De Anima (On the Soul)
104. Q.79 a.1, last replies, and a.2: Angels and mind, the first cause as the best thing, Socratic consistency, and understanding as a passive power
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[0:00] Okay, so and this reply the second objection then, right? He's talking about how the desiring powers and the understanding powers and the sensing powers of that matter are different ones, but there one kind desiring power follows upon having reason, right? Or understanding another one following upon the senses, or if you have both, like we have both, then we have both, right? The emotions or feelings and choice, huh?

[0:32] Now, when Augustine, according to this, he says places the will in the mind, right? Or the philosopher places the will in reason, right? He doesn't mean that the will is in the power called the what mind, or Aristotle mean that the will is in the power called reason or the ability to understand, but he means it's in that. Part of the soul, right? That is elevated above what matter, right?

[1:07] Okay, the part of the soul that is unique to the human soul, right? To the rational soul, and doesn't not shared by the other what animals, right? Okay.

[1:24] And so Augustine says the will is in the mind, and the philosopher says it's in reason. They're really saying the same thing, right? That this higher, desiring power called the will, this ability to choose and so on. It's something that we have because we have understanding and or reason, huh? And it is something that belongs in the immaterial part of the soul. So the will, like the the active and the passive understanding, will be all in the what soul and not in the body, huh?

[2:00] To be in the higher part. Now the third one is talking about the angels. To the third, it should be said that the angels there is not another power except the understanding and the will. They don't have senses and they don't have what emotions, huh? But they have the understanding and the will, which follows upon the understanding. And account of this, the angel is called a mind or an understanding, right?

[2:34] Because its whole power consists in this. But again, you know, it doesn't mean that the angel is his own what power of understanding, huh? Yeah. But how is he not? But you might say you might call the angel a the angel is an understanding substance, right? A substance that understands, huh? But sometimes you find in Latin instead of calling the angel a substance understands, they call it understanding.

[3:03] Meaning by that a substance that understands, right? Okay, and a material substance. Okay. But the soul is not so apt to be called that because it has many other powers, as the sense powers and the feeding powers that we talked about in the previous question.

[3:26] Now the fourth one is talking about the connection between immateriality. And to the fourth, he says it ought to be said that the immateriality itself of the created understanding substance is not his ability to understand. But you can say nevertheless that from being immaterial, from its immateriality, it has such a powerful understanding. Whence it is not necessary that. The understanding be the very substance of the soul, but that it be its

[4:05] virtue and power, right? Virtue is something that's taken for, I mean, power or the excellence of power. So again, mainly in not understanding the way the word "understanding" is what used, huh? Okay. I say in English you see more clearly that understanding is used both to name the act of understanding, right, and the ability to understand. Okay. I say man has understanding. I probably mean he has ability to understand, huh?

[4:44] But sometimes you use the word for understanding, meaning actually knowing something, right? Okay. I don't think we're accustomed in English to use the word "understanding" for the soul that has what the ability to understand, right? But in Latin that was a common, commonly done, okay? And sometimes "mens" or "mind," right, was used, huh? For the for the substance, right? Yeah, yeah. This way Descartes does, right? Huh?

[5:17] Descartes has two substances: the extended substance and mind, right? And the mind was really what, you know, it doesn't really make a distinction there between the the two, huh? Okay.

[5:35] When you read Anaxagoras, right? Anaxagoras has really arrived at an angel, huh? But he speaks of a greater mind. What does he mean by a greater mind?

[5:47] Well, he means a substance that what understands, right? And therefore, a substance that can distinguish things and and order them, huh? But then this greater mind, I sometimes ask the students, you know, is this greater mind he's arrived at? Is this the divine mind or is this the angelic mind, huh? And the angelic mind, huh? Because this is not a mind that's responsible for the existence of matter, but a mind that can move matter from one place to another.

[6:30] Well, that's what the angel can do, right? He cannot bring matter into existence, but he can move it here or there and so on. So he hasn't quite yet arrived at the divine mind, huh? And so maybe I remember De Koninck saying once in class, but didn't go into it at the time. Never got back to him on it, but it's easy to know the angelic mind and the divine mind, huh?

[6:56] And by natural reason, it's easier to know the existence of an angelic mind than of a divine mind, huh? Of a mind that is what, not mixed with matter. It's altogether immaterial, huh? Sure. Then to know there's a mind that could bring matter itself into existence, huh? Huh? And not from anything else, except its own power. That's an amazing thing, you know. It's hard to understand. See.

[7:24] So you have to come in the way to the angelic mind before you come to the divine mind. That's why, um, um, you know, in that kind of false dichotomy that Marx has, and Engels, that there's really only two positions among thinkers: either you think matter is the beginning of everything, even of mind, or else you think. That mind is the beginning of everything, even of matter. Isn't there a third alternative?

[8:04] And that is to see matter and mind as two independent things, right? And one not owing its existence to the other, right? Perhaps mind, being superior to what matter, can act upon it, but not responsible for matter's existence.

[8:27] Well, as a matter of fact, that's the position that Anaxagoras has arrived at, and that's the position that Plato presents in the Timaeus, where he has also the demiurgos, this greater mind, and it's counteracting the chaos of matter and reducing it to some kind of order, but it's not responsible for the existence of matter. Yeah. Okay. So if you leave out that intermediary position, then you get a great gulf that no human mind could ever go.

[8:59] You have to have to arrive at the idea that mind or understanding is something distinct from matter and not being material, right? Before you could ever ask, is there some mind that is responsible for the existence of matter, right? You have to first of all see that mind is something independent of matter, and that's easier to see than to see that there's a mind that created matter.

[9:26] Yeah. Is that the mistake people that say the egg came first or the hen or the chicken came first? They're only using those two things instead of seeing the intermediary. No, that's a different thing. Aristotle solves that question. He answers that question in that book of wisdom. Okay. Yeah. And involves the distinction of simply in some respect, huh? But wait to get the ninth book of wisdom.

[9:53] That question will be answered. Which came first, the chicken or the egg? Depends on the answer. Don't count the chickens before they. Oh yeah.

[10:07] See, those who say the chicken came before the egg, simply speaking, right? Yeah. They'll make the first of all things be the most imperfect to the most undeveloped thing there is. namely the first matter, right? But those who say the chicken came before the egg, right, will see the perfect is coming before the imperfect, and therefore the first cause is being most what? Perfect.

[10:35] Of course, those who make the first cause the least perfect of all things, huh? And they end up in a what? Schizophrenia. Because the end of our thinking is to know the first cause, and there's good reason to say that.

[10:54] And you can also reason that the end of our thinking is to know the best thing. There's a good reason to say both. Now, if the first cause is also the best thing, then everything fits together, as Aristotle says in the Ethics. With the truth, everything fits together, harmonizes, huh? But if you think the first cause of all things is this unformed matter, this imperfect, undeveloped thing, then the first cause is not the best thing.

[11:28] Now you've got two last ends, but not the same. You know, permanent schizophrenia in the modern mind, and they can't. There's no way they can get out of it.

[11:43] Yeah, I say there are two reasons to say that. There's a good reason to say that the end of all thinking is a knowledge of the first cause.

[12:01] And you can say that our mind naturally is moving that direction, huh? Because our mind is not satisfied to know that something is so. Right. He wants to know why it is so. Why it is so. So it naturally wants to know the cause, huh? And many causes themselves have a cause, huh? So why did you hit me? I discover you hit me because you're angry with me, right?

[12:34] Okay. But anger is a kind of cause that has itself a cause. So why are you angry with me, right? So you naturally seek to know the cause, and if the cause has a cause, to know the cause of the cause, right? And as soon as doesn't go on forever, but Aristotle shows it doesn't go on forever, right? Then the ultimate goal then would be to know the very first cause, huh?

[13:00] Okay. That would be the the end of all our desire to understand, huh? As you try to understand, in effect, that means to know the cause that is said to stand under it, right? And if the cause has standing under it, a cause, right? Then to know that. So the ultimate goal of our natural desire to understand is to know the first cause. You see the reason for it?

[13:27] Yeah, I was wondering if there any possibility could address how Aristotle shows that there's not the infinite regress of causes forever. Well, I could, yeah, but you know, I don't know if I want to do it now. Okay. All right. He does it in the second book of Wisdom, right? Oh. He does it in the second book of Wisdom, but he does it in particular for the end there of human life in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics.

[13:53] Okay. And he does so for the mover in the seventh and eighth books of Natural Hearing. Of the physics, so-called, and he does it for definitions there and demonstrations in logic, right? So, in different parts of philosophy, you see how a particular kind of causality has a beginning, but in the second book of wisdom, he shows this universally.

[14:25] Bring it back when we get to the other article if we have some time. I talked a little about it, but okay. So, you can reason that the end of our natural desire to understand is to know ultimately the first cause. But then, in the beginning of the De Anima Aristotle gives another criterion here of why one knowledge is better than another, and he said it can be either because you know a better thing or because you know it better, right?

[15:00] But in the parts of animals, he says the main criterion is knowing a better thing. It's better to know a better thing a little bit than to know a lesser thing a lot. Okay. Now,

[15:16] the end of our knowledge is going to be the very best knowledge. So, if knowledge of a better thing is better knowledge, then a knowledge of the best thing must be the best knowledge. Okay. So it's better to see a beautiful sunset tonight than to see a garbage can or something, right? Right. It's better to smell a rose than to smell things we won't even mention, huh?

[15:48] Okay. It's better to see, hear music, right? Beautiful music than to hear noise and so on, right? So, if knowledge of a better thing is better, then it follows necessarily that a knowledge of the best thing is the best knowledge. And since the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, then a knowledge of the best thing must be the end of all our desire to know.

[16:19] So we have good reasons to say both of these, both of them is true. Now, if the first cause is also the best thing, everything fits together, right?

[16:48] And especially the ninth book of wisdom, when you see that what goes from ability to act does so by reason of something already in act, right? Then you're beginning to see that the first cause is to be pure act.

[17:05] The first cause was an ability that had been actualized. It had something before it. Okay, because ability can't give itself the act it doesn't have. I can't give myself something I don't have. It's a contradiction. But you also find out in the ninth book of wisdom that act is better than ability. In fact, ability is for the sake of act. Act is the end. So if the first cause is pure act,

[17:37] the first cause and the best thing are naturally the same thing. And now everything fits together, and that's the sign that you found the truth. But now, if you think that ability and potency to be actualized is what comes first, if you think. Have some kind of what matter, right? This beginning of all things, and this matter gradually develops into things, Like the materialists think, and so on, like Lenin says, mind is the highest product of matter, right?

[18:17] Okay, but you realize that wonderful thing, mind is nevertheless, huh? Yeah. In fact, you know, Feuerbach and Marx and so on, they think the human mind is the highest divinity, right? The highest thing there is, right? But notice, it's a product. It's the highest product of matter, right? So the first cause is not the best thing.

[18:39] Well, now you've got a what? Two last ends or goals for man, which are not the same. Yeah, it's an interesting thing you said that when you know you have the first cause and the best thing, you have the truth. Thing is, how do you know it's the best? Maybe it's better, but it's not the best. How so? How do you know it's the best? Well, we show that.

[19:04] We show that when we take up God's goodness, okay. In many ways, we show that God is the summum bonum, right? But you have to go through there, like in the summa Contra Gentiles. We first show that God is good, right? Then we show that God is goodness itself, right? And then we show that everything bad is God. Then we show that He's the good of every good, and finally He's the highest good.

[19:34] The one thing builds upon the other. So, you know, Socrates is always checking to see if the things you think fit together, huh? I mean, if you think the area of this is thirty, and you think the length is ten, and you think the width is four,

[20:00] thinking doesn't fit together, does it? No. And regardless of which one is is or may be wrong, one of them has to be wrong at least. It can't be that the length is ten, the width is four, and the area is thirty. It can't be. This is Socrates does, and as he tells students, they say usually a person doesn't contradict himself directly, but two of the things he admits lead to a contradiction to a third thing.

[20:32] You need two things, right, to deduce something, right? And a third thing to be contradicted contradicted by the deduction. Now I say the simplest example there in the dialogue is when Socrates asks a slave boy in the dialogue called Meno, "How do you double a square? " How do you get the side of a square twice as big as the square you have? And the slave boy says, "Well, you double the what?

[21:02] Side. Okay. So if this side is x, then the square whose side is two x is twice as big, huh? Now that, in fact, is is false, right? But Socrates would take an example. Okay, let's say this side was two, then two x would be what? Four. And you admit that four is double of two, right? Okay. Then you figure out the area here, two by two, and the area is like four.

[21:37] Figure out this, and the area is like sixteen. Okay. Now, notice what you admitted, huh? You admitted that four is double of two, right? And you also say that the square whose side is twice as long is twice as big, right? Therefore, this square here is twice as big as that. But then sixteen is not twice as big as four; it's four times as big, right? So these things don't fit together, right?

[22:10] So now the slave boy knows he's mistaken somewhere, and it's more known to him that four is double of two, but sixteen is not double of four, right? Therefore, the mistake must have been to think that if you double the side, you get a square twice as big, right?

[22:28] So that's what Socrates is doing, and Socrates says in the Phaedo there that philosophy is the highest kind of music, mousike. And if you think of music as harmonious sounds, right? Maybe Socrates is touching upon the idea that the philosopher is aiming at a higher harmony than the harmony of sounds that you have in music. He's aiming at the looking philosopher is aiming at the harmony of truth itself, where the different thoughts of the man fit together, right, with each other and with reality too, okay.

[23:14] And the practical philosopher is aiming at the harmony of what? Desire with reason, huh? Okay. But that first harmony is the harmony of truth itself. So one truth doesn't contradict another, what? Truth, huh? And something like this done by Perry Mason, or the detective, when he gets on the witness stand, and some things you admit don't fit in the other things that you admit are there already known in court, and then you're in trouble, huh?

[23:46] Is that? He's the guy who broke down that time. You see Perry Mason, something like that, right? But Socrates is doing that in the sense he's cross-examining people, and he finds out that the things they say don't agree.

[24:06] I told you that time when Petrulko wanted to bring his cousin. Did I tell you about that? And I wanted beautiful things and this thing, and actually the time to do it. And his cousin and his cousin's friend, and they were both had been to the Ayn Rand school, you know. And Ayn Rand is a cigar-smokin feminist, or she's a dollar sign, you know, laissez-faire, her, you know.

[24:33] She wears a dollar sign, you know, for her followers. He read all these novels, Ayn Rand, right? so he's kind of famous. And but um, Ayn Rand, you know, has this exaggerated idea that freedom is the basis of everything. And it adopted the the position of uh, Ayn Rand, that a man is morally obligated to do what he has freely agreed to do. But only that.

[25:07] And so I finally realized what the position was. They said, "Let me write on a piece of paper here. " And you want changing the words? No, no. Okay. So then I started out, and I said, "Now, if you are morally obligated to do only what you have freely agreed to do, then you have no obligations to your parents for having brought you into this world. " Because you didn't sit down and say, "Mom and Dad, if you bring me into this world, I'll do this, I'll do that, I'll be a dutiful son or something, " right?

[25:37] Well, they're willing to admit that consequence of their position, right? Okay. And I said, "Now, if when you're going to college, your father says, 'I'll help you with your tuition, ' but you got to you know work hard, right? " And you agree to those conditions, right? Then you're morally obligated to work hard, right? You see? Or if I say I'll paint your house, you know, for thousand dollars, and and you freely agree, say, then you're obligated to pay it and so on, right?

[26:03] Okay. And I said, "Now, of course, you have no obligations to God at all because you didn't agree to you know be created or something, right? " Well, they're willing to admit that consequence of their position, right? So I was looking for an admission that they would make that would contradict their premise, son. And then finally I thought of it, right? I found out they're anti-communist, son.

[26:25] I said, "But the communists have freely agreed among themselves to overthrow our government. " And your principle is that a man is freely is morally obligated to do what he has freely agreed to do, huh? Therefore, according to your principle, the communists are morally obligated to overthrow our government. But they wouldn't want to accept that consequence of their position, right? And therefore, they couldn't hold on to that, right?

[26:51] Or I said, suppose the guy down the block said, "Birkwest, I'll pay you a thousand dollars for you know rubbing out these guys." And I agree freely, right, to rub you out for a thousand dollars. Well, you maintain that I'm morally obligated to do what I freely agreed to do. So now I'm morally obligated to rub you guys out, right? Well, they couldn't admit that, say. And and I said, I said, furthermore, you shouldn't criticize somebody for doing what you yourself say they are morally obligated to do, right?

[27:21] I see. And and Pete says his cousin, you know, never forgot this conversation, right? Afterward, see. But the point is, some of the things you say don't fit in with other things you say or think, right? And that's a sign, right, that there's something wrong or mistaken in what you're saying. Yeah. Since we're talking about freedom, I'm not sure this fits in with the we're talking about.

[27:47] But when you look at the New Hampshire license plate, is that is that a valid statement? Would you would you go by that for free or die? Is it free or die? Well, I think you use that for you see, is to show that just living is not the best thing, maybe, huh? So it's a decent, it's a statement. Yeah, yeah. Look at what he says. I know, not what course, other men may take, but as for me, give me liberty, give me death, right?

[28:16] But notice when you see those three things there in the Declaration of Independence: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. Happiness is the is the ultimate thing there, right? But they're arranged in the order of necessity, right? You have to be alive before you can be free. You got to be free before you can pursue happiness, right? But happiness is the ultimate end and therefore the best, right?

[28:39] Liberty is next, and life. Well, it's important to see that because when the pro-life people say that the right to life is the fundamental right, it is, right? Without life, you don't have anything. You see, you have liberty, you don't have happiness, even the pursuit of happiness.

[29:08] Okay, do you want to go on to the second article here now, or you want to take a break a little bit or what? Okay, then do a little break. Okay, thanks. With

[29:20] the understanding is a passive power, a power that is acted upon by its object. To second, he proceeds. Thus, it seems that the understanding is not a passive power, for such for each thing suffers or undergoes according to its matter, but it acts the reason of its form. But the understanding power follows upon the materiality of an understanding substance. Therefore, it seems that the understanding is not a what passive power.

[30:02] Moreover, the power of understanding is incorruptible, as has been said above. But the intellect, if it is passivus, is corruptible, as is said in the third book about the soul. Therefore, the understanding power is not passiva or passiva.

[30:23] Moreover, the agent is more noble than the patient, as Augustine says in the twelfth book on Genesis to the letter, and Aristotle says the same thing in the third book about the soul. These two great minds, right, say the same thing.

[30:41] But the powers of the vegetative part are all active; they're like an agent, right? Which nevertheless are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Therefore, much more the understanding powers, which are supreme, are all going to be active, right? Huh? Act is better than ability, right? Interesting objection. But against this is what the philosopher says in the third book about the soul that to understand is a certain what suffering, right?

[31:12] A certain undergoing, right, Now in the body of the article here, Thomas, following his master Aristotle distinguishes what three meanings of the word to suffer, right? Okay. Now you know this is a problem we have when we read get our philosophy from the Greeks and the Latins huh that

[31:41] sometimes a word has been carried over from its first meaning to a second, you know, connected meaning, right? And even a third meaning and more in the Greek or the Latin, but in the English word it has been stopped on the first meaning, right? Okay.

[32:07] Now I mentioned how the word power is of that sort, right? The word power, which translates the Greek word dunamis in the Latin word potencia, right?

[32:22] The word power in English seems to be limited to the active power, right? And we don't tend to use the word power in English for the power to be acted upon, do we? Okay, that seems to be due to a lack of power, right? But the Greek word dunamis is carried over, right? And the Latin word potencia is carried over, right? Okay. Now that's why sometimes I'll translate dunamis or the powers of the soul, as we commonly translate, as the ability, right?

[33:00] Because the English word ability has been carried over, and as soon as the English word able has been carried over. See, so it's not only the ability to act upon something, but also we use the word able for the ability to be acted upon.

[33:22] So, I am breakable, beatable, burnable, and so on, right? And when you speak of breakable, beatable, burnable. You're talking about an ability to be acted upon, right? Okay, to undergo, right? The same way here, the Greek word pathos there and

[33:47] the Latin word passio. now you've got the verb forms here. The first meaning is suffering, right? Okay, but the English word "suffering" as a translation of "passio, you can see that when we speak of the Passion of Our Lord this week, right? The English word would be the suffering of Our Lord, right? Okay.

[34:14] And the first meaning of suffering or passion in Latin is to be acted upon in a way that is harmful to you, right? That is destructive of you, right?

[34:27] That's unpleasant to say the least, right? Okay. Now, in English, the word "suffering" has been limited to that, but in Latin and in the Greek, it was carried over to being acted upon in a way that changes you, right? But not necessarily for the bad. So, if a piece of clay in the shape of a cube is acted upon and it's put into a cylinder shape or something or a spherical shape, right?

[35:07] That would be called what suffering, right? Okay. And then finally, was carried over in a very broad sense to what receiving anything, even something that perfects you and completes you. You see? Okay.

[35:31] Now, sometimes I translate this in English not by "suffering" because that seems to be stuck in English on the first meaning. I use the word sometimes what undergoing, right? Okay, or being acted upon, right? Okay. And I think undergoing has somewhat the original meaning of "passio" in that it means you are being acted upon in a way that's doing harm to you. And I point to certain expressions like "I'm under the weather," right?

[36:08] You say you are under the weather. You mean the weather has acted upon in a way that has made you sick or not so well, right? And when we say you know about somebody that he's undergone a lot, it means bad things, right? You see? Okay. But I don't think the word "undergoing" in English is as tied to the bad as the word "suffering," right? Undergoing in English is almost the same as what you know being acted upon, right?

[36:37] Okay. And you can be acted upon in a way that would change you, but not necessarily to the to the worse, and you could even be acted upon. By your teacher in a way that might actually improve you and make you better, right? And in fortiori, to be acted upon by God, right? In a way that would be perfecting you.

[37:04] So Thomas is distinguishing these three meanings, huh? He says, in one way and most properly, this is the meaning: when something is removed, when something is is moved away from, you might say, from what is suitable to it according to its nature, or according to its own what inclination. Just as when water loses coolness, right, through being heated, right, and when man when a man becomes what sick or when he's sad, okay.

[37:45] In a second way, less properly, one is said to suffer or to undergo from this that one is taken away from. Something or something is taken away from it, whether it be suitable to it or not suitable, right? And according to this, something is said to suffer to undergo, not only the one who what becomes sick, right? But also the one who is what healed. So I might be said to undergo an operation, right?

[38:21] It might actually make me better than I was, huh? Right? Yeah, yeah. You see, that's a bodily change, but it's not. It's actually improving me. You see. So in this sense, not only the one who's saddened, but also the one who is what rejoices, right? Or in any other way is altered or moved, right? Finally, come to a third sense, which is most broad. Huh? Something is said to undergo in a very common way.

[38:56] From this alone, that it is in potency, in ability to something, and it receives that which was in potency without losing anything, right? In which way, everything that goes forth from ability to act can be said to undergo, huh? Even when it's what perfected, huh? In that sense, to understand is a what undergoing, right, huh? So the think back upon the objections, and you'll see that in reply.

[39:32] They're based upon thinking that understanding is an undergoing in the first sense, or in the what second sense, huh? Okay. Just got to read that book there by by

[39:52] what's his name? I want to say Peach. now. The guy wrote the book, the book Literary Converts, right? Oh, Joseph. Yeah, Pierce, yeah. I mean, I'm going to say Pierce again. but notice, son, conversion is an undergoing, right? Something undergo, but in the second sense, right? You're one thing, and now you're the opposite, right? Okay. But it's not necessarily something bad, right? If you're converted to communism, it'll be bad, right?

[40:21] But you could be converted from communism to the West, or from a sinner to a saint, or something, right? Okay. That's the second sense, huh? And the third sense is or what you undergo, huh? Something when God acts upon you, right, huh? But He's perfecting your intellect and your will and so on, huh?

[40:49] Okay. There's now in the De Anima he also says that that sensing is an undergoing, huh? See, but this is undergoing. That is a perfecting of the one undergoing. huh? Could we go through this again? The three senses? Yeah, I am trying to think of. No, is it the sense of t? Here is something staying the same and something changing. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He's talking about about um, a word that has three meanings.

[41:21] Right. Sure. And one thing that you pick up about words is that the meaning that's closest to the senses, or that the senses take note of more, tends very often to be the first meaning, right? Because that's where knowledge begins, huh? Okay. So you take the word "seeing," right? Huh? The first meaning of seeing is the act of the eye.

[41:45] But then, when we imagine something or picture it up in our imagination, we might carry the word "seeing" over there, right? So I can see my mother now. We say, or Hamlet says, "I can see my father now, although his father's not there around the room, right? His father's dead, right? But I can see my father now. Can you see your father now? Yeah, and Hamlet says, "In my mind's eye, meaning inside here, right?

[42:11] Okay. " But then, when I was a little boy, my mother would say, "You know, I see," said the blind man, but he couldn't see at all. He used to say that to me, I don't know why, but make you stop and think, right? But that's the third meaning of the word to see, right? To understand. But the first meaning is the act of the eye. Just the second.

[42:33] It is the to imagine to picture here. But notice that the second meaning is like the first meaning more than the third meaning. And in a dream, we're imagining, but we think we're thinking, we're seeing with our eyes, right? But even in a dream, we don't confuse seeing with the eyes with understanding, do we? It's too far away, huh? But that's the the the third sense, huh?

[42:59] Third sense is what? To understand. To understand. Yeah, yeah. You see the way the the order of the word goes there, right? Yeah. You know, Shakespeare plays on that with King Lear there when the father is betrayed by one of his sons, and the father's eyes are put out, and now his son he realizes understands what it's all about, right? You know, but he didn't see when he had sight.

[43:26] Shakespeare's kind of playing in that, right? Okay, but notice, to understand is more important than to see with your eyes, huh? But we name first the seeing with the eyes because that's more sensible, closer to the senses than act of the senses. You see that? Yeah.

[43:46] Or when I talk about a road in our knowledge, huh? I told you I asked my son Mark or son Paul when he's a little boy. What do you think of the basic road in our knowledge? And he says there are cars and trucks on it. That's what he answered. As soon as he heard the word road, he thought of the first meaning of the word road.

[44:06] So we naturally what do that, huh? Now, notice, huh, that your being acted upon when I am sticking a pin in you is more recognized by you than that I am acting upon you when you see me.

[44:28] Do you see that? Right. Are you aware? And we don't really think about the fact that your eyes are being acted upon by how you surround us, right? Right. See. But if you had a bright light shining in you, huh? Turn that light down or something like that, you see, because that's already starting to offend your eyes, right? Turn your eyes a bit, huh? Or if somebody's got the radio or something on so loud, right?

[44:55] You know, it's almost deafening. You know, turn that down, you know, because it's acting upon you in a way that's kind of what destructive. They say your sense of hearing; these kids are going actually a little bit deaf from hearing this, and they can actually tell, you know, the ear that they have closer to the thing is the one that's gotten somewhat deaf, right? So you are more aware of the fact that you are being acted upon when it's contrary to your nature, when it's painful, huh?

[45:26] See. When I'm sticking that pin and that knife in your ribs, huh? You know, it's much more clear that I'm acting upon you than when my sounds are acting upon your ear, right? Or my face and so on is acting upon your eyes.

[45:48] So, but the second sense here of undergoing is still more in the material order than the third one. Now that the understanding is undergoing is clear from this reason that it has an operation about being in general. Reason is open to knowing everything in some way. One can consider, therefore, whether the intellect is an act or in potency from this, that one considers in what way the intellect or understanding has itself to being in general.

[46:29] Now he says there is found some understanding which is the universal being as the act of all being, and such is the divine understanding which is the divine essence or nature in which originally and in virtue and in his power the whole being, right, pre-exists. As in a first cause, huh? That's why God says, you know, sometimes to was it Moses or Abraham, follow me, and I will show you everything.

[47:01] I'll show you every good. Oh yeah. And Thomas says that is I'll show you myself. But. They're all found in a civil way, and therefore the divine understanding is not in potency, but it's pure act.

[47:18] But no created understanding can have itself as act with respect to the whole of universal being, because thus it would be a what infinite being, huh? See, in some way, the mind or the understanding of man is able to what understand an infinity of things. It's open to an infinity of things. Well, if it actually understood everything, right, it would be in itself in a way what an infinite being, huh?

[47:45] Like God is, huh? Whence every created understanding, through this, that is not the act of everything understandable, is compared to. The understandables as ability to act, but then he makes a distinction between the angelic understanding and ours, and by a certain likeness there also to the ancient physics. But potency or ability is in two ways to act, for there is a certain ability which is always perfect to act, and that's like in the ancient physics, right, where they thought that the matter of celestial bodies was what not in potency to anything further, was fully in what actualized by its form, huh?

[48:33] Oh. Okay. We don't think that about them anymore. But there's a certain potency which is not always an act, but it proceeds from ability to act, as is found in generable and corruptible things. But the angelic understanding is always in the act of its understandables. Now the angelic mind is like our mind after it's been formed by the various arts and sciences, but the angelic mind is is is filled with every form that it's in potency to, on account of its nearness to the first intellect, which is pure act, as has been said.

[49:12] But the human understanding, which is what the lowest, huh, in the order of understandings and most remote from the perfection of divine understanding, is in ability with respect to all understandable things, and in the beginning is like a what blank tablet, which nothing has been written, huh? That's why your mind is in the beginning, right? That's why you say, the students, I come into class and you have a blackboard there that's got nothing on it, This is the human mind in the beginning.

[49:44] It's like a tablet which nothing is written. Which manifestly appears from this, then the beginning, we understanding only in potency. Afterwards, we become what understanding and act, huh? And that's why you know Hamlet says that kind of thing I quoted, huh? Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, right, and could have been distinguished, right, her election has sealed thee for herself, huh? But before he didn't actually understand the distinction among men, did he?

[50:16] Difference among men, huh? Thus it is clear that our understanding is a certain undergoing according to the third way of passion that he distinguished in the first part of the respondeo, and consequently the understanding is a passive power, a power that is acted upon by its what object, huh?

[50:45] Now the first objection, which says that undergoing or suffering is by reason of matter, it's thinking of the first and the second senses of. Undergoing, which we distinguished in the body of the article, reacted upon in a way that is contrary to your what nature, right? Huh? Like I stick a pin in you, huh? Okay. Or the piece of clay, which is a sphere, is molded into a cube or vice versa, right?

[51:14] Okay. Those the first two senses, but it's a passive power undergoing in the third way of passion, which is that of whatever exists in ability, right? That is reduced to act.

[51:36] Now the second objection is about what we call the intellectus passivus, which is sometimes taken not for the understanding of universals, but for that particular reason that was one of the internal senses, huh? And so Thomas is trying to clear up that

[51:57] various ways is taken. To the second, it should be said that the intellectus passivus, according to some people, is said to be the sense desire, in which are the passions of the soul, which also in the first book of the Ethics is called reasonable by what participation because it obeys reason.

[52:19] You know how how Plato compares reason is to the what emotions like a man to the horses, right? And you can tame the horses, right? And they will obey the man, right? And so the emotions can be to some extent tamed, so they'll obey reason, huh?

[52:46] And therefore they'd be rational by participation. But according to others, intellectus passivus means what the virtus cogitativa, which is named the particular reason, huh? And that's one of the interior senses, right? Which the animals have the estimative power instead.

[53:17] And in both of these ways, passive is taken according to the what first two first two ways of passion. In so far as understanding thus said is an act of some bodily organ, but the understanding which is in potency to understandables, which Aristotle, on account of this, calls the intellect, what possible, right?

[53:46] Is not passive except in the third way. One is acted upon in a way that is what perfective of the thing, right? And reducing it from ability to act,

[54:05] because it is not the act of a bodily organ, so it doesn't have passion. Those first two senses, and therefore it is what incorruptible, right? Now, notice the senses can be acted upon in the way the reason is acted upon, and that's when they know they can be acted upon also in those first ways, can't it? So, if I shine a bright light into your eye and I let you close your eye, you'd go what blind, right?

[54:35] Now, if we had these loud sounds in your ear, you'd go deaf, right? We could have some strong peppers here and destructive of your sense of what taste, yeah. So the because the senses are a bodily organ, they can be acted upon in the first or the second sense of undergoing, as well as in the third sense. Huh?

[55:06] You see that? Okay, but the understanding can only be acted upon in the third way because it doesn't have a bodily organ. Now, the third objection is a little different, huh? Because the first two objections are really based upon not understanding the different senses in which we use the word "undergo," right? In the different way the possible is used there, but this third one is saying, isn't it more noble to be an agent than a patient?

[55:38] And Thomas says, well, with respect to the same thing, it is. He said the agent is more noble than the patient if to the same the acting upon undergoing are referred. So the teacher is more noble than the student, right? If he's acting upon the student's mind, right, and the student is undergoing, right, or the cook is more noble than the than the pie, right, if he's acting upon and perfecting it, right.

[56:09] But not, however, always if to diverse things, huh? For the understanding is a passive power with respect to the whole universal being. In fact, Aristotle, you recall, says in the third book about the soul that the soul is in some way all things because it has sense and it has understanding. So I can receive the natures of all things in understanding in the form of a what definition, right?

[56:43] But the vegetative powers they're active,