still works out. Well, there's some truth to that, right?

[58:41] Right. And you have an occupied mind, then you just start to to do this. Huh? It would be a more grievous sin for him then too, because he's seen the pleasures of the higher pleasures. Yeah. Yeah. You experience them. Well, I saw that out in the world in the working world. Everyone is every weekend. I got to be doing this. Got to be doing that. They just couldn't stand to be alone.

[59:06] It seemed like you know. Every weekend I got this plan, this plan, this plan, this plan. Yeah. Yeah.